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Burn, burn! 
Burn, burn, burn, burn… 
 
The scorching rays of the sun 
Accompany the howling wind--- 
Ah! 
Rows of attap roofs suddenly dissolve in a sea of fire! 
Thick clouds of smoke, like a ferocious dinosaur,   
Engulf the skies! 
 
Pi bo pi bo… 
Balls of fire and burning flames 
Extend themselves from the source of the fire in four directions 
With great force and power, 
Flashing brightly, and dancing through the air. 
 
Ah! 
One by one, on the attap roofs, 
The wicked fire demon madly spins and leaps about! 
Countless columns of water 
Strike and spray on the fire demon like a silver whip; 
 
However, 
With ease, the heartless fire demon roars in laughter! 
 
Hua la la la… 
Walls crumble; 
Coconut trees fall… 
A sudden loud, deafening sound! 
What has exploded in the fire site? 
----Terrifying! 
 
Oh dear! 
Even that factory has caught fire, 
That school has turned into a plot of scorched earth, 
And those shops, markets and gardens 
Have all been engulfed by the brutal flames! 
 
The fire displays its prowess 
And demonstrates its impenetrable force of destruction; 
A sea of humanity, 
The woeful cries of fleeing people resemble those of wailing spirits! 
Amidst all this confusion,  
Men, women, old, and young, 
Their faces are a sheet of pale: 
Some mourn the loss of decades of savings and property; 
Others weep by the streets,  
Uncertain of the whereabouts of separated family members! 
 
Whether natural disaster 
Or human calamity, 
The hearts of thousands of fire victims 
Have been shattered by the cruel inferno. 
 
‘Fiery Plunder’ by Tian Liu. Sin Chew Jit Poh, 2 June 1961. 
  
Abstract 
 
 
By 1970, Singapore’s urban landscape was dominated by high-rise blocks of 
planned public housing built by the People’s Action Party government, signifying 
the establishment of a high modernist nation-state. A decade earlier, the margins of 
the City had been dominated by kampongs, home to semi-autonomous communities 
of low-income Chinese families which freely built, and rebuilt, unauthorised 
wooden houses. This change was not merely one of housing but belied a more 
fundamental realignment of state-society relations in the 1960s. Relocated in 
Housing and Development Board flats, urban kampong families were progressively 
integrated into the social fabric of the emergent nation-state. This study examines 
the pivotal role of an event, the great Kampong Bukit Ho Swee fire of 1961, in 
bringing about this transformation. The redevelopment of the fire site in the 
aftermath of the calamity brought to completion the British colonial regime’s 
‘emergency’ programmes of resettling urban kampong dwellers in planned 
accommodation, in particular, of building emergency public housing on the sites of 
major fires in the 1950s. The PAP’s far greater political resolve, and the timing of 
and state of emergency occasioned by the scale of the 1961 disaster, enabled the 
government to rehouse the Bukit Ho Swee fire victims in emergency housing in 
record time. This in turn provided the HDB with a strategic platform for clearing 
other kampongs and for transforming their residents into model citizens of the 
nation-state. The 1961 fire’s symbolic usefulness extended into the 1980s and 
beyond, in sanctioning the PAP’s new housing redevelopment schemes. The official 
account of the inferno has also become politically useful for the government of 
today for disciplining a new generation of Singaporeans against taking the nation’s 
progress for granted. Against these exalted claims of the fire’s role in the Singapore 
Story, this study also examines the degree of actual change and continuity in the 
social and economic lives of the people of Bukit Ho Swee after the inferno. In some 
crucial ways, the residents continued to occupy a marginal place in society while 
pondering, too, over the unresolved question of the cause of the fire. These 
continuities of everyday life reflect the ambivalence with which the citizenry 
regarded the high modernist state in contemporary Singapore. 
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Mandarin 
空前大火  ‘The unprecedented inferno’ in Mandarin 
你们灾民住屋子一
定是不必付屋租吗? 
‘Are you fire victims living in the flats sure that you don’t 
have to pay rent?’ in Mandarin 
上上下下  ‘Regulars’ in Mandarin 
失去家园  ‘Lost homes’ in Mandarin 
天阴之别  ‘Vast difference’ in Mandarin 
我们没有路可以走
了 
‘We had no other roads to walk’ in Mandarin 
乡村  Village in Mandarin 
又是好象河水山  ‘Just like another Bukit Ho Swee’ in Mandarin 
这种话你不可以说  ‘This sort of things you cannot say’ in Mandarin 
终身注定  ‘Life is fated’ in Mandarin 
最有人情味  ‘A warm place to live in’ in Mandarin 
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ah long  ‘Loan shark’ in Hokkien, an unlicensed moneylender who 
makes unsecured loans at high interest rates 
amah  Female domestic servant 
ang chia  ‘Red car’ in Hokkien, referring to the riot truck 
attap  Thatched roof usually made of dried nipah leaves 
bang kali   Hokkien corruption of ‘Bengali’ 
bee hoon  Rice vermicelli 
beo  Temple in Hokkien 
bo bian  ‘Hopeless’ or ‘no choice’ in Hokkien 
bo lang, bo lang, kin  ‘No one here, no one, quick!’ in Hokkien 
bodoh  ‘Stupid’ in Malay 
bo cheng hu  ‘There was no government’ in Hokkien 
bo ho sor chai  ‘Bad place’ in Hokkien 
bukit  Hill in Malay 
chai tow kway  Local light dish, rice flour stir fried with eggs and radish, 
also known as carrot cake 
chap ji ki  Twelve-digit Chinese lottery 
chap lak lau   ‘16 storeys’ in Hokkien, referring to a 16-storey building 
che lor  ‘Find a road’ in Hokkien 
chee cheong fun  Local light dish, rice noodle roll 
cheng tng  Local dessert, fruits and seeds in a sweet syrup 
chin chai  ‘Easygoing’ in Hokkien 
curry puff  Local snack, fried pie with curry, chicken and potatoes 
di siao siao  ‘Mischievous’ or ‘deviant’ in Hokkien 
For Seng  ‘Fire City’ in Cantonese, referring to the City Gas Works at 
Kallang and more generally to the locality 
char bee hoon  Fried rice vermicelli 
char kway teow  Thick, flat rice noodles stir-fried in dark soy sauce with fish 
cake, cockles, and Chinese sausage or beef 
gado gado  Local vegetable salad served with peanut sauce dressing 
gong  ‘Stunned’ in Hokkien 
goo li   Coolie or labourer in Hokkien 
gu ni te  ‘Milk pigs’ in Hokkien 
gua  ‘Evict’ in Hokkien 
Guanyin  The Goddess of Mercy in Mandarin 
Ho Chui Sua  Bukit Ho Swee in Hokkien 
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hock chap   ‘Complicated’ in Hokkien 
Hong Lim Pa Sat  ‘Hong Lim Market’ in Hokkien, referring to Covent Garden 
hong kau  ‘Christian’ in Hokkien 
Hungry Ghosts 
Festival 
Chinese festival on the fourteenth day of the seventh lunar 
month celebrating the spirits and ghosts leaving the lower 
world to visit the living 
hwei  Local informal system of rotating credit, also called tontine 
ikan bilis  Deep fried anchovies 
jaga  Indian watchman 
jalan  ‘Walk’ in Malay 
jin cham  ‘Very difficult’ in Hokkien 
jit bang bua tia  ‘One bedroom and half a living room’ in Hokkien, referring 
to an improved 1-room HDB flat 
kampong Village  in  Malay 
kangkong  Local species of leafy green vegetables 
karang guni  Local rag and bone collectors who visit residences door-to-
door 
killer litter  Litter thrown from a high-rise flat 
kong  ‘Panicked’ in Hokkien 
kua tau lui   ‘Protection money’ in Hokkien, fee which secret societies 
extorted from businesses 
kua liao du lan   ‘If I see them, I get very angry’ in Hokkien 
kway  Generic term for local light dish or snack 
lah  Local colloquial term added at the end of sentence for 
emphasis 
laksa  Rice noodles cooked in coconut curry gravy, frequently with 
shrimp and cockles 
long sai  Cantonese corruption of ‘alongside’, referring to shipyard 
cleaner 
longkang  Drain in Hokkien 
lua hiong  ‘Very impressive’ in Hokkien 
luan kong  ‘Wild talk’ in Hokkien 
Ma Kau Thiong  ‘Macau Cemetery’ in Hokkien, referring to Tiong Bahru 
Cemetery, formally known in Mandarin as Lu Ye Ting and 
in Hokkien as Loke Yah Teng  
Merdeka  ‘Independence’ in Malaya 
Mid-Autumn Festival Chinese festival on the fifteenth day of the eighth lunar 
month celebrating family reunion. Also known as the 
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Mooncake Festival 
Mukim  Malay term referring to subdivision of a district 
Nanyang  ‘The South Seas’ in Mandarin, referring to the Southeast 
Asian region 
ohayo gozaimasu  ‘Good morning’ in Japanese 
Or Kio Tau  ‘At the head of the black-painted bridge’ in Hokkien, 
referring to the part of Havelock Road before the Delta 
Circus 
otah  Local snack, spicy fish cake grilled in banana leaf 
pah chiu chia  ‘Robbery vehicle’ in Hokkien 
pai kia  ‘Bad kids’ in Hokkien, referring to delinquent youth or 
gangsters 
pai mia   ‘Has a hard life’ in Hokkien 
pang keng  ‘Sleeping quarters’ in Hokkien, referring to common rooms 
shared by low-income Chinese workers in the Central Area 
parang  Malay equivalent of the machete 
Po Tui  ‘Town area’ in Hokkien, referring to the Central Area or 
Chinatown 
Qing Ming Festival  Chinese festival to remember and honour one’s ancestors, 
which involves, among other things, the burning of joss 
sticks and paper. Also known as All Souls Day. 
rojak  Local fruit and vegetable salad served in thick dark prawn 
paste 
samseng  ‘Gangster’ in Hokkien 
si  ‘Die’ in Hokkien 
Si Kah Teng  ‘Four-legged pavilion’ in Hokkien, local term for Kampong 
Tiong Bahru 
Sio Po  ‘Small Town’ in Hokkien, referring to the part of the Central 
Area north of the Singapore River 
soon kueh  Local light dish, vegetable dumpling 
taman  ‘Garden’ in Malay 
tau suan  Local dessert, soft soya bean curd in sweet syrup 
tey gu  ‘Earth bulls’ in Hokkien, local term for the Ministry of 
Health’s Hawker Inspectors 
Ti Kong  The Heavenly God in Hokkien 
Ti Kong Tua  Temple of the Heavenly God 
ti lam  Mattress in Hokkien 
tikam tikam  Local gambling game commonly played by children and 
youths 
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tiao lau  ‘Jumping off a building’ in Hokkien, referring to high-rise 
suicide 
toh poon  Swill collection in Hokkien  
tong kor  ‘Painful bitterness’ in Hokkien 
tongkang  Local cargo carrying craft 
towgay  Bean sprouts in Hokkien 
towkay  Employer in Hokkien 
tu tu  Local snack, rice flour with ground peanut or shredded 
coconut filling 
Tua Po  ‘Big Town’ in Hokkien, referring to the part of the Central 
Area south of the Singapore River 
Tua Pui Mah  ‘Fat Grandma’ in Hokkien 
twakow  Light local craft for loading and unloading goods along the 
Singapore River 
ultra vires  ‘Outside one’s jurisdiction’ in Latin. 
Wa m chai  ‘I don’t know’ in Hokkien 
Wah  Local term added at the end of sentence for emphasis 
yong tau foo  Chinese soup dish with stuffed bean curd and other 
vegetables 
 Introduction 
 
  Singapore under the People’s Action Party (PAP) government became a 
quintessential symbol of modernity and responsible governance in the mid-twentieth 
century. Since coming to power at the end of the 1950s, the party leadership has held 
the belief, as long-time Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told the nation’s workers in 
1967, that ‘change is the very essence of life’, and ‘[t]he moment we cease to 
change…we have begun to die’.
1 Similarly, Devan Nair, another member of the 
PAP Old Guard, surmised, ‘Unlike the pre-modern man who dreamed of the world 
he had left, modern man must dream of the world he will make’.
2 These statements 
indicated that the PAP’s philosophy of governance was, as James Scott maintained, 
‘high modernist’, deeply rooted in a  
 
self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion 
of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery 
of nature (including human nature), and above all, the rational design 
of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of 
natural laws.
3  
 
  This study is a social history about the making of modern Singapore in the 
pivotal years after World War Two.
4  The period’s tumultuous history has 
                                                 
1 Lee Kuan Yew, Speech at the 4
th Delegates’ Conference of the National Trades Union Congress on 
26 Apr 1967, from National Archives of Singapore, Speech-Text Archival and Retrieval 
System,  http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public, accessed 15 Apr 2008. Lee was Singapore’s Prime 
Minister from 1959 until November 1990, when he stepped down to serve as Senior Minister. He is 
presently Minister Mentor in the PAP cabinet. 
2 Devan Nair, Not by Wages Alone (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1982), pp. 274-5. 
Nair was long-time Secretary-General of the National Trades Union Congress, and then President of 
Singapore from 1981 to 1985. 
3 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 4. By high modernism, Scott refers to a 
rationalist philosophy of social governance commonly adopted by centralised states in the modern era. 
High modernist governments seek to organise society according to geometric principles and remove 
the visual ‘messiness’ which is typical of autonomous communities. The desire for a planned social 
order, he argues, is evident in modern forms of language, civic administration and city planning, and 
reflects the established scientific belief that progress is both possible and necessary. High modernist 
governance often fails, Scott maintains, because it suppresses metis, the local knowledge which 
autonomous communities possess and which is integral to their development. 
4 Social history has hitherto focussed on the prewar period. See James Francis Warren’s Rickshaw 
Coolie: A People's History of Singapore, 1880-1940 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003) 
and  Ah Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore, 1870-1940 (Singapore: Singapore 
  1customarily been understood in terms of an idealistic struggle between the political 
elites, namely, the British colonial regime and the PAP,
5 and more recently, the 
socialist left.
6 By contrast, this study goes well beyond the elite politics to examine 
four integral elements of social change: the development of public housing which 
was the emblematic architectural form of mid-twentieth century modernism; the 
state utilising the planned housing to forge an organised, progressive nation; the 
kampong community which experienced the crucial first step in this official 
campaign of clearance and rehousing; and finally, the event which made this entire 
transition and transformation of Singapore possible. 
 
  The event in question is the Kampong Bukit Ho Swee fire of 25 May 1961. 
At a time when serious fires in settlements of unauthorised wooden housing in 
Singapore City were almost annual occurrences, the Bukit Ho Swee calamity was by 
far the greatest inferno in the island’s history, destroying 2,200 wooden houses and 
rendering nearly 16,000 people, mostly low-income Chinese families, homeless. 
What the local newspapers then aptly described as an ‘unprecedented inferno’
7 drew 
an equally monumental response from the PAP government; within a year of the fire, 
the Housing and Development Board (HDB), the statutory housing authority, had 
                                                                                                                                           
University Press, 2003); Katherine Yeo Lian Bee, Hawkers and the State in Colonial Singapore: Mid-
nineteenth Century to 1939, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of History, Monash University, 
1989; Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History 
(London: C. Hurst, 1998); Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power 
Relations and the Urban Built Environment, 2
nd edition (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2003); and Loh Kah Seng, ‘Beyond Rubber Prices: Negotiating the Great Depression in Singapore’, 
South East Asia Research, 14 (1), 2006. An exception is Stephen Dobbs, The Singapore River: A 
Social History 1819-2002 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003). 
5 For academic history, see Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1973); C. M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819-1988, 2
nd edition 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989); Yeo Kim Wah and Albert Lau, ‘From Colonialism to 
Independence, 1945-1965’, in Ernest Chew and Edwin Lee (eds), A History of Singapore (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); and Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and 
the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998). Other influential books on 
Singapore’s recent political history are the two officially commissioned works, John Drysdale, 
Singapore: Struggle for Success (Singapore: Times Book International, 1984) and Dennis 
Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse (Singapore: Times Book International, 1986), as well as 
Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press 
Holdings, 1998).  
6 See C. J. W.-L. Wee, ‘The Vanquished: Lim Chin Siong and a Progressivist National Narrative’, in 
Lam Peng Er and Kelvin Y. L. Tan (eds), Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard (St Leonards: 
Allen and Unwin, 1999); T. N. Harper, ‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’, in Tan Jing 
Quee and Jomo K. S. (eds), Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History (Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 
2001); and Liew Kai Khiun, ‘The Anchor and the Voice of 10,000 Waterfront Workers: Jamit Singh 
in the Singapore Story (1954-63)’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 35 (3), Oct 2004. 
7 NYSP, 26 May 1961; SJCP, 26 May 1961. 
  2successfully achieved Lee Kuan Yew’s target of rehousing the fire victims in 
modern flats built on the fire site. A number of official epithets such as a ‘blessing in 
disguise’
8 and a ‘God-sent opportunity’
9 have subsequently been associated with the 
disaster and elevated it to a prominent place in the official narrative of national 
history, the Singapore Story.
10 The second volume of Lee’s memoirs, published in 
2000, got the basic facts wrong but rightly underscored the historic significance of 
the inferno to the PAP’s political survival in the early 1960s and, by implication, 
Singapore’s progress from ‘Third World to First’.
11 The fire had ‘established’ the 
superiority of high modernist public housing over traditional wooden dwellings as 
an architectural form and, more generally, how the PAP leadership could 
scientifically predict, manage and resolve any manner of national crisis. Set against 
this backdrop, this study seeks to explain what the 1961 inferno really meant to the 
government, the fire victims and the young nation at that crucial point in time. 
 
Fires in History 
 
Fires are deeply interwoven into the fabric of human history. This study 
addresses the important question of how Bukit Ho Swee and other kampongs within 
the limits of Singapore City became vulnerable to fire in the 1950s. The outbreak of 
an inferno, which invariably straddles the grey area between natural cause and 
human responsibility, is merely a ‘trigger’, symptomatic of longer-term pressures in 
society which are demographic, social, economic, environmental, and consequently, 
historical in nature.
12 Fires indicate the balance of state-society relations at a 
moment in time: they reveal the state’s efforts to manage a deep-seated hazard and, 
conversely, a community’s ability to build effective social networks to cope with the 
threat.
13 For instance, the 1911 Triangle Fire in New York galvanised the labour 
                                                 
8 HDB, Bukit Ho Swee Estate (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1967), p. 39. 
9 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to CEO, HDB, 4 Dec 1963. 
10 ST, 29 May 1997. 
11  Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: 
Singapore Press Holdings and Times Editions, 2000), p. 344. The book stated that the fire occurred in 
June 1960 and rendered 30,000 squatters homeless. 
12  Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis, and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability, and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 21-45. 
13 Mark  Pelling,  The Vulnerability of Cities: Natural Disasters and Social Resilience (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 2003), pp. 77-90. 
  3movement’s fight for safer working conditions in garment factories.
14 The deaths of 
over a hundred girls working in the unsafe factory building, many forced to jump off 
the burning structure, led the city’s hitherto conservative politicians to embrace the 
‘spirit of progress’.
15 Conversely, in seventeenth century Edo, the city’s population 
coped with the constant threat of fire by building houses which could be easily 
moved in case of such an event.
16 A study of the threat and outbreak of kampong 
fires in postwar Singapore similarly provides us with an insight into the relationship 
between the state and wooden house dwellers, and the latter’s efforts to cope with 
the urban fire hazard. 
 
Urban fires also create states of emergency and, consequently, pragmatic 
moral opportunities for the government to permanently remove what had been 
physically destroyed and to forge on the fire victims’ behalf a new way of life and 
society. The destruction of London by fire in 1666 enabled the monarchy to expand 
its administrative reach through large-scale, planned redevelopment projects such as 
street improvement and housing construction. These strictly implemented measures, 
made possible by the scale of the emergency, in effect strengthened the king’s 
political authority vis-à-vis that of the landlords and labour guilds. The role of the 
London fire, and by implication the monarch, in eradicating the city’s ‘dirt, 
overcrowding, squalor, and general unwholesomeness’ is similar to the elevated 
place the Bukit Ho Swee fire, and the PAP, have managed to obtain in the public 
imagination in the making of modern Singapore.
17 In Edo, too, the Tokugawa 
regime typically relocated great numbers of people and reparceled large plots of land 
in the aftermath of conflagrations.
18  The question of for whom a fire truly 
constitutes a crisis needs to be studied closely. In particular, the Singapore case can 
be usefully compared to the experience of another British colony nearby, Hong 
Kong, where a public housing programme emerged from a series of severe fires in 
                                                 
14 John F. McClymer, The Triangle Strike and Fire (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 
1998). 
15 Dave von Drehle, Triangle: The Fire that Changed America (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
2003), pp. 212-18.  
16 Jordan Sand, ‘The Logic of the Burnable City: Movable and Immovable Property in Edo-Tokyo’, 
paper presented at the conference, Natural Disaster in Asian History, Culture, and Memory, National 
University of Singapore, 26-28 Aug 2005, pp. 15-27. 
17 Walter George Bell, The Great Fire in London in 1666 (London: The Bodley Head, 1951), pp. 
243-98.  
18 Sand, ‘The Logic of the Burnable City’, p. 7. 
  4slums of wooden housing both before and after the great Shek Kip Mei blaze of 
1953.
19 Much has been written about the politics of public housing in Singapore in 
the PAP era by political scientists, geographers and sociologists.
20 But the subject 
requires a proper historical treatment, one which traces the origins and development 
of public housing in the context of kampong clearance and fires, and bridges the 
postwar colonial and PAP periods. 
                                                
 
Of particular importance was the controlling nature of the official discourse 
of emergency, clearance and relocation which accompanied the public housing 
programme. Crisis was a predominant trope in the official and semi-official writings 
on the city-state’s rapid population growth, unemployment problem, and most 
crucially, the insanitary, overcrowded private housing in the postwar years.
21 Such 
works were, really, a form of ‘reform literature’ meant to justify a complete overhaul 
of Singapore society.
22 Exemplary among them is Barrington Kaye’s classic study 
of low-income Chinese households living along Upper Nankin Street in the Central 
Area in 1956. Kaye’s detailed notes about the overcrowded cubicles and lack of 
adequate light, air flow, waste disposal system, and cooking facilities in the 
shophouses lining the street reveal how he, as a social reformer, was not simply 
providing disinterested description but rather was presenting a ‘problem’ ahead of a 
 
19 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rulers in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p. 189. 
20 For works on the wider political and economic role of HDB housing, see Iain Buchanan, Singapore 
in Southeast Asia: An Economic and Political Appraisal (London, Bell, 1972); Robert E. Gamer, The 
Politics of Urban Development in Singapore (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Cedric Pugh, 
‘The Political Economy of Public Housing’, in Kernial S. Sandhu & Paul Wheatley (eds), 
Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1989); M. Castells, L. Goh and R. Y.-W. Kwok, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome: 
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore (London: Pion, 1990); 
Linda Low, ‘The Political Economy of the Built Environment in Singapore’, Solidarity, 131/132, 
Jul/Dec 1991; Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (New 
York: St. Martin's Press; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994); Chua Beng Huat, 
Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore (New York: Routledge, 1997); and 
Chua Beng Huat, ‘Public Housing Residents as Clients of the State’, Housing Studies, 15 (1) 2000. 
21  Examples of such ‘reform literature’ are Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, 1947 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948); Social Welfare Department, A Social Survey of 
Singapore: A Preliminary Study of Some Aspects of Social Conditions in the Municipal Area of 
Singapore, December 1947; J. M. Fraser, The Character of Cities: Singapore, A Problem in 
Population (London: Town and Country Planning Association, 1955); Goh Keng Swee, Urban 
Incomes and Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-54 (Singapore: Department 
of Social Welfare, 1956); and Barrington Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, Singapore: A Sociological 
Study of Chinese Households Living in a Densely Populated Area (Singapore: University of Malaya, 
1956). 
22 Loh Kah Seng, ‘Black Areas: The Urban Kampongs and Power Relations in Postwar Singapore 
Historiography’, Sojourn, 22 (1), Apr 2007, pp. 6-8.  
  5pre-formulated plan for societal transformation. Kampong Bukit Ho Swee was 
similarly depicted by the HDB as ‘an insanitary, congested and dangerous squatter 
area’, rife with crime and gangsterism, in the course of the Board’s programme of 
kampong clearance and public housing development in the 1960s.
23 Such semi-
autonomous settlements located at the urban periphery, to which large numbers of 
low-income Chinese families were moving, constituted to the state an encroachment 
at the social ‘margin’ which was thought to signify the boundary between order and 
chaos.
24 The damning official vocabulary of social transgression and danger, namely, 
‘insanitation’, ‘congestion’, ‘crime’, and ‘Black Belt’,
25 went hand in hand with the 
powerful language of societal reform, with particular reference to the state-driven 
process of ‘emergency’, ‘clearance’ and ‘relocation’.
26  
 
The postwar public housing programme in Singapore, then, could be 
conceived as a ‘spatial form of emergency’.
27 The sense of crisis which pervaded the 
official housing literature supported the ruling elites’ campaign to mobilise families 
en masse and integrate them into the fabric of the emergent nation-state. The 
discourse of emergency masked the radical nature of the postwar public housing 
programme; it gave a powerful moral and social authority to terms like ‘clearance’ 
and ‘relocation’, which in practice frequently meant the destruction of not only 
houses but of established social and economic ways of life centering around the 
residences. The true ‘emergency’ was not, as depicted, the problem of inadequate 
proper housing, but rather the perceived need to remake postwar Singapore along the 
lines of a well-organised showcase state; it was an ‘emergency’, albeit politically 
motivated and expedient, that existed first and foremost in the minds of the 
politicians, social planners and architects of the high modernist state.  
 
Within this discourse of emergency, the kampong fire held a central place: as 
a seemingly ‘non-political’ and ‘natural’ event, it provided the ultimate justification 
                                                 
23 HDB, Bukit Ho Swee Estate, p. 39. 
24 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge Classics, 2002), pp. 150-152. 
25 SIT, Annual Report 1954, p. 14. 
26 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 125-132. 
27 Gregory K. Clancey, ‘Towards A Spatial History of Emergency: Notes from Singapore’, in R. 
Bishop, J. Phillips & W. W. Yeo (eds), Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 53. 
  6for the state’s policy of intervention and removal of the urban kampongs, and the 
relocation of their residents to modern flats.
28  In short, the term ‘fire’, like 
‘emergency’, ‘clearance’ and ‘relocation’, was an inextricable part of a politically 
powerful vocabulary and discursive language of societal transformation in postwar 
Singapore. 
 
The targets of the public housing programme were the families residing in 
what the British, Labour Front and PAP governments perceived as the dangerous 
‘black areas’ of ‘Old Singapore’. While the newly established modern flats were 
increasingly admired by people in the 1950s, there remained much ambivalence 
towards moving into such housing because, particularly for lower-income families 
living in wooden dwellings, the rehousing drastically affected established ways of 
life. Singapore’s case is similar in certain respects to how the bourgeoisie of early 
nineteenth century Paris perceived the city’s labouring class also residing in 
overcrowded housing as ‘dangerous classes’, being faceless individuals living a 
savage and barbarous existence.
29 Such perceptions also parallel how the large pool 
of casual labour in late nineteenth century London, living in similarly desperate 
conditions, were viewed by the upper classes as ‘Outcast London’.
30 Likewise, 
Singapore’s kampong dwellers were classified as ‘squatters’, individuals who were 
supposedly ‘inert’ and incapable of establishing themselves in ‘proper housing’, and 
who consequently required the forceful intervention of the state. In this context, a 
severe kampong fire, which empowers the authorities to act on behalf of the victims, 
also presents the perfect opportunity to physically and socially mobilise and remove 
the ‘squatters’, if necessary. 
 
To complement this analysis of the politics of negation and rehousing, this 
study also seeks to recreate what Kampong Bukit Ho Swee was really like, as 
opposed to how it was so abjectly represented by the urban planners. While 
nominally a village with temporary wooden housing typically found in the rural 
areas of Singapore, Bukit Ho Swee’s residents were a highly urbanised and, in some 
                                                 
28 Clancey, ‘Towards A Spatial History of Emergency’, p. 45. 
29 Louis Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century (New York, H. Fertig, 1973). 
30 Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
  7ways, forward-looking community. The aim here is not to create another set of 
structural oppositions between the state and the people but rather to understand the 
latter’s semi-autonomous ways of life, as fundamentally rational in this particular 
social context. In colonial India, what outwardly appeared to be ‘the disorder, din, 
pressing, yelling and shouting’ of the peasantry and working class were also 
basically recognised and understood as rational within their traditional kinship 
system and culture.
31 Similarly, against the municipal authorities’ measures of social 
control in prewar colonial Singapore, the responses of the labouring classes ranged 
from violent struggle to, more commonly, ‘strategies of evasion, non-compliance, 
and adjustment’, and were similarly rational within their social and cultural world.
32 
Such contestation in effect comprises a form of ‘everyday politics’,
33  or 
‘infrapolitics’ utilising the ‘weapons of the weak’.
34 Likewise, the urban kampong 
dwellers in the 1950s possessed both overt and covert, and organised and 
spontaneous, means of contesting the policies of the powerful. The resistance reveals 
that kampong residents possessed a clear sense of what was ‘just, beautiful and 
wise’ and a desire not to be taken for a fool, as was the case of working class 
Parisians in the eighteenth century.
35 This study explores the lives of key groups of 
kampong dwellers, including men and women, and also children and youths, and 
their relationship with family, work and the state at large. In postwar Singapore, as 
in Belgian cities in the eighteenth century,
36 children and youths in low-income 
families faced great pressure to work at a young age and support the family, but this 
had serious repercussions on their relationship with society.  
 
In other words, a social history of the urban kampongs of Singapore enables 
us to foster an approach concerned with both structure and agency, the larger social, 
economic and political changes taking place after the war, and the responses of 
                                                 
31 Ranajit Guha, ‘Discipline and Mobilise’, Subaltern Studies VII (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 109. 
32 Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore, pp. 14, 67. 
33 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a 
Central Luzon Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
34 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), and Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990). 
35  Arlette  Farge,  Fragile Lives: Violence, Power and Solidarity in Eighteenth-Century Paris 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 32, 281. 
36 Catharina Lis and Hugo Soly, Disordered Lives: Eighteenth-Century Families and their Unruly 
Relatives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 132-156. 
  8ordinary people.
37 This is particularly important in understanding the full social 
impact of the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire. The impact of urban disasters in general on 
vulnerable communities is sometimes devastating and at other times far more 
complex, but it is, above all, always historically significant. In the great flood of 
Buffalo Creek, an American mining town in the state of Kentucky, in 1972, the 
victims suffered both individual and collective traumas, with the result that the 
community began to fall apart in the aftermath of the calamity.
38 In the case of the 
Triangle Fire, while the tragic blaze led New York’s politicians to embrace the spirit 
of reform, the labour movement itself, in working with the politicians, also became 
more moderate as a result.
39 In other words, to understand the true extent of the 
Bukit Ho Swee fire’s impact requires us to examine how far the life of a formerly 
semi-autonomous community, and its social and economic relations with the state, 
were transformed in the wake of the catastrophe. The full story may not be one of 
the complete destruction of community but a more complex reconstitution in which 
both modern and customary ways  of life co-exist in a state of tension. 
 
Consequently, the theme of change and continuity is integral to the study of 
the 1961 inferno. It entails mapping both the dynamics and tensions of social life in 
the Bukit Ho Swee public housing estate which was built on the ashes of the fire site. 
The estate was organised around rational-geometric principles but small-scale 
spontaneous urban communities often possess a deep functional order underpinning 
their dynamic social life, which the purely visual order of planned communities 
could not effectively accommodate or replicate.
40 Most studies of life in HDB 
estates in the 1970s and 1980s, both official
41 and academic
42, have focussed 
                                                 
37 Recent research on how the interiors of HDB flats were designed suggests that the residents played 
an important role in forging their social compact with the state. Jane M. Jacobs & Stephen Cairns, 
‘The Modern Touch: Interior Design and Modernisation in Post-Independence Singapore’, 
Environment and Planning A, 40 (3), 2008: 572-95. 
38 Kai T. Erikson, Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), pp. 156-245. 
39 von Drehle, Triangle: The Fire that Changed America, pp. 212-218.  
40 Scott, Seeing Like a State, pp. 132-146; Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities: 
The Failure of Town Planning (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 386-405. 
41 See You Poh Seng and Stephen H. K. Yeh, The Sample Household Survey of Singapore (Singapore: 
Economic Research Centre, University of Singapore, 1967); Stephen H. K. Yeh, Housing and 
Development Board Sample Household Survey (Singapore: Economic Research Centre, University of 
Singapore and Housing and Development Board of Singapore, 1969); Stephen H. K. Yeh and 
Statistics and Research Department, Housing and Development Board, Report on the Census of 
Resettlement Areas, Singapore, 1968 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1969); Stephen H. K. 
Yeh and Statistics and Research Department, Housing and Development Board, Report on the Census 
  9narrowly on issues of housing satisfaction and neighbourliness. However, this study 
seeks to assess, more broadly, the degree of change in Bukit Ho Swee Estate’s 
residents’ role as citizens of a high modernist state after the fire. This analysis will 
enhance our understanding of the nature of high modernity in Singapore, where the 
framework of the ‘nation’, as manifested in the PAP’s uses and regulation of space, 
is still being ‘constructed, reinforced, and challenged’ by the citizenry.
43 The Bukit 
Ho Swee case consequently illustrates the nature of the social dynamics and tensions 
inherent in the development of modern Singapore in the PAP era. 
 
In bringing the past into the present, a study of urban fires also reveals how 
the sheer scale of destruction often produces powerful social myths. Seventeenth 
century Londoners, for example, commonly viewed the city’s great blazes ‘as 
instruments of the vengeful hand of God’ to punish the king’s court, which they 
perceived as rife with moral deprivation.
44  Such a religious belief reflects, 
significantly, the uneasy relationship between the character of a particular type of 
state and society. The myth that the 1871 Chicago inferno was started by a cow 
kicking over a lamp in a barn in an Irish family home has also been persistent, 
illustrating the stereotypes of native-born Americans towards the more recent 
immigrant class.
45 The same conflagration also helped determine the ‘shape of 
belief’ among upper and middle-class Americans about Chicago and other urban 
centres as ‘disorderly’ cities, where ‘[u]rban disorder, whose central theme is the 
                                                                                                                                           
of Malay Settlement Areas, Singapore, 1967 (Singapore: Economic Research Centre, University of 
Singapore, 1970); Stephen H. K. Yeh, Homes for the People: A Study of Tenants’ Views on Public 
Housing in Singapore (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1972); Stephen H. K. Yeh (ed.), 
Public Housing in Singapore: A Multi-disciplinary Study (Singapore: Singapore University Press for 
Housing and Development Board, 1975).  
42 See Gamer, The Politics of Urban Development in Singapore; Peter D. Weldon, John S. Western 
and Tan Tsu Haung, Housing and Satisfaction with Environment in Singapore, Working Paper No. 
13, Singapore: Department of Sociology, University of Singapore, 1973; Shimon E. Spiro and Ngiam 
Tee Liang, Villagers and Estate Residents: Report of a Survey, Resource Paper Nos. 4-5, Department 
of Social Work, University of Singapore, 1976; Peter S. J. Chen and Tai Ching Ling, Social Ecology 
of Singapore (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1977); Riaz Hassan, Families in Flats: A Study of 
Low Income Families in Public Housing (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977); Shimon E. 
Spiro, ‘The Relocation of Villagers into Public Housing: Some Suggestive Findings from a 
Singaporean Study’, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 5 (1-2), 1977; and Tai Ching Ling, 
Housing Policy and High-rise Living: A Study of Singapore's Public Housing (Singapore: Chopmen 
Publishers, 1988). This list does not include numerous academic theses completed by undergraduates 
from the University of Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s on the social effects of rehousing. 
43 Lily Kong and Brenda S. A. Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of 
“Nation” (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 211. 
44 Stephen Porter, The Great Fire of London (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1996), p. 6. 
45  Richard F. Bales, The Great Chicago Fire and the Myth of Mrs. O'Leary's Cow (Jefferson: 
McFarland and Co., 2002), p. 76. 
  10breaking of imaginative frames, has in many ways become the frame itself’.
46 In 
these cases, the point is not whether such beliefs were true but that they were 
commonly held. The important place of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in the Singapore 
Story, and also the persistence of social rumours on the ‘coincident’ nature of the 
inferno, show that the calamity has, similarly, played its decisive part in determining 
the ‘shape of belief’ about modernity in Singapore.  
 
Documents and Memories 
 
As momentous events which shatter the usual calm of social history, fires are 
much written about and debated, and also well-remembered. They produce both a 
substantial body of written literature and a rich pool of oral history reminiscences, 
which have been invaluable for this study. Studies of urban disasters have used oral 
history, written personal accounts and court records to good effect to vividly recreate 
the terror of the destruction,
47 and to examine their impact on the victims,
48 and on 
society at large.
49 The two main sources used here are the declassified records of the 
Singapore Improvement Trust, the defacto colonial housing authority, held at the 
National Archives of Singapore (NAS), and oral history interviews. In addition, I 
have used various local departmental records and reports, particularly from the HDB, 
the Social Welfare Department (SWD), the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry 
of Culture; British, Australian, and American archival records; maps and 
                                                 
46 Carl S. Smith, Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket 
Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 279. 
47 Leon Stein’s pioneering work on the Triangle Fire vividly described how the women on the three 
floors of the burning Triangle building faced the fire and either lived to tell the tale or died. His main 
source was his interviews with 25 survivors, whom he called his “most treasured collaborators”. 
Similarly, David McCullough’s book on the 1889 Johnstown Flood in Pennsylvania, by using a 
combination of oral history, written personal accounts and court records, recounted the experiences of 
individuals who were swept up by the water and struggled against or perished in it. Leon Stein, The 
Triangle Fire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 216; David G. McCullough, The Johnstown 
Flood (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). 
48 Kai Erikson’s study of the Buffalo Creek flood, for instance, drew upon 650 interviews of the 
victims soon after the disaster, which provided a close-up shot of the event’s traumatic impact. 
Erikson, Everything in Its Path, pp. 9-17. 
49 David Lowe’s work on the 1871 Chicago fire contained eye-witness accounts by the city’s social 
elite, which revealed their perception of the lower-income classes as ‘vagabonds’, ‘cutthroats’, 
‘barbarians’, and ‘Visigoths’. David Garrard Lowe, The Great Chicago Fire: In Eyewitness Accounts 
and 70 Contemporary Photographs and Illustrations (New York: Dover Publications, 1979), pp. 60, 
67, 79. 
  11photographs; Chinese, English and Malay newspapers; audio and audio-visual 
material; heritage gallery material and public histories; and biographies. 
 
Forty-five years after the event, obtaining access to the Singapore archives 
was still a task fraught with difficulty, where official gatekeepers frequently hover in 
the long shadows of the makers of the country’s recent past.
50 In Singapore, a 
researcher seeking access to classified government records held at the National 
Archives of Singapore is required by law to obtain the approval of the depositing 
institution. I wrote to the HDB for access to 25 files listed on the NAS website on 
the rebuilding of Bukit Ho Swee after the 1961 fire.
51 The Board’s corporate affairs 
department decided, however, that ‘as the records contain personal data of 
identifiable individuals, we are not able to release the records’.
52 This was despite 
my willingness to refrain from naming the individuals and my observation that many 
of the files dealt not with the fire victims but with the administration of housing and 
social amenities in the estate. Eventually, the assistance of my Member of 
Parliament, an academic himself, enabled me to obtain partial extracts from eight 
HDB files which did not contain personal information on individuals. In comparison, 
the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and the Arts granted me access to 
23 Social Welfare Department files, mostly on its relief work for fire victims, 
including those of the 1961 inferno, subject to the condition that sensitive 
information would not be released prior to clearance from the Ministry. I agree that, 
in this case, the safeguard was necessary given the personal and confidential nature 
of the Department’s work.
53 Here, fortunately, official control of access has been 
tempered by a willingness to assist independent pioneering research.  
 
I was unsuccessful with respect to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
Internal Security Department, whose documents are, for security reasons, not 
deposited at NAS. I explained that information on two important, albeit politically 
sensitive, issues, namely, police investigations into the cause of the fire and the work 
                                                 
50 Loh Kah Seng, ‘Presently Seeking the Bukit Ho Swee Fire’, in Loh Kah Seng (ed.), Tangent 
special issue, The Makers and Keepers of Singapore History, 6 (2), 2007, p. 160. 
51 The HDB files on Bukit Ho Swee are listed at the National Archives website,  
http://www.a2o.com.sg/a2o/public/grid/index.html. 
52 Email correspondence with HDB, Corporate Development Department, 5 Dec 2006. 
53  Email correspondence with the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and the Arts, 
Administration Branch, 22 Dec 2006. 
  12of the leftwing rural associations in organising wooden house dwellers in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, were necessary for writing a ‘total history’ of the Bukit Ho Swee 
fire. I was first told that the records in question could not be found and then by 
another official that they were still classified.
54 As a result, I am unable to throw any 
further definitive light on the cause of the fire, which will continue to remain a 
historical mystery, in the realm of social rumours and speculation.  
 
Oral history constitutes an extremely important source for this study. The 
‘voices of the past’
55 have been especially useful in understanding wooden house 
dwellers’ experiences, particularly of intra-city migration, the dynamics of urban 
kampong life, coping with the fire hazard, the scale and horror of the 1961 inferno, 
and moving into and growing up in an HDB housing estate. This study draws from 
more than a hundred interviews I conducted between 2006-2007, largely in Bukit Ho 
Swee Estate, where many former fire victims still live and where I had spent my 
childhood and teenage years. I have also used about thirty interviews from the Oral 
History Centre (OHC) of the National Archives of Singapore, conducted between 
the early 1980s and 2005. Three quarters of the interview subjects are former urban 
kampong dwellers but there are also important interviews with individuals whose 
life and work were inextricably bound up with the 1961 fire: architects, public 
officials, fire-fighters, artists, grassroots leaders, rural activists, and social workers. 
In the process of conducting the interviews and using the oral history, I have tried to 
negotiate between the task of building a collective biography of Chinese urban 
kampong dwellers in postwar Singapore with particular reference to the social 
transformation brought about by the fire, and the obvious need to acknowledge 
differences in experience due to age, gender and income group. As the following 
chapters will show, the study is based on the diverse voices of males and females, of 
English, Mandarin and Hokkien speakers (which is an indicator of economic status 
in Singapore), and of former civil servants, shopowners, hawkers, shipyard cleaners, 
factory workers, construction workers, general labourers, and home-makers. Where 
the interview material is of a particularly sensitive nature, I have used pseudonyms 
to protect the anonymity of my informants. 
                                                 
54 Email correspondence with MHA, Policy & Operations Division, 10 Nov 2006; and with Internal 
Security Department, 24 Feb 2007. 
55 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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In one sense though, the passage of time, now more than four decades after 
the fire, has made balanced oral history work far more difficult. Although some of 
the OHC interviews were conducted at an earlier moment in time and helped fill part 
of the gap, most of my informants were postwar baby boomers, presently in their 
late 50s-70s, with only a handful in their 80s. Consequently, their memories of the 
kampong and the 1961 inferno would have been based on the experiences of 
children, adolescents and young adults. The result has been the difficulty of relying 
solely on oral history to establish the veracity of the experiences of the older age 
groups, especially of their rehousing in HDB flats after the fire. Where I have 
discussed elderly people’s experiences, they have often come second-hand from the 
recollections of others, like their children. In this regard, I have been ever mindful to 
complement the oral history testimonies with written sources. 
 
By contrast, the strength of my oral history work is that being a child in the 
1950s was in some important ways significantly different from growing up in 
present day Singapore. In the kampong, the child’s social life was centered much 
more in the immediate locality in which they grew up, played and studied than 
would have been the case today. The fact that their early social life mixed both play 
and work produced an astute awareness and understanding among kampong children 
of the landscape and environment far beyond their age. Most of my informants 
remember life in Bukit Ho Swee and the fire vividly, and usefully. As Samuel 
Seetoh, born in 1944, emphasised, ‘I can still remember how the kampong looked 
like. It is in the “heart disk”. Old people always say they forgot where they put the 
keys or what they did just now but long, long ago, they can still remember because it 
is in the heart disk’.
56 Tan Geok Hak, born in 1929, belonged to an older generation, 
but when I spoke to her in the HDB flat in Bukit Ho Swee Estate where she had 
lived since 1962, she showed me her old Singer sewing machine, a relic from the 
kampong days, and two dark green British Army blankets neatly folded in a bag, 
which were issued to fire victims at the relief centre in the traumatic aftermath of the 
inferno.
57 
 
                                                 
56 Author’s interview with Samuel Seetoh, 27 Apr 2007. 
57 Author’s interview with Tan Geok Hak, 5 Oct 2006. 
  14There have been, admittedly, doubts cast upon the reliability of oral history, 
most seriously on how memory mutates or erodes over time into a reflection, rather 
than a pure recollection, of the past; this is shaped by both developments in the 
individual’s life and in society as a whole. The key problem here is that the Bukit Ho 
Swee fire is not only keenly remembered by people but that a mythic representation 
of the event has also been created by the PAP government and has frequently 
appeared in various forms in the local media. In his study of the Chauri Chaura riot 
in 1922, an event which also holds a pivotal place in Indian national history, Shahid 
Amin found that the recollections of the incident seven decades later had been 
tainted by the hegemonic master narrative.
58 Similarly, in the Singapore case, 
research on the collective memories of the iconic 1964 race riots have found that the 
elderly people’s personal narratives have often incorporated the central themes of 
the Singapore Story.
59 How much of my oral history is independent personal 
memory and how much is simply a filtered form of the official myth was an issue I 
constantly encountered and struggled with in the course of my research and writing. 
Critics of oral history have tended to argue that the presence of any political 
influence renders the source wholly unreliable. My approach, rather, has been more 
modest and empirical. I have attempted to distinguish the independent from state-
authored parts of individual memory, and I have tried to use the respective 
fragments to write about both social experiences and social myths. 
 
  The study begins by tracing the proliferation of urban kampongs in postwar 
Singapore with the unhindered movement of low-income Chinese families, who 
were then either leaving shophouse cubicles in the Central Area or arriving from 
Malaya and China and settling directly in wooden houses. Chapter 2 examines the 
origins of one such kampong, Bukit Ho Swee, and the development of semi-
autonomous forms of life after the war which caused the authorities to view the 
kampong as an insanitary, dangerous ‘black area’. How Bukit Ho Swee and other 
urban kampongs were perceived as a threat to the imagined high modernist state and 
consequently targeted by official discourses and emergency programmes of 
demolition, clearance and rehousing in the 1950s is the subject of Chapter 3. This 
                                                 
58 Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), p. 130. 
59 Adeline Low Hwee Cheng, ‘The Past in the Present: Memories of the 1964 “Racial Riots” in 
Singapore’, Asian Journal of Social Science, 29 (3), 2001, p. 447. 
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chapter also examines the resistance of wooden house dwellers, both spontaneous 
and when organised, to such measures. The prominent role of kampong fires in this 
deeply contested struggle over the character of the Singapore state is discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, which examine, respectively, the outbreak of severe urban 
kampong fires in the 1950s, and the extent to which these disasters permitted the 
state to build emergency housing on behalf of the fire victims.  
 
Chapter 6, which marks the turning point in this study, follows the path of 
the ‘unprecedented inferno’ which in under seven hours devastated Bukit Ho Swee 
in May 1961 from the perspectives and experiences of its residents. The next two 
chapters examine how, within the context of a state of emergency occasioned by the 
disaster, a new public housing estate emerged in record time on the ashes of the fire 
site and served as a strategic springboard for the building of a high modernist nation-
state in the 1960s. First, Chapter 7 discusses the PAP government’s emergency relief 
and temporary housing programmes for the fire victims. The next chapter looks at 
how the Bukit Ho Swee inferno successfully brought together the earlier colonial 
programmes of emergency housing and the PAP’s own hard-headed approach to the 
housing problem, allowing the latter to restore the social and political margin and 
begin the work of integrating families en masse into the fabric of the new nation-
state. But, as also discussed in these two chapters, the birth of modern Singapore out 
of the fire was at times keenly contested by the victims, many of whom objected to 
the official terms of relocation or speculated angrily over the cause of the fire. The 
last two chapters highlight the consequences arising from the tensions between the 
PAP’s determined rehousing policy and the former kampong dwellers’ ambivalence 
towards the HDB programme. Chapter 9 reveals the ongoing contradictions within 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate, which manifests both the new aspects of modernity and the 
vestiges of the kampong’s semi-autonomous ways of life. The final chapter traces 
the emergence of three different myths of the Bukit Ho Swee fire, which highlight 
the fundamental ambivalence of the estate’s residents, and Singaporeans in general, 
towards their role as citizens in a high modernist nation-state. Chapter 1 
Movement into the Margin 
 
A new urban landscape had materialised in Singapore by the end of the 
1950s. At the margins of the City stood a discontinuous belt of more than fifty 
kampongs (see Map 1.1). Located up to four miles inland from the mouth of the 
Singapore River, the urban kampongs fanned out of the southern apex of the island 
along the main radial roads: to the west, along Havelock, Tiong Bahru and Kampong 
Bahru roads; to the east and northeast, along Kallang, Geylang, Upper Serangoon, 
and MacPherson roads; and to the north, along Dunearn and Balestier roads. In 1961, 
200,000-250,000 people out of an urban population of a million lived in kampongs 
within City limits: in Bukit Ho Swee, Tiong Bahru, Telok Blangah, and Pasir 
Panjang in the west; Kallang Basin, the Geylang Lorongs, Paya Lebar, and Siglap in 
the east; and Toa Payoh in the north.
1 These urban settlements comprised housing 
constructed of temporary materials like plank, old boxes or scrap metal, with attap or 
sometimes zinc roofs, which were customarily found in the rural areas. The wooden 
housing was typically inexpensive, much more closely-built than in the rural areas, 
constructed without planning approval, and was often but not exclusively rented by 
lower-income groups. As the Chinese constituted three-quarters of Singapore’s 
population from the beginning of the twentieth century, most kampongs had Chinese 
majorities, although Malay kampongs also existed at the eastern and western parts of 
the urban area.
2  
 
Behind the expansion of Bukit Ho Swee and other urban kampongs into 
massive settlements of unauthorised housing was the migratory movement of low-
income Chinese families after World War Two. By studying such moves into the 
urban kampongs, particularly in the Bukit Ho Swee locality, this chapter examines 
how Chinese attitudes towards housing changed in the postwar years. What resulted 
were two prongs of migration into the urban kampongs: from the Central Area to the
                                                 
1 HDB, Annual Report 1961, p. 4. Singapore’s total population in 1961 was 1.7 million. 
2 B. W. Hodder, ‘Racial Groupings in Singapore’, Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography, 1953, pp. 
31, 33; R. J. W. Neville, ‘The Areal Distribution of Population in Singapore’, Journal of Tropical 
Geography, 20, Jun 1965, pp. 21-22. 
  17Map 1.1: Urban Kampongs in Singapore c. 1955  
A ‘Big Town’ 
B ‘Little Town’ 
5 Kampong Bukit Ho Swee 
  18Kampong Address 
1. Pukat  Martin Road 
2. Martin  Martin Road 
3. Bintang  Havelock Road 
4. Covent Garden   Kim Seng Road-Covent Row 
5. Bukit Ho Swee-Beo Lane   Havelock Road-Tiong Bahru Road 
6. Tiong Bahru   Seng Poh Road-Tiong Bahru Road 
7. Henderson   Tiong Bahru Road 
8. Pisang   Spottiswoode Park Road 
9. Silat   Kampong Bahru Road 
10. Bukit Theresa   Kampong Bahru Road 
11. Kasita   Kampong Bahru Road 
12. Purmei   Kampong Bahru Road 
13. Pahang   Kampong Bahru Road 
14. Radin Mas   Kampong Bahru Road 
15. Ban Siew San   Wishart Road 
16. Jagoh   Telok Blangah Road 
17. Heap Guan San   Telok Blangah Road 
18. Alexandra Terrace   Pasir Panjang Road 
19. Bugis   Kallang Road 
20. Soopoo   Kallang Road 
21. Pulau Minyak   Geylang Lorong 1 
22. Lorong 3   Sims Avenue-Geylang Road 
23. Koo Chye   Geylang Lorong 3 
24. Hock Soon   Geylang Lorong 3 
25. Lorong 5   Sims Avenue-Geylang Road 
26. Lorong 17   Sims Avenue-Geylang Road 
27. Lorong 21A   Geylang Road 
28. Lorong 27A   Sims Avenue-Geylang Road 
29. Lorong 29   Sims Avenue-Geylang Road 
30. Wak Tanjong   Sims Avenue-Paya Lebar Road 
31. Engku Aman   Geylang Road 
32. Geylang Serai   Geylang Road 
33. Kampong Ubi   Geylang Road 
34. Eunos   Geylang Road 
35. Amber   Mountbatten Road 
36. Lorong K   Telok Kurau-Changi-Road-East Coast Road 
37. Marican   Serangoon Road 3
rd mile 
38. MacPherson Road South   MacPherson Road 
39. Kallang Pudding   MacPherson Road 
40. Ampat   MacPherson Road 
41. Lorong Tai Seng   Paya Lebar Road 
42. Potong Pasir   Upper Serangoon Road 
43. Woodleigh   Upper Serangoon Road 
44. Bukit Arang   Serangoon Road 
45. Bartley Road   Bartley Road 
46. Lim Teck Boo   Paya Lebar Road 
47. Lew Lian   Upper Serangoon Road 
48. Paya Lebar   Paya Lebar Road 
49. Chia Keng   Yio Chu Kang Road 
50. Teo Chew   Grange Road 
51. Pasiran   Gentle Road-Newton Road-Chancery Lane 
52. Wayang Satu   Dunearn Road 
53. Chia Heng   Thomson Road 
54. Ah Hood Road   Balestier Road 
  1955. Boon Teck Road   Balestier Road 
56. Jalan Ampas   Balestier Road 
57. Chantek Bahru   Dunearn Road 
Sources: SIT 808/50, ‘List of Kampongs in City Area in Order of Fire Risk’, in 
Memorandum from Superintendant, Singapore Fire Brigade, to Manager, SIT, 27 October 
1954; CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1958, 19-20 May, 1958, pp. 420-22. 
 
 
Plate 1.1: Wooden houses built over a river in Singapore (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 1.2: Raised wooden houses in an urban kampong, place unknown, c. 1960s (Courtesy 
of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
urban fringe and directly from outside Singapore. The largely unhindered movement 
rendered the margins of the City fluid and unstable, as large settlements of 
  20unauthorised wooden housing emerged on hilly ground, disused cemeteries and over 
swampy land. 
 
Between Staying and Moving 
 
  Were low-income Chinese, historically-speaking, stayers or movers? So 
much of the documentation on housing in Singapore has been organised around the 
frame of overcrowding that it seems the obvious answer is the former; residing in 
overcrowded dwellings clearly presupposes a basic inertia against moving. In the 
early twentieth century, the British colonial government had become acutely aware 
of severe congestion in the Central Area, the most developed part of Singapore.
3 
The Central Area encompassed the southern and northern banks of the mouth of the 
Singapore River, which the Chinese called Tua Po (‘Big Town’, see Table 1.1) and 
Sio Po (‘Small Town’) respectively. Stretching four miles long between Keppel 
Harbour and the Kallang River and a mile deep, the Central Area was a tiny area, 
with its northern and southern banks measuring only 565 and 770 acres respectively. 
It was the site of the founding of a trading station by Stamford Raffles in 1819 and 
of Singapore’s subsequent development as a colonial entrepot. The Singapore River 
which cut through it in an east-west direction was the settlement’s artery of growth, 
fed by the regional trade in primary commodities from neighbouring countries 
bound for the West and manufactures going in the opposite direction.
4 The Central 
Area was also the disembarkation point for the mostly poor, lowly-educated and 
unskilled migrant labourers from China who entered the colony to turn the wheels of 
commerce, particularly from the end of the nineteenth century, and consequently 
resided near their workplace along the river and quayside. 
 
Yet this Chinese immigration, comprising a continuous stream of arrivals 
and departures characteristic of colonial Singapore until the early 1930s, also calls to 
mind the typical ‘sojourner’. Prior to the onset of the Great Depression and the 
                                                 
3 See W. J. Simpson, Report on the Sanitary Condition of Singapore (London: Waterlow and Sons, 
1907), and Singapore, Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the 
Cause of the Present Housing Difficulties in Singapore and the Steps which should be Taken to 
Remedy Such Difficulties (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1918). 
4 Straits Settlements Trade Commission 1933-1934, Vol. I (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1934), p. 41. 
  21subsequent implementation of colonial controls on immigration, male and female 
Chinese migrants typically were either singles or married persons whose spouses 
had remained in China. They were prepared to leave their ancestral villages to work 
in what they called the Nanyang for a few years before returning home with precious 
savings, and then possibly renewing the cycle.
5 Until the 1930s, as Table 1.1 shows, 
the main factor in Singapore’s population growth was not natural increase but the 
migration surplus of arrivals over departures.
6  There was, in other words, a 
contradiction between the predisposition of the Chinese to sojourn to Singapore and, 
once having arrived, to restrict themselves spatially in the Central Area before 
making the return journey home. 
Table 1.1: Components of Population Growth, 1881-1931 
Intercensal Period  Population Increase  Natural Increase  Net Migration 
Increase 
1881-1891 43,857  -30,932  74,798 
1891-1901 45,980  -42,542  88,522 
1901-1911 75,729  -59,978  135,707 
1911-1921 115,037  -35,594  150,631 
1921-1931 139,387  18,176  212,211 
Source: P. Arumainathan, Report of the 1970 Census (1973), Vol. 1, p. 31. 
 
  Chinese attitudes towards migration and movement in Singapore must be 
viewed within the constraints imposed by British planning and the geography of the 
Central Area, from which the island’s development first fanned out. Both factors 
could be traced to the master plan introduced and directed by Raffles. The Jackson 
Plan of 1822 envisaged a small developed area around the mouth of the Singapore 
River, about three kilometres along the seafront and one to two kilometres inland.
7 
The plan stipulated that ‘the separate nationalities and provincial groups should 
inhabit distinct areas of the town’.
8 North of the river, the plan provided for an 
administrative and commercial centre, and beyond it, a ‘European Town’ and 
‘kampongs’ for the Arab and Bugis populations. To the south, there was to be a 
                                                 
5 Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 26. 
6 C. A. Vlieland, A Report of the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics (London: 
Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1932), p. 32. 
7 John W. Humphrey, Geographic Analysis of Singapore’s Population (Singapore: Department of 
Statistics, 1986), p. 2. There was no ‘Malay’ quarter since the ethnic group, comprising mainly 
agriculturalists and fishermen, resided outside the planned area. 
8 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey (Singapore: Printed at Government Printing Office, 1955), 
p. 8. 
  22‘Chinese kampong’, with a ‘Chulia kampong’ on its western side. The terms of 
reference used by these early colonial urban planners, ‘town’ and ‘kampong’, 
indicate a binary conception of social space and pattern of settlement: the former 
was European, the latter Asian. In implementing this vision, the Jackson Plan carried 
out the first instance of resettlement in colonial Singapore, relocating ‘lower classes 
of Chinese’ who had settled on ‘a considerable portion of the sea and river 
face….which are now demanded by a higher and more respective [mercantile] 
class’.
9 
 
However, the social boundaries and physical space between town and 
kampong were not so simply fixed and maintained in the subsequent course of 
Singapore’s history. More kampongs subsequently emerged on the island but 
although ‘probably first occupied by the races whose name they bear’, they were 
subsequently inhabited by other ethnic communities.
10 By mid-nineteenth century, 
when the Europeans vacated their overcrowded neighbourhood for more 
comfortable suburbs on higher ground, it was immediately occupied by the 
burgeoning Chinese population, who named it ‘Small Town’, in reference to their 
original quarter south of the river.
11 Such a pattern of Chinese residential movement 
and settlement was significant in signifying their initiative and dynamism in matters 
of work and residence. In seeking to fulfill their own interests, they had managed in 
a comparatively short span of time to modify the Jackson Plan. This autonomy of 
action and movement repeated itself in the mid-twentieth century, when the Chinese 
attitude towards work and residence was neither simply a willingness to stay put nor 
a desire to move; rather, it was a blend of both, which operated dialectically, 
sometimes reinforcing the one, at other times cancelling out the other. Subsequent 
history shows that the Chinese attitude in Singapore towards movement was in fact 
one of ambivalence. 
 
                                                 
9 Stamford Raffles’ letter to Captain C. E. Davis, 4 November 1822, in Charles Burton Buckley, An 
Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), p. 
82. 
10 John Cameron, cited in Hodder, ‘Racial Groupings in Singapore’, p. 27. 
11 John Cameron, cited in Hodder, ‘Racial Groupings in Singapore’, p. 30; Proceedings and Report of 
the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Cause of the Present Housing Difficulties, Vol. I, p. A-
2; Teo Siew Eng & Victor R. Savage, ‘Singapore Landscape: A Historical Overview of Housing 
Change’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 6, 1985, p. 50. 
  23Following their colonisation of ‘Small Town’ in the 1850s, the urban 
Chinese population is usually understood to be resistant to rehousing. Up to the eve 
of the Pacific War in 1941, low-income Chinese appeared determined to continue 
living in small, low-rental cubicles of shophouses, the 2- to 4-storey housing form 
prevalent in the Central Area. The shophouse was suited to the needs of migrants, 
for it combined commercial and residential functions – the ground floor was 
typically used for business while dwellers lived upstairs – at a location where the 
cost of transport to their workplace could also be minimised. As Brenda Yeoh points 
out, the Chinese labouring classes thwarted attempts by the Municipal Authority of 
Singapore to limit the number of cubicles in shophouses to a ‘Sisyphean jugglery’, 
‘incapable of challenging the rapidity with which improvised structures of wood, 
cloth, canvas, matting, sack, and even tea boxes could be put up by cubicle dwellers 
to demarcate and protect the privacy of their living spaces’.
12 According to James 
Warren, Chinese rickshaw pullers preferred cramped cubicles and pang kengs in 
lodging houses on both sides of the Singapore River, occupying an area as small as 
60 square feet per man.
13  Admittedly, as Stephen Dobbs observes, Chinese 
lightermen lived onboard their crafts moored in the river, but this arrangement 
similarly kept the rentals down and enabled the boatmen to live near their 
workplace.
14 
 
Government concerns with overcrowding in cubicle housing and its 
detrimental effects on personal and public sanitation dominated official inquiries 
into the housing situation at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1907, Professor W. 
J. Simpson, commissioned to investigate the high birth rates in the City, warned of 
severe congestion in the shophouses. This he attributed to the Chinese tendency ‘to 
build horizontally rather than vertically’, by adding new buildings to the back of 
existing shophouses.
15 A decade later, the 1918 Housing Commission, appointed to 
investigate housing difficulties in Singapore, pinpointed two ‘Congested Areas’ on 
the northern and southern banks of Singapore River, parts of which were extremely 
                                                 
12 Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built 
Environment, 2
nd edition (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), pp. 143-48. 
13 James Francis Warren, Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore (1880-1940) (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 40-44, 202-4. 
14  Stephen  Dobbs,  The Singapore River: A Social History 1819-2002 (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2003), pp. 84-85. 
15 Simpson, Report on the Sanitary Condition of Singapore, p. 12. 
  24overcrowded up to a density of 1,304 persons per acre. Here, both the artisan and 
labouring classes could live close to their work, near the river, the harbour and the 
wharves: 
 
It is amongst the poorest class that the struggle for existence is 
keenest. This class is therefore impelled towards the facilities 
provided by the Congested Areas. They have to put up with what 
they can get in the way of a room, or a share of a room, for the only 
choice is between accepting and giving up the struggle.
16  
 
Just before the advent of World War Two, the 1938 Weisburg Building Committee, 
studying the possibility of redeveloping the densely-built Crown lands, repeated the 
caution that the shophouses, intended for single males, had become ‘warrens of 
cubicles and form slums of the worst description’.
17  
 
Increase in Family Life 
  
The housing congestion in the 1930s was linked to rapid population growth. 
As the Weisburg Committee observed, the population in certain parts of the urban 
area had ‘nearly doubled in the last five years’. This population increase was largely 
brought about by the political turmoil in China and increases in female immigration 
and, consequently, in family life. The Municipal population had jumped 44% from 
360,000 in 1923 to over 520,000 in 1937, while the number of assessed buildings 
had only risen by half that proportion in that time. Of particular note were increases 
in the ratio of women to men among the Chinese from 367:1000 to 732:1000 and in 
births from 3,750 to 18,577. In planning new housing for the low-income dwellers in 
the urban area, the Committee surmised that the considerations were, most crucially, 
rent and transport cost, and also marketing cost and ‘the reluctance to move from 
familiar surroundings and friends’. Nevertheless, inner city residents had already 
begun moving to the urban margins and even beyond, such that ‘[o]n East Coast, 
                                                 
16 Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Cause of the Present 
Housing Difficulties, Vol. I, pp. A-4 - A-6. 
17 SIT 70/41, Report of the Weisburg Building Policy Committee, 1938. 
  25Upper Serangoon, Bukit Timah, Holland, and Pasir Panjang Roads, it is impossible 
to distinguish the boundaries between the Municipal and Rural Board areas, 
development being equal on both sides’.
18 
 
The demographic changes documented by the Weisburg Committee had their 
origins in the official immigration controls which, for the first time in Singapore’s 
history, imposed curbs on the number of arrivals to the colony. During the Great 
Depression, heavy unemployment and destitution among the unskilled labour led the 
British colonial government to progressively slash the quota for male Chinese 
arrivals, until it was fixed at 1,000 persons between June 1932 and May 1933. The 
policy effectively reduced the number of arrivals to under 28,000 between 1930 and 
1933.
19 The quota system, however, did not affect the entry of women or the cost of 
their passage to Singapore. Between 1934 and 1938, ‘shiploads of Cantonese 
women’, mostly from the Shun Tak and Tung Kwun districts and aged between 18 
and 40 years, arrived in Malaya. The peninsula received a migration gain of over 
190,000 female Chinese deck passengers (out of a total of 460,000 migrants), the 
majority being peasant women who found work in local estates, industries and 
factories. Many of them claimed to be widows and eventually settled down and 
remarried. Wilfred Blythe, the Deputy Controller of Chinese Labour, observed in 
1941 ‘swarms of Chinese children in their teens, mostly local born, and still more 
who have not yet reached their teens’.
20 Between 1934 and 1940, Singapore 
experienced a natural increase in its population of 141,548 persons.
21  
 
Of the female immigration, the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), the 
defacto colonial housing authority, observed in 1938: 
 
we are at present faced with something in the nature of a social 
revolution in connection with the Chinese labouring classes. Until a 
                                                 
18 SIT 70/41, Report of the Weisburg Building Policy Committee, 1938. 
19 Loh Kah Seng, ‘Beyond Rubber Prices: Negotiating the Great Depression in Singapore’, South 
East Asia Research, 14 (1), 2006, p. 21. 
20 W. L. Blythe, Historical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office, 1953), pp. 29-30; P. Arumainathan, Report on the Census of Population 1970, Singapore 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 33. 
21 Singapore, ‘Report of the Population Study Group’, Master Plan: Reports of Study Groups and 
Working Parties (Singapore: Government Printing Press, 1955), p. 18. 
  26few years ago, such labour came here unaccompanied by wife or 
family. On the current rates of wages they were able to remit to China 
sufficient to keep wife and children in comfort in their native village. 
But with the development of Chinese female immigration, the whole 
position has changed.
22  
 
One of the arrivals was Chung Lai Cheng, born around 1917 in Kwangtung province, 
who at the age of sixteen had married a widowed accounts clerk working in 
Singapore. He returned to Singapore three months after the marriage and four years 
later, around 1937, Chung and a stepson by his previous marriage followed him 
there.
23 It was only in 1938 when female migrants, like the men, were subject to a 
monthly quota of 500 in order to reduce the competition for jobs. By then, the 
Chinese population had become increasingly settled and consequently a more mobile 
local community.  
 
  The new mobility of low-income Chinese families was the result of two 
opposing social and demographic forces. First, there were the long-standing 
inhibiting factors which had hitherto restricted Chinese movement away from the 
Central Area: namely, rent, transport and marketing costs and the reluctance to move 
away from familiar local surroundings and friends. These factors now came into 
tension and conflict with new forces which encouraged mobility: local settlement 
and marriage, the subsequent birth of children, the formation of a nuclear family, 
and the consequent need to find suitable housing. Between the 1930s and 1960s, 
Chinese attitudes towards moving outward from the Central Area were influenced 
by these opposing forces; some favoured relocation while others preferred to stay 
put, but all felt a degree of pull from both factors. 
 
The increase in Chinese family life became much more pronounced after 
1945. What is often not fully appreciated is that the stream of Chinese immigration 
to Singapore changed significantly in its composition and contributed to the 
development of a settled Chinese community. Most scholars have emphasised the 
                                                 
22 SIT 692/38, Memo by Chairman, SIT, 11 Aug 1938. 
23 Barrington Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, Singapore: A Sociological Study of Chinese Households 
Living in a Densely Populated Area (Singapore: University of Malaya, 1956), pp. 233-34. Chung 
worked in a cheroot factory for nearly twenty years. 
  27importance of natural increase over immigration in analysing the character of the 
postwar population growth. This is true in numerical terms; Table 1.2 shows that 
immigration no longer accounted for the bulk of the population increase after the 
1947 census. Saw Swee Hock has pointed out that, when the population growth was 
4.5% in the 1947-1957 period, the net migrational increase accounted for about 1%, 
and was a negligible factor in the next intercensal period.
24 
Table 1.2: Components of Singapore’s Population Growth, 1931-1970 
Intercensal Period  Population Increase  Natural Increase  Net Migration Increase 
1931-1947 380,399  178,296  202,103 
1947-1957 507,785  395,571  112,214 
1957-1970 628,578  595,614  32,964 
Source: P. Arumainathan, Report of the 1970 Census (1973), Vol. 1, p. 31. 
 
However, a purely numerically-based interpretation ignores the significance 
of the social impact of the immigration. Leo van Grunsven, in his little-noticed study 
of intra-urban migration in Singapore, has pointed out that the net migrational 
increase for the 1931-1947 period was marginally greater than the natural increase, 
accounting for 53% of the total, and it still comprised 22% in the following 
intercensal period.
25 But what was crucial was not merely the volume of postwar 
migration but its character, causes and consequences. Whereas the prewar arrivals 
had come from China mainly to find work, most postwar immigrants were arriving 
from China and the Federation of Malaya either to join their families or to establish 
family life in Singapore. 
 
Because emigration was not restricted, there was a net migrational deficit 
after the war up to 1953  as more people left the colony than those entering it (see 
Table 1.3). But the composition of the inflows was significant. Of the Chinese 
arriving from China and Hong Kong in this period, some were motivated by the 
customary ‘push factors’ which made life difficult on the mainland; this exodus was 
exacerbated in October 1949 by the establishment of a communist regime. But, 
significantly, locally resident Chinese were also asking their families to join them in 
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  28Singapore.
26 Between 1949 and 1953, most of the 2,300 families who annually 
entered Singapore were wives with one or two children, or other family members 
joining their husbands. In this period, 5,000-10,000 more Chinese men left 
Singapore yearly than those entering, with a slightly smaller surplus of Chinese 
women and children arriving over those departing. Children formed only about 13% 
of the immigrants, with the majority being males, who could work and support the 
local family, while the girls were often betrothed in China.
27  
Table 1.3: Migration Statistics in Singapore, 1947-1953 
Year Immigration  Emigration Net  Migration 
1947 154,145  157,078  -2,933 
1948 124,804  155,879  -31,075 
1949 110,815  139,563  -28,748 
1950 94,722  109,772  -15,050 
1951 95,769  124,866  -29,097 
1952 95,864  96,597 -733 
1953 102,413  103,065 -652 
Compiled from Singapore, ‘Population’, Annual Report, 1947-1953. 
 
The pattern of migration from China was consolidated in August 1953. A 
new Immigration Ordinance was enacted ‘with a view to protecting the standard of 
living and keeping local residents in employment’. The Ordinance limited the entry 
of adults from China and India to those seeking reunion with their families (wives 
and children of local residents), to those admitted on compassionate grounds (elderly 
parents of local residents), and to specialists and professionals whose services were 
in demand, such as engineers, technicians, teachers, accountants, and doctors.
28 The 
restrictions led to an increase in the arrivals of wives and children of local residents 
in 1955. The entry of family members from China and India soon stabilised, and was 
then stymied by amendments to the Ordinance in 1959, which aimed to ‘bring about 
a more balanced and assimilated Malayan population whose ties and loyalty are to 
this country alone without which the foundation for a true Malayan nation cannot be 
laid’.
29 The amendments prohibited wives and children of local residents from being 
permanently admitted into Singapore if the man was not a Singapore citizen, if they 
                                                 
26 Singapore, ‘Population’, Annual Report 1955, p. 19. 
27 Singapore, ‘Report of the Population Study Group’, pp. 23-25.  
28 Singapore, ‘Population’, Annual Report 1953, p. 17. 
29 ST, 3 Nov 1959. Before the amendments, children under 15 years of age were allowed to enter. 
  29had been living apart continuously for five years after December 1954, or if the child 
was more than six years old. 
 
In social terms, the inflow from the Federation of Malaya was as important 
as the China stream. Although Singapore had administratively separated from the 
peninsula in 1946, migration between the two countries was unrestricted until the 
island was expelled from Malaysia in 1965. In November and December 1946, there 
were 27,834 arrivals from Malaya, against 18,144 migrants from outside the 
peninsula and 25,356 births.
30 In the next two decades, large numbers of people, 
particularly Chinese, moved south to Singapore. This was due to adverse 
developments north of the causeway: the twelve year-long Emergency beginning in 
June 1948; the large-scale, involuntary resettlement of rural Chinese in the ‘New 
Villages’; unemployment due to recession in the tin and rubber industries, in 
addition to the usual rural-urban drift of persons in search of employment.
31 In 1949, 
resettlement operations in Johor, the state closest to Singapore, led to ‘sharp 
reactions in Singapore to squatter evictions’.
32 The authorities believed that while 
accurate statistics on the Singapore-Malaya migration were unavailable, the 
movement was ‘substantial both during and after the Japanese occupation, with the 
general direction of net migration from the Federation of Malaya to Singapore’.
33 In 
1952 and 1953, although the colony experienced small monthly migrational losses 
of between 300-1,000 persons to countries outside Malaya, they were offset by gains 
of 500-1,000 persons from Malaya.
34 Between 1958 and 1960, there was a net 
surplus of 6,916 Chinese males and 6,916 females surrendering their Federation 
passports to take up permanent residence in Singapore, largely Chinese and persons 
from Johor.
35  
 
                                                 
30 HB 423/46, A Report of the Damage Resulting from the War and the Japanese Occupation, 10 Dec 
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  30The postwar censuses capture the social composition and impact of this 
immigration.
36 In the 1957 census, there were 515,751 foreign-born persons in 
Singapore. Of these, 181,329 (or 35%) had arrived in the 1947-1957 period. This 
group consisted of 88,811 persons (49%) born in the Federation of Malaya and only 
39,969 (22%) born in China. Female arrivals were numerically prominent, 
comprising 41,302 persons (47%) of the Malaya-born and 22,886 (57%) of the 
China-born. Among children and teenagers between ages 0-19 in 1957, there were 
29,009 males and 27,306 females born in Malaya. This was more than twice the 
15,426 males and 10,421 females born outside Singapore and Malaya, but roughly 
the same proportion as the numbers of Malaya-born and China-born persons arriving 
in the period.
37 In the 1970 census, out of a total of 530,883 foreign-born persons, 
98,699 persons (19%) had arrived in the 1956-1965 period. This group consisted of 
65,284 persons (66%) born in Malaysia and 18,745 (20%) born in China, indicating 
the increasing numbers of the former. In 1970, the proportion of female arrivals had 
also risen from the previous census, comprising 36,332 persons (56%) of the 
Malaysia-born and 12,133 (65%) of the China-born.
38 Both censuses indicate the 
substantial numbers of female immigrants and entrants from Malaya. 
 
The arrival of Chinese from Malaya and China for family reasons was part of 
a major demographic shift in postwar Singapore, expanding on the population 
changes begun in the 1930s. During the Japanese Occupation, the island’s 
population had suffered a natural decrease of 14,000 persons.
39 After the war, the 
population quickly settled down, married and bore multiple children, leading to 
rising numbers of locally-born persons and rapid population growth. The postwar 
immigration and natural increase, consequently, were not mutually exclusive but 
were underpinned by a common desire to form families or reunite with local families 
and consequently reinforced each other. With rising birth rates and falling mortality 
rates, the Chinese population grew from 418,640 in 1931 to 729,473 in 1947, 
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1,090,596 in 1957, and 1,579,866 in 1970.
40  The influx of Chinese women 
progressively improved the sex ratio from 1,656 men per 1,000 women in 1931 to 
1,132 in 1947, 1,039 in 1957, and 1,017 in 1970.
41 More Chinese settled down, 
married and had children. The nuclear family constituted 67% of all Chinese 
households in 1957 and 73% by 1970. The size of the nuclear family was 5.41 
persons in 1957 and 5.58 in 1970; among the Chinese, the size was 5.10 in 1957 and 
5.46 in 1970. In short, a typical postwar nuclear family had three or four children.
42  
 
Where the prewar population had comprised largely of working age adults, 
the average postwar person was younger and more likely to be locally-born. The 
percentage of Chinese children between ages 0-14 was 37% in 1947, 44% in 1957 
and 38% in 1970. The mean age of the Chinese population also fell from 26.9 years 
in 1931 to 25.1 in 1947 and 23.0 in 1957, before rising to 25.2 in 1970 due to the 
state-sponsored family planning programme.
43  
 
A 1947 survey of 3,841 immigrant Chinese living in the Municipal area 
found that 72% had not returned to their homelands, while 60% had made no 
remittances to their families.
44 Furthermore, 499 out of 977 persons (51%) had not 
returned or sent remittances home since their first arrival, suggesting that the 
migrants’ attachment to China was ‘only partial and somewhat tenuous’.
45 It is 
probable some of them brought their wives and children to Singapore after the war. 
 
40 Chua, Report on the Census of Population 1957, p. 44.  
41 Saw, The Population of Singapore, p. 50. 
42 Arumainathan, Report on the Census of Population 1970, p. 208.  
43 Chua, Report on the Census of Population 1957, pp. 50-51; Arumainathan, Report on the Census of 
Population 1970, pp. 54-55. 
44 SWD, A Social Survey of Singapore: A Preliminary Study of Some Aspects of Social Conditions in 
the Municipal Area of Singapore, 1947, p. 112. 
45 SWD, A Social Survey of Singapore, pp. 120-21.  
Plate 1.3: The children of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, c. 1960. In the background are the 
SIT’s 4-storey housing (Courtesy of Ivan Polunin). 
 
 
Plate 1.4: Children and youths at the Malayan Chinese Association shophouse along 
Havelock Road, at the edge of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, c. 1950s (Courtesy of Wong Pok 
Hee). 
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Exodus from ‘Pigeon Cages’ 
  
  Since the mid-1930s, the Chinese population resident in the Central Area had 
already been feeling the pressure of the increase in family life. Between 1936 and 
1947, Chinese families began to move to outlying parts of the City. As Map 1.2 
shows, the urban population changes were least in the inner city and greatest in the 
urban periphery.
46 While the Central Area’s population increased by only about 0-
20%, those in the intermediate zones rose by 40-50%. The most dramatic increases, 
of more than 50%, were in the fringe areas of the City: towards Toa Payoh in the 
north, Alexandra in the west and Kallang and Siglap in the east.  
Map 1.2: Percentage Increase in the Population of Singapore Municipality, 1936-1947 
 
Source: Diagram 3, Singapore, ‘Report of the Population Study Group’, Master Plan: 
Reports of Study Groups and Working Parties (1955). 
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  34This demographic drift outward was, of course, not new and could be 
considered natural. From the 1840s, people had been fanning out from the town area 
along the coastline in both directions and also inland in a northwesterly course. By 
the 1950s, the urban spread had reached Pasir Panjang, Alexandra, Siglap, and Toa 
Payoh in the four main directions.
47 By following the arterial roads leading out of 
the Central Area, the movers had continuously redefined what was rural or urban, 
and what had been rural a generation earlier became part of the City proper. In this 
process, the well-built permanent houses of the upper classes who had left the 
congested centre for the ‘suburbs’ were swamped by the more numerous and 
closely-built unauthorised housing of the low-income group. By the eve of World 
War Two, numerous Chinese were already living in wooden houses, rearing pigs 
and growing vegetables outside the Central Area. A British observer viewed these 
houses as an ‘expression of local poverty, easy climate, transient population, and the 
youth of the whole human development here’.
48 By 1940, low-income Chinese 
leaving the Central Area had again blurred the lines between urban and rural, town 
and kampong. 
 
The urban expansion had historically involved only a small minority of the 
population but the Japanese interregnum turned the migration into an exodus. The 
war had destroyed comparatively few residential buildings but more crucially had 
prevented the maintenance of the surviving homes. In addition, the surge in 
population after the war was not met by a corresponding increase in housing stock.
49 
Consequently, the Japanese Occupation aggravated the ‘very old subject’ of the 
construction of unauthorised wooden dwellings in the urban area:
50 
 
During the Occupation, much of the land acquired and not yet used 
was let out by the Japanese, in an endeavour to swell their revenue, 
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1946; HB 423/46, Comments on Questionnaire Adopted by the Subcommission of the Economic 
Reconstruction of Devastated Areas, 24 Oc 1946. 
50 SIT 808/50, Municipal Architect’s Scheme for Dealing with the Question of the Execution of 
Mandatory Orders for Demolition of Unauthorised Attap Dwelling Houses and Resettlement of the 
Occupiers, 23 Mar 1950. 
  35while other areas were occupied by squatters, against whom 
apparently no action was taken.
51 
 
The Japanese administration received numerous requests for vegetable cultivation on 
Municipal and SIT lands. Some of the lands were let out for cultivation and other 
uses but others, the Japanese revealed, were occupied without authorisation: 
 
Such occupiers have been served with notices to quit or alternatively 
to apply for permission to occupy the lands on monthly tenancy, and 
the result is that they except a few have either delivered up vacant 
possession of the lands, or rented the lands from this Kakari.
52  
 
  After the war, the SIT found that 
 
[a]fter the Liberation, further areas were let out for such purpose as 
storing scrap material, and the majority of the tenancies granted by 
the Japanese were recognised and continued. During this period, still 
more land was occupied by trespassers, so that with the return of 
Civil Administration the Trust was faced with the formidable 
problem of regaining possession of its land and restoring it to order 
and cleanliness. The Trust has since then acquired further land which 
is occupied by squatters who were tenants of the former owner.
53 
 
  During and immediately after the Japanese Occupation, unauthorised 
wooden buildings were reported to have been erected in places such as Tanjong 
Katong and along Dunman, Haig and Geylang roads in the eastern part of the City.
54 
In Kampong Henderson in the western half of the City, in-filling rapidly took place 
due to the exodus of people from the Central Area fleeing the Japanese bombing. 
The kampong’s population reportedly swelled from a few hundred to 5,000 during 
                                                 
51 SIT, The Work of the Singapore Improvement Trust 1927-1947, p. 31. 
52 Kanzai-Ka Kanri Kakari 75/2602, Report from 1 Aug 2602 to 31
st Mar 2603. 2602 under the 
Japanese imperial calendar is the year 1942. 
53 SIT, The Work of the Singapore Improvement Trust 1927-1947, p. 31. 
54 Municipal Commission, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Municipal Commissioners, 12 Jan 1948. 
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ter.
57  
                                                
the war and doubled to 10,000, comprising 1,000 families, in 1947.
55 The 1947 
Municipal survey found that 59% of its 4,965 sampled households had shifted into 
their present residence between the beginning of the occupation and the time of the 
survey.
56 One family displaced by the war was Jimmy Yi’s parents, who had 
married in Johor and fled to Singapore at the start of the Japanese invasion. They 
eventually moved into a wooden house in Kampong Silat, near the General Hospital, 
where they brought up Yi (born 1950), his eight brothers and a younger sis
 
Yi’s case illustrates the migrational patterns which led to the movement of 
families into the Kampong Bukit Ho Swee locality. Loh Tian Ho, my father, was 
born in 1936 to a couple living in an attap house in Pasir Panjang, a rural area then, 
where they grew vegetables. When the Japanese attacked, the family fled the 
emerging chaos into the City. They rented an attap house in a Chinese kampong in 
Telok Blangah, just southwest of the Central Area. Later, his mother, Tua Pui Ma 
(‘Fat Grandma’), separated from her husband and married a Straits-born Chinese 
who had arrived from Malacca, Malaya, after the war to look for work. This was Ah 
Kong, my grandfather, who was English-educated and worked as a government clerk. 
In subsequent years, the family lived in other kampongs in the vicinity, including 
Bukit Ho Swee itself briefly. They had been living in a wooden house – five 
members in the family – at the fringe of Bukit Ho Swee along Havelock Road for 
seven or eight years at the time of the great fire of 1961.
58 
 
Immediately after the war, the upper storeys of the shophouses in the Central 
Area were already congested with married workers and their young families.
59 The 
Chinese named the cubicles ‘pigeon cages’.
60 Evidently the area had achieved a 
‘residential stability’, having exhausted the possibility of creating more cubicles.
61 
The 1947 Municipal survey reported that in ‘an area of 2,285 acres or some 11% of 
 
55  Joyce Horsley, Resettlement of a Community: Discussion of the Problems Arising from the 
Disorganisation of a Community in Singapore, unpublished academic exercise, Department of Social 
Studies, University of Malaya, 1956, pp. 81-82. 
56 SWD, A Social Survey of Singapore, p. 68. 
57 Author’s interview with Jimmy Yi, 4 Feb 2007. 
58 Author’s interviews with Loh Tian Ho, 13 Jan 2007 & 2 Feb 2007. 
59 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee (Singapore: Government Printing House, 1947), p. 5. 
60 Author’s interview with Chua Tua Tee, 13 Jul 2007. 
61 Van Grunsven, Patterns of Housing and Intra-urban Migration Part 1, pp. 86-87.  
Plate 1.5: Ah Kong and Tua Pui Mah (seated), with my parents flanked by my uncle and 
aunt, c. 1969 (Photograph by Loh Tian Ho). 
 
the total area of the Municipality, live just under half the population of the whole 
Municipality’, in the three inner city wards comprising the Central Area, between 
Telok Blangah in the southwest to Serangoon in the northeast.
62 According to the 
1947 Housing Committee, the density in the Central Area, with 300,000 persons 
crammed into a thousand acres, was 300 persons per acre. This contrasted with a 
density of 34 persons per acre for the entire Municipal area, with a population of 
680,000, and only 2 persons per acre in the rural area, with a population of 
244,000.
63 In subsequent years, the Central Area’s population grew slowly from an 
estimated 340,000 in 1955
64 to 402,000 in 1963, an overall increase of 34% between 
1947 and 1963.
65 
 
                                                 
62 SWD, A Social Survey of Singapore, p. 24. 
63 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, pp. 5, 51. 
64 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey, p. 25. 
65 Singapore, Master Plan First Review, 1965: Report of Survey (Singapore: Planning Department, 
Ministry of National Development, 1965), p. 37. 
  38In analysing the expansion of the urban kampongs, it is important to situate 
the event, even one as influential as the Japanese Occupation, within the context of 
the social and economic geography of urban Singapore. In 1953, the Acting Deputy 
Lands Manager of the SIT, in trying to deflect responsibility for this development, 
rightly pointed to more long-standing extenuating factors: 
 
There is a tendency to lay the whole blame for the ‘squatter problem’ 
on the Japanese Occupation and by implication on the Government. 
No doubt the squatter problem was increased during the Japanese 
Occupation but the main encouragement was given to squatters who 
wished to cultivate land in order to provide food. It was not a policy 
during the Occupation to encourage persons to squat merely for the 
purpose of providing accommodation. Although there was lack of 
control, bad squatter kampongs existed in some form or other before 
the Japanese Occupation.
66 
 
Negotiating Family and Workplace 
 
How did the urban Chinese respond to the housing squeeze? Maurice 
Freedman’s anthropological work in Singapore in 1949-1950 sheds light on the 
different dynamics operating in urban and rural Chinese families. Analysing the 
original schedules of the 1947 Municipal survey, Freedman found that the urban 
households were usually nuclear families. This was because the parents lived with 
one of their married children, typically the eldest son, enabling the other children to 
establish nuclear families. In contrast, Freedman’s own survey of 74 rural 
households in Jurong found that the average household size was 7.3 and 35 
households were of the extended family type.
67 This suggests that the urban family 
was more predisposed than its rural counterpart towards leaving the Central Area in 
fragments.  
 
                                                 
66 HB 1060/53, Memo from Acting Deputy Lands Manager, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 30 Oct 1953. 
67 Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore, pp. 28, 34, 38-39. 
  39In the 1950s, the congested Central Area was accommodating smaller 
households than elsewhere in the country. In his 1956 study of 632 Chinese 
households in Upper Nankin Street, a street of shophouse dwellers in the Central 
Area earmarked for clearance, Barrington Kaye found that the average household 
size was 3.0 overall and 4.5 for nuclear families. These figures are lower than the 
country-wide Chinese averages of 5.1 and 5.41 respectively in the 1957 census. 
Children under 10 made up 25% of Kaye’s survey population, compared to 33% in 
the 1957 census.
68 Moreover, in You Poh Seng’s 1955 housing survey of the Central 
Area, 91% of the households had not applied for permanent housing built by the SIT, 
with 63% citing the high cost of rent as the main reason. When asked where they 
would go if they had to move out, 73% preferred to be near their present residence 
and workplace, 13% in the Kampong Tiong Bahru area just west of the Central Area, 
and the remainder to urban areas in the east, like Geylang and Jalan Besar.
69 While 
You’s informants might be interpreted as resistant to rehousing, they in fact 
possessed a degree of recognition of the need to move and where to move to in such 
an eventuality. 
 
  If to leave the Central Area was an accepted conclusion, to where and what 
type of housing should the Chinese family move? One option was the permanent 
housing built by the SIT. Its policy was to ‘provide the lower and lower middle 
income groups with houses of sound construction and good design and amenities 
such as open spaces, shops and playgrounds’.
70 Most of the SIT’s estates were 
situated just outside the Central Area, such as Balestier, Farrer Park and St. 
Michael’s to the north; Tiong Bahru, Kampong Silat, Bukit Merah, Delta, 
Henderson, Alexandra, Brickworks, and Queenstown to the west; and Lavender 
Street, Jalan Besar, Lorong Tiga, Kallang Airport, Upper Aljunied Road, Kolam 
Ayer, and Guillemard Road to the east. In most cases, these estates were close to the 
urban kampongs – Tiong Bahru Estate, for example, was only half a mile from ‘Big 
Town’, and nearer to the Central Area than the massive kampongs on its western 
flank – so the choice between a permanent flat and a wooden dwelling was not based 
on distance. 
                                                 
68 Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, pp. 28, 32. 
69 You Poh Seng, ‘The Housing Survey of Singapore, 1955’, Malayan Economic Review, 2 (1), 1957, 
pp. 73-74. 
70 SIT, Annual Report 1959, p. 3. 
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What deterred the Chinese residents was that SIT housing was high-rental 
and frequently unsuitable for the needs of extended or semi-extended families. 
Between 1947 and 1959, the Trust built a total of 20,907 units or an average of 
1,742 units per year. This was far below the 1955 Master Plan’s estimation of a 
figure of 10,000 units per year over twenty years to meet the housing shortage. In 
fact, this figure was adjusted upwards at the end of the 1950s to 15,000 units in 
accordance with the high rate of population increase.
71 SIT housing was in such 
short supply that it encouraged the popular practice of paying a large sum of ‘tea 
money’ to obtain a Trust flat, allegedly between $200 to $1,000.
72 
 
In contrast, Goh Keng Swee’s 1956 study of low-income households found 
that a fifth of the households (but a fourth of the population) lived in a state of 
poverty, with an income under the amount of $102 required to meet the minimum 
monthly standards of living.
73 The SIT sought to peg rentals for its houses at one-
fifth of family income: between up to $35 and $55 for household incomes of $400 
and below, and between $56 and $75 and above for incomes above $400.
74 These 
rates were much higher than the subsidised rentals of the Housing and Development 
Board, the post-colonial housing authority, for its 1-, 2- and 3-room flats: $20, $40 
and $60 respectively.
75 In 1959, there were just 13,324 families on the Trust’s 
housing register, a figure which was both large and small; it signified the low 
numbers of flats built by the SIT but also the massive number of families not listed 
on the register, who obviously felt that what was constructed did not fulfill their 
housing needs.  
 
In some cases, the SIT housing was simply unsuitable for Chinese urban 
families. In 1957, the redevelopment of the Central Area resulted in the clearance of 
290 families residing in flats at Selegie Road, in Stamford district in the town area. 
More than 85% of the families belonged to the low-income group earning under 
                                                 
71 HDB, Annual Report 1960, p. 8; Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey, p. 25. 
72 MT, 31 Dec 1949. 
73 Goh Keng Swee, Urban Incomes and Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-
54 (Singapore: Department of Social Welfare, 1956), p. 131. Goh surveyed households earning less 
than $400 a month. 
74 SIT, Annual Report 1959, p. 45. 
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  41$400 a month.
76 All the families desired to remain in the City area and were initially 
willing to accept new premises to be built nearby at Albert Street, with only two 
families expressing mild interest in moving to Queenstown New Town.
77 The Trust 
decided to allocate one two-room flat (a living room and one bedroom) for families 
between 3-10 persons and two such flats for families of more than 10 persons.
78 The 
rehousing, according to the SIT, proceeded smoothly, with nearly all the families 
affected by Phase I of the scheme moving into the Albert Street housing.
79 But J. M. 
Jumabhoy, the Assemblyman for Stamford, received numerous complaints about 
overcrowding. The Trust, he revealed, had failed to take into account how ‘there 
might be more than one married couple in a family of 10’, or that ‘there may be 
other adults in the family, so that a one-bedroom flat would not be sufficient’.
80  
 
Eventually, the Trust acknowledged that ‘some hardship’ had occurred for 
the larger families.
81 When offered a 3-room maisonette, Leong Chew Chang asked 
for an additional 2-room flat nearby, because ‘all my sons are now adult, and in the 
near future they will be getting married’.
82 Ow Kim Yeow, however, rejected the 3-
room housing, explaining that ‘my two sons are having their own family and with 
many children, there will be great inconvenience and dispute if they stay together’.
83 
Lim Leong Soon, the head of a household with three married family groups, 
totalling 18 persons, had been staying in two flats with three bedrooms and a living 
room. On the maisonette, Lim felt that ‘[t]he rooms are too small and can hardly 
solve the problem of overcrowding in my household’. He decided that, if no larger 
accommodation was available, ‘I am prepared to put up with my difficulties as best 
as I could’.
84 Most of the rehoused families settled in the vicinity, but those who did 
not find the SIT arrangements suitable were forced to move elsewhere.
85 
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  42Goh Keng Swee’s 1956 survey revealed where most Chinese families chose 
to move to under such circumstances. Of the 2,364 households residing in 
shophouses, the average size was 3.1 persons, compared to 4.8 in the 1,108 
households in wooden dwellings. Only 3% of the shophouse households had an 
exclusive use of the dwelling, with 31% sharing with 10 or more households!
86 Goh 
discovered that 93% of the households living in wooden dwellings were located in 
the three outer city wards situated on the urban periphery. In Ward IV in the eastern 
part of the City, he reported ‘a very dense attap settlement north of Geylang Road up 
to the Kallang Pudding, a swampy area. In fact there is a considerable attap 
settlement over this swamp between Lorong 1 and Lorong 17’. In the northeast of 
Ward V, situated north of the Central Area, there was ‘a large vegetable farming 
area between Upper Serangoon Road and Braddell Road to the east of Balestier 
Road’. In Ward VI at the western end of the Singapore River, Goh discovered ‘a 
large number of attap settlements in the southern section of this ward between 
Havelock Road and Teluk Blangah Road. The largest of these are found in the Tiong 
Bahru area, where more than 20,000 families are counted in the Diagnostic Survey 
Team attap census’.
87 
 
Marriage was a frequent cause of the local migration and so many moving 
families were young ones. Yap Kuai Yong, born in 1927 in the Central Area, grew 
up in Upper Nankin Street and Nankin Street, south of the Singapore River. When 
she married, she shifted to For Seng (‘Fire City’), a large kampong with a mixed 
population near the City Gas Works, north of the Rochor River, just outside the 
eastern limit of the town. Yap explained her decision, ‘When we got married, we 
didn’t manage to apply for a house. If we rented a house, it was illegal. [Laughs] My 
first son then was two years old, the second one was a few months old’.
88 Lim Soo 
Hiang’s grandmother and father had arrived in Singapore from China in the 1930s. 
The Japanese attack on Malaya created a fear of reprisal from the invaders among 
the Chinese and precipitated a rush to marry off single females; the young man 
consequently took a wife and, with his mother, left their residence in the Central 
                                                 
86 However the latter includes single-person households. Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, pp. 63-
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87 Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, pp. 14-15, 66. The Diagnostic Survey Team referred to was 
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  43Area to 10 Beo Lane in Bukit Ho Swee. Lim was born in 1953 to this union, as were 
two elder brothers, two younger brothers and two elder sisters.
89  
 
The exodus of Chinese nuclear families from the Central Area into the urban 
margin is customarily likened to an ‘overspill’, implying an involuntary relocation 
compelled by demographic circumstances.
90  However, Leo van Grunsven has 
perceptively termed the urban kampongs ‘autonomous settlements’. While many 
migrating families had admittedly been ‘pushed out’ of the Central Area, there was a 
genuine opportunism and dynamism in how they settled on hilly or swampy areas, 
unused burial grounds or areas adjacent to incinerators or sewage works at the 
margins of the City. In doing so, they had pragmatically negotiated a solution to the 
old demand for low-rental housing near their workplace and the new challenge of 
raising a growing family. West of the Central Area, a large urban kampong 
population resided on formerly unused hilly land; the location was close to the inner 
city’s harbour-docks and middle- and upper class residential areas, and the British 
military base at Ayer Rajah, which were both sources of employment for the 
residents. Similarly, the dense kampong concentration living in wooden houses built 
over swamps in the developed Kallang-Geylang area to the east largely obtained 
work from the manufacturing industries located in the Kallang Basin, such as 
sawmills, boat building and repair, tanneries, and factories producing sago, cane, 
charcoal, furniture, and rubber.
91 Urban kampong dwellers, like the state and private 
developers, were drawn to the same places at the urban periphery but had usually 
arrived first and settled on the land while the government spent months deliberating 
on acquisition.
92 
 
Proximity to workplace, though, was not of equal importance to all urban 
kampong dwellers. As an economic group, they were heterogeneous and comprised 
three subgroups: full-time farmers engaged in agricultural activities, semi-urban 
                                                 
89 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
90 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, p. 2. 
91 Van Grunsven, Patterns of Housing and Intra-urban Migration Part 1, p. 60; Lee Kip Lin, ‘A 
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unpublished manuscript, 1990, p. 88. 
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dwellers and urban dwellers.
93 As Table 1.4 shows, full-time farmers, dependent for 
their livelihood on the produce of the land, typically lived in kampongs further away 
(three to four miles) from the Central Area, such as in Toa Payoh and MacPherson 
Road (Ward V in Goh Keng Swee’s study), and to the west in Kampong Henderson 
and Queenstown. But while their main income might be derived from market 
gardening, one or more members of the family could be working in the Central 
Area.
94 The urban dweller, on the other hand, was ‘the City worker and his family 
who occupy cubicles in multi-family dwellings erected on vacant land in the suburbs 
close to the City’, in places such as Tiong Bahru and Bukit Ho Swee (see Table 
1.4).
95  This group was residing in the urban kampongs due to the housing 
shortage,
96 and in economic terms, was ‘tied to the town and [if rehoused] proper 
accommodation has to be provided within approximately five miles of the town 
centre’.
97 Wedged in between were the semi-urban dwellers, who derived their 
income from both urban employment and growing vegetables or rearing poultry or 
pigs, or obtaining such produce at lower cost from a neighbour. These families were 
relatively well-established in the kampongs, as ‘[m]any of these families live close 
to the City but when they first moved on to the land they were in rural 
surroundings’.
98  
 
The urban kampongs, consequently, had mixed populations. In Toa Payoh, 
for instance, there were 21,000 people living in wooden houses in 1955. This 
included farmers, residents who kept pigs or poultry but had little land, and other 
attap dwellers with no farming interests at all.
99 Kampong Henderson also had an 
economically heterogeneous population of vegetable gardeners, pig farmers and 
workers in the five bee hoon-making factories in the locality. The latter was a vital 
part of the local economy, with the workers given land nearby to erect their houses, 
 
93 Singapore, Report of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party (Singapore: Printed at 
the Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 5. 
94 HB 722/55, Memo titled ‘The Squatter Problem’, undated, c. 1955. 
95 SIT, Annual Report 1954, p. 14. 
96 HB 722/55, Memo titled ‘The Squatter Problem’, undated, c. 1955. 
97 HB 722/55, Notes of First Meeting of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party, 15 Sep 
1955. 
98 HB 722/55, Notes for Consideration of the ‘Squatter Problem’ Working Party, undated, c. 1955; 
HB 722/55, Memo titled ‘The Squatter Problem’, undated, c. 1955. 
99 HB 722/55, Draft Report of the Working Party on Toa Payoh, undated, c. 1955. Table 1.4: Population and Economic Characteristics of Urban Kampong Dwellers 
Urban Kampong  No. of Families  Estimated No. of Families 
Engaged in Farming 
Queenstown 210  210 
Kampong Henderson  122  122 
MacPherson Road  377  300 
Toa Payoh  780  200 
Kampong Silat/Tiong Bahru  3,750  - 
Kampong Bugis  320  - 
Kampong Soopoo  280  - 
Henderson Road  400  - 
Bukit Ho Swee  1,670  - 
Adapted from Singapore, Report of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party 
(1956), pp. 14-15. 
 
rear poultry and pigs and plant vegetables to augment their wages. Conversely the 
pig farmers did irregular work in the Central Area as labourers, lorry drivers and 
artisans to supplement their incomes.
100 Covent Garden, seated astride the western 
end of the Singapore River, was known to the Chinese as Hong Lim Pa Sat.
101 It had 
a mixed population of urban and semi-urban dwellers, while the numerous godowns 
and warehouses in the kampong indicated how the livelihood of its inhabitants was 
chiefly tied to the entrepot trade. Joyce Soh, born there in 1947, belonged to a large 
extended family headed by her grandfather and his seven sons. He was well-known 
to his neighbours as a builder of twakows and tongkangs, the crafts plying the river 
transferring goods from larger ships to the numerous warehouses on the quays along 
the riverfront.
102 My mother, Loh Siew Har (born 1952) lived nearby in a wooden 
house on the banks of the Singapore River off Kim Seng Road with her mother and 
four brothers. Her father also worked on the twakows.
103 
 
Despite the expansion of industry and building construction in postwar 
Singapore, the colony remained in the firm grip of the entrepot trade economy. This 
formal economy was supported by a large ‘shadow economy’, a service sector which 
had developed as a means of absorbing surplus labour produced by rapid population 
                                                 
100 Horsley, Resettlement of a Community, pp. 78-79, 95. 
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102 Author’s interview with Joyce Soh, 5 Apr 2007. 
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  46increase. The 1957 census states that more than two-thirds of the economically-
active population were employed in three sectors connected directly or indirectly to 
the entrepot trade: ‘commerce’ (26%), ‘transport, storage and communications’ 
(11%), and ‘services’ (34%). Only 14% of the labour force was in manufacturing, 
while the postwar expansion of building and construction had raised the percentage 
of workers in that industry to 5%. Two-thirds of the employment were in unskilled 
or semi-skilled occupations, such as ‘craftsmen, production process workers and 
labourers’ (31.4%), ‘sales workers’ (18.3%) and ‘service, sport, entertainment, and 
recreation workers’ (17%). The Chinese population was over-represented in the first 
two categories and in ‘agricultural workers’ and ‘fishermen’. The typical urban or 
semi-urban kampong dweller was likely to work in low- and middle-income jobs 
which accounted for more than half of all occupations, such as clerical workers 
(comprising 11.9% of economically-active persons in the 1957 census); unskilled or 
general labourers (nearly 10%); workers in domestic service, hospitals, hotels, clubs, 
and restaurants (10%); hawkers, street vendors and stallholders (7.9%); rail, road 
and ship transport workers (7.5%); agricultural smallholders and market gardeners 
(5.2%).
104 Except for the last, these occupations were typically located in the City 
and would have tied the worker to it and the workplace.  
 
However, it should be noted that the employment of urban and semi-urban 
dwellers was complex and ought to be construed in terms of shades of economic 
activity. There was much under-employment or part-time and irregular employment, 
giving rise to a large pool of the so-called ‘self-employed’. This included hawkers 
and stallholders (frequently itinerant and unlicensed), trishaw riders and taxi drivers 
(which included drivers of ‘pirate’ or unlicensed taxis):
105  
 
[The] hawkers of food and other things [who] with the small traders 
and trishaw riders and others form a numerous group of ‘self-
employed’….many who seek a livelihood in such occupations can 
                                                 
104 Chua, Report on the Census of Population 1957, pp. 82, 85, 88. 
105 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey, p. 21; G. J. Brocklehurst, Report to the Government of 
Singapore on Social Security Measures (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 47. 
  47hardly be regarded as fully employed in them, while they equally 
cannot well be regarded as unemployed.
106 
 
The number of hawkers was acknowledged to be ‘unascertainable’ since it included 
both professional hawkers and unemployed people who had temporarily taken up the 
occupation.
107 In addition, there was a large pool of ‘casual labour’, such as dock 
workers and building and construction labourers, who were ‘paid daily’ and moved 
‘at frequent intervals from one job, and one employer, to another’.
108  Such 
flexibility and mobility of work was characteristic of the low-income group in an 
entrepot economy, unfettered by the social discipline of factory wage work. In a 
kampong along Rochor Canal at the eastern fringe of the City, the breadwinners 
were mostly workers in the service or manufacturing industries or hawkers, living on 
irregular incomes and residing within three miles of their workplace.
109 The nature 
of work suggests a greater ability and willingness among low-income Chinese to 
move places, proof of which was the existence of the group of ‘semi-urban’ 
kampong dwellers. A 1957 social report stated that while a quarter of the population 
were residing in the rural areas, many were employed in the urban area.
110  
                                                
 
Direct Arrivals 
 
What is also often not realised was how many migrants from Malaya, China 
and other countries were arriving directly in the urban kampongs after the war. The 
act of bypassing the traditional reception zone in the Central Area suggests that 
Chinese families were looking at home and workplace in a radically altered way. 
The Land Office reported in 1948 that ‘every departmental request for a site on 
Crown Land involved the disturbance of aliens many of whom drifted into 
Singapore during or immediately before the occupation’.
111 The Social Welfare 
Department, in appraising the proliferation of unauthorised wooden housing, 
 
106  Singapore,  Report of the Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 3;  
107 Brocklehurst, Report to the Government of Singapore on Social Security Measures, p. 9. 
108 Singapore, Report of the Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood, p. 3. 
109  Chua Chap Jee, Case-study of an Urban Slum in Singapore, unpublished academic exercise, 
Department of Geography, University of Singapore, 1966, pp. 22-23a. 
110 Brocklehurst, Report to the Government of Singapore on Social Security Measures, p. 9. 
111 Commissioner of Lands, Annual Report 1948, p. 7. 
  48concurred that ‘there had been a steady influx of population into Singapore from 
neighbouring countries’.
112 A substantial stream of this movement into the urban 
kampongs from outside Singapore, particularly immediately after the war, was of an 
emergency nature: 
 
There has been a considerable influx of population caused through 
the political chaos in the Netherlands East Indies. The reoccupying 
military forces have claimed priority for whatever accommodation 
they require and it has been a problem of real difficulty to find 
alternative billets so as to set free such buildings which are required 
for rehabilitation purposes…. 
 
The housing situation in Singapore is also greatly aggravated by the 
fact that many people from the rural areas have found it necessary to 
come to Singapore to live in order to be near the very meagre 
supplies of food and clothing which have been available in the last 
few years. The result of this is that much land in the Municipal area 
which was vacant before the War, has now been occupied by 
unauthorised squatters….The number of squatters in unauthorised 
occupation of land must run into many thousands.
113 
 
In addition, there had been a ‘considerable influx of population from the [Malayan] 
mainland during the recent state of emergency’ into wooden dwellings.
114 
 
Besides the ‘push’ supplied by political crises in Malaya, China and the 
Netherlands East Indies, many migrants seeking family or work also arrived directly 
in the urban kampongs. Leo van Grunsven argues that a large proportion were 
married women with children joining their husbands in Singapore.
115 In 1978, he 
surveyed 229 Chinese migrant households in Kampong Potong Pasir, northeast of 
the Central Area. He found the largest proportion, 37%, to have arrived in Singapore 
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  49between 1950 and 1959, compared to 19% prior to 1950 and 22% between 1960 and 
1969.
116 Van Grunsven also discovered that, of the Chinese migrant household 
heads, 23% had come from the Central Area, 38% from urban areas outside it, 4% 
from the rural area, and 34% from outside Singapore. Of the 83 migrant household 
heads who had arrived in Potong Pasir in 1950-1959, 39% had come from the 
Central Area, 33% from urban areas outside it, 2% from the rural area, and 27% 
from outside Singapore. These findings support three key conclusions: a substantial 
outflow from the Central Area; heavy movement between urban kampongs; and a 
large proportion of direct arrivals in Potong Pasir who bypassed the Central Area.
117 
                                                
 
In 1954, the first full working year of the Immigration Ordinance, more than 
3,000 Chinese wives and children arrived from China. This prompted fears that, 
while this inflow ‘is no doubt desirable from eugenic and other points of view, their 
arrival aggravates the Colony’s serious problems of overcrowding and strains still 
further the social services being provided’.
118 The parents of Tay Yan Woon (born 
1943) had married and had children in China, before first Tay’s father and then his 
wife left for Singapore. They arrived in Si Kah Teng (Kampong Tiong Bahru), just 
south of Bukit Ho Swee: 
 
My parents were from China. My mother came to Singapore when 
she was still very young, around 20 odd years old at that time. Two of 
my elder brothers, one younger brother and me, the four of us were 
born in Singapore. Another two of my elder brothers and one sister 
remained in China. My mother joined my father in Singapore, who 
lived in Si Kah Teng at that time, and we were born there. But not 
long after, when I was 4 or 5 at the most, Si Kah Teng was burned. 
Then we moved to Bukit Ho Swee, rented an attap house, where we 
reared some livestock.
119 
 
 
116 Leo van Grunsven, Patterns of Housing and Intra-urban Migration: Part 2: A Case Study of 
Kampong Potong Pasir (Utrecht: Geografisch Instituut, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1983), p. 35. 
117 Van Grunsven, Patterns of Housing and Intra-urban Migration Part 2, p. 95. 
118 Singapore, ‘Population’, Annual Report 1954, p. 15. 
119 Author’s interview with Tay Yan Woon, 28 Sep 2006. 
  50Unlike Tay, Beh Swee Kim’s family came from Malaya but for similar 
reasons. In 1954, when she was 12, Beh, with her parents, six younger brothers and 
two younger sisters, moved from their hometown, Taiping, in the state of Perak, 
Malaya, to Singapore. They stayed in a shophouse at Alexandra, west of the Central 
Area, before she married and moved to an attap house in Bukit Ho Swee. Her father, 
who had worked as a teacher and a clerk in Taiping, did not want to remain in 
Malaya and came instead to Singapore to make a living.
120 Likewise, for Sim Kim 
Boey, born in the 1930s in a kampong in Batu Pahat in the state of Johor, marriage 
led to her settling down in Bukit Ho Swee: 
 
My husband is a Singaporean and I married him here. It was arranged 
and I didn’t know him previously. His family knew my father so they 
arranged it. He was a manual worker, that was common in those 
days.
121 
 
Wong Pok Hee’s family, too, arrived from Johor and rented a cheap attap 
house in Bukit Ho Swee for ten dollars. Wong (born 1941) explained that family 
tragedy, rather than the war, was instrumental in their relocation: 
 
I was born in Pontian, a small town in Johor. We were still in Johor 
when the Japanese invaded Malaya. We communicated with them, 
we borrowed some pens from them. [Laughs] They did not disturb us. 
I came to Singapore when I was six. My father had already passed 
away then. Previously he was a sawmill worker and built houses, 
then he felt sick one day and passed away. The rest of our family 
came to Singapore because we had nothing for making a livelihood in 
Johor. At that time, there was no need for passports. I had an elder 
brother and four siblings, three elder sisters, seven of us including our 
mother. I was the fifth child, the youngest. I had a younger brother 
who was given to our relative in Malaysia and didn’t come over.
122 
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  51In 1947, the urban kampong population was estimated at 127,000. Between 
1936 and 1947, it had increased from 26,000 to 56,000 in the Outram and Kampong 
Bahru areas in Mukim I west of the Central Area; and from 28,000 to 50,000 in 
Braddell, Toa Payoh and Bukit Timah in Mukim XVII to the north. In the east, the 
urban kampong population had risen from 24,000 to 37,000 in Kallang and Paya 
Lebar in Mukim XXIV; from 2,500 to 10,000 in Geylang Serai (part of Mukim 
XXIII); and from 25,000 to 38,000 in Siglap in Mukim XXVI. These changes 
marked an overall population increase of 60%. The health authorities reported that 
there were seventeen kampongs in Mukim I and about thirty others in other areas, all 
of which were ‘being added to daily’.
123  
 
Driven by reasons of emergency and family reunion, the urban kampong 
population swelled in the 1950s. In 1952, unauthorised wooden constructions were 
reportedly increasing at the rate of thirty a month.
124 By 1959, most of an estimated 
10,000 wooden houses in Singapore were located at the fringes of the City.
125 In 
1953, the SIT’s survey of wooden dwellings in the City found the population risen 
to 185,000, an increase of 46%.
126 Both the 1955 Master Plan and the 1956 Land 
Clearance and Resettlement Working Party estimated some 41,000 families, or 
246,000 persons, resided in wooden dwellings in the urban area.
127 The Master Plan 
report similarly warned that the proliferation of the ‘attap’ areas had become a major 
social concern.
128 Massive fires in Kampong Koo Chye in 1958, Kampong Tiong 
Bahru in 1959 and Kampong Bukit Ho Swee in 1961 rendered, respectively, 2,050, 
5,220 and 15,694 persons homeless. Despite the fires, and substantial clearance and 
resettlement in other kampongs, the number of urban kampong dwellers remained at 
200,000-250,000 in 1961, an increase of 58-97% over the 1947 figure. These 
numbers are estimates but the growth rate of the urban kampong population was 
evidently much higher than that taking place in the Central Area. 
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  52  The exodus into the urban kampongs was accelerated by the involuntary 
relocation of people due to private and public development projects. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, the state played a key role here, since its postwar 
development programme for more schools, hospitals, houses, and roads were forcing 
the eviction of numerous families living in wooden houses.
129 Conversely, the 
acceptance of certain urban kampongs as ‘tolerated attap areas’ under the 1955 
Master Plan, also discussed in Chapter 3, encouraged a spurt in the construction of 
unauthorised wooden dwellings in these settlements.
130 Chapter 5, in addition, 
examines how the victims of the great urban kampong fires in the 1950s constituted 
another movement, either to another kampong or even back to the fire site to erect 
new temporary dwellings. Most families dishoused by eviction or fire refused the 
offer of SIT accommodation because they found the new location inconvenient for 
work or the rents too high. They commonly settled instead into dense urban 
kampongs which were not easily cleared.
131 By not building affordable permanent 
housing for those evicted, the government’s very ‘success’ in demolishing one area 
of unauthorised housing contributed directly to the in-filling of the remaining urban 
kampongs.
132  
 
Mobile Families and ‘Unscrupulous Racketeers’ 
 
  In contrast, private builders of unauthorised wooden housing, some 
registered, others illegal, responded vigorously to the growing demand for cheap 
housing within City limits. The urban kampong dwellers did not usually build their 
housing themselves. Ostensibly, ‘[t]he squatter is not an experienced house builder, 
he wastes materials, makes constructional mistakes, or engages second rate “skilled 
labour”’.
133  Consequently it was considered that ‘[s]elf-help housing is 
impracticable in Singapore’ as the dwellers usually engaged a building contractor.
134 
In December 1958, Lim Koon Teck, the Progressive Party Assemblyman for Paya 
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  53Lebar, informed the Assembly that these builders were constructing houses on 
leased or vacant lands without submitting plans to the City Council for approval and 
making a profit of $2,000 per dwelling. The rackets were ‘spreading like wildfire’ 
and building hundreds of houses every week. As Lim pointed out, many people were 
purchasing ‘flimsy houses which require constant repair, without light or water, and 
sometimes no drainings, and…liable to be pulled down over their ears’, and in 
addition still had to pay rent to the landowner.
135  
 
In particular, the People’s Action Party
136 strongly represented the builders 
as illegal and unscrupulous ‘racketeers’. In December 1957, the party, still in 
opposition in the Legislative Assembly as a socialist, anti-colonial party, won the 
most number of seats (13 out of 32) in the 1957 City Council elections.
137 The new 
Mayor of the City, Ong Eng Guan, a rising star in the party, announced a ‘new 
kampong policy’ and pledged to ‘reverse the old policy of neglecting our people 
who live in the kampong’.
138 Simultaneously accusing the colonial bureaucracy of 
corruption, Ong charged that ‘unscrupulous builders, in liaison with officials of our 
Building and Surveyors’ Department, have built many unauthorised structures and 
sold them to innocent victims at huge profits, who later found out that their houses 
are unauthorised’.
139 He urged the need to ‘ruthlessly suppress the profiteering and 
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  54exploitation of innocent people by building contractors of unauthorised huts’.
140 
After the PAP came to power in the May 1959 elections, the HDB, formed in 
February 1960 to spearhead its housing programme, resolved that ‘[d]rastic action 
has to be taken to crack down on racketeers and to nip nefarious activities in the 
bud’.
141 The Board maintained that the problem was a social one, deeply embedded 
in the kampongs, since the ‘racketeers’ were frequently the chief-tenants of the 
wooden dwellings and were ‘generally persons with secret society connections’.
142  
 
  The PAP’s binary social representations of ‘unscrupulous racketeers’ and 
‘gullible people’ fueled its drive to eradicate unauthorised dwellings and build 
public housing. Nevertheless, to urban kampong dwellers, concerns with ‘legality’ 
and ‘scruples’ ranked low against the basic need for affordable, suitable housing. 
What mattered to them were the ease of building wooden housing – an attap house 
could literally be constructed overnight – or, more often, of finding one to rent. Lee 
Ah Gar was part of a family of five staying in a wooden house at 12-E Beo Lane 
immediately after the war, at the western tip of the Singapore River. His father, a 
hawker selling rojak, was not doing well. A visit to Geylang Serai kampong, at the 
eastern part of the City, offered an opportunity to improve their livelihood. The 
decision to uproot to the other side of the City was made as easily as the rapid 
construction of a wooden house at the new site: 
 
My father had a friend who lived in Geylang Serai, so he and my 
mother went there to take a look, and found that the crowd there was 
much bigger! So wouldn’t it be better if we sold rojak there? So my 
father went there and found a spot, a piece of land, with his friend, 
and he built a house on that spot. I tell you, last time it was all attap 
houses. We went to the construction company to buy all the materials, 
the wooden boards and such, then got the construction company to 
get it done for us. There was no registration. 
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  55Finding a wooden house for rent, as Lee explained, required no official 
assistance and depended simply on 
 
recommendation from neighbours and friends. Say, if I know you, I'll 
ask if you have houses for rent at your side. You could also go out to 
look yourself. Unlike now, when you have to knock on doors, the 
attap houses then were open. You just go door to door asking, 
“Auntie or uncle, do you have a room for rent?”
143 
 
Lily Wee, who grew up in a family of eight, moved between contiguous kampongs 
in Bukit Ho Swee, Tiong Bahru and Henderson west of the Singapore River after the 
war. Mutual help was important in finding a wooden dwelling to rent: 
 
You needed a house, you just looked around. It was very easy to find. 
Especially, there was no television, right? By word of mouth. You 
said you are looking for a house. Then somebody would say, there is 
a house down there, and then you went to see. Last time, there was no 
agent. Actually there were but if you had relatives living here and 
living there, you would tell somebody and somebody would tell you, 
down there, the house is empty. You could get things done very 
quickly in a kampong, it was very easy if you needed help.
144 
 
‘Continuous moving’ was a common frame of experience for many urban 
kampong dwellers in the Bukit Ho Swee locality. Tan Geok Hak was born in 1929 
in an attap house in Zion Road at the western tip of the Singapore River. Her family 
moved repeatedly to rental housing nearby, mostly wooden, occasionally a 
shophouse: at Covent Garden, Indus Road, Ganges Avenue, and finally, Bukit Ho 
Swee. Tan’s relocation from Ganges Avenue was involuntary, as they were being 
evicted. But her final move to Bukit Ho Swee in 1959 was to fulfill a personal need: 
she had married by 1954 and had three children subsequently and so ‘had to find a 
place for my family’. Tan added,  
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  56At that time, it was not possible to rent from the government, so we 
rented from someone. So we kept moving. It was not stable. Last 
time, if you want to rent a room [in public housing], it was very 
difficult. So we kept renting attap houses until the [1961 Bukit Ho 
Swee] fire. After the fire, we lived in public housing.
145 
 
The challenge of finding the next suitable house was also replicated in the 
early life of Tan Ah Kok, born in 1932 and adopted by a couple. Her experiences of 
moving were governed by family events. Tan grew up in a small family of four in a 
rented room inside an attap house behind King’s Theatre; this was in Si Kah Teng 
and the proximate site where the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire started. But when her 
adopted father passed away and the family could not afford the rent, they went to 
live in a kampong in Leng Kee Sua, near Alexandra, where her mother had married 
another man. He was a twakow coolie but had become a temporary market gardener 
during the Japanese Occupation due to the cessation of trade. After the war, when he 
resumed his former work, her family went back to their previous landlord in Si Kah 
Teng, where the rent – $2.50 a month – was ‘very cheap’. Tan stayed there until 
1952, when she got married and rented an entire attap house for her family near the 
Great World Amusement Park nearby. Tan had found the last place through word of 
mouth: 
 
People recommended it to us. Someone whom we knew in Bukit Ho 
Swee, their second aunt was staying at the Great World. We were 
looking for a place. She said the place was good, it had 2 rooms and a 
hall, so there was no need to share with another family. Her mother-
in-law had built the house and was looking for people to rent. 
 
Finding an attap house, for Tan, was not daunting:  
 
People last time did not advertise in the newspapers. [Laughs] In the 
past, it was through recommendations. Let’s say, we heard that you 
wanted to rent a house, and if there was one available, I will tell you 
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to go and rent it. If you find the house good, then it’s OK. If you 
don’t find it good, then you won’t take it.
146 
 
  Kampong Bukit Ho Swee and other urban kampongs were consequently 
products of an important social transformation in postwar Singapore. The movement 
of low-income Chinese families into previously vacant spaces at the margins of the 
City had radically altered the urban landscape. Customarily depicted as historically 
inert or gullible, the low-income urban Chinese family was changing then, not just in 
its size and composition but also in its attitudes towards family life, housing and 
movement. Whether they had left the Central Area by force of circumstance, or 
arrived directly in the urban periphery due to war, emergency or family reunion, for 
many, albeit not all of them, the traditional reluctance to move out of range of 
shophouse or workplace was eroding. In its place was a growing willingness to 
move, even move repeatedly, to seize an opportunity or take a risk for a better life 
for one’s family. The new mobility of the Chinese families gave rise to large 
settlements of unauthorised wooden dwellings like Bukit Ho Swee and destabilised 
established patterns of housing laid out by the British colonial planners. The 
accommodation in the urban kampongs was dismal, but they were arguably ‘slums 
of hope’, where their residents, with their children, were in search of a new future.
147 
 
146 Author’s interview with Tan Ah Kok, 22 Mar 2007. 
147 Author’s interview with Ann Wee, 1 Nov 2006. Chapter 2 
‘Black Area’ 
 
  Kampong Bukit Ho Swee in the 1950s, as Map 2.1 shows, lay in the growing 
quarter of unauthorised wooden housing at the tail end of the Singapore River, two 
miles from the Central Area. Covering a rectangular area of about 135 acres, under 
half a mile wide and a fifth of that deep, it was by no means the largest kampong in 
the area, being dwarfed by Si Kah Teng
1 across Tiong Bahru Road. This was one of 
the two main roads which bounded Bukit Ho Swee, the other being Havelock Road 
to the north. On the kampong’s eastern and western flanks were Outram Road and 
the Tiong Bahru sewerage works respectively. The Havelock and Outram roads led 
into the Central Area, showing the direction of the pell mell development of wooden 
housing. Cutting through Bukit Ho Swee were two roads, Beo Lane and Bukit Ho 
Swee, which met close to Tiong Bahru Road. At the kampong’s north-eastern corner 
ran Carey Road and Chancellor Road, short lanes terminating at the foot of the hill, 
on which stood a disused Cantonese cemetery named Lok Yah Teng, but which the 
locals called Ma Kau Thiong.
2 Besides Si Kah Teng, there was a substantial wooden 
housing development north of Havelock Road and in the twakow-building area, 
Hong Lim Pa Sat,
3 and to the south, in Kampong Silat, Bukit Merah and Telok 
Blangah. Wooden and permanent housing struggled for space; Bukit Ho Swee was 
surrounded by the SIT’s Henderson, Bukit Merah, Delta-Havelock, and Tiong Bahru 
housing estates. These estates were fairly small except for the last, which nestled 
between Bukit Ho Swee and the built-up area of ‘Big Town’ to the southeast. 
 
  Kampong Bukit Ho Swee was a typical kampong in 1950s Singapore, 
possessing a geographically mobile low-income population which had found new 
                                                 
1 The local Hokkien name for Kampong Tiong Bahru, referring to the four-legged pavilion shelters in 
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3 The local Hokkien name for Covent Garden. 
  59Map 2.1: Localities of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, 1960 
 
Sources: Maps 80-81, Street Directory and Guide to Singapore (Singapore: Survey Department, 1957) and oral history interviews. 
  60homes in unauthorised wooden housing built on the hilly land and disused graves in the 
area. This chapter charts the development of Chinese family life in Bukit Ho Swee and 
nearby kampongs from the early twentieth century to the emergence of a semi-
autonomous social and economic community in the 1950s. As a result of their character, 
despite their proximity to the heart of the City, the kampongs were perceived by the 
state as ‘black areas’, notorious for crime, gangsterism and insanitary living. This 
chapter contends that urban kampong life, as actually experienced by various groups of 
dwellers themselves – the men, women and children – was different from such a 
preconception. 
 
Origins 
 
Little is known about the origins of Bukit Ho Swee, since much of the literature 
on early colonial Singapore has focussed on the more developed areas. Ho Chui Sua, its 
Hokkien name, while translating scenically as ‘river’, ‘water’ and ‘hill’ (‘河水山’), was 
derived from the hill (‘Bukit’), its dominant geographical feature, and the name of a 
Chinese merchant, Tay Ho Swee. Tay, born in Singapore in 1834, dealt in teak, opium 
and spirits.
4 According to a descendant, Tay had acquired Bukit Ho Swee from the 
Crown, on which hill he constructed two large bungalows, one for residence and the 
other for the family’s ancestral tablets. There was, at the time, opium and pepper 
cultivation on the hill but no other houses. When Tay died in 1903, his sons built ‘more 
than ten’ attap houses for let, with some ‘70-80’ people residing in them before World 
War Two. Living largely on the rentals, the family’s fortunes had apparently 
deteriorated as the residential bungalow and then the ‘ancestral’ house were sold off, the 
latter around 1947. Both buildings were destroyed in the 1961 fire and Tay’s land 
acquired with compensation by the government.
5 
                                                 
4 Song  Ong  Siang,  One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 119. 
5 OHC, interview with Tay Kim Oh, 12 Jun 1989. 
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Plate 2.1: Tay Ho Swee, year unknown (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
  The building of attap houses on Bukit Ho Swee coincided with Chinese leaving 
the Central Area in the early decades of the twentieth century. In 1908, when the 
Municipal Commissioners, after re-numbering Havelock Road, named three private 
roads along that stretch of Bukit Ho Swee – Carey Road, Bukit Ho Swee and Beo Lane 
– the area was observed to contain ‘a number of plank and attap houses’.
6 In the 1920s, 
Tiong Bahru was already covered with wooden houses, ‘some on the hilly ground and 
many on stilts over the swamps with boards leading from hut to hut’, all lacking proper 
sanitation and drainage.
7 By 1932, a dense collection of both permanent and temporary 
structures had sprung up in the hilly area encircled by Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee 
[road], with the former typically lining the roads and the latter gravitating inwards. This 
                                                 
6 Municipal Commission, Minutes of Proceedings of the Municipal Commissioners, 13 Dec 1907 and 28 
Feb 1908. A few months before, in December 1907, Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee were given each 
other’s names, before the ‘residents and owners [probably the Tay family] of property in the higher part 
of Havelock Road’ petitioned successfully for the names to be swapped. 
7 SIT 744/50, Draft Memo on the History and Development of Tiong Bahru Estate, 1950. 
  62area, adjacent to Ma Kau Thiong, had been a Hokkien cemetery.
8 Permanent buildings 
also stood along Havelock Road, particularly at the Carey Road corner.
9  
 
  One of the early arrivals to the kampong was Wan Hong Cheong, who came to 
Singapore in 1920 at the age of sixteen with his parents and two younger sisters from 
Fukien province. Initially staying in the Central Area where they had disembarked, they 
then moved to rural Hougang before shifting to Bukit Ho Swee, where a fellow villager 
from China was residing and where it was more convenient to find work. Through 
friends, Wan did construction work at Hong Lim Pa Sat and also dabbled in other 
manual jobs. According to Wan, most households in inter-war Bukit Ho Swee were 
families, not singles. Apparently, 8 or 9 out of 10 dwellers in the 1920s were Hokkiens 
from Anxi Province in China. Many were bullock cart drivers, transporting rice and 
other goods from ships to warehouses and rearing a few cattle each; others cultivated 
vegetable plots. Wan’s family rented a small room in an attap house for $3 a month, 
sharing the house with another family. The dwellings, of which there were quite a few, 
were plank and attap but Wan remembered a Western-style bungalow owned by the Tay 
family, from whom his own family had rented. Some of the attap houses were let out for 
$3-5 per month and sublet for $1-2. The dwellings, Wan recalled, were not closely-built, 
with adequate space for the bullock carts to move through. Tan Kah Kee, the well-
known Chinese businessman, established a large biscuit factory at Beo Lane. The 
typical elements of kampong life by the 1950s had become readily apparent to locals: 
the collection of water from public standpipes along Havelock Road, which the 
inhabitants called Or Kio Tau,
10 the lack of sanitation with the rains washing out cattle 
dung into the open and pigs eating at the toilet area, the poorly maintained earthen 
tracks running through the kampong, and the presence of secret societies. Nonetheless, 
security was ‘not bad, quite good’, for although ‘there were many samsengs’ 
[‘gangsters’], they did not cause trouble unless provoked. Overall, Wan surmised, there 
was not much official control. His family resided for more than two years at Bukit Ho 
                                                 
8 Singapore, Report of the Committee Regarding Burial and Burial Grounds (Singapore: Government 
Printing Office, 1952), p. 19. 
9 FMS Survey 19/1932, Map of Singapore Town, 1932. 
10 Literally, ‘at the head of the black-painted bridge’ in Hokkien, referring to referring to the portion of 
Havelock Road before the Delta Circus. 
  63Swee before moving to Jurong.
11 Yet, according to Yeo Chin Hwa, another early 
resident, 1920s Bukit Ho Swee was far less urbanised: ‘In the early days, the villagers 
here worked as bullock cart drivers, manufactured mee or grew vegetables. Few worked 
in the city. In the past there were very few coffeeshops here. Even to drink a cup of 
coffee, we had to go far away’.
12 
 
Fire, Bombs and Sentries 
 
Catastrophe first torched Bukit Ho Swee on 8 August 1934. The disaster 
indicated the permanent establishment of Chinese family life on the hill and warned the 
authorities of the difficulties of both subduing an urban kampong blaze and providing 
for the fire victims. The fire, started by an unascertained cause
13 at 12.15 pm in an attap 
house on the eastern side of Si Kah Teng and fanned by a strong wind, spread with 
‘lightning rapidity’ to engulf three densely-settled kampongs with more than 500 
Chinese and Malay attap houses, burning down Bukit Ho Swee before jumping 
Havelock Road. At about 2 pm, it was subdued by fire-fighters making a stand on the 
flat ground at the foot of the hill. Even then, it took a ‘kindly change’ in the wind 
direction to turn the flames away from the timber yards and godowns of Covent 
Garden.
14  
 
Chinese families counted prominently among the fire victims. 1,989 fire victims 
(1,032 women and 957 men) were registered, comprising ‘humble Chinese coolies, 
Malay labourers and their wives and dependents’.
15 Most were coolies working on the 
ships plying the Singapore River and their families, underlining the area’s link to the 
entrepot economy. While some of the fire victims were single men living in the nearby 
coolie lines, others were shipping coolies and clerks who had settled down and married, 
                                                 
11 OHC, interview with Wan Hong Cheong, 24 Aug 1984. 
12 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. 
13 A Chinese newspaper suggested that the fire might be due to the frying of pig lard. NYSP, 10 Aug 1934. 
14 ST, 9 Aug 1934; MT, 9 Aug 1934; NYSP, 9 Aug 1934. 
15 NYSP, 11 Aug 1934; ST, 9 Aug 1934, 10 Aug 1934. Initial estimates ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 
fire victims. 
  64indicating how the immigration policies of the early 1930s had nurtured Chinese family 
life and directed it partially into the urban kampongs. The Havelock Road wooden 
houses, intended initially as temporary accommodation,
16 had been occupied by the in-
migrating families. More than 600 homeless persons were temporarily housed at the 
nearby Great World Amusement Park, comprising 300 women, 200 men and over 100 
children. These were the poorest fire victims who could not obtain accommodation 
from relatives or friends. Journalists saw ‘an ill-dressed Chinese woman getting into a 
ricksha with two infant babies in her arms and around her feet all that remained of her 
water-soaked and charred belongings’,
17  while after the fire, ‘[s]tricken families 
searched among the ruins for trifles left behind’.
18 
 
The colonial municipal administration stated afterwards that its policy was to 
prohibit inflammable wooden housing from the town area and to gradually demolish 
those still in existence. It had also sought to ensure that wooden housing in planned 
kampongs conformed to building by-laws and maintain adequate space between the 
dwellings.
19 The fire demonstrated that the official measures taken had not successfully 
managed and contained the fire hazard in the urban kampongs. The flames had been put 
out on the flat ground near the Singapore River, from which water could be pumped to 
the fire engines at high pressure.
20 However, they were unstoppable on the hill, which 
was already ablaze when the fire engines arrived, yet that was precisely where so many 
families lived. Once started, neither the fire brigade nor the kampong dwellers, who 
doused the roofs of their houses, could stem the advancing flames. But the locals 
reacted swiftly to the fire alarm, as ‘[f]aster than the fire spread the alarm and houses 
were vacated’.
21 No lives were lost on this occasion, and in subsequent kampong fires, 
despite the great numbers of fire victims, reported deaths often remained few.  
 
                                                 
16 ST, 9 Aug 1934. 
17 ST, 9 Aug 1934. 
18 ST, 9 Aug 1934. 
19 ST, 9 Aug 1934. 
20 MT, 9 Aug 1934. 
21 ST, 9 Aug 1934. 
  65The disaster elicited strong expressions of sympathy from social organisations 
and businessmen. The Hokkien Huay Kuan mobilised a substantial contingent of 
volunteer workers to collect subscriptions from the Chinese community and urged the 
fire victims to go to Thian Hock Keng Temple at Telok Ayer for temporary housing. By 
11 August, the donations had exceeded the $10,000 mark, remarkable for an economy 
still recovering from the world slump. The fire victims each received $4 – roughly half 
the monthly wage of a Chinese labourer in the early 1930s
22 – from the Hokkien Huay 
Kuan’s relief fund, while efforts were made to find employment for those put out of 
work. The rehousing problem grew, as the number of victims residing at Great World 
had risen to 1,000 by then. On the 13
th, the Municipal Commission and the Chinese 
Protectorate moved a quarter of the fire victims, numbering 247 adults and 249 children, 
into a block of old 4-room SIT houses at Henderson Road previously slated for 
demolition.
23 The fire victims were given rent waivers but still had to pay for water and 
electricity.
24 The occupation was originally intended for a month but, at the end of 
August, it was extended by another month because, as the Secretary for Chinese Affairs 
admitted, there was ‘no chance of the Henderson Road houses being vacated’.
25 In 
October, however, the authorities were no longer willing to bear the financial costs of 
the occupation in the midst of the global depression. They decided to clear the premises. 
By mid-November, the fire victims had been removed from the Henderson Road houses, 
experiencing what amounted to a second round of dishousing.
26 
 
At this point, all efforts at rehabilitation ended. The Malaya Tribune, 
representing the views of the domiciled English-speaking community, had suggested 
that ‘[t]he conflagration was perhaps for the best – best, that is, in the interests of the 
victims themselves’, for whom the government should build modern, sanitary tenement 
                                                 
22 MRCA Jul 1932, pp. 31-32; Loh Kah Seng, Beyond ‘Rubber Prices’ History: Life in Singapore during 
the Great Depression Years, unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Department of History, National 
University of Singapore, 2004, p. 67. 
23 Municipal Commission, Minutes of Proceedings of the Municipal Commissioners, 10 Aug 1934. 
24 ST, 13 Aug 1934. 
25 SIT 714/34, Memo from Secretary of Chinese Affairs to Chairman, SIT, 31 Aug 1934. 
26 SIT 714/34, Memo from Secretary of Chinese Affairs to Chairman, SIT, 15 Nov 1934; Memo from 
Secretary of Chinese Affairs to Chairman, SIT, 19 Oct 1934. 
  66houses on the fire site.
27 A week later, however, it was noted that no permanent homes 
had been provided.
28 Between 1936 and 1941, the SIT built 784 flats and 54 tenements 
on the attap area to the southeast which became Tiong Bahru Estate, but this was a 
project first undertaken as early as 1927.
29 The family of Chua Beng Huat (born 1946) 
was dishoused by the 1934 fire but, as he explained, ‘they just moved back and started 
again. My parents never lived away from Bukit Ho Swee for long. The neighbours were 
important to my mother particularly’.
30 The attap ash-ridden ruins of prewar Bukit Ho 
Swee were reclaimed and rebuilt by the dwellers themselves. 
 
Then came the world war. Given the dearth of English-language official records 
on this period, the best alternative source is oral history. I do not pretend at a 
representative account of kampong life during the war, but oral history provides insights 
and memories into how the Japanese years touched the dwellers, from the bombs which 
abruptly and dramatically killed, to the Japanese checkpoints, which illustrated how the 
kampong’s economic life was suddenly overlaid with a Japanese security regime.  
 
The rain of bombs which signalled the start of the Japanese attack down the 
Malay peninsula towards Singapore targeted developed, built-up areas; consequently 
Bukit Ho Swee, as an urban kampong, was not spared. Air Raid Precaution (ARP) 
teams had been formed to help warn and evacuate the residents.
31 Lee Beng Kway, who 
had come to Singapore in 1931, was studying at Kai Kok Public School on the slopes of 
Bukit Ho Swee. One day, Lee as usual walked from his home in Ulu Pandan to school 
but found only the principal there, who told him the area had been bombed and warned 
him to go home. Walking down Havelock Road, Lee saw that more than ten attap 
houses had collapsed during the bombing raid and a team of men were digging out 
bodies. Lee ‘stood there watching for a while. Here and there were rows of bodies. 
There were elderly people and young adults, men and women, and children, arranged in 
                                                 
27 MT, 10 Aug 1934. 
28 ST, 11 Aug 1934, 16 Aug 1934. 
29 SIT, The Work of the Singapore Improvement Trust 1927-1947, p. 11; SIT 744/50, Draft Memo on the 
History and Development of Tiong Bahru Estate, 1950. 
30 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
31 One ARP volunteer recalled a bomb which landed at Eng Watt Street in the middle of Tiong Bahru 
Estate but failed to explode. OHC, interview with Tan Mok Lee, 26 Jul 2002. 
  67rows like fish being sold at the market. Some had missing arms and legs. There were 
also small children’.
32  
 
Yap Ah Sai, a tu tu hawker born in 1928, lived in the kampong until the 1961 
fire. Tan Kah Kee’s biscuit factory in Beo Lane where his mother worked was still 
operating at the time. As Yap recalled, the first Japanese bomb landed behind the 
factory, at the Tiong Bahru sewerage works. In their air raid drills, the kampong 
dwellers had learnt to extinguish their lights at night when the air raid sirens sounded 
and to dig wooden shelters. Yap had relatives in rural Bukit Timah and Changi but his 
family had stayed put, since ‘life for poor people was like that, whether there was a war 
or not’. Some residents, he recalled, were killed while trying to flee to Changi during 
the bombing raids.  
 
Making a living during the Japanese Occupation forced many dwellers to 
negotiate between their long-standing economic ties to the Central Area and the security 
controls and constraints imposed by the new regime. Public checkpoints, manned by 
Japanese sentries to whom passers-by had to bow and show their passes as a ‘rite of 
passage’, constituted the sudden creation of a ‘landscape of fear’.
33 There were, as Yap 
recalled, two or three sentry posts between Bukit Ho Swee and ‘Big Town’, mostly in 
Outram. He was relatively fortunate in being able to negotiate daily such checks to 
make a living in the Central Area. One of the sentries was friendly, teaching him to say 
‘ohayo gozaimasu’ (‘Good morning’), which he used with good effect for two months. 
Yap first sold the Syonan Times in ‘Big Town’, walking from the kampong to Outram 
to collect the newspapers at 4 am. Since few people bought the papers, he later became 
a stevedore at a godown with the help of a fellow kampong dweller. Yap would walk 
daily to Kampong Bahru where the godown was located. He worked there for half a 
year, carrying bags of flour and rice, earning 38 cents in the day and 46 cents at night. 
                                                 
32 OHC, interview with Lee Beng Kway, 8 Oct 1984. 
33 Brenda S. A. Yeoh & Kamalini Ramdas, ‘Remembering Darkness: Spectacle, Surveillance and the 
Spaces of Everyday Life in Syonan-to’, in P. Lim Pui Huen & Diana Wong (eds), War and Memory in 
Malaysia and Singapore, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 160, 172-73. 
  68Work was slack as the Japanese overseers left at noon to escape the heat, and he often 
only had to work for 4 out of 8 hours a day.
34 
 
Lee Ah Gar, whose family relocated briefly to Geylang Serai after the war, had 
just moved into an attap house at Beo Lane when the Japanese attacked. He knew about 
the devastation of the bombing: 
 
There were ground tremors when the planes started bombing, in rows of 
seven, 49 planes in all. When they came in – hong, hong, hong, hong – 
the ground shook. Down at Beo Lane, my father and I saw it with our 
own eyes. There were many female workers in the oil factory picking 
peanuts for making oil. There was supposed to be an air raid procedure, 
they had been warned not to run out in an air raid but to hide in the 
shelter in the factory until the warning siren stopped. That day was 
especially chaotic. 49 planes coming. One woman panicked, ran out and 
was hit by either a bomb or machine gun [fire]. She fell, her organs 
ripped out and spilling onto the road. The ARP could only pick up the 
organs and body parts and put them in a white bag, separate from the 
body. The organs were still moving like a snake. The hill was hit by 
bombs and fell over and the houses at the foot of the hill were buried by 
the landslide. Many families were killed and the rubbish trucks were 
filled with dead bodies. 
 
Lee, too, knew about the fear of encountering the Japanese checkpoints. One 
was located opposite the Havelock Road police station at the junction with Outram 
Road. There were stationed the Kempeitai, the Japanese military police. He related one 
frightening incident: 
 
When you walked past there, you must bow to them. There was a woman 
who paid no attention. They stripped her. Opposite was a coffeeshop, 
                                                 
34 OHC, interview with Yap Ah Sai, 3 Aug 1983. 
  69and a man was watching there. Seeing this, the Japanese could not stand 
it. The Japanese made him walk over. The man was also stripped, and 
the woman and the man were made to face each other and hit each other. 
We quickly walked away and didn’t know when they stopped. This was 
one Japanese checkpoint, and the next one at the junction of Cantonment 
Road and Outram Road, at the corner of New Bridge Road, was another 
dangerous area. The next one was at Bukit Pasoh [east of New Bridge 
Road]. 
 
It was common then to see people die. Most of the dead were sent to GH 
[General Hospital], and those with families would be claimed. Most 
people knew that you should just close the coffin but not nail the lid 
down. Some people who didn’t know nailed it down. When you reached 
the police station at the traffic junction, you had a big problem. The 
soldiers would stop you and check the coffins, using the bayonets of 
their rifles.
35 
 
The Shadow Economy 
 
  As had been the case after the 1934 fire, Bukit Ho Swee recovered from the 
ravages of war. The postwar years witnessed massive in-filling of wooden housing. The 
1948 Royal Air Force aerial photograph (Plate 2.2) indicates visible space between the 
dwellings around Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee [road] up to the lower slopes of Ma Kau 
Thiong, the unoccupied cemetery. By 1958, however, newly-built houses had sprung up 
in the previously open spaces (see Plate 2.3). In the official estimates, the kampong had 
231 wooden houses (totalling 2,772 dwellers) in 1948 and by 1957, 19,017 persons, 
while the 1961 fire rendered 2,800 families (15,694 people) homeless. The 
neighbouring larger Silat-Tiong Bahru kampong had 422 wooden houses (5,064 
                                                 
35 Author’s interview with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. 
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dwellers) in 1948 and by 1957, 45,675 persons.
36 Tay Ah Chuan, born in Bukit Ho 
Swee in 1939, observed that ‘when I was young, the houses were not so crowded. Later, 
they were joined to one another until they were very congested’. His father, a lorry 
driver who was previously a bullock cart driver, was a long-time resident in the area.
37 
 
  Bukit Ho Swee in the immediate postwar era was a slum of hope, whose 
dwellers were attempting to che lor (‘find a road’). They naturally gravitated towards 
the kampong’s roads, factories, coffeeshops, and graves, public spaces which marked 
out its social and economic contours. Much of the residents’ daily work and social life 
lay outside the discipline imposed by regular wage employment and the official norms 
of what was considered proper, safe and clean living, and was consequently considered 
local, loosely-structured or illegal.  
 
Although many of the residents were still economically tied to the Central Area, 
the kampong developed its own economy. This is not to de-emphasise the extent of 
unemployment (4.9% in 1957) or under-employment in Singapore but it illustrates how 
low-income Chinese families coped with such a predicament. Bukit Ho Swee’s local 
economy consequently managed to exist in a state of substantial, although not full, 
equilibrium, indicating how the irregular employment patterns characteristic of the 
wider economy had been, to a large extent, institutionalised in the kampong economy.
38 
As light secondary and small-scale industries grew in importance in the 1950s,
39 so the 
small-and medium-scale factories and shops dotted throughout Bukit Ho Swee provided 
localised work for many residents. The jobs were typically daily- or piece-rated, 
irregular, part- time, and low-paying, but they enabled family members to supplement 
the main household income or, if this was lacking, to pool resources together. Women 
 
36 The figures are from SIT 808/50, Memo by W. E. Hutchinson (Deputy Municipal Health Officer) to 
Municipal Health Officer, 31 Aug 1948, and Singapore, Report of the Land Clearance and Resettlement 
Working Party (Singapore: Printed at the Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 14-15; and P. 
Arumainathan, Report on the Census of Population 1970, Singapore (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office, 1973), p. 238. 
37 Author’s interviews with Tay Ah Chuan, 21 Feb 2006 and 13 Sep 2006. 
38  Iain Buchanan, ‘The Fringe-dwellers: Some Socio-economic Problems of Singapore’s Low-Cost 
Housing Scheme, with Particular Reference to the Resettlement of Squatters’, Geographica, 4, 1968, p. 
64. 
39 Singapore, Annual Report 1953, p. 76; Singapore, Annual Report 1957, p. 120. Plate 2.2: Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, 1948. Royal Air Force, Sortie No. 81/269, 1948 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
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Plate 2.3: Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, 1958. The wooden houses are now obviously more closely built together. The SIT has also built flats at Boon 
Tiong Road at the bottom right of the picture. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 81/8816, 1958 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
  73and youngsters, in particular, were important contributors to this economic life.
40 On 
average, a family of four in the 1950s could survive on a minimum of $102 a month.
41 
 
The roads of Bukit Ho Swee, historically the sites of major building and 
development, were nodes of economic activity. As Map 1 and Plate 1 in the Appendix 
show, the area bounded by Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee [road] remained the 
kampong’s most developed locale. Tan Kah Kee’s biscuit factory at 40 Beo Lane was 
now defunct but had been converted into warehouses storing commodities like coffee 
beans, dried chilli, rubber, and copra. There were also at the junction of the two roads a 
medical shop, a coffeeshop, a barber shop, and provisions shops, while down the hill 
towards Havelock Road stood numerous shophouses, more coffeeshops and teahouses, 
a vegetarian hall, laundry shops, barber shops, and soya sauce and peanut oil factories 
(one being the well-known Kwong Joo Seng ‘Chicken Brand’ soya sauce factory at the 
western edge of Beo Lane). 
 
The shopowners were the kampong’s wealthier residents and often had extended 
families living in the kampong’s larger and better-built wooden houses.
42 The family of 
Chua Beng Huat – his parents had returned after the 1934 fire with nine brothers and 
sisters – stayed at 60 Bukit Ho Swee at the junction of the two roads. They, according to 
Chua, owned ‘a big provision shop plus a big house with a very large sitting room and a 
very big room for storing flour because my dad had been trading in flour’. At the end of 
the war, his father started a transportation company, while his mother ran the provisions 
shop.
43 Another provisions shop, Yong Kee, was located above Havelock Road at 10 
Beo Lane, close to Kwong Joo Seng factory. It was established by Lim Soo Hiang’s 
grandmother after the family moved into the kampong at the time of the Japanese attack 
on Malaya. When the old lady passed away, Lim’s mother took over the running of the 
                                                 
40 Teh Weng Kuang, The Urban Squatters in Singapore: Its Growth and Clearance, unpublished Master’s 
Thesis in Urban Planning, Faculty of Architecture, University of Singapore, 1972, pp. 4.14-4.15. 
41 Goh Keng Swee, Urban Incomes and Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-54 
(Singapore: Department of Social Welfare, 1956), p. 125. 
42 Chua Beng Huat, ‘The Business of Living in Singapore’, in Kernial S. Sandhu & Paul Wheatley (eds), 
Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies), p. 1005. 
43 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
  74shop, while her father operated a camera shop in Change Alley in the town area. The 
couple and their seven children lived in two large bedrooms at the back of the 
provisions shop.
44 
 
Close by above Havelock Road, Tan Tiam Ho (born 1936), son of a lorry driver, 
stayed with his parents, grandmother and three sisters in an attap house. Having leased 
the land from the government, they built wooden houses and let them out each for $10-
15 a month. Because, as Tan explained, ‘my father was struggling to provide for the 
family’, his mother also worked in the Kwong Joo Seng factory, sorting through 
peanuts.
45 Such manual work was piece-rated and low-paying, as was sifting through 
bags of coffee beans in one of the warehouses at Beo Lane, which, according to Wang 
Ah Tee (born 1943), paid $3 per bag. Wang’s family of eleven resided at 37 Beo Lane; 
his father was a hawker, his elder brothers and sisters worked at the warehouse, while 
Wang was a restaurant assistant in ‘Little Town’.
46 Even so, ‘people then had no jobs 
and would even quarrel over the coffee bags’.
47 Brothers Lee Ah Gar and Lee Soo 
Seong (born 1938) and their family had moved into Beo Lane after their family’s fish-
rearing business in MacPherson was evicted from the area around 1940. Their father, 
Lee Chek Chin, initially worked in Kwong Joo Seng factory while Ah Gar, a teenager, 
helped out briefly in a provisions shop.
48 
 
More shops and half a dozen coffeeshops stood along Tiong Bahru Road to the 
south (see Map 2 and Plate 2 in the Appendix). The family of Tay Bok Chiu (born 1944) 
owned a small provisions shop in a 2-storey zinc-roofed building there, selling ikan bilis 
and fish, crabs, onions, dried chilli, noodles, and groceries. His father obtained his 
goods from the Central Area, transporting them back on his trishaw.
49 The father of 
                                                 
44 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
45 Author’s interview with Tan Tiam Ho, 12 Mar 2007. 
46 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
47 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
48 Author’s interviews with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006 and Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006. 
49 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. 
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Pang Ming Toh (born 1948) operated a barber shop in the area. It was fairly deep, and 
the business was carried out in the front while the family lived at the back.
50 
 
At Or Kio Tau, as Map 3 and Plate 3 in the Appendix indicate, and where Beo 
Lane reached Havelock Road, were numerous shops and other businesses. The 
dominating building here was the 3-storey shophouse along the main road owned by the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and built just before the war.
51 The shophouse’s 
upper storeys were residences but its ground storey was a focal point of economic 
activity: four coffeeshops, a Teochew porridge eating house, a barber shop, a Chinese 
medical hall, two provisions shops, a shop making clogs, and a Chinese bank. Born in 
1949 to a Hainanese family, Lim You Meng stayed in a sizeable attap house at 22 Beo 
Lane behind the shophouse. Lim’s father was a coffee maker in one of the coffeeshops, 
run by Lim’s uncle.
52 Another enterprise there was a charcoal shop named Hiap Soon, 
owned by the mother-in-law of Ong Ah Sai (born 1930), who when she married into the 
family lived there and ran the business.
53 
 
The registered enterprises at the shophouse jostled for space and profit with the 
unregulated activities which gravitated there. This was also the location of what the 
Chinese called the Or Kio Tau market.
54 One half of the bazaar was a wet market while 
cooked food was sold in the other. Among the bunches of vegetables laid out on the 
floor was kangkong, Lim You Meng observed, grown on the fertile soil at the sewerage 
works. As he recalled, the market was open the whole day; in the morning, food like 
char bee hoon and fritters was sold by the roadside, while in the afternoon, hawkers set 
up their business outside the market, selling groceries, yong tau foo and cloth. It was, 
according to Lim, ‘very lively in the afternoon and evening. You could just set up a 
simple stall to sell food, it was unregulated’.
55 Living on the outskirts of Hong Lim Pa
 
50 Author’s interview with Pang Ming Toh, 21 Oct 2006. 
51 According to Lee Ah Gar, the shophouse was named Goh Aup Aik at one point. Author’s interview 
with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. 
52 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
53 Author’s interview with Ong Ah Sai, 19 Apr 2007. 
54 The Mandarin name for the market was新和兴. 
55 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007.  
Plate 2.4: Bicycles and cars on the one-way Havelock Road. On the left is the dominant MCA 
shophouse, while across the road, mostly obscured, are wooden houses and small businesses, c. 
1950s (Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
 
Plate 2.5: A provisions shop located on the ground floor of the MCA shophouse, c. 1950s. On 
the right is a female trishaw hawker with hat (Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
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Plate 2.6: The empty space behind the MCA shophouse which sometimes served as a makeshift 
basketball court, c. 1950s. In the background is a row of two storey permanent housing. 
Walking towards the building is a hawker (Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
Sat, Teo Khoon Wah (born 1951) knew the market well: 
 
There was a market at Or Kio Tau which was Hong Lim Pa Sat’s rival. 
You went to one or the other in those days. Or Kio Tau I think was 
cheaper and bigger. I worked in the market for a short while when I was 
young. I was helping my elder brother who was selling pig stomach. He 
was in his 20s and had only primary school education. The business at 
Or Kio Tau was better as there were more people. The market was just 
individual stalls set up in front of the shops by the roadside. Some of the 
stalls were mounted on a trishaw.
56 
 
From this stretch of Havelock Road up to Ganges Avenue, residential and 
commercial buildings mingled, as wooden housing alternated with shophouses, 
provisions shops, a shop selling coffee powder, sauce factories, sawmills, melon seed 
factories, karang guni (‘junk’) shops, tyre shops, motor workshops, a goldsmith, an 
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  78incense shop, and a gambling house. There, the family of Goh Yong Soo (born 1947), 
lived and prepared their business. His father, a cloth-seller, brought his goods, first by 
trishaw and later by pickup, to sell at the ‘Fire City’, at the eastern edge of the Central 
Area.
57 
 
Further north, at the junction of Havelock and Delta roads were another three 
sites of local employment, the Singapore Steam Laundry, Seiclene Electric Laundry and 
the Fraser and Neave factory across the road. James Seah (born 1948), his parents and 
four siblings lived in a wooden house at 20 Beo Lane. His father took a bus to the 
Central Area daily, where he worked as a book-keeper for a trading company. His three 
sisters worked in the steam laundry.
58 The mother and three elder sisters, too, of Wong 
Pok Hee, who had migrated from Johor and whose father had passed away, worked in 
the electric laundry. According to Wong, his mother and sisters were able to support the 
family. Wong, a teenager, also worked as a provisions shop assistant at the Or Kio Tau 
shophouse.
59  
 
More shophouses, factories and businesses lined Havelock Road eastwards (see 
Map 4 and Plate 4 in the Appendix). There were coffeeshops, a petrol kiosk, a barber 
shop, an Indian shop selling spices, two laundry shops, the Adrian cane factory, and the 
long-established Pepsi-Cola factory. Lum Siang Onn (born 1939) married into a family 
which ran a laundry shop called Ho Sing in this area, on the ground floor of a 
shophouse, above which they lived.
60 Towards the end of the road were a factory 
making shoe polish, a sauce factory, a pepper factory, Sinsen soap factory, and more 
warehouses. The family of Roy Chan (born 1942), having shifted from Telok Ayer in 
‘Big Town’, stayed at 585 and 587 Havelock Road at the foot of Ma Kau Thiong. The 
extended family of twelve resided in a large wooden longhouse while Chan’s 
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  79grandfather owned two small factories making soap and later wooden crates in the other 
building.
61  
 
The business and population areas of Bukit Ho Swee attracted another economic 
group: the street hawkers. Buoyed by the growth of the resident population, it was 
estimated in 1950 that the number of hawkers in the Tiong Bahru area had doubled 
within several years.
62 Comprising licensed and frequently unlicensed itinerant peddlers, 
street side vendors and stallholders, they gathered at key places of local commercial and 
social activity. The fare was cheap and local: different kinds of noodles and kway, yong 
tau foo, rojak, and ice water. Hawking had historically functioned in Singapore as an 
outlet for surplus labour and a safety net for the poorer classes. They could turn to 
hawking in difficult times without much skill or capital, although it could also be 
financially attractive in an economic upturn.
63 In turn, the supply of cheap, easily 
accessible hawker food satisfied the demand of working households whose adults did 
not have the time to cook. 
 
Besides the Or Kio Tau market, hawkers congregated at cinemas at the Great 
World Amusement Park north of Hong Lim Pa Sat and King’s Theatre along Kim Tian 
Road in Si Kah Teng.
64 The numerous temples in Beo (‘temple’) Lane and the two 
temples at the eastern end of Havelock Road also drew hawkers. Briefly, Teo Khoon 
Wah recalled, his mother and siblings sold porridge beside the Pepsi-Cola factory, 
where there was also an Indian stall selling tea. It was, Teo maintained, good business 
because of the factory workers leaving after work. At Carey Road, near the Ti Kong 
Tua temple, where there was also pedestrian traffic, there were 4-5 hawker stalls, selling 
chai tow kway, ice, char kway teow, and a small barber shop.
65 Another magnet for 
hawkers were the local schools, since many parents gave their children money to buy 
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  80their lunch from them.
66 Lim You Meng, studying at Kai Kok Public School, invariably 
found hawkers at the school gates selling drinks and snacks.
67 Oh Gek Heok (born 
1953), who with her brother Oh Boon Eng (born 1948) and her family stayed at 597-E 
Bukit Ho Swee below Ma Kau Thiong, could buy a slice of fish cake from a trishaw 
hawker for five cents outside Seng Poh School.
68 
 
Some were hawkers by trade but hawking was more frequently a form of part-
time or short-term work than the vocation of the ‘self-employed’. In 1952, when the 
City Council ceased its raids against illegal hawkers, it inadvertently encouraged a 
substantial expansion of part-time, unlicensed hawking.
69 There were an estimated 
20,000-25,000 hawkers in Singapore in 1955, of whom 3,000-4,000 were itinerants.
70 
The 1950 survey of hawkers in the Municipal area found that only 16% were 
professionals, with the rest hawking to either support a family, to earn a higher income 
than a labourer’s wage (although 90% earned less than $5 a day), and because they were 
unable to find any other work or were too weak or old to do so. According to the survey, 
67% were men, 21% women and 12% children (74% males and 26% females), while 
nearly half had started hawking at the end of the war.
71 Although it was not uncommon 
for boys to hawk in prewar Singapore,
72 after the war, more girls – 40% of all child 
hawkers – were hawking in 1950.  
 
Lee Chek Chin, the father of Ah Gar and Soo Seong, was a professional hawker 
in Bukit Ho Swee. A Teochew, many of whom were traditionally in the occupation, he 
started selling rojak and later tau suan using a makeshift stall at the Or Kio Tau 
shophouse during the war, as the Kwong Joo Seng factory had ceased manufacturing. 
But because ‘he couldn’t hit his target and he always had a lot of rojak left unsold’, his 
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  81wife, Lim Ah Nee, and Ah Gar also hawked, selling fried bananas, tapiocas and sweet 
potatoes during the Japanese Occupation. Ah Nee later became a fish hawker, who 
walked with her fish stall from Bukit Ho Swee along the Singapore River to New 
Market Road to obtain the fish every morning, ‘braving robberies’. According to Soo 
Seong, ‘the income from her work was just enough to make ends meet and send us to 
school’. After the war, Ah Gar sold gado gado and crystal buns prepared by his mother, 
and the elder Lee later taught him, still in his teens, to sell rojak. Ah Gar hawked and 
did a number of brief odd-jobs before obtaining regular employment as a foreman with 
Robinsons Company in 1951.
73 Similarly, with his three sisters and four brothers, 
Samuel Seetoh (born 1944) moved into 172 Kampong Tiong Bahru in 1956. His father 
sold buns in Tanjong Pagar and so did he, starting when he was about 13 and still in 
school, pushing his cart through Bukit Ho Swee to the Or Kio Tau market, always 
fearing the stray dogs along the way.
74 In the postwar years, hawking was consequently 
an occupation in which the family worked as a single economic unit.
75 
 
Few kampong dwellers shared the official concern with contaminated hawker 
food,
76 instead emphasising its affordability and flavour. Madam Wong, caretaker of 
the Giok Hong Tian temple at the end of Havelock Road, insisted: 
                                                
 
Opposite the temple was someone selling minced meat noodles, 20 cents, 
yong tau foo, 20 cents, laksa, 20 cents, a large bowl, and Teochew 
noodles at the corner. The food was clean! It was sold by people who 
lived behind us. They washed the ingredients at the public tap here, the 
intestines. The yong tau foo had many ingredients: salted vegetables, 
intestines, pig stomach, yong tau foo, fishballs, all in one bowl.
77  
 
 
73 Author’s interviews with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006 & Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006. 
74 Author’s interview with Samuel Seetoh, 27 Apr 2007. 
75 Report of the Hawkers Inquiry Commission, p. 8. 
76 Memo on the Hawker Problem by the Acting Municipal Health Officer, Report of the Hawkers Inquiry 
Commission, p. 35. 
77 Author’s interview with Madam Wong, 2 Nov 2006. 
  82In Hong Lim Pa Sat, Joyce Soh, whose family usually had some variety of noodles at 
home in the afternoon, recalled a trishaw hawker selling delicious yong tau foo and 
stressed that ‘we didn’t feel that the hawkers were unclean, we had no problems at all 
eating the food all along’.
78 Enjoying the inexpensive hawker fare, too, Tan Tiam Ho 
protested, ‘We didn’t feel that the food was dirty! We were used to it. The hawkers 
were hygienic, they were not very dirty’.
79 
 
Moving regularly between places and people, hawkers served as the eyes, ears 
and mouths of the kampong: 
 
The marketplace was a place where buyers and sellers met. It was a 
marketplace for information. Some people tell the hawker, the hawker 
tells somebody. The hawkers would inform the residents about certain 
events that were organised. So the hawkers during those days were the 
people’s first point of contact with kampong folks. [What would hawkers 
talk about?] It was all sorts of news, such as what the open-air cinemas 
were going to show, price increase and price decrease, market 
announcements, when someone passed away. They were gatherers of 
information and they were also information providers.
80 
 
The dwellings themselves were in many cases also places of work. This 
continued the tradition of Chinese life in the Central Area, where the shophouse 
combined business and residence. Where space permitted, kampong dwellers engaged 
in semi-rural activities, rearing a few chickens, ducks and pigs, cultivating vegetables or 
growing fruit trees. Sometimes the livestock was caged or fenced in, at other times, they 
ranged freely. The pigs, known as gu ni te (‘milk pigs’) and sold when they attained a 
certain size, supplemented the family income.
81 Other produce was often not sold but 
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  83consumed by the family, helping to reduce the daily cost of living, or at times given to 
relatives or neighbours in gestures of mutual self-help. 
 
 
Plate 2.7: Large pig feeding at an interior road in Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, c. 1960 (Courtesy 
of Ivan Polunin). 
 
Behind the Or Kio Tau market where Lim You Meng and his family lived was a 
plot of land for rearing pigs and poultry and growing vegetables like chilli, bitter gourd 
and sweet potatoes.
82 These subsistence activities engaged the housewife and, to a 
lesser extent, the children. Nearby, outside Tan Tiam Ho’s house, the family grew 
vegetables like sweet potatoes, red vegetables and brinjals, ‘not much because there was 
not much space so it was not for sale’. As Tan explained, ‘You just had to water them. 
Even children knew how to do it. My mother took care of the pigs and poultry, and we 
children also had to help out. We did a bit and then we went off to play’.
83 Lee Soo 
Seong, whose father formerly reared fish, observed that he was ‘very experienced’; as a 
festive occasion approached, he bought fish fry and chicks in advance and reared them 
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  84in the little space in front of the house, so that when they matured, the family could use 
some themselves and sell the rest.
84 
 
The three little pigs reared by Tay Yan Woon’s family, who had shifted to Bukit 
Ho Swee after an earlier fire in Si Kah Teng, lived in a pig sty within their attap house, 
next to the kitchen. The pigs, and the poultry they also reared, required minimum 
upkeep: 
 
When someone else’s sow gave birth, we bought the piglets and reared 
them until the sows gave birth. Then we reared the piglets and so on. As 
for chickens and ducks, hawkers would sell them and we reared them 
until they became adults. We fed the leftovers from our meals to the pigs, 
and those who did not rear pigs also gave their leftovers. We also walked 
to Tiong Bahru to collect leftovers from other families, or we went to the 
market there to collect cabbage stems that people didn’t want.
85 
 
Other varieties of piecemeal work took place within the confines of the home. 
Some women, technically ‘housewives’, washed or sewed clothes or did handicraft at 
home. Lim You Meng’s mother, who at one time sorted coffee beans at Beo Lane, also 
washed some laundry.
86 For Tan Ah Kok, whose father, a lighterman, had passed away 
when the twakow capsized, the house became the main means of income: ‘My mother 
helped people to look after their children and I helped her. The children were from the 
town area, from Craig Road where we previously stayed. The pay wasn’t a lot, only $20 
a month’.
87 The house was also the sanctuary for illicit activities such as gambling and 
opium-smoking.
88 Lee Soo Seong’s landlord moonlighted, making Chinese wine at 
night. Government inspectors arrested the offenders on numerous occasions but many 
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  85families remained undeterred and neighbours continued to warn one another when the 
inspectors arrived.
89 
 
  Another form of illegal work plied along Havelock and Tiong Bahru roads. 
Ordinarily these carriageways served kampong dwellers working in the Central Area 
who cycled to work or took a bus. Two buses linked Bukit Ho Swee to the town: the 
Singapore Traction Company’s No. 9 running between Delta Road and Raffles Quay, 
starting from 10 cents for the first mile, and several Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus 
Company services along Tiong Bahru Road, starting from 5 cents for the first mile.
90 
By comparison, pirate taxis – private cars which could charge low fares because they 
did not pay license fees – could be hired cheaply, for example, 20 cents for a trip from 
Or Kio Tau to Upper Cross Street in ‘Big Town’, and more for places further away. 
Bukit Ho Swee’s residents often took the pirate taxis but also drove them, cruising 
between Havelock Road and Princess House to the west, slowing down near 
prospective passengers and beckoning them with a wave or the sound of a horn. The 
authorities conceded that, compared to public buses, they were popular because of their 
‘comparative speeds and comfort’.
 91 As Roy Chan observed, pirate taxis were popular 
as the fare was cheap and they were faster than the buses.
92 There were, in 1956, some 
5,000 pirate taxis in Singapore. As one former driver explained,  
 
In the ‘50s, I drove a pirate taxi. It was good money. Cars were cheap 
and I bought one for only about $1,000. You could earn tens of dollars a 
day, so why wasn’t it good? Life was very comfortable. It was 20 or 30 
cents to town. Everyone would know which was a pirate taxi. You just 
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  86horned, tut,  tut,  tut, tut. You just waited by the roadside and the car 
would come over.
93 
 
Other forms of daily-rated and irregular employment were found in the Central 
Area or even beyond. Tan Geok Hak, having shifted numerous times nearby before 
settling in Bukit Ho Swee, was an amah in Sembawang for a British family employed at 
the Naval Base; she took a bus daily to her workplace while a nanny babysat her three 
children.
94 So was Joyce Soh’s mother, who cleaned the house of a European family in 
Tanglin. Soh herself, after quitting school, also worked in a European home on 
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for one to two years before she got married. For two 
hours of work a day, she earned $50 a month, ‘quite a big amount then’.
95 Sim Kim 
Boey, the arrival from Batu Pahat living with her sister-in-law, found work closer to 
home after her husband passed away around 1957, in a tobacco factory at Tanjong 
Pagar, earning $1.80 a day.
96  
 
Many lowly-educated women and youths worked in the little-studied occupation 
of ship cleaners. In 1958 and 1959, between 1,500 and 2,500 persons a month, mostly 
Cantonese women, toiled at the Singapore Harbour Board dockyard at Keppel Harbour, 
cleaning the sides, bulkheads, funnels, and decks of cargo ships and scraping and 
disinfecting tanks in temperatures often above 32°C. The cleaners had to wait for long 
hours in the early morning before a selected few would receive work tickets from the 
contractors. The women, in particular, were paid less than the men, although they were 
specially sought for the hazardous tank cleaning, since ‘being slim, they can more easily 
enter the aperture of the tank and sustain the hardship of working within its restricted 
space’.
97 To help support Jimmy Yi’s large family in Kampong Silat, his mother 
augmented the income of his father, a carpenter, by working as a long sai (corruption of 
‘alongside’). She earned $4.70 a day, although Yi, who worked there briefly during his 
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  87school holidays, made twenty-five cents more.
98 So did the mother and elder brother of 
Samuel Seetoh, as their father, who sold buns, was not doing well.
99 Angie Ng (born 
1955) and her family of seven stayed in an attap house at Kim Tian Road in Si Kah 
Teng. To supplement the income of her father, an odd-job labourer, her mother also 
cleaned ships:  
 
It was manual work like collecting rubbish from the hold of the ship and 
the engine room. My mother was quite small built, so usually she was 
sent to the engine room to clean the oil and dirt. [Was this regular?] As 
regular as they could. She was hawking at first. Then other housewives 
came along, saying that cleaning ships was better money.
100 
 
Another woman who worked as a long sai for many years was Png Pong Tee (born 
1927), who when she was 40 days old was adopted by a family selling attap and wood 
for housing in Si Kah Teng, near the sewerage works. When Png’s husband passed 
away in the 1950s due to illness, among the various labouring jobs she took up to 
support her three daughters and a son, including working as a coolie to load and unload 
goods, was cleaning ships:  
 
It was tough working on a ship, scraping off the rust. Sometimes the rust 
would get into your eyes. If your skin was broken, the salt water really 
stung you, and your skin might also rot. You had to work every day of 
the week before the ship left, because it took several days to clean, not 
just one day, because the ship was so big. When you had to clean the oil, 
your body was covered all over in black oil, that was terrible. So I had to 
bring clothes there to change, or else how could I go home? I earned 
$2.80 a day working as a long sai. Initially it was $1.80, then the pay 
increased.
101 
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  88 
Community of the Living, the Dead and the Pigs 
 
More so than one’s economic position, urban kampong life was shaped by the 
character and culture of the local environment. The size of the average wooden dwelling 
was often constrained by the roads and the larger structures built along them, and by the 
presence of Ma Kau Thiong to the east, the sewerage works to the west, and to the north 
and south, the SIT estates at Ganges Avenue and Boon Tiong Road respectively. The 
larger houses of wealthier families along Beo Lane were well-ventilated and in good 
repair; off the roads, however, was an entirely different living environment.
102 There, 
the odd well-maintained building was swamped by numerous small, haphazardly-built 
wooden houses lining narrow kampong tracks, which often had low ceilings, no 
windows in the bedrooms and were shared by more than one low-income, tenant 
family.
103 As Lee Ah Moh, born in Bukit Ho Swee in 1922, aptly described, ‘Our 
houses – you build here, I’ll build there, side by side. We built as long as there was 
space. All were sandwiched together. Some of the houses, their backs faced the fronts 
[of other houses], or the fronts faced the backs, or they faced the corners’.
104 
 
In a settlement which had developed without planning, amenities were at a 
premium but this meant that the cost of living was low. Rubbish, clogged drains and 
pools of stagnant water collected in the kampong lanes, while pedestrian paths became 
mud tracks after heavy rains and the air turned dusty in the heat. Bukit Ho Swee had no 
sewers, although the sewerage works nearby served parts of the City which did have 
plumbing and street-side culverts. The average toilet, a wooden shed built outside the 
house, sometimes conveniently over a drain, utilised the ‘pail’ system and was cleared 
daily by night-soil workers. It was shared by multiple families, as was the communal 
bathroom, also a separate structure, to which one fetched water for bathing. Most 
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  89houses did not have piped water, so people obtained water for free from wells or the 
City Council standpipes along the road where, after a queue, they would carry the water 
home in buckets, or, circumstances permitting, wash their food or laundry on the spot. 
Meals were cheaply cooked using wood for fuel, frequently picked from sawmills at 
Hong Lim Pa Sat. Wealthier households purchased a supply of generator-powered 
electricity, which switched off at a fixed time at night, but low-income families simply 
made do with kerosene or pressure lamps, and often only in the evenings. 
 
For the residents, housing was not a top priority, ranked below the never-ending 
challenge of finding work. Even allowing for an omnipresent nostalgia, most kampong 
dwellers when reflecting on their wooden housing found little to complain and in some 
cases much charm. The official concern with overcrowding, lack of light and 
insanitation found little empathy with them. Notions of darkness and light, stuffiness 
and fresh air, and sanitation and dirt were conditioned by the physical environment. For 
many residents, living in a house made of wood with gaps between the planks was liang 
(‘well-ventilated’),
105 although the degree of this varied according to the size and height 
of the house, the roofing material (zinc roofs conducted heat while some attap roofs had 
a sky well or a glass pane), the availability of windows, and the shade provided by 
overhanging trees. The lack of lighting in the house was often of little concern when the 
occupants’ social and economic life took them outside it much of the time, when ‘it was 
the outside, rather than the inside, which was intended to have meaning’.
106 Tan Ah 
Kok, whose family used kerosene lamps, felt that ‘even when it was dark, because we 
were used to it, it was okay. But if you were used to living in a brightly lit home, you 
wouldn’t want to stay in a dark house’,
107 while Lee Soo Seong simply stated, 
‘Kampong lighting was not like the bright lighting in the HDB flats today – what for? 
It’s crazy!’
108 Some families certainly kept their houses and surrounding areas clean; 
Tan Ah Kok’s family and their landlord’s cooperated to regularly sweep the area,
109 
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while the family of Tay Choo (born 1940), who rented part of their house to other 
families, rostered the tenants to wash the toilet twice a day.
110 Others, particularly those 
who rented, often did not or could not do so. 
 
The pail toilet system had long been criticised by the British medical 
establishment for being insanitary and disease-breeding.
111 But for its smells and the 
worms which multiplied freely in old waste, it was readily accepted by the residents. 
Those who felt uncomfortable with the accumulated filth, as Lily Wee explained, 
adapted one way or another:  
 
We had a bucket toilet at one end of the house. Because it was 
inconvenient, we didn’t go to the toilet all the time. But everyone made 
sure, when the night-soil man came to clear, to be the first to beat the 
schedule. But there were times you couldn’t help it. When adults went in, 
they smoked to kill the smell, so once I tried with my grandmother’s 
cigarette, and I coughed badly. [Laughs] It was more torturing than the 
smell, so I never did it again. So you quickly went in and quickly came 
out.
112 
 
The residents were more concerned to use the toilet than with its smell or dirt; when Lee 
Soo Seong’s family moved from Beo Lane to Bukit Ho Swee [road], they shared an 
attap house and a wooden toilet with more than ten families, each with at least five 
members. A common scene in the morning was people bringing paper to squat in front 
of the toilet, calling for the occupant to hurry if they were urgent.
113 
 
If the pail system was tolerated by the residents, it was enthusiastically 
welcomed by the free-range pigs. Tan Ah Kok related, ‘Our toilet was like a small 
house, with two planks. The waste would fall to the bottom and the pigs would eat it. 
 
110 Author’s interview with Tay Choo, 14 Feb 2007. 
111 Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore, pp. 190-206. 
112 Author’s interview with Lily Wee, 3 Jun 2007. 
113 OHC, interview with Lee Soo Seong, 19 Nov 1996.  
Plate 2.8: A dilapidated toilet constructed of bricks and plank in the Bukit Ho Swee area, year 
unknown (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 2.9: A pig waits near a toilet in the Bukit Ho Swee area, year unknown (Courtesy of 
National Archives of Singapore). 
 
  92Sometimes when you were doing your business, the pigs were there waiting. [Laughs] 
The toilet was high and the bottom was deep. If it was too low, the pigs would get 
in’.
114 Pigs, really, were part of the kampong’s economy and the local system of 
environmental sanitation. As Samuel Seetoh related about his landlord, such encounters 
at the toilet were sometimes due to shrewd engineering and planning: 
 
The pig sty was built next to the toilet and they made a trapdoor for the 
pigs to go for the waste. [Laughs] Every time you opened the door, the 
pigs knew their delicacy was coming. So they put their heads there and 
waited. Sometimes, you took too long, the fellow snorted. It was like 
telling you, why you take so long?
115 
 
The graves of Bukit Ho Swee signified the changing attitudes of the 1950s 
Chinese family towards gods, ghosts and ancestors. Unlike Ma Kau Thiong, on whose 
western side the pigs roamed but was otherwise uninhabited,
116 the adjoining Hokkien 
cemetery was closely-built over with burgeoning wooden houses, and occasionally, the 
torrential rains washed away the topsoil to reveal part of a coffin. ‘Living people and 
dead people were neighbours. We didn’t feel afraid’, Lee Soo Seong mused, noting that 
under the kitchen in his house was a grave.
117 In the crushing press of numbers into 
confined space, pragmatism had evidently overcome the customary Chinese deference 
for the deceased. Urban dwellers’ living with the dead belied a new attitude towards 
housing location, as families moved from the low-lying Central Area to higher, burial 
grounds. A friend of Tay Ah Chuan staying in Si Kah Teng had a grave inside his room, 
over which the house was built. The family simply covered the grave with a piece of 
cloth and laid a mattress over it.
118 A mutual friend, Tay Bok Chiu, who saw the grave 
while retrieving a marble, explained that ‘the family made offerings to it on the 1
st and 
15
th of the month. The builders didn’t care, they just levelled the gravestone and paved 
cement over it and built the house to make money’. After the 1961 fire, Tay discovered 
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  93that below his bed was a coffin with bones; he had not known previously!
119 The house 
of Ong Chye Ho (born 1924), who lived near Or Kio Tau and worked in a sawmill at 
Beach Road, was also built over a grave. Ong wondered, ‘What was there to be afraid 
of? They are dead. We didn’t make offerings. The grave was below the house, so how 
to pray?’
120 Png Pong Tee, the ship cleaner and coolie, would sometimes reach home at 
night after working overtime. Although she had to walk past the graves in Si Kah Teng 
at night to reach her house, she also had no fear of the dead: ‘I have no grievance with 
the ghosts, why would they come out to catch me? If they caught someone, it was 
because previously they kiam che [‘owed the ghosts a debt’]. The ghosts would not 
anyhow catch people’.
121 
 
Not only were the graves tolerated, they were encroached upon as public spaces 
and put to practical use. Like many other children, Lee Soo Seong and his friends 
played at the graves of Ma Kau Thiong; at sunset, they would sit on straw mats placed 
over the dead and listen to the adults tell stories.
122 Chua Beng Huat and his friends also 
frequently played at the cemetery. It was, Chua explained, ‘the only playground. We 
weren’t really playing anything other than running around and digging into holes 
looking for bones’.
123 According to Tay Ah Chuan, the coffin’s wooden boards were 
also used as makeshift bridges over small canals or to build pig stys; ‘it was not unusual 
for us’, Tay explained, ‘It was 见惯不怪’ (‘You grow accustomed to what you 
frequently see’).
124 
 
As the average wooden house was small and unlit in the daytime, life often 
spilled into the kampong’s public spaces, among which, as, Chua observed, ‘[t]he 
village institution par excellence was undoubtedly the village coffeeshop’, constantly 
filled with men and teenagers in its fourteen-hour long operating time from eight in the 
morning to ten at night. As under-employment was prevalent, the coffeeshop was the 
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  94site of ‘collective idling’: gambling, listening to popular storytellers Ong Toh or Lee 
Dai Soh on the Rediffusion, the cable radio service which broadcast in various Chinese 
languages, the elderly man reading out Chinese newspapers to his audience, or simply 
the ‘trading of jokes, mild put-downs, boastful self-defence and aggrandising 
embellishments of one’s exploits’.
125 Women, on the other hand, tended to remain 
within or near their homes. At home, housewives did piece work, took care of the young 
children, and looked after the home; if they were out, it was for groceries at the market 
or to bring the children to school.
126 But women also found social networks and sat and 
chatted with one another on benches or forecourts outside their houses in their spare 
time.
127 
 
  Interrupting but also reinforcing the rhythm of daily life was the periodic 
kampong ‘event’. This typically centred around some sort of celebration, whether of the 
Lunar New Year, festivals or the birthdays of gods worshipped by the Chinese. Despite 
many of the residents having a new relationship with the dead, traditional Chinese 
customs were still observed. The New Year was celebrated noisily with fire crackers 
and was ‘a special time’, for ‘eating chicken and aerated water were Chinese New Year 
items’.
128 Teochew opera performances which the wealthier villagers organised on the 
gods’ birthdays were so eagerly anticipated that many residents brought their stools to 
grab a front row seat.
129 According to Lee Soo Seong, such performances, based on 
stories from ancient China, were invaluable in reinforcing traditional values among low-
income Chinese, particularly the home-bound and uneducated women.
130 This was 
particularly evident during the Mid-Autumn Festival, the occasion of a full moon.
131 If 
the moon was obscured, Lee remembered, the children, ‘all very excited and serious’, 
would relive an old custom, banging on their pans, broken pails and buckets to chase off 
the ‘Heavenly Dog’ which had ‘swallowed’ the moon. Although ‘the whole hill would 
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  95be very noisy’, the adults did not mind the din and ‘everyone would be happy when the 
Heavenly Dog had finally been chased away’.
132 
 
As an important occasion for venerating one’s ancestors, the Hungry Ghosts 
Festival
133 also drew large numbers of residents (and hawkers). Like other large-scale 
traditional celebrations, it was organised by the wealthier residents or, what oft 
amounted to the same, the management board of local temples; on these occasions, as 
Chua Beng Huat recalled, these individuals broadcast their social status as the 
kampong’s elite: 
 
The Hungry Ghosts Festival was very big. There was a platform built on 
the entire road and it would be covered with food. Huge amounts of 
paper money were burned and it burned all day. Every family brought 
their dishes, depending on whether they were rich or poor. We often took 
up a whole section of the podium because my mother was a big believer. 
We had a whole roasted pig, chicken, everything. At the end of the day, 
we kids ran about giving out food to neighbours and relatives.
134 
 
  The annual celebrations and the daily socialisation had the crucial effect of 
forging a sense of community and place among the residents, integrating those who 
recently arrived into the basic norms and dynamics of kampong life. Trust based on a 
personal relationship, as Lim You Meng explained, underpinned the social fabric of the 
kampong community:  
 
When we were celebrating the gods’ birthdays, the temple would send an 
uncle to collect money from my family to hire the Teochew and Hokkien 
opera troupes. We gave $1, as we were not so well-off; the rich families 
gave $2. We knew this uncle well, and he could collect the money 
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  96because people knew him and trusted him. He was unemployed and an 
opium smoker.
135 
 
  It is important not to romanticise the way of life and the social ethic of the 
kampong community. As with all systems, it had its flaws and social conflict sometimes 
occurred at its interstices. This was clear in the case of the hwei, an informal system of 
rotating credit popular in postwar Singapore. The hwei was a form of self-help 
organised among low-income, uneducated people (except possibly the tontine head) 
who were either unwilling or unable to utilise bank credit, for which securities or 
guarantors were required. By raising a sum of money from its members, the hwei 
enabled subscribers urgently in need of cash (such as for a wedding or to start a 
business) to obtain it quickly, while others could invest their savings and benefit, 
particularly by delaying their bids, from a fairly high rate of interest.
136 The determining 
element in the system was mutual trust. But the hwei had gained a poor reputation in  
official circles because of cases where the head or a member had absconded with the 
money. Undoubtedly this had happened, and kampong dwellers ostensibly knew the 
risks without being deterred from joining one. Elizabeth Soh (born 1955), who stayed at 
the foot of Ma Kau Thiong along Havelock Road and whose grandmother was head of a 
hwei, explained that ‘usually, when people organised a hwei, they only let those they 
knew enter’.
137 The hwei’s success, as another resident acknowledged, was based on the 
integrity of the tontine head as well as the members, while only those who used the 
money to gamble were the high-risk ones.
138 Subscribers were seemingly aware that 
participating in the hwei was itself a gamble.
139  
 
  Without discounting its apparent failings, the hwei was well-suited to operating 
in a low-income urban kampong. The heads were typically the wealthier residents, such 
as shop owners or members of a temple management board who had ‘established’ their 
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  97integrity through their daily interactions with other residents or their steady support of 
kampong celebrations. Lim Soo Hiang’s mother, who ran Yong Kee provisions shop, 
headed a hwei and had little problem with members, who were usually their neighbours, 
defaulting on their subscriptions. Shopowners were, after all, familiar with this informal 
system of credit, since their customers often bought provisions in advance and paid for 
them at the end of the month when they received their pay; the customers sometimes 
defaulted on the loan but, being neighbours, usually paid up.
140 Lee Soo Seong, 
observing that shopowners knew many people from their day-to-day transactions, 
remembered ‘this person named Ah Puay as he was well-liked by the villagers. People 
often spoke of him as a good chap and he was respected amongst the elderly. He helped 
to settle disputes’.
141 Conversely, members of the hwei, often subsisting on low incomes 
from irregular work, found it tailored to living in the ‘here and now’: they could quickly 
obtain funds for an emergency or invest what little money they had at a particular 
moment in time to earn some sorely-needed interest. Many of the heads and members, it 
is important to note, were women, emphasising again the key role they played in the 
family economy. Samuel Seetoh’s mother, the ship cleaner, joined several hweis to help 
finance her hawker husband’s businesses.
142 
  
The proximity of relatives, as social and economic pillars of support, constituted 
an inner circle of self-help. Goh Keng Swee’s 1956 study found ‘a fairly extensive’ 
network of mutual help between relatives, with about 4% of the low-income households 
(a figure likely to be understated) receiving contributions from relatives staying 
elsewhere, amounting to a monthly average of $51 per recipient, ‘no small sum at 
all’.
143 The Bukit Ho Swee case is varied. Maurice Freedman found ‘little clustering of 
kin in a geographical sense’ among urban Chinese households in Singapore but his 
frame of reference was the more closely knit villages in China bound by common 
kinship.
144 This existed only among Bukit Ho Swee’s wealthier and more established 
extended families, such as those of Chua Beng Huat, Lim You Meng and Roy Chan. 
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  98Even so, the nuclear family which moved more recently into the kampong could have 
relatives in the same or nearby kampong or in the Central Area (where their parents 
might be residing). Zhou Lian Che (born 1929) lived with her husband and five children 
in a 2-storey, zinc-roofed private house along Havelock Road, while her mother and 
elder sister resided in wooden houses opposite in Bukit Ho Swee.
145  Similarly, 
according to Tay Ah Chuan, ‘4-5 families in the area’ were his relatives.
146  
 
But other kampong dwellers had few if any relatives at all with whom they were 
in contact. In this situation, the passing of the main breadwinner could reduce them to 
living on the margin. Sim Kim Boey, Wong Pok Hee and Tan Ah Kok all attest to how, 
in terms of social security, widows were ‘one of the least protected sections of the 
community’.
147 In Goh Keng Swee’s survey, widows only comprised 3% of the 
households but half of them were living in poverty.
148 With her husband and three-year-
old son, Beh Poh Suan (born 1932) lived on the slopes of the hill in the year of the 
Bukit Ho Swee fire. On the first day of the Lunar New Year, her husband passed away. 
Leaving her son to the care of a neighbour during the day, she worked in a cigarette 
factory, making $2.50 a day. For Beh, ‘my relatives didn’t care about us, my brothers 
only cared about themselves. They seldom came to see me’. A literal ray of light in their 
lives was provided by her towkay, who offered to install a light in her house for free, 
since ‘you and your child are living in darkness, your husband has just passed away and 
you are in mourning, and you might be afraid’.
149 
 
The Pai Kia and the Children 
 
  By far, it was the presence of secret societies which gave Bukit Ho Swee a 
notoriety as a bo ho sor chai (‘bad place’).
150 Comprised mainly of male kampong 
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  99dwellers in their teens and twenties, the secret societies were locally embedded. They 
were more accurately ‘splinter groups’ from the triads which had come to Singapore 
from China along with the immigrants, smaller and less well-organised.
151 Although the 
local secret societies continued to acknowledge the suzerainty of one of the ‘08’, ‘18’, 
‘24’, ‘36’, or ‘108’ triads, for all practical purposes they operated independently. The 
closely-built kampong housing afforded these gangs shelter from the long arm of the 
law; uniformed policemen, despite the proximity of Havelock Road police station, 
seldom made the effort to enter Bukit Ho Swee. The gangs recruited youths who were 
not studying or had dropped out, and were not under the direct guidance of parents who 
were either working, socialising in coffeeshops or taking care of younger siblings. For 
instance, a youth residing in Bukit Ho Swee who joined the ‘08’ gang at the age of 15 
did so because his parents did not exercise adequate supervision over him.
152 Secret 
societies also enlisted lowly-educated young adults unable to obtain regular 
employment but who were seeking income and identity.  
 
The secret societies proliferated after the war in the Central Area and in rural 
and urban kampongs, numbering 360 in 1954 (of which 130 were active), with 11,000 
members on police rolls (6,500 active).
153 They were a harsh fact of life in the entrepot-
based, pre-industrial economy, characterised by the structure of large, low-income 
Chinese nuclear families and the absence of official regulation in kampongs. Bukit Ho 
Swee was ‘one of Singapore’s well-known 黑区 (“black area” in Mandarin)’ and ‘the 
world of the “24”’, which faced its rival, the ‘08’, in Si Kah Teng.
154 From the 
standpoint of the secret societies, Bukit Ho Swee was not a homogenous kampong but a 
number of smaller ‘turfs’ with elastic social boundaries. Splinters of the ‘36’, Tiong Gi 
Kiam, ‘66666’ and Gi Tiong Ho, all collected kua tau lui (‘protection money’) from 
shopkeepers in Beo Lane, Bukit Ho Swee and Havelock Road.
155 In 1954, ‘teenager 
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  100gangsters’ were becoming active in the Ganges Avenue-Delta area.
156 According to a 
former detective, the Jalan Membina area, just below Bukit Ho Swee, had no less than 
eight different secret society gangs, belonging to the ‘08’, ‘24’ and ‘36’.
157  
 
Again, the secret societies should not be romanticised; many were criminal 
organisations, although, as the police conceded, not all were truly dangerous.
158 As was 
oft-pointed out in official statements and newspapers, they committed crimes against 
property and the person, like robbery, kidnapping and murder. After the war, secret 
society members began an involvement in politics, as strikebreakers in labour disputes, 
participants in riots or vote-getters in elections; in the 1957 Tanjong Pagar by-election, 
various gangs canvassed votes for all three candidates and threatened workers of the 
rival parties.
159  The authorities claimed that secret societies lived ‘entirely by 
intimidation’ and that ‘the public is inhibited from testifying against their members by 
fear of gang reprisals’.
160 Higher-income residents in the permanent housing nearby 
were afraid of Bukit Ho Swee’s gangs; children and women were warned to avoid the 
kampong. Female residents at Kai Fook Mansion, a shophouse at Kim Tian Road, felt 
that Bukit Ho Swee ‘was very complicated’, and ‘I dared not go’ as ‘my father said that 
I cannot go in, a lot of samseng there’.
161  
 
Nonetheless, the gangs had an entirely different working relationship with the 
local communities from which they had sprung. Far from fearing them, kampong 
dwellers accepted and at times even admired their resident pai kia (‘bad kids’).
162 It is 
necessary, then, to unravel here the official discourse of anti-criminality prevalent in 
postwar Singapore. To kampong dwellers, the term ‘secret society’ was a misnomer, 
since the gangsters, if not actually known by name, were often visible in local places or 
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  101activities. A secret society member could be ‘just an ordinary person, greeting people 
and drinking coffee’,
163 or a former primary school-mate who had dropped out or not 
progressed to secondary education.
164 Lee Soo Seong knew of a ‘twenty-something 
gangster named Ah Ter’, who was ‘scrawny and very refined looking’, but was highly-
regarded by the locals and, being a member of the ‘36’, was able to walk freely into the 
turf of the ‘24’.
165 
 
Bukit Ho Swee, to its dwellers, was not considered a dangerous place and a 
hotbed of crime and criminality. In the absence of official municipal regulation of the 
kampong, the local gangsters functioned as its eyes, creating what Jane Jacobs called ‘a 
web of public respect and trust’.
166 They were indispensable in policing it against crime 
and fire (see Chapter 4).
167 Pai kia sat in the coffeeshop daily at the Beo Lane-Bukit Ho 
Swee [road] junction, the kampong’s south entrance, scrutinising strangers entering the 
village. One outsider visiting his friends in Bukit Ho Swee discovered that ‘as I was 
about 18 years old, they watched me to see whether I was a secret society member. 
They ignored you if you were 40 or 50 years old. They also ignored the girls. But if you 
were in your late teens or early 20s, and you were a stranger, they would stare at 
you’.
168 Joyce Soh of the family of twakow-builders found the pai kia in Hong Lim Pa 
Sat ‘very righteous and 本性不坏 [‘their nature was good’]. If there were strangers or 
people with bad intentions who came into our kampong, they would protect us’.
169 The 
gangs also practiced self-help: ‘if someone poor had died and there was nobody to carry 
the coffin, you just light two white candles, and they would help’,
170 to ‘arrange the 
funeral and prepare the mourning clothes, you didn’t have to say a word’.
171 
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  102The positive security role of the secret societies gave rise to the widely-known 
phenomena of kampong houses left unlocked in the day (although this was also due to 
the poverty which discouraged theft) and the social acceptability of locals ‘walking 
through other people’s houses, in through the front door and out at the back’.
172 
Kampong living, consequently, provided a strong sense of social security. When Lily 
Wee, as a young single woman, walked back home from Bukit Merah at night after 
watching Chinese opera, ‘I never felt for my safety. That was the feeling of kampong 
life, you felt very secure in your own kampong. It must be the unwritten rules of that 
time’.
173 In fact, it was the police, not the gangs, with which kampong dwellers (and 
low-income Chinese in general) had a wary, even fearful, relationship; witnesses of a 
crime typically told the policeman, ‘Wa m chai’ (‘I don’t know’).
174 
 
One form of secret society activity, however, did spill over into local violence: 
disputes over the ‘turfs’ which were the key source of their economic bases. Yet the 
residents did not feel they were personally at risk in these local conflicts. If a gangfight 
was planned between rival members, they might inform the residents, ‘Don’t come out 
of the house, after dinner, you lock yourselves inside’.
175 Some locals felt that gang 
fights were ‘fake’: ‘they threw Pepsi-Cola bottles, png,  png,  png, and within five 
minutes, they were gone’.
176 
 
Secret societies typically imposed a financial levy on the kampong’s economic 
activities, collecting kua tau lui from hawkers, pirate taxis and gambling and opium 
dens, so grafting one form of illegality on top of another, and from legitimate 
businesses.
177 This illicit financial practice, officially labelled as ‘extortion’, was 
accepted by locals as a necessary evil but also voluntarily. As the authorities 
acknowledged, the gangs provided ‘real protection to their subscribers from the 
interference of other gangs, and the majority of victims subscribe willingly as a form of 
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  103insurance and do not consider the demands extortionate’.
178 Chua Beng Huat, whose 
family ran a provisions shop, explained, ‘With people like us who had business, they 
didn’t even have to extort money. They just had to come to my father and say they 
needed money, and they would get the money. It was not extortion in any kind, because 
it could be your neighbour’s son’.
179 Gangsters also came to Yong Kee provisions shop 
for protection money; Lim Soo Hiang’s mother felt that ‘these people were上上下下 
(‘regulars’) and since they were not asking for much, we just paid them off. They 
wouldn’t create trouble for us. They would speak with us properly. Our area was still 
quite peaceful, not much trouble or bad people’.
180 However, Goh Yong Soo’s father, a 
cloth-seller, was ‘most afraid of them’ and ‘we were badly bullied’. Members of a gang, 
falsely claiming to be from different secret societies, would demand protection money 
repeatedly. Goh explained, ‘How could you not pay them? At the most, you could 
postpone it’.
181 
 
The ‘extortion’ of hawkers was more exacting on this low-income earning group 
but was to some extent also not as severe as one might expect. Tay Bok Chiu, then a 
teenager, had to regularly pay one gangster while selling crabs at the Or Kio Tau market; 
every stall there gave 50 cents, because ‘if you didn’t, he would find trouble with 
you’.
182 When Wang Ah Tee’s father sold rojak during the gods’ birthday celebrations, 
he also had to pay kua tau lui.
183 But other hawkers, such as Lee Ah Gar and his father, 
both itinerant peddlers, managed to avoid the practice, there being ‘no such thing that I 
heard of’.
184 Samuel Seetoh of the hawking family in Si Kah Teng, by claiming kinship 
with an influential Seetoh family in the area, found that ‘the secret societies did not 
disturb us but in certain celebrations, they still collected money but not every month. 
They gave us some leeway’.
185 When the gangsters came to him, Tan Nam Sia (born 
1945), who ran a roadside noodle stall at the Or Kio Tau market, simply told them, ‘I 
                                                 
178 SPF, Annual Report 1954, p. 29. 
179 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
180 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
181 Author’s interview with Goh Yong Soo, 25 Jul 2007. 
182 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. 
183 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
184 Author’s interview with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. 
185 Author’s interview with Samuel Seetoh, 27 Apr 2007. 
  104have no business’. His mother later discussed the matter with the gangsters, after which 
‘they didn’t come anymore. They understood my business did not make a lot of 
money’.
186 
 
The secret societies were, in fact, a microcosm of an important aspect of the 
urban kampong community. The work-shy pai kia, who contributed little to their 
families through legitimate work, were socially valued for their role as the community’s 
guardians. The protection rendered was, however, for a fundamentally pragmatic 
purpose, for the kampong was the source of the gangs’ finance, manpower and shelter. 
Tay Bok Chiu commented aptly on the similarity of the dog eat dog nature of the 
underworld and the dark side of the urban kampong: 
 
In those days, if you could take advantage, you took advantage; if you 
could bully, you bullied. If you didn’t know more powerful people, you 
were always bullied. It was almost lawless, like bo cheng hu (‘there was 
no government’).
187 
 
A similar single-minded pragmatism pervaded the larger community within 
which secret societies were embedded. Bukit Ho Swee was not a community which, 
like rural villages, stood outside the magnetic pull of city life. It was, rather, an urban 
kampong, developed in response to social deprivation and founded and built primarily 
on practical self-interest. The community, consequently, was transient in nature, 
underlaid frequently by a chronic tension among the low-income Chinese residents who 
had found a place to make a living but were constantly, for themselves and their 
families, looking outward and upward, even if they were unsure how this transition 
might be accomplished. Subtenants, it appeared, were less integrated socially into the 
kampong than the established families, while a social distance also existed between the 
richer and poorer residents.
188  The pragmatism in seeking good fortune was 
                                                 
186 Author’s interview with Tan Nam Sia, 3 May 2007. 
187 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. 
188 According to Iain Buchanan in his survey of Geylang Lorong 17. Iain Buchanan, ‘The Squatter Slum, 
Its Growth and Clearance’, Architecture 1 17 n, 1966/67, pp. 111, 114. 
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’.
190  
                                                
underscored by the prevalence of the hwei as well as the illicit chap ji ki, the twelve-
digit lottery, which was ‘as popular as ever’ with large sections of the public, due to the 
widespread desire to ‘win money by chance’.
189 If they found their wooden houses 
agreeable dwellings, that did not prevent the dwellers from both admiring and desiring 
more permanent housing; many would have agreed with Wang Ah Tee’s view of the 
newly-built SIT flats at Boon Tiong Road at the foot of Ma Kau Thiong: ‘if you stayed 
in that kind of house, it was considered顶呱呱 (“very good”)
 
  The children of Bukit Ho Swee stood awkwardly between this kampong 
community and the progress many of their parents sought. Large families forged a new 
mobility among low-income Chinese, compelling them to leave the Central Area. On 
the other hand, the presence of children, as we have seen, reinforced a sense of 
community: socially, through their participation in the kampong’s celebrations and the 
activities of the secret societies and, economically, by hawking or getting involved in 
other forms of irregular work on behalf of the household.  
 
  The term ‘children’ was often a misnomer except in the strict sense of age. The 
typical kampong child appropriated early both the roles of adult and child and could be, 
as Arlette Farge observed in eighteenth century Paris, ‘rascals and pranksters and 
responsible persons’. Consequently, social and spatial ‘movement’, both in physical and 
socio-economic terms, characterised the life of kampong children, vacillating between 
‘childhood and adult life, dependence and autonomy, economic responsibility and 
unbridled mischief’.
191 As Chua Beng Huat recalled of his childhood, adults and boys 
gambled together in the coffeeshops, as ‘there wasn’t much differentiation of adults and 
children. By the time you were twelve or thirteen years old, no longer going to school 
and hanging out in these places, the adults didn’t treat you as kids. They would gamble 
with you no matter what age you were, as long as you had money’.
192 
 
189 SPF, Annual Report 1950, p. 18. 
190 Author’s interviews with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007, and with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
191 Arlette Farge, Fragile Lives: Violence, Power and Solidarity in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 65. 
192 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006.  
Plate 2.10: Young men at the MCA shophouse, c. 1950s. Wong Poke Hee is in white shorts 
(Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
 
Plate 2.11: Young men outside a provisions shop at the MCA shophouse, c. 1950s (Courtesy of 
Wong Pok Hee). 
 
  107  Education offered a way out of the community and the possibility of different 
fe chances. As part of the  li postwar expansion of education in Singapore, many of Bukit 
 fewer 
ontinued into secondary education; those who did often went to the nearby Chinese-
medium
prospect of an ‘iron rice bowl’ in the English-medium civil service. ‘We didn’t value 
                                                
Ho Swee’s children were attending primary school, usually in the vicinity. There was, 
in the 1950s, a growing desire among parents to send their children to English-medium 
rather than vernacular schools.
193 In the kampong, an increasing minority of parents, 
recognising the social importance of the language of their colonial masters, were 
enrolling some of their children in English-medium schools like Havelock and Tiong 
Bahru primary schools, a clear indication of their pragmatic pursuit of progress.
194 But, 
there appeared to be some arbitrariness and uncertainty in this: the parents of Lim Soo 
Hiang, for instance, sent her and three of her siblings to English-medium schools but 
two others to Chinese-medium schools.
195 The majority of children, however, still 
attended Chinese-medium and -financed primary schools which stood largely outside 
official control and sources of funding: for example, Kai Kok Public School in Bukit 
Ho Swee and Chuen Min Public School at Tiong Bahru Road, both of which were run 
by Chinese businessmen living in Bukit Ho Swee or the vicinity,
196 and the Chinese 
Industrial and Commercial School along Outram Road. In 1960, there were 490 boys 
and 317 girls studying at Kai Kok and 425 boys and 318 girls at Chuen Min.
197 
 
Not many graduated, though, from the primary schools and even
c
 Chung Cheng High School (Branch) at Kim Yam Road. In 1952, only 7.8% of 
all students in Chinese-medium schools were enrolled in secondary education. This was 
a striking difference from English-medium education, where parents appeared 
determined to keep their children in school.
198 In many cases in Bukit Ho Swee, both 
parent and child ranked education low among their priorities, since it did not guarantee 
regular employment. A Chinese secondary education in particular left one with no 
 
193 DOE, Annual Report 1950, p. 55; Singapore, First Educational Triennial Survey 1955-57, p. 17. 
194 Chua Beng Huat, ‘The Business of Living in Singapore’, p. 1007. 
195 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
196 ME 2421/57, List of Management Committee Members of Chuen Min Public School, 4 Jul 1957; ME 
2481/57, List of Management Committee Members of Kai Kok Public School, 21 Jan 1958. 
197 ME 913/57, Inspection Report, 19 May 1960; ME 943/57, Inspection Report, 22 Jul 1960. 
198 DOE, Annual Report 1952, pp. 18, 34. 
  108education’, Tay Bok Chiu explained, ‘What was most important was to make a living 
and make money’.
199  Girls and the older children, moreover, were likely to be 
withdrawn from school by their parents to work and support the family. Under Chinese 
custom, females were not regarded as breadwinners or as part of the family upon 
marriage. While it increased throughout the 1950s, the proportion of girls attending 
Chinese schools in Singapore was still only 40% in 1957.
200 
 
Work lured children away from schools to various job sites of the kampong’s 
shadow economy – to streets and houses as hawkers and to factories, shops and 
arehouses as daily- or piece-rated workers. Wang Ah Tee and his friends literally dug 
for coin
 at 7-8 
m and finished at 8-9 pm. Children who were in school went to the 
 
  home-
centred taking care of 
e family’s pigs, poultry and vegetables, looking after smaller children (either one’s 
                                                
w
s, nails and other scrap metal from the nearby incinerator to sell to the karang 
guni collector.
201 While her parents and elder brother sold rojak and kway door to door 
among the neighbouring wooden houses, Tay Yan Woon earned a dollar plus a day in 
the Beo Lane warehouse, sorting coffee beans with many other children:  
 
I was very young. We sat on the floor sorting coffee beans. People went 
to sort coffee beans when they were very young. We started work
a
factory after class. There were males and females, mostly children. They 
gave you a bag of coffee beans, and the whole family would go through 
that bag. When you finished one bag, they gave you a new one. The 
more bags you sorted, the more money you earned. [Did you get more 
pay for working at night?] No, they paid you by bag. One bag about $3. 
[Did you work on weekends?] The factory was open everyday.
202 
Other forms of children’s work occurred within the home or for the 
 economy. Girls shouldered much of this unpaid responsibility: 
th
 
199 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. 
200 Singapore, Annual Report 1957, p. 141. 
201 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
202 Author’s interview with Tay Yan Woon, 28 Sep 2006. 
  109siblings or children who were baby-sat), cleaning the house, and washing or sewing 
clothes. A resident of Kampong Silat, Agnes Ho, born in 1939 and the eldest child in 
the family, ended her primary education when her mother began working as an amah 
for a European doctor near the General Hospital. Besides taking care of her younger 
sister, Ho’s chief daily task was to collect water from a public tap about twenty metres 
away.  
 
I started with two small pails, then they got bigger. Then I used bamboo 
poles to carry the two kerosene tins of water. So one day, seven times, 
that was fourteen tins. People put their pails down at the taps overnight 
 
  rking 
childre r hands, as did 
hool-goers, who often cast aside their schoolbags once they were home and went out 
                                                
[to reserve their spot]. But still, in the day, they would quarrel and kick 
each other’s pails. I decided to collect the water at 6 or 7 at night when 
there was nobody. In the day also, my younger sister, she was going to 
be two and learning to walk, was always behind me but she wanted to 
follow me. So at night was better because she slept quite early.
203 
But such arduous work and school did not occupy all children. Even wo
n, due to the irregular nature of their employment, had time on thei
sc
to play. As most children walked to and from school, the journey was frequently more 
interesting for them than their classes, navigating the shortcuts off the main roads and 
admiring the ‘scenery’ along the way. Lily Wee, who walked from Si Kah Teng to 
Cantonment Primary School in ‘Big Town’, took short cuts, where ‘it was very 
enjoyable. If we saw something nice on the way, we would take a look. We would dilly 
dally because there was no hurry to go home, because once you went home, you took 
your lunch and the whole afternoon, until dinner time, you didn’t know what to do’.
204 
An important effect of this ‘meandering’ was to raise children’s awareness of local 
spaces and help integrate them into the wider neighbouring community.  
 
 
203 Author’s interview with Agnes Ho, 24 Sep 2006. 
204 Author’s interview with Lily Wee, 3 Mar 2007. 
  110  Children’s social activities and games similarly tied them to the kampong 
community. Many children whose energies were immediately not needed for household 
bour, particularly the boys, spent their free time outside the house, running about 
t and involved gaming and gambling (or 
t least, competition). One game involved slicing through a banana with a knife to see 
                                                
la
topless and barefoot with their siblings, neighbours and friends. Playing children had 
fun with games like ‘hide and seek’ and ‘police and thief’ in the open spaces (including 
atop Mau Kau Thiong), and with marbles, tops, game cards, hopscotch, fighting fish 
and spiders, rain water (when heavy rains flooded the kampong), climbing trees, flying 
kites, and hunting fishes and tadpoles in a nearby longkang (‘drain’). In their play, they 
often replicated the social life of their fathers, out of home and within the community. 
Young girls, who sometimes played with the boys but frequently remained at home with 
their toys and games, grew into the domestic role and responsibility of their mothers as 
home-makers and home-workers. Parents invariably had little time nor inclination to 
focus their young on school, house or paid work; this reflected their ambivalence 
towards the future prospects of their children, who represented their ‘hope for life’ but 
were trapped in a harsh and seemingly unalterable environment.
205 As Tan Tiam Ho 
surmised, ‘For our parents, having a child was just like not having a child, whether you 
were back or not, whether you had eaten or not. We were allowed to go about and run 
about freely’.
206 Kampong kids consequently grew up in a world of freedom with only 
limited authority to curtail their imaginations.  
 
  This lack of control produced self-invention among the children. Their games 
were not pure play but both child-like and adul
a
who could create the ‘cliffhanger’ without severing it.
207 Yet another was to grind light 
bulbs with a hammer into fine glass to coat the strings of ‘battle kites’; the kids knew 
that the glass had to be fine or the kite would be too heavy.
208 Children made slingshots 
with wooden sticks or used fruit seeds or ‘tikam tikam’ to build a game of chance made 
with a wooden board, nails, rubber bands, and magazine pictures, which would allow 
 
205 Farge, Fragile Lives, p. 52. 
 Tiam Ho, 12 Mar 2007. 
206 Author’s interview with Tan
207 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
208 Author’s interview with Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006. 
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terference from our parents, unlike the 
parents now, who would stop the kid from doing this or that. It was ‘free 
 
  ardly 
compac  of Malay 
ampongs in Malaya and Singapore, a developing community ‘in a process of 
comi
them to make some money.
209 Simple guessing games enabled the young ones to 
grapple with the element of chance as adults did in their gambling: opening a book and 
guessing the page number or grabbing a handful of rice or matches and guessing 
whether the total number was odd or even.
210 Ong Boon Eng, in comparing the children 
of yesterday and the present, observed, 
 
Even during that time, we played with fire – firecrackers, carried lanterns 
– like nobody’s business. No in
concept’, the brain was free. We were more capable, more daring.
211 
The community of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee in the 1950s was outw
t but inwardly socially unstable. It was, as Joel Kahn observed
k
be ng’ rather than one fixed in time and space.
212 Economically, the Bukit Ho Swee 
population was divided between residents who were tied to the Central Area and those 
who, to a large extent, did their productive work locally. The lack of regular 
employment gave rise to singular ways of life which were kampong-bound: the shared 
housing and amenities, the coffeeshop idling, the hweis, and the secret societies. The 
local sense of community was, however, balanced by the adults’ unceasing search for 
material improvement, be it by having more family members work or attain higher 
education, or by duelling with chance through gambling. In social and economic terms, 
then, Bukit Ho Swee was partly autonomous and partly urbanised. In one sense though, 
the kampong was still independent: its ways of life had emerged without official 
regulation and were frequently outside the law. 
                                                 
209 Author’s interview with James Seah, 21 Oct 2006. 
210 Author’s interview with Tay Ah Chuan and Lim Yock Eng, 21 Feb 2006. 
211 Author’s interview with Oh Boon Eng, 4 Apr 2007. 
212  Joel S. Kahn, Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), p. 64. Chapter 3 
A Roar from the Oppressed People 
 
  ‘Bukit Ho Swee was not on our radar screen’, according to a pioneer 
architect of the Housing and Development Board, when it first embarked on the 
public housing project in 1960.
1 This statement, however, belies an earlier history of 
state efforts to regulate unauthorised wooden housing in the locality west of the 
Singapore River. This chapter examines two sides of a growing urban conflict in the 
1950s: the housing policies of the colonial state on the one hand and the contestation, 
both spontaneous and organised, they provoked among kampong dwellers on the 
other. In its pursuit of a modern, rejuvenated colonial state, the British regime 
sought to impose control on the fluid kampong spaces and to restore the social and 
political margin which had emerged at the urban periphery. The authorities created a 
powerful controlling discourse of clearance, depicting urban kampongs as insanitary 
and dangerous places belonging to ‘Old Singapore’.  
 
This discourse underpinned the policy efforts of three branches of the 
colonial civil administration to either clean up or demolish unauthorised wooden 
housing and resettle their dwellers in government-regulated houses. The City 
Council, which replaced the Municipal Commission in 1951,
2 was an experiment in 
elected local government which became a more representative body in the course of 
the decade. It was responsible for approving building plans, surveying and 
controlling dwellings, sanitising kampongs, fire-fighting, and providing modern 
social amenities and infrastructure in the urban area.
3 On the other hand, the 
Singapore Improvement Trust, established in 1927 mainly to carry out improvement 
                                                 
1 Author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. 
2 In 1951, Singapore was upgraded to the status of a City. 
3 Initially, in 1952, the eighteen elected and six appointed City Councillors managed six urban wards 
of the City of Singapore, with three elected Councillors taking charge of a ward. Of the small number 
of 44,896 electors registered for the 1952 elections, only half (22,475) voted. The first Chairman of 
the City Council was T. P. F. McNeice, a leading and experienced social service administrator. 
McNeice was in 1946 the President (later Secretary) of the Singapore Social Welfare Council, a body 
appointed by the Governor to advise the government and the Department of Social Welfare on the 
coordination and development of social welfare services in Singapore, and in 1949 the Chairman of 
the SIT. In 1957, the Council became a fully-elected body of 32 representatives, with a Mayor elected 
from amongst them annually. 
  113schemes like building backlanes and controlling insanitary buildings in the Central 
Area, had become the defacto housing authority of the colonial government after the 
war. Finally, the SIT and the Land Office managed the use of vacant Trust and 
Crown lands, issuing, respectively, Temporary Occupation Licences (TOLs) and 
tenancy permits to wooden house owners for short-term periods of occupation. 
 
However, as this chapter also discusses, British colonial attempts to contain 
or clear the urban kampongs and relocate the residents in regulated housing were 
powerfully contested. Rehousing became a major political issue in a period of 
fervent anti-colonialism, underlining the limits of what a colonial power could or 
could not make a sovereign people do.
4 Kampong dwellers in Singapore, and in 
Bukit Ho Swee specifically, challenged the demolition of their wooden houses and 
involuntary rehousing. They contributed significantly to the growth of an anti-
colonial politics which challenged the work of the City Council and the SIT’s 
building and clearance projects in the late 1950s. Leftwing rural activists, aligned 
with the People’s Action Party and working with politicians and the local old boys’ 
associations, organised the residents of Bukit Ho Swee and elsewhere to redefine the 
basis and premises of official controls. 
 
Transforming ‘Old Singapore’ 
 
  The end of World War Two witnessed the advent of major social projects in 
Singapore undertaken by the returning colonial regime. While retiring quickly from 
India and Burma, the British were determined to retain control over Malaya and 
Singapore for at least a generation. Postwar British policy towards its Southeast 
Asian colonies envisaged, as Nicholas Tarling observed, a substantial reform of 
society in order to establish politically stable and economically viable nation-states.
5 
Upon the formation of an anti-communist alliance representing the three main ethnic 
                                                 
4 In constitutional terms, the 1955 elections for 25 seats in the Legislative Assembly represented a 
watershed in Singapore politics and heralded a swing towards leftwing politics. The conservative 
parties which had dominated the previous elections in 1948 and 1951, the Progressive Party and the 
Democratic Party, were eclipsed by the PAP and the left-of-centre Singapore Labour Front. The latter 
won ten seats in the elections and formed a minority coalition government with the Alliance party 
(with three seats), with David Marshall becoming the first Chief Minister of Singapore. 
5 Nicholas Tarling, The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-east Asia (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp. 157, 170, 173. 
  114groups, Britain accelerated Malaya’s progress towards independence and granted it 
in 1957. Singapore, however, remained strategically valuable as a military base and 
entrepot port; it was separated from the peninsula in 1946 and its subsequent 
political developments were divorced from those north of the causeway. The British 
in Singapore were consequently not affected by any immediate timeline for political 
withdrawal. Their social programmes were so ambitious and vigorous that they 
merit the term ‘new imperialism’, even if many of them were not fully realised. 
Social restructuring on a large scale, like political change, sought to achieve the twin 
colonial aims of establishing viable nation-states and safeguarding Britain’s strategic 
and economic interests. As Tim Harper notes, postwar British power in Malaya and 
Singapore attempted to foster among the people a sense of direct allegiance to the 
state and was motivated by powerful societal concerns about social disorder, 
criminality, youth delinquency, and the proletarisation of the working class.
6  
 
British social policy in Singapore sought to ‘rationally’ reconstitute urban 
spaces according to a ‘high modernist’ philosophy. The official aim was to control 
the increasingly fluid spaces located at the margins of the City and rehouse the 
families dwelling there in regulated housing, in order to ensure that a population 
which had recently become mobile would be able to find accommodation only on 
the terms of the state. In seeking to bring local society within the direct sphere of 
official control, British social policy was publicly framed and articulated as a basic 
response to crises. While there were clearly serious social problems at the time, it is 
important to realise that this ‘language of emergency’ obscured the more ambitious 
and aggressive intent that lay behind its ‘hidden transcripts’.
7 In attempting to bring 
the dwellers of semi-autonomous kampongs under direct control, the colonial 
establishment represented the settlements as ‘dangerous’, ‘insanitary’ or ‘criminal’, 
inimical to the modernist vision, and evoked in the public eye a clear sense of the 
scale and urgency of the problem to be tackled. The premeditated social policy, in 
short, preceded the ‘crises’ it was meant to resolve. The lower rungs of Chinese 
society bore the brunt of this emergency campaign of social reform. Governor Henry 
                                                 
6 T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 55-75. 
7 James C Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
  115Gurney in 1948 viewed the locally-born, non-English speaking Chinese of the first 
generation, whose fathers were immigrants, as a menace to peace, who  
 
have as little in common with other Malayan communities as their 
fathers have. Their numbers are expanding in labour forces and 
squatter settlements….They are hardy and prolific, and nothing can 
be done to convert them into Malayan citizens. Their outlook is 
entirely Chinese, and it must be remembered that an effect of the 
Japanese occupation has been to settle many of them on the land from 
which it is difficult to dislodge them. These squatter areas are 
Chinese colonies in Malaya, equipped with Chinese schools which 
intensify their Chinese outlook and riddled with Chinese secret 
societies.
8  
 
The description was of Malaya but it could just as aptly apply to postwar Singapore 
and Bukit Ho Swee. 
 
British social policy held the pathological premise that Singapore’s social ills 
were deeply rooted in the population. Louis Chevalier had observed how middle-
class Parisians in the first half of the nineteenth century perceived crime not to be 
the province of professional criminals ‘but something ordinary and genuinely 
social’.
9 In Singapore, the Social Welfare Department was established in 1946 by 
the colonial government to coordinate social services hitherto provided by church-
based and voluntary organisations. Its work, which aimed at extending the reach of 
colonial social policy into local society, was well ahead of other social welfare 
programmes in Southeast Asia by 1949.
10  But colonial administrators openly 
bemoaned the shortage of Chinese-speaking officials in the bureaucracy after the 
                                                 
8 CO 537/3758, Enclosure ‘Groups in the Chinese Community in Malaya’, in letter from Sir H. 
Gurney to Sir T. Lloyd, 8 Oct 1948. 
9 Louis Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century (New York, H. Fertig, 1973), p. 77. 
10 Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, ‘Social Welfare in Southeast Asia’, Far Eastern Survey, 18 
(12), 15 Jun 1949, p. 139. 
  116war and acknowledged the ‘difficulty of knowing what the ordinary Chinese man or 
woman is thinking’.
11 The SWD consequently conflated Chinese youth with crime: 
 
A result of the introduction of Japanese ‘co-prosperity’ to Singapore 
was the result of corruption and venality as part of everyday 
life….The effect on the youth of the Colony was deplorable. The 
current dislocation of family life and the closing of schools made 
matters worse still. Boys and girls became street-loiterers, 
pickpockets, thieves, burglars, and gangsters.
12 
 
The clearance of ‘squatters’ and other socially undesirable types, an 
important component prefigured in the British mindset and social policy, was 
perceived as an essentially Chinese problem; Malays were considered ‘more 
amenable…to resettlement and more willing to come to agreement with the 
landowners who wish to develop the land they occupy’.
13 The colonial government 
viewed the growing belt of unauthorised housing on the urban periphery of the city 
as a dangerously enlarging margin, a liminal site where their control was weakest 
and any change, as Mary Douglas argued, could profoundly alter ‘the shape of 
fundamental experience’.
14 The nameless and faceless urban kampong dwellers 
moving into unauthorised housing and living semi-autonomous and frequently illicit 
ways of life became, in the official mind, the City’s ‘dangerous classes’.
15 Placing 
the urban kampongs under direct government authority consequently became a 
primary task in forging a modern postwar colonial image of Singapore. 
 
Prewar Bukit Ho Swee had already been, in a small way, the site of an earlier 
contestation between the colonial state and unauthorised housing builders. In 1938, 
                                                 
11 CO 537/3758, Memo by T. P. F. McNeice, G. C. S. Adkins & G. W. Webb, in letter from Sir F. 
Gimson to Sir T. Lloyd, 8 Dec 1948. Adkins was the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the Singapore 
administration. 
12 SWD, Annual Report 1946, p. 30. 
13  SIT 808/50, Paper titled ‘Resettlement’, by Commissioner of Lands and Acting Secretary for 
Social Welfare, 16 Jul 1952. The paper cites the case of a private developer seeking to redevelop its 
lands in Kampong Chantek, where almost all the Malays offered resettlement on an alternative site 
accepted it while almost all the Chinese dwellers rejected it for cash compensation. 
14 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 150. 
15 Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes; Loh Kah Seng, ‘Black Areas: The Urban 
Kampongs and Power Relations in Postwar Singapore Historiography’, SOJOURN, 22 (1), April 
2007, p. 21. 
  117Yeo Tiong, staying at 41 Bukit Ho Swee, grew vegetables on a small plot of 
Municipal land nearby. The authorities charged that he had built a wooden house 
there and used it as an opium den and living quarters. They instructed Yeo to 
remove it, since the area had previously been cleaned up and ‘a reversion to past 
insanitary conditions is not desirable’. Although Yeo protested that the dwelling was 
only for him to ‘take rain and shelter from rain and sun while working in my field’, 
it was demolished.
16 Obviously, the contest was one-sided and a harbinger of what 
was to follow in the postwar years. 
 
Representations 
 
In the aftermath of World War Two, official statements on unauthorised 
wooden housing in Singapore were framed within a discourse of control, demolition 
and rehousing. This ‘language of emergency’, as Greg Clancey observes, was much 
utilised by postwar planners who sought to mobilise households and integrate them 
into the social structure of the nation-state.
17 In the language and framework of this 
discourse, urban kampongs and their dwellers were always spoken of in the 
collective sense, never individually, and rendered as objects – the reified others – 
which one could objectively appraise and consequently act punitively against.
18 The 
kampongs and their wooden houses were labelled the ‘Black Belt’ of the City,
19 
while the generic phrase ‘attap hut’, which ignored the varied quality of the 
dwellings and roofing material, signified the wooden house as a ‘primitive’ or pre-
modern housing form. Another powerful associated term commonly used by the 
government, ‘squatter’, alleged illegal encroachment on property hindering the 
march of ‘progress’. This attitude and approach ignored the patent fact that private 
landowners in Singapore customarily leased out land not required for development 
on a monthly basis, while the Land Office and SIT issued, respectively, TOLs and 
                                                 
16 SIT 378/38, Letter from Yeo Tiong to Municipal Secretary, 30 Mar 1938; and Memo to Manager, 
SIT, 4 June 1938. 
17 Gregory K. Clancey, ‘Towards A Spatial History of Emergency: Notes from Singapore’, in R. 
Bishop, J. Phillips & W. W. Yeo (eds), Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 53. 
18 Albert Memmi, The Coloniser and the Colonised (London: Earthscan, 2003), p. 129. 
19 SIT, Annual Report 1954, p. 14. Other labels were “shack towns” or “shanty towns”. Singapore, 
Report of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office, 1956), p. 7; SIT 1218/53, Paper on Housing Surveys for United Nations Organisation by J. M. 
Fraser, 1953, p. 19. 
  118tenancy permits for short-term occupation of Crown and Trust land, for fear that 
vacant lots would tempt trespassers and rubbish dumpers.
20 As J. M. Fraser, 
Manager of the SIT, was himself aware, ‘a large proportion of the squatters in the 
town area are not squatters in the true sense of the word but are people working in 
town who have found it impossible to secure housing accommodation and have 
either built a hut or rented accommodation in an existing hut in some place not too 
far from their place of work’.
21 George Pepler, appointed Planning Adviser to the 
government in 1950, acknowledged that ‘the question of legality [of the ‘squatters’] 
has little relevance since it is bound to take second place to humanity. Squatting will 
not be stopped until housing accommodation is provided for all the inhabitants of 
Singapore’.
22 
 
The term’s legality was only seriously challenged on one occasion. The Land 
Clearance and Resettlement Working Party of 1955, appointed to inquire into the 
‘squatter problem’, rejected the term as ‘most unsatisfactory’,
23 since it had been ‘a 
long established custom in Singapore for owners of land not required for immediate 
development to rent out plots on a month to month basis and for the tenant to erect 
thereon a house’.
24  The dwellers, the Working Party maintained, were more 
accurately tenants who had resided on the land and paid rent to the landowner.
25 But 
although the Working Party suggested to replace the term ‘squatter’ with ‘attap 
dweller’,
26 it continued to circulate widely in official circles in both the colonial and 
postcolonial periods.  
 
The British government, in considering the expansion of public housing in 
Singapore after the war, strongly preferred prefabricated concrete houses, which 
were gaining in popularity in Britain and the United States, over wooden dwellings. 
It was felt in Singapore that wooden houses were ‘temporary expedients of a very 
                                                 
20 SIT, Annual Report 1955, p. 31. In 1952, the Land Office issued more than 7,000 TOLs, largely for 
agricultural holdings but also 2,323 TOLs for flats. 
21  SIT 952/50, Comments on Memo Submitted by Commissioner of Lands on the Problem of 
Squatters on Crown Land by Manager, SIT, 13 Nov 1950. 
22 SIT 952/50, Note titled ‘Urban Squatters’ by George Pepler, 5 Jan 1951. 
23 HB 722/55, Notes of Seventh Meeting, 11 Nov 1955. 
24 Singapore, Report of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party, pp. 2, 3. 
25 HB 722/55, Interim Report of the Working Party formed to Consider a Report on the ‘Squatter 
Problem’, undated, c. 1955. 
26 HB 722/55, Notes of First Meeting, 15 Sep 1955. 
  119poor quality’, ‘vulnerable to insects and disease and weather and not easy to keep 
clean, so that disease among people in such buildings, crowded as they will be, is 
more than a possibility if the period of occupation is lengthy’. The British also 
wanted to ‘scatter’ the population in self-contained communities all over Singapore, 
close to industries where they would work.
27 
 
The representation of wooden house dwellers as inert ‘squatters’ obstructing 
the path of progress contributed to a controlling official discourse of clearance, 
relocation and resettlement. This was a powerful language through which the often-
involuntary process of removing people from not only a type of housing but also a 
home, and a unique social and economic way of life, could be justified as not only 
desirable but indeed necessary. However, ‘clearance’, the officially-sanctioned term 
in relation to the removal of ‘squatters’, meant to many wooden house dwellers 
something altogether different. While there were admittedly mixed responses among 
the Chinese towards moving into modern housing, the Hokkien word for ‘clearance’ 
in the postwar period was gua, which had the stronger meaning of ‘being chased out 
of’ or ‘evicted’.  
 
The first official discussion of unauthorised wooden housing was undertaken 
by the 1947 Housing Committee, tasked to prepare a preliminary building plan to 
relieve the housing shortage.
28 Writing in the characteristic ‘language of emergency’, 
the Committee likened housing in Singapore to a dangerous social contagion: ‘The 
disease from which Singapore is suffering is Gigantism’, out of which ‘[a] chaotic 
and unwieldy megalopolis has been created’ by ‘haphazard and unplanned growth’, 
while ‘[s]hops, residences and factories are huddled together with patches of 
undeveloped land’ and ‘[n]o provision is made for road improvement, open spaces 
or public buildings or amenities’. This pell mell urbanisation and resultant slums, the 
Committee warned, were ‘detrimental to health and morals’.
29 Such language was 
not disinterested description but contained, in Ranajit Guha’s words, the ‘voice of 
                                                 
27 CO 825/47/15, Memo by O. W. Gilmour titled ‘Postwar Housing in Singapore’, 3 Nov 1944; and 
Memo by O. W. Gilmour titled ‘Postwar Housing in Singapore: Suggestions for Meeting the Housing 
Difficulty’, 1 Aug 1944. Gilmour was Deputy Municipal Engineer before the war. 
28 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee (Singapore: Government Printing House, 1947), p. 3. 
29 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, p. 11. 
  120committed colonialism’,
30 which supported the clearance programme. The SIT was 
then preparing to build new flats in Tiong Bahru and displace 2,000 kampong 
dwellers living there. J. M. Fraser, a member of the Committee, stated that the 
vacant land there could be fully developed within three years and underscored the 
need to acquire more land for such housing at once.
31 
 
The Committee’s report, when discussing wooden housing in the urban area, 
transformed the metaphorical contagion into a real one. It declared the ‘insanitary 
kampongs’ to be ‘the worst type of slum’, with ‘living conditions which are not fit 
for animals to live in’ and ‘no proper means of drainage and sanitation’. The 
problem, the report warned, affected not only the occupants but was also a threat to 
the whole city, and consequently, ‘[t]he only solution to this problem is demolition 
and re-housing’.
32 This was manifestly an instance of the ‘poetics of transgression’, 
signifying the urban kampong as primitive and contaminated as opposed to civilised 
and clean.
33  The kampongs were also perceived as dangerous places, where, 
according to Gareth Stedman Jones, the ‘outcast’ or ‘residuum’ of society dwelled.
34 
The Committee’s Chairman, C. W. A. Sennett, the Commissioner of Lands, viewed 
the slums as ‘the nurseries of a C3 nation and schools for training youth for crime’. 
Someone could visit, he added, ‘if he likes to risk his personal safety, such 
unauthorised kampongs of attap huts as have sprung up in places such as Kampong 
Silat or Henderson Road’.
35  
 
The report was accompanied by sensational photographs of Covent Garden 
and Tiong Bahru, highlighting the contaminated physical environment – the poor, 
deteriorating state of wooden dwellings and toilets, rubbish littered around the 
houses, stagnant river and drain water, dark interiors, and free-roaming pigs – but no 
                                                 
30 Ranajit Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’, in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley & Sherry B. 
Ortner (eds), Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), p. 346. 
31 SIT 475/47, Minutes of Meeting of the Housing Committee on 20 Jun 1947. 
32 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, pp. 6, 11. 
33 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 130-132. 
34 Stedman Gareth Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 11. 
35 SIT 475/47, Notes for Discussion on Housing by Commissioner of Lands, 13 Jun 1947. ‘C3’ was a 
rating in the British classification of medical fitness for military service during World War One and 
referred to someone unfit for combat duty. The term was subsequently extended to populations and 
nations. 
  121sign of the social or economic life. Contrasted with these images were brightly-lit 
pictures of neatly-aligned new SIT housing.
36 Human activity in the kampongs was 
conspicuously absent, but not animal life, given the strong official desire to highlight 
how ‘pigs and poultry roamed the area and in many cases shared the huts with the 
inhabitants’.
37 The visual juxtaposition of the official photographs, highlighting the 
clean and unclean and, by association, the moral and immoral, demonstrates Susan 
Sontag’s contention that ‘photographing something became a routine part of the 
procedure for altering it’.
38  
 
A local contractor, who regarded brick and concrete housing as 
uneconomical, had stated that prefabricated attap houses, which could last 10-20 
years and were arousing interest in Kuala Lumpur, would be much cheaper.
39 
Nevertheless, the Housing Committee, which sought ‘a City having foundations’, 
wanted to quickly focus on ‘planned permanent housing’, since temporary housing 
would ‘positively tend to create more slums in the city and extend their existence 
over a further period of 10 or 20 years’.
40 J. M. Fraser, in particular, favoured semi-
permanent prefabricated dwellings made of reinforced concrete, which could last 50 
years and of which the SIT had constructed 200 units at Balestier Estate; these 
modern houses, he maintained, would ‘provide a valuable unit in the construction of 
complete communities’.
41  
 
Besides endorsing permanent over temporary housing for the short-term 
three-year building programme, the Committee underlined the importance of long-
term planning over the next twenty years. It called on the SIT to take on greater 
planning and building responsibilities and for the state to provide adequate funds for 
housing. A key proposal here was to shift the Central Area population into new 
homes. C. W. A. Sennett argued for the Trust to be vested with ‘proper zoning 
powers and powers to plan ahead of development, and to disperse population by 
                                                 
36 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, pp. 29-43. 
37 SIT 744/50, Draft Memo on the History and Development of Tiong Bahru Estate, 1950. 
38 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), p. 64. 
39 SIT 475/47, Letter from Lim Kim Tah to Chairman, Housing Committee, 15 Jun 1947. Lim also 
suggested that the wooden houses’ floor, as well as the kitchens, toilets and bathrooms, should be 
made of concrete. 
40 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, pp. 7, 17.  
41 SIT 475/47, Memo titled ‘Prefabricated Houses at Kuala Lumpur’ by J. M. Fraser, 13 Aug 1947. 
  122planning housing estates, “dormitory towns” [for urban workers], industrial estates, 
satellite towns, light and heavy industry centres, recreational and other facilities’.
42 
The Committee envisaged moving some 400,000 people outside the Municipal 
limits within the next ten years; it was already necessary, then, for Singapore and its 
urban planners and architects to have a ‘Master Development Plan’.
43 Essentially, as 
the Australian Commissioner in Singapore aptly surmised, the colonial government 
was being urged to abandon its laissez faire approach to development in favour of 
structured planning to facilitate the emergence of Singapore as an industrial city.
44 
 
Not only was the language of contagion prominent in the report, the medical 
establishment was also influential in determining trajectories of action. They had 
also argued for the dispersal of the Central Area population and for tight control 
over wooden housing. W. E. Hutchinson, the Deputy Municipal Health Officer, 
when asked to choose between building flats in the Central Area or at the outskirts 
of the city, replied that the latter was most likely to alleviate overcrowding and 
benefit the urban population’s health.
45 Another doctor suggested that the disused 
cemeteries in the inner city be acquired and developed, for ‘[w]e want ground for 
Housing the Living and not the Dead in space’.
46 P. S. Hunter submitted that 
dispersal would help control the incidence of tuberculosis.
47 However, he also urged 
the government to provide light, water and conservancy on vacant lands to 
encourage people to settle and construct wooden houses, since dwellings built by the 
occupiers themselves, he claimed, would be properly maintained. But he also 
emphasised that ‘all houses had to be built according to one or other type plan – no 
deviation, alliation [sic] or addition to be permitted’.
48  
 
W. E. Hutchinson, in particular, was instrumental in extending the reach of 
the official gaze, hitherto restricted to the Central Area, to urban kampongs. In 1946, 
                                                 
42 SIT 475/47, Notes for Discussion on Housing by Commissioner of Lands, 13 Jun 1947. 
43 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, pp. 9, 11-13. 
44  A4231/1948/Singapore, Despatch from Australian Commissioner to Secretary, Department of 
External Affairs, 23 Aug 1948. 
45 SIT 475/47, Minutes of Meeting of the Housing Committee on 2 Jun 1947. The other two doctors 
consulted were Dr. N. A. Canton, Municipal Health Officer, and Dr. R. S. Johnson, Chief Health 
Officer. 
46 SIT 475/47, Report from Dr. K. Kiramathypathy to Chairman, Housing Committee, 26 Jun 1947. 
Kiramathypathy was a practitioner at Lanka Dispensary, Serangoon Road. 
47 SIT 475/47, Minutes of Meeting of the Housing Committee, 14 Jul 1947. 
48 SIT 475/47, Memo on Housing by Dr. P. S. Hunter, undated, c. 1947. 
  123he had emphasised that ‘the erection of these huts to no layout, with no adequate 
drainage and sanitary offices, no refuse disposal, no water supply and dependent on 
wells, results in a possible foci for disease which MUST be appreciated’. 
Hutchinson warned of a possible contagion spreading to the General Hospital from 
Kampong Silat with a ‘collection of nearly 500 insanitary huts’, which had ‘grown 
immensely, and conditions have grossly deteriorated’. Citing a recent cholera 
outbreak in Malaya, he declared that ‘[w]hatever may be the killing property of 
overcrowding [in the Central Area] or the ill-health that may result, it has nothing of 
the urgency that now exists in the creation of these insanitary kampongs’.
49 In 1948, 
he called for the policy against unauthorised wooden housing to be expanded from 
demolition to surveillance, explaining that while many insanitary houses had been 
demolished before the war, it was necessary to exercise control before the houses 
were erected.
50 Hutchinson’s train of thought illustrated vividly Mary Douglas’ 
contention that ‘ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy 
experience’.
51 
 
Plate 3.1: The official photograph as part of the discursive language of clearance and 
rehousing. A dilapidated wooden house with attap roof in the Bukit Ho Swee area, year 
unknown. Note the spittoon outside the house and the unlit interior. Official photographs 
such as this typically focus on the poor housing conditions without showing signs of 
kampong life (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
                                                 
49 SIT 348/46, Memo by Deputy Municipal Health Officer to Chairman, SIT, 30 Oct 1946.  
50 SIT 808/50, Memo by Deputy Municipal Health Officer, 31 Aug 1948. 
51 Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 5. 
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Plate 3.2: Two other themes of the official photographs: filth and the lack of social 
organisation. Discarded household items lie in open space in the Bukit Ho Swee area, as a 
resident walks past nonchalantly, 1947 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 3.3: Another image of social disorganisation: uncleared rubbish in the Bukit Ho Swee 
area, year unknown (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 3.4: A powerful image of insanitation: an uncovered drain with stagnant water in the 
Bukit Ho Swee area, year unknown (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 3.5: The discursive image of social transgression and contamination: free-ranging pigs 
feed among the wooden houses in the Bukit Ho Swee area, c. 1930s (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
Sanitation and Surveillance 
 
The medical establishment was ready to associate ill-health with the physical 
environment of kampongs but this was a perception not always corroborated by the 
  126facts. Ill-ventilated, congested dwellings, and malnutrition, were declared to be 
crucial causal factors in its campaign to eradicate tuberculosis.
52 According to a 
medical social worker in the 1950s, however, the disease was more prevalent in the 
Central Area shophouses than in wooden dwellings on the periphery of the city.
53 
Tuberculosis was the leading cause of death in Singapore in 1947. The disease was a 
major public health concern after the war, particularly among children, with an 
incidence of 2.35 per 1,000 persons in 1947 but which fell continuously to 0.57 in 
1960.
54 By 1959, the authorities acknowledged a gradual reduction in the death 
rate.
55 They had indeed wondered that the disease was not more prevalent ‘in view 
of the many overcrowded cubicle dwellings which persist with most primitive 
kitchen and sanitary arrangements, the many squatter areas, and the thousands of 
hawkers to be met with in Singapore’.
56 Nevertheless, despite the lack of detailed 
empirical investigation into the incidence of tuberculosis in wooden housing, the 
perception of urban kampongs as sites of filth and disease was sufficient to 
determine official policy towards these settlements. 
 
In 1949, on Hutchinson’s recommendation, the Municipal Commission 
established an ‘experimental Kampong Sanitation Squad’ in Kampong Silat to lay 
sullage drains, clear existing drains and dispose of refuse and nightsoil.
57 The 
following year, the project was extended to Kampongs Alexandra, Amber and 
Geylang Serai. More than 7,000 feet of concrete drains were laid in 1950, while pig 
rearers in Kampong Alexandra were served notices to keep their pigs in stys. The 
project was, however, plainly uneconomical, siphoning off substantial Municipal 
labour from the daily tasks of city maintenance,
58 while much of the work was soon 
                                                 
52 MD, Annual Report 1947, p. 73; MD, Annual Report 1949, p. 47; MD, Annual Report 1950, p. 55. 
53 Author’s interview with Joyce Horsley, 3 Nov 2007. Horsley worked with tuberculosis patients in 
Kampong Henderson in the mid-1950s. Even the extent of tuberculosis in shophouse housing 
appeared to have been exaggerated. In a study of the impact of the living environment of low-income 
families on the health of infants in the 1950s, while 52% and 25% of the housing of the Chinese and 
Indian families respectively were considered ‘bad’ according to living density and sanitary facilities 
and other amenities, the researchers found that ‘[t]he level of housing appeared to have no definite 
influence on the well-being of these infants’. E. M. Browne, ‘A Survey of Singapore of Low Income 
Level Housing in Relation to Health of Infants’, Medical Journal of Malaya, 8, 1954, pp. 237-38. 
54 MD, Annual Report 1947, p. 49; CC HD, Annual Report, 1948-1960. 
55 CC HD, Annual Report 1959, p. 5. 
56 MD, Annual Report 1952, p. 2. The medical authorities also conceded that ‘[m]any wild statements 
had been made in regard to its incidence in our local population but beyond crude deaths and death 
rates no reliable statistics exist’. MD, Annual Report 1949, p. 86. 
57 CC, Administration Report 1949, pp. 82-83, 130. 
58 CC, Administration Report 1950, pp. 84, 132; CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1950, 4 Sep 1950. 
  127lost due to in-filling in the kampongs.
59 The experiment was not extended to other 
urban kampongs, although it was initiated in 1954 in rural kampongs.
60 Public 
health inspectors, however, continued to visit the kampongs to ensure that pigs were 
kept in stys, no unauthorised housing was erected, and nightsoil was not being used 
as manure. But Table 3.1 shows that the time devoted to kampong inspection 
fluctuated. The number of wooden houses actually surveyed in the 1950s was small 
in relation to the total number of wooden houses (about 10,000 in 1959) found in the 
urban area, except in 1949, when over 15,000 houses were inspected as part of the 
study of the Attap Dwellings Special Committee (Table 3.1). This under-registration 
suggests that the sampling and surveillance was far from complete, particularly in 
the mid to late 1950s. 
Table 3.1: Kampong Inspection by the City Council, 1949-1960 
Year  Man-Working Days  No. of Wooden Houses Inspected 
1949 356  15,614 
1950 175  2,400 
1951 N.A.  N.A. 
1952 N.A.  N.A. 
1953 220  3,362 
1954 115  2,364 
1955 304  4,393 
1956 104  1,838 
1957 145  2,582 
1958 145  2,331 
1959 111  4,244 
1960 953  8,364 
Source: CC Public Health Inspectors’ Section, Annual Report, 1949-1960. 
 
What hindered the inspection efforts, and caused much official anxiety, was 
the physical nature and social development of unauthorised wooden housing. 
Neatly-aligned blocks of public housing were ‘designed to make a powerful visual 
impact as a form’.
61 Urban kampongs, by contrast, displayed untidy exteriors which 
hid the social and economic order embedded within them. The ‘messiness’ on 
display was, to the authorities, simply a sign of chaos. The SIT worried over the 
fluidity of kampong spaces, where ‘[h]uts were erected with astonishing rapidity and 
when once in existence, it was difficult to get them demolished….The situation 
                                                 
59 HB 408/52, Memo from City Health Officer to Commissioner of Lands, 23 May 1952. 
60 CC, Administration Report 1952, p. 14. 
61 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 104. 
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changed almost from day to day and was very difficult to control’.
62 In 1953, the 
Trust established ‘squatter patrols’ to prevent the building of unauthorised wooden 
houses on Crown and Trust lands. The disorderliness and random nature of 
temporary dwellings also frustrated a basic means of administrative governance – 
cadastral surveying and mapping. The SIT, in a survey of wooden dwellings in 1953, 
realised that ‘most of them are a maze of temporary buildings interpenetrated with 
pathways, the development being dense and chaotic’.
63 This form of ad-hoc housing, 
the Trust realised, was altogether far more difficult to regulate than the Central Area 
housing, with which they had dealt since the beginning of the twentieth century: 
 
There is a lack of adequate maps. Unlike the central areas, which are 
comparatively changeless…the attap areas change almost from day to 
day with the result that even a map prepared one year previously is 
certain to be out of date.  
 
The existing numbering system is chaotic and often non-existent. No 
direct reference could therefore be made from any sort of plan to a 
form based on an existing system – as was possible in the central 
areas.
64 
 
Goh Keng Swee’s 1956 study of low-income families also found that ‘even 
with the best system of documentation, attap dwellings can sometimes be the most 
difficult to locate….The postal address of attap dwellings do not run in serial 
order….it is a common practice for unauthorised attap dwellings to borrow 
addresses belonging to other unauthorised houses in the neighbourhood’.
65 Joyce 
Horsley, a medical social worker looking after tuberculosis patients in Kampong 
Henderson in the mid-1950s, found the house numbers ‘all jumbled up’ and had to 
ask the residents for locations of specific dwellings.
66 Government surveyors even 
found it ‘particularly difficult in some instances just to say what was a house, for 
occasionally, attap houses seem to have the habit in Singapore of enlarging their size 
 
62 SIT, The Work of the Singapore Improvement Trust 1927-1947, p. 17.  
63 SIT 1218/53, Paper on Housing Surveys for United Nations Organisation by J. M. Fraser, 1953.  
64 SIT 1218/53, Paper on Housing Surveys for United Nations Organisation by J. M. Fraser, 1953. 
65 Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, p. 7. 
66 Author’s interview with Joyce Horsley, 3 Nov 2007. Table 3.2: Number of Dwellings in Urban Kampongs in 1948 & 1958 
Name of Kampong  Number of 
Houses in 1948 
No. of Houses 
Numbered by City 
Assessor (1958) 
As Suggested by 
City Assessor 
50% Added to 
Give More 
Realistic Figure 
(1958) 
Tiong Bahru   402  908  1,362 
Boon Teck Road   617  577  865 
Potong Pasir   550  468  702 
Henderson Road   289  292  438 
Amber   200  233  349 
Radin Mas and Pahang   182  180  270 
Ah Hood Road   N.A.  159  238 
Bukit Ho Swee   232  144  216 
Wak Tanjong   1,174*  133  199 
Lorong 17  N.A.  117  175 
Chia Heng   45  113  169 
Silat   442  105  157 
Beo Lane   55  90  135 
Covent Garden   N.A.  81  121 
Soopoo   132  81  121 
Wayang Satu   300  72  108 
Bukit Purmei   80  62  93 
Bukit Teresa   N.A.  50  75 
Pukat   N.A.  49  74 
Heap Guan San   69  45  67 
Ban Siew San   50  42  63 
Bugis   N.A.  42  63 
Jagoh   26  40  60 
Lorong 27A  N.A.  36  54 
Upper Woodleigh   60  32  48 
Marican   50  29  43 
Pasiran   N.A.  16  24 
Lorong 3   N.A.  14  21 
Bukit Kasita   25  10  15 
Jalan Ampas   N.A.  9  13 
Martin   161  8  12 
Ampat   N.A.  7  10 
Lorong 27A   N.A.  5  7 
Pisang   N.A.  4  6 
Teo Chew   25  3  4 
* including adjacent areas. 
Sources: CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1958, 19-20 May, 1958, pp. 420-22; SIT 808/50, 
Memorandum from Deputy Municipal Health Officer to Municipal Health Officer, 31 
August 1948. 
 
  130by extension, from time to time, to the main structure’.
67 In December 1957, when 
the SIT updated its survey of the urban kampongs, it discovered ‘in many areas an 
alarming increase’ of unauthorised wooden housing. The Trust concluded that ‘[t]he 
only issue is whether it is haphazard and uncontrolled, or whether it is to be properly 
controlled and a minimum of service and amenities provided for the inhabitants’.
68 
Table 3.2 shows differences in the numbers of wooden dwellings estimated by W. E. 
Hutchinson in his 1948 survey compared with those listed by the City Council a 
decade later, highlighting the difficulty of municipal control over the spread of 
wooden housing. It is also evident from Table 3.2 that Bukit Ho Swee, Beo Lane 
and Tiong Bahru were already on the official ‘radar’ as early as 1948. 
 
Demolition and Dishousing: The Work of the Municipal Commission and the City 
Council 
 
Given the problems of building control, the Municipal Commission adopted 
a piecemeal and reactive policy towards the establishment of unauthorised housing. 
Its main blunt response was, for a long time, demolition. In July 1941, prior to the 
collapse of British power, the Commission had authorised the construction of 
wooden housing in the Municipal area as a temporary war-time measure.
69  
Immediately after the war, however, the Commission had no legal power over 
unauthorised wooden housing built on Crown land during the Japanese Occupation 
and the period of the British Military Administration (BMA), from September 1945 
to April 1946. In September 1946, a number of owners of unauthorised wooden 
housing located on the disused cemetery in Tiong Bahru, who had rebuilt their 
houses to Municipal requirements, submitted their building plans to the Commission 
for approval. Despite an objection from some quarters that this would encourage the 
construction of more haphazard and insanitary wooden housing, the Commission 
granted them temporary permits on the condition that no further building take 
                                                 
67 Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, p. 67. 
68 HB 52/56, Report by Planning Adviser (Planning Coordination Committee) on Housing, undated, c. 
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69 SIT 545/41, Memo from President, Municipal Commissioners, to Private Secretary to the Colonial 
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  131place.
70 It then decided in 1948 to issue 2-year annual permits to owners of 
unauthorised housing built on Crown lands during the Japanese and BMA periods.
71 
The purpose of issuing tenancies and TOLs was to regularise settlement patterns and 
bring the unauthorised wooden housing under some form of direct control, enabling 
future action against the occupants.
72 
 
The authorities, however, were determined to remove unauthorised housing 
built on Crown land after the BMA period. In 1946, the SIT ordered 82 families, 
who had built unauthorised wooden houses on Crown land on Owen and Dorset 
roads in April and May, to move to Kim Keat Road. The dwellers were mostly 
political refugees from ‘riot areas upcountry’ with no relatives in Singapore and had 
‘lost their all through Japanese aggression’.
73 They pleaded to remain at their site for 
two years, as they were 
 
poor labourers, coolies and hawkers….due to our ignorance and 
illiteracy and due to the fact that as there was no other house where 
we could move in, we were compelled to erect the existing huts with 
all the savings we had without obtaining the necessary sanction from 
your honour.
74 
 
In 1948, 69 of the cases were evicted without managing to secure a lease on Trust 
land for farming or housing in artisans’ quarters as initially promised by the SIT.
75 
 
  In the previous year, the SIT’s Lands Section recommended immediate 
action against ‘all new squatters’ and to treat ‘existing squatters’ who refused to 
vacate as ‘trespassers’.
76 In 1948, Yap Pheng Geck, an unofficial member of the 
Municipal Commission and a Chinese community leader, represented the owners of 
                                                 
70 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1946, 16 Sep 1946. 
71 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1948, 12 Jan 1948. 
72 SIT 843/52, Memo from Acting Deputy Lands Manager, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 19 May 1953. 
73 SIT 148/46, Letter from Consul General of the Republic of China to Commissioner of Lands, 6 
Nov 1946. 
74 SIT 148/46, Signed Petition from 82 Persons to Engineer, SIT, 20 Sep 1946.  
75 SIT 148/46, Memo from Lands Officer, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 22 Jan 1948; and Signed Petition 
from 19 Persons to Manager, SIT, 12 Apr 1948. 
76 SIT 650/47, Memo titled ‘Squatters on SIT Land’ from Lands Section, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 22 
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  132137 unauthorised dwellings served with Mandatory (demolition) Orders by the 
courts, including owners of ten houses opposite the Tiong Bahru Estate. The owners 
were contesting the demolition of their structurally sound dwellings on the sole basis 
that they were built without authority. When Yap asked if such housing could be 
considered necessary in view of the housing shortage, the official reply was ‘that 
unauthorised buildings are erected in defiance of the law, no matter how pressing the 
necessity’.
77  In 1949, however, the Commission grudgingly agreed to permit 
dwellers issued with Mandatory Orders to rebuild their structures to comply with 
Municipal standards, whereupon they would be issued temporary permits.
78  
 
In October 1950, the Municipal Commission formed an Attap Dwellings 
Special Committee to investigate the execution of Mandatory Orders issued against 
unauthorised wooden housing. The Committee surveyed a 10% sample of wooden 
housing in the Municipal area.
79 Its report, completed in November 1951 and 
adopted by the City Council, recommended that no new unauthorised wooden 
dwellings be permitted in the City and that the government should establish a 
housing authority to build permanent or semi-permanent ‘workers’ dwellings’ close 
to the urban kampongs to ‘minimise disturbance of occupational ties’ of the 
residents. The Committee felt that  
 
[v]ery little can be done (by provision of access roads, drains etc.) to 
improve areas of attap dwellings, at any rate the worst ones, and any 
funds available to do what could be done would be better spent by 
way of schemes for their replacement by better dwellings. The 
existing areas should therefore be accepted as a necessary (but 
diminishing) evil while schemes for their replacement are 
progressing.
80 
 
D. C. Rae, the Municipal Architect, argued for the wooden dwellings to be moved to 
more outlying areas so as not to obstruct the expansion of commercial and industrial 
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  133activities from the Central Area.
81 The Committee, concurring, proposed that the 
government or SIT acquire an area at the outskirts of the City for 3,000 wooden 
houses to be built according to a particular ‘type plan’ for people evicted from 
unauthorised dwellings.
82 The report hardened the City Council’s attitude towards 
unauthorised wooden housing, whose members decided that ‘[v]igorous action 
involving prosecution and demolition is the only way in which this open contempt 
of the City’s building regulations can be tackled’.
83 In 1952, the Council began court 
proceedings against the owners of unauthorised housing on Crown land at Carey 
Road.
84 In July 1953, the Council commenced demolishing, with ‘no exceptions’, 
newly- or partly-erected unauthorised wooden dwellings, with its staff accompanied 
by policemen to prevent a breach of the peace.
85 The City Health Department 
enthusiastically welcomed such punitive action taken against the ‘insanitary huts’.
86 
 
Elsewhere within government circles, demolition was a deeply-resented 
policy. The courts were reluctant to issue Mandatory Orders to evict wooden house 
dwellers in light of the current housing shortage while legal proceedings against 
such housing were frequently protracted;
87 in 1959, it still took at least 2-3 months 
for a judgment to be reached.
88 Chinese community leaders consistently pressed the 
government not to demolish existing wooden housing without first building 
sufficient numbers of low-cost housing.
89 The Nanyang Siang Pau argued that the 
solution to the problem of unauthorised housing was to build new houses, not 
demolish existing ones.
90 In mid-1952, Yap Pheng Geck had protested that many 
occupants had been given only five minutes to remove their belongings before their 
houses were demolished, and although the residents ‘begged the labourers who were 
pulling down our houses to allow us to retain the materials of the buildings’, ‘[t]hey 
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  134threw all our building materials into the river’. ‘More than 300 persons’, Yap 
surmised, consequently ‘are rendered homeless and having now to sleep in open air 
and are suffering the pangs of hunger’. Amid rising anger and dismay, Yap asked, 
‘[i]f the Authorities do not allow people to build houses in the area, why did they not 
prevent anyone from building from the beginning?’
91  
 
In six months, the City Council proudly proclaimed, the demolition policy 
slashed the average monthly number of new unauthorised houses from 100 to 15 
(and 14 by the following year). A serious dishousing difficulty, however, soon 
surfaced, forcing the Council to form a subcommittee to examine a problem of their 
own creation.
92 In 1955, the Council suspended the demolition. In May that year, the 
police had withdrawn protection for demolition squads not possessing Mandatory 
Orders,
93 ostensibly because there was no legal sanction for the police to assist in 
the demolition work,
94 but also because, it was feared by then, police presence 
would itself provoke a breach of the peace.
95 ‘The first riot’, the SIT’s Lands 
Division correctly predicted, ‘will cause a revision of this decision’.
96 Police support 
was restored in early 1956, following an incident where a demolition squad in Toa 
Payoh without an escort was assaulted by house owners.
97  
                                                
 
In August 1955, though, the City Council was forced to revise its policy on 
unauthorised wooden housing. On the advice of the Land Clearance and 
Resettlement Working Party, it designated areas in the City with wooden houses and 
the adjacent vacant lands as ‘attap areas’; in effect authorising the vacant lands for 
settlement, although demolition of dwellings would still be carried out in non-
designated areas.
98 In sanctioning such a move, the Council attempted once again to 
bring unauthorised wooden housing under some form of direct control. Five 
 
91 HB 408/52, Letter from Yap Pheng Geck to Manager, SIT, 11 Jul 1952. 
92 CC, Administration Report 1953, pp. 18, 218-19; CC, Administration Report 1954, p. 251. 
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1955 
95 HB 659/53, Senior Assistant Commissioner’s Directive No. 20/55 titled ‘Evictions Policy and SIT’, 
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96 SIT 993/50, Lands Division Monthly Report Jul 1955. 
97  HB 659/53, Memo from President, CC, to PS, MLGLH, 25 Nov 1955; and Report on the 
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  135kampongs which were not overly-congested were designated as ‘attap areas’, to be 
provided with ‘spine’ roads (for the passage of fire engines and refuse collection), 
open spaces and children’s playgrounds. The Working Party also mandated a 
distance of 25 feet between the walls of new and existing wooden houses, concrete 
floors and asbestos or corrugated iron roofs and kitchen walls.
99 The Council hoped 
that with these measures, wooden houses in the City would ‘for the next 20 years 
form a necessary part of general housing policy’.
100 In reality, the actual regulation 
of unauthorised wooden dwellings was beyond the powers of the City Fathers. In 
1956, the Architect and Building Surveyor’s Department found that ‘a considerable 
number’ of wooden houses had been erected without its authorisation and that ‘it is 
only with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to obtain any compliance 
with the very minor requirements set out in the [Working Party’s] Report’.
101 
Sometimes, evicted occupiers simply vacated the dwelling without demolishing it, 
whereby new tenants often moved in.
102 In hindsight, the City Council’s demolition 
policy, in directing those dishoused to other urban kampongs, was to prove 
incredibly short-sighted. 
 
Clearance and Resettlement: The SIT Response 
 
While the City Council struggled to stem the tide of unauthorised dwellings, 
the SIT, given the nature of its work, was undertaking a more aggressive social 
policy. In 1947, upon the Housing Committee’s recommendation of launching a 
three-year building programme, the SIT began to construct ‘low-cost’ housing at the 
margins of the City, but still within four miles of the Central Area. Families earning 
under $600 a month qualified for the housing, although the ceiling was reduced to 
$400 in 1956. The following year, the SIT received a $5 million loan from the 
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  136government to fund the building programme. The area west of the Singapore River 
witnessed a mushrooming of Trust housing in the following decade. In 1947-1954, 
1,324 new dwellings and shops, including 4-storey blocks of flats, were added to 
Tiong Bahru Estate. Henderson Estate, with 156 dwellings and shops, emerged 
between 1948-1949, as did Havelock Road (or Delta) Estate, with 585 dwellings and 
shops, between 1950-1953, and Bukit Merah (or Redhill) Estate, with 1,304 
dwellings and shops, between 1952-1955. Slum clearance schemes also contributed 
more permanent housing to the locality. For example, between 1948-1952, 467 
dwellings and shops were built as part of the Kampong Silat improvement scheme, 
transforming what had early on been identified as an insanitary area located close to 
the General Hospital.
103 In 1957, the SIT started demolition work in relation to the 
improvement scheme at Covent Garden, where blocks of one-room flats were to be 
built and the kampong’s 650 families moved to Trust flats being erected in 
Queenstown New Town to the west.
104 
 
Urban kampong communities found themselves increasingly displaced by 
the pace of the SIT housing development. In 1951, the SIT, which managed large 
urban kampongs on Trust land on tenancy agreements, revealed that its lands at 
Alexandra Road, Kampong Java, Farrer Road, south of Tiong Bahru Road, and 
Alexandra Estate (West), which were available for housing, would soon be 
exhausted. In contemplating new areas, the Trust targeted the ‘best housing sites on 
the Island and in the City [which] are occupied by graves and squatters, often 
adjacent’.
105 In 1952, the SIT assumed control of Crown lands in the Kallang Basin, 
Kampong Alexandra and Henderson Road where 2,400 families were staying in 600 
wooden dwellings under TOLs, which were ‘either insanitary or scheduled for 
development’. The Trust estimated that 1,000 families would require rehousing from 
these areas in the next two years due to housing and industrial development.
106 
Kampong Alexandra and Henderson Road, in particular, were viewed as ‘two 
distinct and very large problems’, which required an estimated 2,000 new units of 
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  137housing for the displaced families.
107 At Kampong Silat, the improvement scheme 
dispersed its population, voluntarily or otherwise, into SIT flats, wooden houses 
nearby or onto non-Trust land.
108 In 1958, the SIT owned about 1,000 acres of land 
in Toa Payoh, Kampong Henderson, Kampong Alexandra, Bukit Purmei, Kallang 
Basin, MacPherson Road (South), Thomson Road, Bukit Timah, and Tiong Bahru, 
where many residents were residing under tenancy agreements or TOLs. While 
inadequate finance, high cost of building materials and insufficient skilled building 
labour hampered the SIT’s building programme in the 1950s,
109  the greatest 
difficulty lay in clearing away wooden house dwellers. J. M. Fraser believed that 
clearance, rather than building capacity, was the true bottleneck in the Trust’s 
construction programme.
110 There were some unauthorised occupiers regularly 
‘appearing’ on Crown lands targeted for development in order to obtain 
compensation or SIT housing but they were a small minority.
111 
 
Clearance was a complex operation but the root cause of its difficulty was 
primarily economic. Clearance from land required for development, unlike the 
eviction of ‘trespassers’, was accompanied by an SIT offer of some form of 
rehousing but whether this was deemed suitable by the dwellers was a separate 
matter. For farmers, the chief difficulty was that most agricultural land was already 
under cultivation,
112 while they also resisted converting to an urban lifestyle. Two 
farming families in Kim Keat, when evicted and offered accommodation by the SIT, 
demanded, ‘[H]ow can you expect us to give up our living system by altering the 
country life to city life?....That is to say let the vegetables grow on rocks’.
113 
 
The greater problem, however, was rehousing urban and semi-urban 
kampong dwellers in flats. What the Trust labelled as ‘low-cost’ housing was 
certainly not so to the low-income population. The SIT conveniently blamed 
applicants for its flats for ‘choosiness’, as they allegedly 
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  138 
hold superstitious beliefs concerning the citing of a flat; generally 
they prefer mid-floor flats to top or ground floor; they expect a bus 
service to take them from door of house to office, and generally have 
a horror of isolation and quietness….On an average, approximately 
50 per cent of the applicants refuse a first offer of accommodation.
114  
 
More importantly, however, the authorities found that some wooden house dwellers 
could not ‘afford even the lowest type of Trust accommodation and that they will 
not move great distances from their work as the cost of transport is too great’.
115 It 
was extremely difficult to find accommodation for those earning less than $200 a 
month,
116 who could not afford a monthly rent of $10.
117 The SIT perceived ‘a 
fundamental objection amongst the local population, particularly the lower paid 
classes, to paying rent at all, and most of them would rather pay $5 a month for 
space in an overcrowded shophouse or an attap hut than pay a reasonable proportion, 
say up to 20% of their income, for good accommodation’.
118 Particularly difficult 
were the poor semi-urban dwellers, who 
 
are not farmers but the household budget is aided a great deal by the 
vegetables, fruit, eggs and poultry obtained from the land 
surrounding their house. These families cannot move into farming 
settlements far from their employment nor do they look with favour 
on the prospect of becoming a tenant of a permanent house. The 
higher rent and service charges coupled with the loss of produce from 
their garden often makes it impossible for them to accept such 
accommodation.
119 
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  139There was little practical difference between the eviction of ‘trespassers’ and 
the clearance of low-income tenants due to urban development. Among the 411 
families dishoused in the Kampong Silat improvement scheme in 1949, only 159 
accepted Trust accommodation while the majority moved elsewhere.
120 Pek Cheng 
Siew, a trishaw rider supporting a family of ten, lived in an attap house at Geylang 
Lorong 41 built on Trust land during the Japanese Occupation.
121 When he was 
notified by the SIT to move to a flat because the land had been earmarked by the 
Master Plan for a children’s playground, he protested, 
 
I am a poor man with a large family to support and am paying rent for 
land at $4 per month only and the assessment at $10.20 per half 
annum….With my meagre income, I could not afford to stay in SIT 
premises which is very expensive….I have not applied for SIT 
premises nor have any intention of removing from my present 
abode.
122 
 
Under such circumstances, it was often so difficult for landowners to clear land for 
development that they occasionally resorted to hiring secret society gangsters to 
intimidate the residents.
123  The SWD frequently mediated disputes between 
landowners and a combination of tenants, subtenants and illegal trespassers who 
would ‘usually band together and employ a lawyer’; these negotiations were often 
protracted because the dwellers’ demands were allegedly ‘outrageous’ and because 
the landowners invariably refused to compromise.
124 
 
In 1952, as an adjunct to the clearance project, the government initiated a 
‘squatter resettlement programme’ to allow persons evicted from Crown or Council 
land required for development to build wooden houses on 10-year permits, initially 
outside the City limits.
125  In 1957, the SIT’s Resettlement Department was 
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  140managing 18 such areas, with 16 more mapped and awaiting acquisition.
126  
Resettlement areas were, in principle at least, intended as ‘self-help’ settlements 
with minimum expense and supervision but the construction of fish and duck ponds 
and pig stys and pig breeding were expressly prohibited.
127 The Acting Deputy 
Lands Manager emphasised that the settlements had to be ‘subjected to very rigid 
control from the beginning’, since ‘[t]o allow persons to move on to the land and 
build whatever they please within certain limits only leads to a continual running 
fight with the builders on the interpretation of the limits’.
128  
 
In 1954, when the SIT began clearing more than 300 families in Kampong 
Henderson, 69 families registered for Trust housing at Brickworks Estate at 
Alexandra Road while 120 applied to move to a resettlement area.
129 The former, 
however, found the rental and cost of living much higher than before, while the 
farmers who moved into rural resettlement areas faced greater traveling distances to 
town and consequently higher transport costs.
130 Some applicants rejected the 
Brickworks housing because the monthly rental ($26.50) was simply too high.
131 
Others later left the flats and returned to their wooden houses in Henderson,
132 while 
new settlers occupied vacated wooden dwellings in the kampong without 
authorisation.
133 The dwellers, in a petition to the authorities, strongly felt that the 
‘[a]ttap houses were built to house the dwellers permanently’.
134 Owing to the 
difficulty of resettlement, the Henderson clearance was, by early 1956, ‘dormant’.
135 
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  141Clearance became a major stumbling block for the government when the SIT 
began work on Queenstown ‘suburb’ in the western part of the City in 1952. 
Envisaged as a ‘modern, efficient and complete town’, Queenstown was to house 
65,000 people in five neighbourhoods, each served by shops, schools and other 
community services.
136 However, the project was delayed by the clearance of 372 
families living on Crown lands under TOLs. The Trust offered the non-agricultural 
families, many of whom had lived there for a generation or more,
137 low-rental 
housing nearby but only six families accepted.
138  In 1955, the 75 bona fide 
agriculturalists were offered an ex-gratia payment, a house lot and a farming lot at 
the Jurong resettlement area, but this site, eleven miles from the City, was unpopular. 
In October, the government finally obtained eviction warrants against the remaining 
families who had refused the terms.
139 It was not until the following year that the 
first neighbourhood, Princess Estate, with 1,793 dwellings and flats, was completed. 
The second, Duchess Estate, was completed in 1958 with 752 dwellings, after the 
resistance of the local dwellers had been overcome.
140 Interestingly, the public 
response to the Queenstown flats was lukewarm, for reasons of ‘lack of school 
facilities’, ‘absence of cinemas’, ‘long travelling distances to work’, ‘all charges are 
considered part of the “rent” by applicants and the total is considered by them to be 
beyond their ability to pay’, ‘preference for the town area’, ‘dislike for flats’, and 
‘dislike of tall buildings or ground floor flats’.
141 What appeared to be the Trust’s 
seeming success at clearance, in the absence of a viable rehousing programme with 
adequate social amenities, proved to be the City Council’s bane. Evicting urban 
kampong dwellers in one area was akin to causing the proverbial jump ‘from the 
frying pan into the fire’, simply driving the homeless into one of the remaining 
unscathed kampongs. 
 
The social complications of the clearance policy, particularly at Queenstown, 
led the government to appoint a Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party
142 
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142 Also called the ‘Squatter Problem Working Party’.  
  142in 1955, to make recommendations towards solving the ‘squatter problem’. The 
Working Party categorised kampong dwellers into three subgroups: urban and semi-
urban dwellers and farmers. The focus was on semi-urban dwellers who, unlike the 
other two groups, could not readily go to a rural resettlement area or an SIT flat.
143 
The Working Party understood that rehousing a semi-urban dweller in a flat 
mandated a transformation of life and not just a change of housing: 
 
Most of these families are rural type dwellers, i.e. they have always 
lived in plank and attap houses, they have always depended on wells 
or standpipes for their supply of water, and they have never 
experienced water borne sewerage. On the other hand, they have 
always experienced a form of freedom which is absent in permanent 
thickly populated urban districts in that an increase in the family can 
be accommodated by extending the house, and when they are out of 
work, they can spend more time on the land and produce food. Their 
rent to the land owner is small and they have a feeling of 
independence and ownership.  
 
The threat of eviction to these people is a serious matter. If they move 
into rooms in a permanent house, they lose the produce of their 
gardens. If they erect their house elsewhere they must obtain 
permission of the landowner, the local authority and the Singapore 
Improvement Trust or else face a further eviction. Whatever move 
they make their former sense of security is destroyed.
144 
 
The Working Party proposed four rehousing schemes for evicted dwellers to 
1) find their own accommodation (these had to satisfy building and planning laws); 
2) accept SIT accommodation; 3) accept wooden housing in planned ‘semi-urban 
settlements’, which could be ‘tolerated attap areas’ in urban or rural areas; and 4) 
join farming settlements. The Working Party, however, rejected the idea of ad-hoc 
‘self-help’ housing, maintaining that many settlers lacked the skill and experience, 
and proposed that a basic house be provided for them instead in semi-urban and 
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  143farming settlements. It was also felt that ‘[s]ettlers living in Semi-urban and Farming 
Settlements would become land owners and form a more stable community than 
tenants or shack-dwellers’ – indicating the official desire to integrate kampong 
dwellers into the formal structures and governance of the state, so foreshadowing the 
policy of the PAP government.
145 The Working Party’s rejection of ‘self-help’ 
housing, despite the possibility of improving living conditions in the kampongs, 
reflected a deep-seated official aversion towards unauthorised wooden housing and a 
determination to closely manage future settlement patterns.
146 In 1957, on the 
Working Party’s recommendation, the SIT became the sole clearance and 
resettlement authority. A separate Resettlement Department was established within 
the Trust, with seven Resettlement Inspectors recruited, mainly from Malaya, to 
manage the resettlement areas. This was, as Clancey points out, an attempt in part at 
least by the Singapore authorities to apply the principles of the large-scale 
resettlement of Chinese squatters taking place in planned New Villages in 
Malaya.
147 The following year, in order to regularise the administration of state 
lands, the SIT began to convert TOLs into tenancy agreements. 
 
Planning and Zoning 
 
Given the postwar difficulties faced by the City Council and SIT, the British 
colonial government realised the need for a coordinated policy attack on ‘squatters’, 
unauthorised housing and unstable urban spaces. Following the Housing 
Committee’s call for the production of a Master Plan, the SIT began work on a 
Diagnostic Survey to collect the necessary demographic and social information. This 
was based on the legal framework provided by the Town and Country Planning Act 
in Britain, which authorised the collection of information for a development plan.
148 
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  144In 1948, the Singapore government was personally advised by British town planner 
Sir Patrik Abercrombie, hailed locally as ‘probably the greatest living expert on 
town and country planning’.
149 Following this visit, J. M. Fraser left to consult 
housing and planning authorities in Britain. In July 1950, he reiterated the 
importance of formulating a long-range development plan and of the will and means 
to implement it.
150 In the same year, George L. Pepler, long-time Chief Planning 
Officer in the government of Britain, was appointed Planning Adviser to the 
Singapore government; the SIT rejoiced that ‘no better choice could have been 
made’.
151  
 
The Diagnostic Survey, led by Pepler and Fraser and carried out between 
1952-1954, included a dwelling-to-dwelling investigation of the most densely-
populated urban kampongs, compiling data on the use and location of each house 
and the number of occupants. While this study was less detailed than that of the 
Central Area, it represented a key step forward in mapping the semi-autonomous 
settlements.
152 In an urgent memorandum on the government’s housing policy to 
Governor John Nicoll in mid-1954, S. C. Woolmer, Chief Architect of the SIT, and 
D. H. Komlosy, the Planning Adviser of the SIT and Chief Planning Officer of the 
Diagnostic Survey Team, declared that housing in Singapore had been a ‘very hand 
to mouth affair’ and called for ‘efforts that must be made NOW’ and ‘steps that must 
be taken AT THIS MOMENT’ to lay down a ‘firm coordinated policy’ and enable 
an enlarged SIT to expand the housing programme.
153  The findings of the 
Diagnostic Survey led to the production of the Master Plan, a comprehensive 20-
year development plan for Singapore, which became the cornerstone of colonial and 
to a large extent PAP housing policy. The Plan, published in 1955 and adopted in 
1958, was presented as a ‘bold plan’ for ‘a better future’, since ‘[t]he consequences 
of not planning for the growth of a modern state, with all its social complexities and 
diverse economic problems, are too serious to contemplate’.
154 Dispersal of the 
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150 SIT 645/50, Memo by Manager, SIT, titled ‘Singapore Development Plan’, 21 Jul 1950. 
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154 Singapore, The Better Future: An Explanation of the Master Plan (Singapore: 1958), p. 1. 
  145Central Area population to permanent housing in the outer urban areas and in new 
towns outside the City was, as Table 3.3 shows, integral to the Plan. 
 
Concerning the urban kampongs, the Master Plan’s thrust was containment, 
contraction and clearance. This policy was in accord with its characteristic 
framework of zoning, which categorised land use according to residential, industrial, 
recreational, and other functions. The Plan held that ‘[t]he Attap Dwelling will not 
be appropriate within the built-up precincts of a modern City’,
155 and identified 
154,900 dwellers who were being or likely to be cleared due to development.
156 It 
accepted, as Table 3.4 shows, only 148,000 persons (12% of Singapore’s population 
in 1953) to reside in wooden housing in the City, nearly 100,000 less than the 
prevailing figure.
157 The Plan sought to resettle, over twenty years, 161,000 out of 
246,000 urban kampong dwellers in either permanent housing (to be built at an 
annual rate of 10,000 units) or resettlement areas. Some of the resettlement areas 
would be located in the urban area, housing 63,000 persons and containing, at five 
persons per house, 12,600 wooden dwellings.
158 
 
The outstanding 85,000 dwellers were allowed to remain in 16 urban 
kampongs designated as ‘tolerated attap areas’ (see Table 3.5). This move, which 
aimed to provide cheap housing for the low-income group, was a political decision 
undertaken against the opposition of the SIT.
159 Dwellings in these kampongs were 
mandated to meet the strict housing standards set by the Attap Dwellings Special 
Committee: a distance of 15 feet between walls of non-inflammable materials like 
brick or corrugated iron, or 25 feet for inflammable materials; a concrete floor and 
drain, and corrugated iron wallings for the kitchen as a fire precaution.
160 In 1957, 
the authorities admitted that the original purpose of designating these areas as 
‘tolerated’ had been lost, with ‘racketeers’ moving into the kampongs to build 
‘barrack-type wooden houses’, and decided that the settlements ‘be sterilised’ and 
                                                 
155 SIT 808/50, Report by George Pepler titled ‘Attap Dwellings on Land Likely to be Required for 
Permanent Forms of Development in the City Area During the Next Five Years’, 26 Jul 1952. 
156 HB 1013/50, Memo by the Chief Planning Officer, Diagnostic Survey Team, 17 Oct 1954.  
157 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey (Singapore: Printed at Government Printing Office, 
1955), pp. 26-28. 
158 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey, p. 51. 
159 HB 477/53, Notes of a Discussion on the Improvement of Kampongs, 7 Mar 1957. 
160 HB 477/53, Notes of a Discussion on a) Control of Unauthorised Buildings and b) Improvement 
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  146that no further building be permitted until a layout had been prepared in consultation 
with the SIT.
161 In the following year, plans for the construction of spine roads and 
main drains were prepared for Radin Mas, Heap Guan San, Geylang Serai, and Wak 
Tanjong.
162 However, in January 1959, the SIT found that ‘no control was being 
exercised and haphazard building was taking place’, dooming ‘the likelihood of ever 
clearing these areas’.
163 
 
The vast majority of the settlements were categorised as ‘insanitary 
kampongs’. As highlighted in Table 3.4, it was felt that ‘[l]iving conditions in these 
areas are very bad’, which could ‘only be rendered healthy by a planned programme 
of clearance and rebuilding’. The most densely-populated kampongs near the City, 
like Tiong Bahru, Bukit Ho Swee, Kampong Soopoo, and parts of the Kallang Basin, 
considered to be ‘in so bad a general condition’, were marked for clearance.
164 The 
Master Plan estimated the removal of 3,200 wooden houses and rehousing of 22,400 
persons in SIT housing in the next five years, including 600 dwellings at Kallang 
Basin and Bendemeer Road, with a further 32,500 kampong dwellers to be displaced 
within ten years.
165  In the urban districts (Table 3.6), except for the state-
administered Malay Settlement, the kampong population was to be drastically 
slashed to make way for permanent housing, schools, public open spaces, and 
community buildings. The Master Plan sought, finally, to physically restore the 
social-environmental margin. In place of the ‘Black Belt’ of wooden dwellings on 
the urban fringe, it envisaged a ‘Green Belt’ of ‘open space around the City to limit 
its spread’.
166 
 
The Plan had immense implications for Bukit Ho Swee. It foresaw a total 
transformation of Tiong Bahru district and marked out different zones of land use. 
Its wooden house population of 38,800, as Table 3.7 shows, were to be completely 
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cleared out for permanent housing for more than 100,000 people, with thirteen 
primary and four secondary schools, to be built by 1972.
167 The factories and shops 
along Havelock Road and the sawmills and warehouses of Covent Garden were 
permitted to remain. However, the wooden houses of Bukit Ho Swee, Or Kio Tau, 
Hong Lim Pa Sat, and Si Kah Teng were to be demolished and in most cases 
replaced by permanent housing, which was also to be built on Ma Kau Thiong. The 
cemetery would also have a primary school and an area of open space, as would Si 
Kah Teng. The Master Planners firmly supported the building of multi-storey 
housing on disused Chinese cemeteries and hilly ground.
168 Factories and wooden 
houses in the developed area between Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee [road] were to 
make way for permanent housing, a primary school and community buildings.
169 
The clearance of Bukit Ho Swee and Tiong Bahru, as shown in Table 3.8, ranked 
high in the deliberations of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party, 
which worked closely with the Diagnostic Survey Team. In October 1956, the SIT 
already showed an interest in erecting housing on Ma Kau Thiong.
170 In May 1957, 
the Trust concluded that the cemetery was ‘excellent building ground’ without the 
need for expensive foundations for twelve 5-storey blocks, totalling 880 one-room 
flats, for more than 3,500 persons.
171 The cemetery, to the SIT, held the key to the 
development of the entire locality. The Trust believed that if SIT housing could be 
built at the site, it would be more likely to succeed in clearing Covent Garden, which 
was nearby and where an improvement scheme was envisaged.
172 By the end of the 
year, the government had acquired one lot on the site.
173 The plan, however, was 
shelved in September 1958 due to the cost of securing road access to the cemetery. 
The Trust, however, underlined that the site was suitable for emergency housing ‘if 
and when a programme of emergency housing was adopted’.
174 
 
167 Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey, p. 57. 
168 SIT 808/50, Memo from Acting Manager, SIT, to George Pepler, 29 Jul 1952; and Notes by 
George Pepler, ‘Attap Dwellings on Land Likely to be Required for Permanent Forms of 
Development in the City Area During the Next Five Years’, 29 Jul 1952.  
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Town Map Sheets 1/209, 1/210, 1/229, 1/230. 
170 SIT 842/2/52, Memo from Senior Planner, Planning Division, SIT, to Chief Planner, Planning 
Control, SIT, 5 Oct 1956. 
171 HB 932/57, Memo from Planning Adviser, SIT, to Senior Planner, Development Control, 28 May 
1958; and Memo from Assistant Architect, SIT, to Chief Architect, SIT, 26 Aug 1957; HB 244/50, 
Memo from Chairman, SIT, to PS, MLGLH, 12 Jun 1957. 
172 HB 932/57, Memo from Chairman, SIT, to PS, MLGLH, 31 Oct 1957. 
173 HB 932/57, Memo from Acting Deputy Commissioner of Lands to Chairman, SIT, 18 Dec 1957. 
174 HB 932/57, Minutes of Trust meeting, 29 Sep 1958. Table 3.3: Distribution of Population under the Master Plan between 1953 and 1972 
1953 
Central Planning Area       
Population satisfactorily housed  190,900
Population affected by redevelopment  150,000
Total 340,900
 
Urban Planning Area 
Population satisfactorily housed in permanent dwellings   306,700
Attap population affected by rehousing  161,000
Attap population not affected by rehousing  85,000
Total 552,700
 
Rural Planning Area 
Attap population  150,000
Population in permanent homes  70,000
Total 220,500
Population not specifically allocated to particular areas  6,700
Grand Total  1,120,800
 
1972 
Central Planning Area       
Population in permanent homes  290,000
 
Urban Planning Area 
Population in permanent homes  852,400
Population in attap settlement  148,000
Total 1,000,400
 
Rural Planning Area 
Population in Woodlands New Town  80,000
Population in Bulim New Town  85,000
Population in Yio Chu Kang New Town  35,000
Population elsewhere  120,500
Population in attap settlement  347,500
Total 668,000
Grand Total  1,958,400
Source: Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey (1955), pp. 27-28. 
 
  149Table 3.4: Redistribution of Attap Population under the Master Plan 
Urban Planning Area 
Existing attap population   246,000 
Less attap population displaced  161,000 
Attap population on good sites (‘tolerated attap areas’)  85,000 
Add new planned attap settlements (resettlement areas)  63,000* 
Total future attap population  148,000 
Net displacement from Urban Planning Area  246,000 - 148,000 = 98,000 
   
Rural Area   
Existing attap population  150,000 
Add attap population displaced from urban area  78,000* 
Add natural increase of attap population  100,000* 
Total future attap population  328,000 
* All these persons will require new attap dwellings. 
Source: Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey (1955), p. 27. 
 
Table 3.5: Tolerated Attap Areas 
Kampong  Acres  Existing Population  Future No. of Families 
Heap Guan San  65.85  3,293 1,313 
Radin Mas  66.82  2,673 2,003 
Geylang Serai (Malay Farm)  285.06  7,127 12,823 
Bukit Arang  103.80  5,605 1,661 
Bartley Road  94.21  5,087 1,507 
Chantek  147.65  6,792 3,540 
Bukit Theresa  65.86  2,634 1,972 
Woodleigh  4.42  186 122 
Kallang Pudding  39.17  2,546 191 
Bedok  59.33  3,856 295 
Paya Lebar  438.40  23,673 7,015 
Tampenis  60.03  3,242 958 
Serangoon  132.74  7,168 2,121 
Jalan Eunos  222.98  5,574 10,029 
MacPherson Road South  193.34  12,567 964 
Wak Tanjong  136.38   3,410 6,131 
Total (to nearest thousand)  2,116.04  95,000 53,000 
Source: HB 722/55, Memorandum by D. H. Komlosy (Planning Adviser, SIT), 22 
December 1955. 
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Table 3.6: Selected Clearance Areas 
Kampong  No. of families 
Queenstown 210 
Kampong Henderson  122 
MacPherson Road (S)  377 
Toa Payoh  780 
First Settlement (Master Plan)  500 
Henderson Road (Incinerator Site)  97 
Abattoir Site  174 
Kampong Silat/Tiong Bahru  3,750 
Kampong Bugis  320 
Kampong Soopoo  280 
Henderson Road  400 
Bukit Ho Swee  1,670 
Total 8,680 
Source: Singapore, Report of the Land Clearance & Resettlement Working Party (1956), pp. 
14-15. Table 3.7: Urban Planning Districts in the Master Plan, 1955 
District Date 
Population Schools 
Public 
Open 
Space 
Community 
Buildings 
Temporary Permanent Total  (acres)  (acres)  (acres) 
Tiong 
Bahru 
1953 38,800  59,600 98,400 18.3  6.7  0.8 
1972 --  101,650  101,650  85.1  43.4 11.5 
Telok 
Blangah 
1953 10,100  8,700  18,800 27.3  --  0.5 
1972 9,400  15,800  25,200 47.4 159.6  3.3 
Orchard 
Road 
1953 2,500  51,500  54,000 36.3  36.9  0.7 
1972 --  84,650  84,650  93.8  57.9 11.0 
Toa Payoh 
1953 25,180  38,820 64,000 69.1  6.5  0.5 
1972 2,500  128,850  131,350  182.8  129.7  5.5 
Queens-
town 
1953 9,400  600  10,000  --  1.4  0.1 
1972 300  77,550  77,850  106.1  84.2  10.1 
Whitley 
1953 4,500  5,000  9,500 13.0  --  -- 
1972 1,500  16,700  18,200 27.8  22.5  0.8 
Dunearn 
1953 2,740  960  3,700  1.9  --  -- 
1972 950  15,200  16,150  58.7 5.0  1.0 
Holland  1953 10,200  4,000  14,200 83.7  2.2  1.2 
1972 22,300  41,000 63,300 130.3  22.2  8.8 
Tanglin  1953 1,200  21,200  22,400  --  74.0  0.2 
1972 --  39,750  39,750  13.4  74.0  0.2 
Pasir 
Panjang 
1953 5,800  4,100  9,900  8.7  --  0.2 
1972 4,350  8,500 12,850 18.5  22.0  6.4 
Bukit 
Timah 
1953 5,800  6,200 12,000 3.8  --  0.2 
1972 18,500  36,400 54,900 62.3  170.5  8.2 
Thomson  1953 5,500  --  5,500  --  1.0  -- 
1972 500  28,350  28,850  27.2 99.7  6.7 
Paya 
Lebar 
1953 45,600  12,600 58,200 27.0  1.2  0.3 
1972 41,800  64,200  106,000  124.2  46.2  8.0 
Aljunied 
Road 
1953 12,700  11,400 24,100 53.9  --  -- 
1972 3,800  49,200  53,000  102.4 16.1  8.8 
Geylang  1953 50,000  75,300  125,300  108.7  18.8  0.7 
1972 19,750  124,400  144,150  187.3 258.9  13.8 
Malay 
Settlement 
1953 17,000  5,700  22,700  4.6  1.2  -- 
1972 21,500  21,000 42,550 50.9  21.2  7.0 
Source: Singapore, Master Plan: Report of Survey (1955), pp. 56-64. 
 
  152Table 3.8: Clearance Areas by Priority, 1955 
Name of Kampong  Acres  Total Dwellings  Total Population  Priority 
Kampong Silat 
171.04  4,160  22,404  2 & 3  Tiong Bahru 
Mount Washington 
Kampong Bugis  15.62  370  1,924  3 
Kampong Soopoo  7.36  250  1,662  2 
Henderson Road 
203.01 N.A. 
2,408 
3  Selomai 1,548 
Alexandra   6,720 
Carey Road 
56.26 1,950  10,018 
3 
Bukit Ho Swee  1 
Beo Lane  1 
Source: HB 722/55, Interim Report of the Working Party formed to Consider a Report on 
the ‘Squatter Problem’, undated, c. 1955. 
 
Resistance and Mobilisation 
 
When faced with eviction, the dwellers of unauthorised housing were not 
afraid to defend their homes. Demolition provoked such strong, spontaneous 
resistance that one Chinese newspaper described the social response to it as ‘a lion’s 
roar from the oppressed people’.
175 This collective reaction was a marked departure 
from the passive resistance which had largely typified relations between the state 
and Chinese society up to the 1930s.
176 The people involved in the contestation, in 
some way, all stood on the periphery of colonial society – wooden house dwellers, 
women, youths (both Chinese school students and gangsters), and leftwing 
politicians and social activists. Among the resistant wooden house dwellers were 
migrant families from Malaya who had fled the Federation to avoid the ‘New 
Villages’ resettlement programme.
177 The prominence of women in the resistance 
against eviction underlined their important role as home-makers and local workers. 
The SIT found that most residents had either ‘political backing or the backing of 
hooligans or gangsters’, and that demolition was so fraught with difficulty that even 
the presence of policemen, who were meant to merely observe and not to interfere 
with the demolition process except to prevent a breach of the peace, was often 
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  153insufficient.
178 Secret societies protected their turfs and constituents against hostile 
intruders and physically challenged demolition squads on the spot, while City 
Councillors, Legislative Assembly members and activists sought to block demolition 
orders through administrative channels.
179 Although demolition squads were ordered 
not to proceed if they were obstructed, in order to allow the SIT to take the 
necessary legal action against the occupants, tension and conflict invariably broke 
out at sites of eviction.  
 
In January 1953, the SIT’s Deputy Lands Manager, attempting to demolish 
several wooden houses at Nile Road, was struck several times by the landlord’s wife. 
When he returned on another day to complete the task, she threatened him with a 
brick, while the surrounding crowd became extremely agitated.
180 In July, the 
Acting Lands Manager of the SIT attempted to demolish three unauthorised wooden 
houses at Geylang Lorong 27 built on Trust land and occupied by two families who 
had refused to leave. When he led a demolition squad of three Lands Inspectors, 12 
labourers and an escort of two police constables to the site, 
 
a hostile crowd of about forty people gathered. The two PCs were 
unable to disperse the crowd. The Indian family moved out [in] about 
fifteen minutes but the Chinese family refused to move…certain 
members of the crowd adopted a threatening attitude….I decided to 
withdraw to Aljunied Road with all personnel as there was an 
immediate possibility of a breach of the peace. 
 
Subsequently, Joo Chiat police station sent a patrol car to the area, 
 
The officer in charge of the patrol car interrogated the obstructive 
family during which time a crowd of fifty persons or more gathered. 
In view of the hostile attitude adopted by certain members of the 
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  154crowd he decided to ask for further support. By this time the whole 
area was aroused.  
 
Senior officers from the police station and later a riot squad descended upon the 
scene before the situation was finally brought under control, with the Chinese family 
removed and the buildings demolished.
181 
 
In 1955, when police protection was temporarily withdrawn, the SIT still 
sought to remove three wooden structures on Crown land in Toa Payoh. Near the 
end of the demolition, the house owner, his son and an occupier had become 
‘somewhat agitated’, and the son struck the Lands Inspector with a four-foot metal 
bar, whereupon the assault was joined by the other two. The three men were 
subsequently convicted and fined.
182 Three years later, gangsters at Henderson Road 
successfully prevented a demolition attempt, while the Lands Manager and other 
officials were also assaulted in other kampongs, in all cases in the presence of two 
constables.
183 Demolition orders became part of ‘a dangerous process’, with the 
SIT’s Lands Inspectors facing on-site intimidation, whether ‘written, verbal or, even 
physical’.
184  Unauthorised construction and occupation of wooden housing 
continued to increase that year through to 1959. In September 1959, after the general 
elections were over, the Resettlement Department, with sufficient police protection, 
demolished a number of unauthorised structures in Kampong Henderson and 
elsewhere. This, however, did not have, as was initially declared, the desired effect 
of discouraging further unauthorised building.
185 
 
Urban kampong dwellers did not stand alone against a concerted policy of 
dishousing. Politicians who recognised the importance of a political mass base 
realised, as Ho Kok Hoe, City Councillor for River Valley surmised, that ‘there were 
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  155a lot of votes there’.
186 The Singapore Attap Dwellers’ Association (SADA), 
founded in 1952, was politically prominent in the early 1950s. It was closely linked 
to the Labour Front government which was in power between 1955 and 1959. Its 
President, Mak Pak Shee, was the party’s Assemblyman for Geylang and, as a 
member of the Land Clearance and Resettlement Working Party, he advocated the 
rejection of the term ‘squatter’.
187 In October 1953, the association had an estimated 
2,000 members, representing 10,000 persons. While assuring the government that it 
would ‘never be its policy to hold up development in this Colony’, it sought to 
protect attap dwellers from eviction by ‘unscrupulous landlords or land speculators’ 
desiring to develop land without due compensation or the provision of alternative 
housing.
188  The SIT commented favourably that SADA was led by ‘astute 
politicians’,
189 with the association and the authorities cooperating ‘in all action for 
resettlement’.
190 In April 1953, the association proposed to name a resettlement area 
in Upper Aljunied Road ‘Kampong McNeice’ as ‘a mark of appreciation’ to T. P. F. 
McNeice, President of the City Council and Chairman of the SIT.
191 The association 
worked on the basis that ‘the squatters were morally entitled to certain rights’ in 
negotiating rehousing terms in the Queenstown project and in seeking similar 
rehousing terms and fair rates of compensation for farmers in the Jurong 
resettlement area.
192 
 
The greatest political advances into the urban kampongs, however, were 
made by the PAP, the most progressive political party in the 1950s. Its aim, as top 
leader Lee Kuan Yew explained later, was to bridge ‘the gap to the Chinese-
educated world – a world teeming with vitality, dynamism and revolution’.
193 
Penetrating the ‘black areas’ which lay outside official regulation was a key strategy 
in the PAP’s efforts to mobilise the lower-income, Chinese-speaking population. 
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  156Following the revival of leftwing politics in 1954, the SADA was superseded by two 
powerful organisations closely-associated with the PAP left and the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) underground: the Singapore Farmers’ Association (SFA) 
and the Singapore Wooden House Dwellers’ Association (SWHDA), both formed in 
1955. In recent years, scholars have re-evaluated the place of the political left in 
Singapore’s history and questioned the power of the ‘Communist united front’ in 
local politics.
194 While there was communist influence at the executive level of both 
organisations to a ‘greater or lesser extent’,
195 the SFA and SWHDA were firmly 
anti-colonial. As one activist explained, ‘the purpose was to bring about the social 
consciousness of the people, raise their understanding of politics and unite them for 
the cause of the anti-colonial struggle’.
196 
 
The SFA and SWHDA sought to engage the wooden house population which, 
because of its low levels of employment and education, was not easily organised 
into labour or student unions. Their political work consequently crossed rural and 
urban boundaries. They were politically influential among low-income Chinese 
farmers and semi-urban and urban dwellers in Potong Pasir, Bedok, Sembawang, 
Punggol, Toa Payoh, Paya Lebar, and Lorong Tai Seng. Lim Chin Kok, President of 
both the SFA and the leading labour union, the Singapore Factory and Shop 
Workers’ Union, could also reach out to urban workers living in wooden houses.
197 
What differentiated the leftwing associations from SADA was their anti-colonial 
stance and transparency in upholding the interests of kampong dwellers. The SFA 
and SWHDA were not necessarily obstructive in representing wooden house 
dwellers against landlords trying to evict them but ‘the tight control’ the associations 
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  157had over the dwellers was considered significant.
198 Chan Chiaw Thor, secretary of 
the SFA and regarded as ‘the single most influential political figure in the rural 
areas’,
199 maintained that ‘we worked hard to interview the farmers and understand 
their problems. We raised other people’s problems to them and how we helped to 
solve them, and the dwellers felt happy hearing them’.
200 In turn, the rural dwellers 
often supported the activists en masse, as a community; this was the case, according 
to Chio Cheng Thun, an activist in Lorong Tai Seng where he also lived, because the 
residents placed much emphasis on community feeling and relationships.
201 By early 
1956, the SFA and SWHDA had a membership of 5,000 each,
202 while the SFA was 
already more broadly based than SADA and better organised, with a ‘larger number 
of representatives educated and briefed to act on their own initiative within the 
framework of a general policy’.
203 
 
The activists levelled the political playing field between low-income, 
Chinese-speaking kampong dwellers and the colonial regime and landowners. They 
provided legal advice on the dwellers’ behalf, and drafted letters to the authorities 
and landowners on house construction and repair as well as stating their position on 
eviction. Where, previously, kampong dwellers customarily had to submit to the 
demands of removal or offer bribes to officials, they could now effectively articulate 
and defend their own interests in the legal language of administrative authority. As 
Poh Soon Seng, an SFA member and later General Secretary of the Singapore 
Country People’s Association, observed, the dwellers used to be intimidated upon 
receiving legal letters ordering them to move out within a short time: 
 
The landowners had lawyers write letters, sounding like an emperor, 
telling the tenants to move out by this date, and there was no mention 
of compensation. The residents, being ignorant, were frightened. 
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  158With an association to represent them, they were no longer afraid and 
so landowners couldn’t simply evict them.
204 
 
Indeed the political relationship was much reversed, as local officials and 
landowners, confronted with organised opposition, became far more wary of the 
wooden house dwellers.
205 The authorities found that wooden house dwellers were 
‘even more intractable to resettlement than people in central areas’, because ‘the 
large numbers of…people living in attap dwellings make them a political force of 
some magnitude and the banding together of such persons into protective 
associations are discouragements to rapid clearance’.
206  
 
A key area of social and political contention was the implementation of the 
Master Plan. The SFA, in referring to the Plan, criticised slum clearance as a 
typically ‘tragic affair’ which failed to provide the affected dwellers with affordable 
alternative accommodation. Resettled farmers, it contended, were also not given 
adequate compensation for the loss of their houses, crops and farming equipment,
207 
especially as considerable labour and material had been expended to develop the 
land’.
208 In 1956, when the SIT sought to remove 27 farmers in Jurong who were 
members of the SFA in order to establish a resettlement area, the majority of the 
occupiers went to the association in ‘general opposition to the use of any of the land’. 
The SIT consequently found the association ‘not prepared to consider any 
compromise’.
209 The SFA maintained that it steadfastly opposed the mass eviction 
as bringing the farmers ‘untold hardship’.
210  
 
The political history of Singapore has dwelt almost exclusively on political 
parties and the labour and student movements. The SFA and SWHDA were, 
however, also crucial in helping to forge a potent alliance of workers, students and 
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  159wooden house dwellers against colonial rule. In the mid-1950s, kampong dwellers 
frequently appeared at sites of industrial action, where workers belonging to 
leftwing unions were challenging employers over the right to unionise, better wages 
and working conditions. The kampong dwellers brought the strikers a steady supply 
of meat, vegetables and eggs,
211 underscoring how poultry rearers and market 
gardeners pragmatically helped to sustain militant unionism against the threat of 
unfair dismissal by hostile employers. The local, semi-rural kampong economy 
consequently came to play a little-seen but vitally important part in the politics of 
the anti-colonial struggle. 
 
By April 1956, the SFA’s membership had grown to 6,000, with its cultural 
activities like the Mid-Autumn Festival celebrations gaining popularity in the 
kampongs.
212 In the May Day speech that year, Lim Chin Kok called for unity 
among labour, students and farmers in the struggle for independence but especially 
against the colonial state’s oppression of Chinese students.
213 In July, the SFA and 
SWHDA, jointly with the ‘Middle Road’ group of leftwing unions,
214 supported a 
PAP call for a united front for ‘Merdeka’ (‘independence’). At the meeting, Lim 
Chin Siong also expressed sympathy for secret society members, attributing their 
existence to unemployment caused by the colonial system.
215 In August, SFA and 
SWHDA members supported the left’s ‘anti-yellow culture’ campaign against 
colonial and ‘Western’ values and practices.
216 In September, when Chief Minister 
Lim Yew Hock began a massive crackdown on leftwing leaders and ‘Communist 
front organisations’, he perceived wooden house dwellers as being part of the 
‘Communist united front’.
217 The Special Branch feared that ‘a large number of 
Chinese workers, peasants and students in Singapore support [the] PAP, and this 
group, infiltrated by Communist elements, is likely to be the spearhead of 
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  160disturbances’.
218 Lim Yew Hock began by detaining seven leading leftists, including 
Lim Chin Kok, and banned two leftwing organisations.
219 The SFA and Middle 
Road unions immediately released a joint statement condemning the arrests and 
demanded the release of the detainees.
220 The SWHDA similarly declared that the 
6,000 families who were its members, comprising 40,000 people, opposed the 
unlawful detention and demanded that the leaders be tried in an open court or else be 
unconditionally released.
221 Chan Chiaw Thor was part of a delegation which went 
to see Lim Yew Hock on 21 September to demand an explanation for the arrests.
222 
In early October, when Chinese students staged sit-ins at the Chinese High School 
and Chung Cheng High School in protest against the arrests, the SFA, together with 
other leftwing unions, provided financial, material and moral support for the 
politically-motivated students.
223  
 
Riots broke out on 25 October across the island, with the worst fighting 
taking place in Bukit Timah, Kallang, Geylang, and the Central Area. The SFA and 
SWHDA allegedly supported the violence, particularly in the rural areas, and were 
accused of planning to burn down two English schools and a police station in Jurong 
and attack the Bukit Timah police station.
224 Both associations were deregistered in 
November after the riots ended,
225 and seven members were arrested during the 
crackdown.
226 The 1956 riots, and other instances of mass violence in the 1950s, 
have customarily been interpreted within the framework of the ‘Communist united 
front’ master narrative, without sufficient regard given for the thinking of the 
ordinary people who were involved. The transformation of a large part of 
Singapore’s population from one which superficially submitted to colonial authority 
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  161(but passively contested it) to another which overtly challenged the British 
establishment was not primarily due to manipulation by MCP cadres but rather, the 
prevailing social and economic circumstances. In the words of George Rude, 
wooden house dwellers, like their late eighteenth century French counterparts, ‘far 
from being mere passive instruments, absorbed and adapted the slogans and ideas of 
the political groups contending for power’.
227 Pulling together the threads of 1950s 
anti-colonial politics and the depth of oppression suffered by the ordinary people, it 
is striking how ordinary and rational the riots in fact were. Whether the violence 
was triggered off by communist or government provocateurs, the wooden house 
dwellers, workers and students were struggling, in Arlette Farge’s words, for order, 
not against it, for justice and honour, ‘giving shape and form to what is lacking and 
what it is that has to be overcome’.
228 
 
Following the riots, the MCP sought to establish a new organisation in 
‘outlying remote areas’.
229 SFA and SWHDA leaders who had survived the Lim 
Yew Hock cull were still able to maintain some control over their former 
members.
230 Within months of the proscription against the SFA and SWHDA, many 
of their members had joined the Singapore Country People’s Association (SCPA) 
and the Singapore Rural Residents’ Association (SRRA).
231 According to C. C. 
Chin, a member of both associations, MCP cadres or members of the leftwing Anti-
British League dominated key positions in both associations and their branches.
232 
In 1960, the newly-elected executive committee of the SRRA was comprised largely 
of suspected communists and former political detainees; its Chairman, Sim Bok 
Huan, and another committee member were former members of SWHDA and the 
SFA respectively.
233 The membership of the SCPA and SRRA had risen rapidly to 
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  1622,500 and 3,000 respectively,
234 and continued to do so after the PAP came to power 
in 1959. By the end of 1960, the SCPA had 5,000 members and seven district 
branches.
235 Despite their names, both associations were open to residents of 
‘Kampongs within the existing City Limits’.
236 In engaging kampong dwellers, the 
SCPA and SRRA were keenly involved in their social life. They organised the 
young village men into crime patrols and helped the kampong dwellers to repair 
wooden houses, roads and bridges, clear drains and clean pig stys. They also ran 
sports, dance and singing events, sewing classes, kindergartens, and literacy classes 
for adolescents who did not attend school.
237 The SRRA, for example, ran literacy 
classes in Lorong Tai Seng and Geylang Serai.
238 Both associations were decidedly 
anti-colonial and their cultural and educational activities allegedly contained a 
‘strong Chinese Communist flavour’.
239 At a literacy class in Paya Lebar in 1960, a 
speaker critically discussed the implications of the Emergency Regulations in 
Malaya.
240 Then in May 1960, the SCPA and SRRA formed a joint committee to 
formulate a common policy.
241 In February 1961, together with other leftwing 
organisations, they condemned the assassination of Congolese Premier Patrice 
Lumumba.
242 
 
While wooden house dwellers were being drawn directly into the anti-
colonial struggle, the city administration was itself being transformed. This was 
testament to a pragmatic and determined PAP policy to mobilise the grassroots from 
the political margins as well as through official channels. In contesting the 1957 City 
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  163Council elections, the party pledged to provide more standpipes and electricity and 
better kampong drainage and sanitation to wooden house dwellers.
243 Significantly, 
housing was not mentioned, a sign that Mayor Ong Eng Guan and the party 
understood that the kampong dwellers wanted amenities, not ‘better housing’, which 
in practical terms meant eviction from their homes and more costly rentals.
244 After 
the PAP’s victory in the elections, Ong, in proclaiming his ‘new kampong policy’, 
declared that ‘[t]he poorest sections of the people living in places like Chinatown, 
and those in the kampongs like Geylang or Kampong Silat…shall have first priority 
in our development programme’.
245 Ong pledged to improve kampong roads for the 
passage of fire engines, build standpipes for the dwellers’ convenience, supply 
electricity, provide free standard architectural plans for erecting wooden houses, and 
establish maternity and infant welfare clinics and mobile clinics and dispensaries in 
the larger kampongs.
246 In 1958, the Council installed 600 standpipes, more than six 
times the modest target (fifty) Ong had stated in his policy speech.
247 
 
The new policy had galvanised the Council into action. With the crucial 1959 
general elections for full self-government beckoning, a flood of motions, mostly by 
non-PAP Councillors, ensued – to improve roads, drainage, sewage disposal, and 
street lighting, erect standpipes, supply electricity, provide adequate fire hydrants, 
and organise voluntary fire-fighting squads in the urban kampongs. In 1958, the 
Council agreed to install street lamps in Kampong Tiong Bahru, Bukit Ho Swee, 
Beo Lane, and Kampong Silat. More standpipes were installed in Kampong Tiong 
Bahru while Beo Lane was to be re-metalled.
248 The stretch of Havelock Road from 
Delta Circus to the Pepsi Cola factory was widened in 1958, while a number of 
kampong roads were built or metalled, including roads at Kampong Silat, Potong 
Pasir, Boon Teck, and Kampong Tiong Bahru.
249 In 1960, the City Council also 
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  164approved schemes to supply electricity to a number of rural and urban kampongs.
250 
However, the ‘new kampong policy’ was not a complete success. The list of 
building and public works achievements only demonstrated how much more still 
had to be done. With the Council’s funds constrained under the Local Government 
Ordinance, many of the Councillors’ motions were not adopted, including improving 
kampong sanitation and obtaining proper building materials and skilled labour to 
repair kampong roads.
251 It was only after the Kampong Tiong Bahru fire in 1959 
that a motion to provide sewerage to the kampong was adopted.
252 But motions to 
supply electricity and, more crucially, install water mains there were still not 
adopted. Just as importantly, the major interior roads, Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee 
[road], had not been re-metalled or widened by 1961. They were private roads and 
priority for this category of road was given to the Geylang Lorongs.
253 The inaction 
in the Bukit Ho Swee locality was also testament to the inertia of politicians facing 
the sheer scale of the tasks which confronted them. Consequently, the City Council’s 
members and departments responsible for public works and building administration 
preferred the status quo to reforming past policies and processes as the money ran 
out. Officials, as Ho Kok Hoe explained, simply passed the buck.
254 
 
The PAP’s ability to penetrate the ‘black areas’ and mobilise low-income 
Chinese kampong dwellers was instrumental in its resounding victory in the 1959 
general elections. The party won 43 out of 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly, 
securing 53% of the vote.
255 Lee Kuan Yew emerged in triumph as the Prime 
Minister of the self-governing State of Singapore.
256 The party’s ascendancy and the 
surge of anti-colonial politics in Singapore which went hand in hand also 
transformed the structure of the colonial civil administration. The SIT was to be 
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  165dissolved in 1960, with its housing and planning responsibilities transferred to two 
new agencies, the Housing and Development Board and the Planning Department, 
respectively. Similarly, the experiment in local government ended, as the PAP 
sought to centralise the government and bureaucratic machinery.
257  The City 
Council was to be dismantled at the end of 1960, with its departments integrated into 
and coming under the control of various government ministries. Its housing-related 
responsibilities were transferred to the HDB, which was part of the newly-created 
Ministry of National Development, whose first head was the former Mayor, Ong 
Eng Guan. Lee Kuan Yew declared that the integration would benefit the Ministry 
more than any other ministry, by removing the duplication of work previously 
carried out by architects, engineers and technicians in the City Council, Public 
Works Department and the SIT.
258 
 
Bukit Ho Swee and Hong Lim Pa Sat 
 
Urban kampong dwellers in the Bukit Ho Swee locality contributed 
substantially to the political climate and changes which shook 1950s Singapore 
society. Politics had come to the kampong, rather than the other way round. The 
‘traditional notion of “law-abidingness”’ among low-income Chinese in Malaya and 
Singapore, as an official Australian document stated, did not amount to more than 
‘keeping out of trouble and not interfering in matters not one’s immediate 
concern’.
259  Without the aggressive political activism, kampong dwellers in 
Singapore would have typically been more complacently concerned with their 
livelihoods. Relationship with the government was perceived in strictly negative 
terms; as Tan Tiam Ho put it aptly, ‘We were more concerned with our families. 
Government, as long as we didn’t break the law, we would not bother with them’.
260 
 
The adults of Bukit Ho Swee gradually overcame their political apathy and 
voted for political change by the end of the 1950s. In the 1955 Legislative Assembly 
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  166elections, when Bukit Ho Swee was part of Tiong Bahru ward, in a contest between 
two conservative candidates, the Democratic Party’s William Tan Ah Lek narrowly 
defeated his Progressive Party opponent. The turnout was more telling: only 47% of 
the electorate voted.
261  In the 1957 City Council elections, the candidate of the 
newly-formed Workers’ Party (led by David Marshall), John Cruz Corera, won 55% 
of the vote in Delta ward, comprising Bukit Ho Swee, against a rival from the ruling 
Labour Front government; the turnout was 37%. According to United States 
consulate analysts, Delta was ‘another city division in one of the poorer parts of 
Singapore’; they saw in Corera’s success the strength of the leftist vote and 
predicted victory for the PAP’s ‘strong candidate’ for Delta, Madam Chan Choy 
Siong, in the 1959 Legislative Assembly elections.
262 They were proven right: 
Delta’s 15,000 voters gave Chan nearly 70% of the vote in a four-way contest, 
trumping businessmen from the conservative Liberal Socialist Party and Malayan 
Chinese Association.
263 Chan, popularly known among low-income Chinese as the 
‘chee cheong fun lady’ (her mother sold chee cheong fun in the town area), was a 
member of the PAP Central Executive Committee. She was bilingual, having 
graduated from the Chinese-medium Nanyang Girls’ High School. She had been 
Chairman of the PAP’s Women Section, where she had actively campaigned for 
women’s rights since 1956.
264 As the previous City Councillor of Kreta Ayer ward, 
she had helped install standpipes and build bus shelters, dispensaries, and creches 
under Ong Eng Guan’s ‘new kampong policy’.
265 The 1959 elections were not only 
a victory for the most progressive candidate but democratic politics as a whole; with 
voting made compulsory, the turnout was 91%. As Lee Soo Seong explained, 
‘elections were how people obtained their political education’.
266 Elections did not 
merely reflect prevailing political sentiment but also shaped it, for ‘some people 
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  167might not care for politics but when you had to vote, you had to know politics’.
267 
The 1959 elections were clearly ‘a roar’ from people living at the physical and social 
margins of society.  
 
Chinese-educated students living in Bukit Ho Swee, like their parents, were 
frequently swept up in the anti-colonial wave. As early as 1950, communist 
literature was found at Chung Cheng High School (Branch) at Kim Yam Road.
268 In 
April and May 1955, as the Hock Lee Bus strike at Alexandra Road intensified, Lee 
Soo Seong and his classmates from Chung Cheng Branch went atop the SIT flats 
opposite the bus depot to watch fellow Chinese students support the strike, 
performing political songs, speeches and skits;
269 as did Tay Ah Chuan, a student at 
Chuen Min Public School, and his classmates.
270 As tensions at the depot mounted 
in May, the police cordoned off access to both ends of the Bukit Ho Swee stretch of 
Havelock Road – at Delta Circus and the Havelock Road police station. When 
fighting erupted between the police and the strikers and students on 12 May, Tay Ah 
Chuan saw a Hock Lee bus pursued and stoned at Havelock Road.
271 At Delta 
Circus, an American journalist was mistaken for a policeman and beaten to death by 
a crowd,
272 while a Chinese student, a resident at 799-D Havelock Road (Or Kio 
Tau), was shot in the lung and ‘paraded’ by fellow students from Alexandra to the 
town area as evidence of police brutality. He died of his wound.
273  Many 
demonstrating students fled into Bukit Ho Swee, where the police decided not to 
follow.
274 In the 1956 crackdown, when the Lim Yew Hock government banned the 
Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union, students at Chung Cheng 
Branch held a meeting to condemn the action. They called for a cessation of study, 
despite the principal’s objections, for three periods in protest.
275 The ensuing riots 
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  168reached Tiong Bahru Estate, where crowds smashed windows of SIT flats and 
stoned a military vehicle along Tiong Bahru Road, while Havelock Road police 
station was also stoned.
276  
 
The politicisation of Bukit Ho Swee’s youth owed largely to the old boys’ 
associations which cultivated their radical political thinking in the 1950s,
277  
particularly among those who had only a primary education. Both primary schools in 
Bukit Ho Swee had old boys’ associations, where former students, including the 
minority who progressed to Middle schools, continued to maintain contact at the 
associations’ premises, where they studied together, ate their meals and slept over. 
On the surface, they organised social events like concerts, picnics and other cultural, 
literary and recreational activities but the social engagement formed the basis of 
political mobilisation for the anti-colonial struggle. As Lee Soo Seong, a student of 
Kai Kok and Chuen Min primary schools, explained, ‘the aim was to organise the 
students and incite them into action’ and sometimes the associations produced and 
distributed magazines containing leftwing articles.
278 In late 1956, the Chinese 
Industrial and Commercial School Old Boys’ Association organised numerous 
concerts, which allegedly helped spread communist influence.
279 A member of the 
Chuen Min Old Boys’ Association had also helped to establish the PAP Branch in 
Bukit Ho Swee.
280 According to Lim You Meng, a student of Kai Kok, some of the 
schoolteachers were also left-leaning and campaigned for the PAP in the 1959 
elections.
281 In 1960, when the old boys’ association of Chong Teck School at Silat 
Road organised a concert, 1,000 people listened to an association official charge that, 
although the PAP had been elected into power, ‘the Internal Security Council is still 
dominated by Colonialists’.
282  In the same year, Kai Kok’s and the Chinese 
                                                 
276 CO 1030/578, Report on the Riots in Singapore, October 1956, Appendix C, ‘List of Incidents’. 
277  See for instance CO 1030/241, Monthly Intelligence Report, 21 Jun-3 Aug 1956; and CO 
1030/241, Monthly Intelligence Report, 13 Oct-30 Nov 1956. 
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  169Industrial and Commercial School’s old boys’ association made submissions to the 
government on the Societies’ Bill.
283  
 
The final element in the overt political mobilisation of Bukit Ho Swee, and 
collaborating with the PAP and the old boys’ associations, were the militant rural 
associations. The Singapore Rural Residents’ Association maintained a branch 
office along Havelock Road.
284 In 1960, a Chung Cheng High student who allegedly 
organised communist-controlled cells in the school was also active in the Tiong 
Bahru branch of the SRRA.
285 In the same year, the SRRA negotiated, on behalf of 
kampong dwellers at Bukit Merah, with the HDB over the clearance of the kampong 
for the development of an industrial estate.
286 Between 1959 and 1961, the SRRA, 
in conjunction with the Kai Kok Old Boys’ Association and the Singapore Itinerant 
Hawkers and Stallholders’ Association, whose members were mainly kampong 
dwellers,
287 organised festive celebrations, plays and variety shows at night at the 
Chuen Min School premises.
288 
 
The politics of rehousing had also, by the late 1950s, reached the Bukit Ho 
Swee locality. In the Covent Garden improvement scheme, ‘a great majority’ of the 
families sought housing at rents between $30 and $40 per month.
289 In 1956, the 
wooden house owners, working with ‘political representatives’, established a 
committee to organise the tenants against accepting SIT flats at Queenstown until a 
satisfactory rate of compensation had been agreed with the Trust.
290 This social 
solidarity underlined the leveling impact of eviction: it affected house owners, 
shopkeepers as well as poor tenants, and the resistance which emerged cut across 
class differences and constituted what James Scott termed ‘the weapons of the 
                                                 
283  Singapore Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Select Committee on the Societies 
(Amendment) Bill, pp. B12-14. 
284 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
285 FO 1091/107, Singapore Special Branch Intelligence Summary, Sep 1960. 
286 HB 830/57, Notes of a Discussion between Officers of the HDB, Representatives of the SRRA 
and Certain Settlers from the Redhill Clearance Site, 31 Oct 1960. 
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  170weak’.
291 The SIT worried over rumours that the dwellers were ‘contemplating to 
engage thugs to give Trust inspectors and jagas [Indian watchmen stationed in the 
area] a thrashing, in view of the rehousing activities and patrolling of the area’.
292 
Wooden houses which had been sealed off were abruptly reopened by the owners to 
new tenants. In June, when the SIT’s Estates Officer tried to seal off a dwelling, he 
was stopped by a house owner who had been organising the tenants. The 
confrontation quickly turned political, as the officer was firmly told that ‘I was a 
European and had no right to issue directions affecting Asians’.
293 The following 
month, a female house owner struck a watchman, who was helping to clear a family 
from her dwelling, with a broom, ‘presumably dirtied with excreta’.
294 On another 
occasion, a Lands Inspector, with two policemen, was confronted by a man, 
apparently instigated by two local women, who ‘started to use abusive language’ and 
then ‘threatened to assault us and later challenged us to a fight….He put it in such a 
way that we were not to step there again’.
295 In October, the Trust considered 
opening a discursive front in the campaign, to win over public opinion by releasing a 
press statement underlining that the delay in the scheme was due to ‘the 
intractability of certain people on the site’.
296 
 
In July 1958, however, the SIT conceded that it ‘had no effective control of 
the area’ and was forced to release the flats reserved for the residents to ordinary 
housing applicants.
297 By mid-1959, the redevelopment of the area was no longer 
regarded as possible.
298 In May, the Trust agreed to revive former tenancies and to 
attempt to maintain some control over the housing until the scheme could resume.
299 
In February 1960, the newly-formed HDB found the seals placed on four dwellings 
broken and the houses either occupied by tenants, both former and new, or used as 
opium and gambling dens, while vacant land in the area was also used for boat 
building, wooden box making and storage of timber and other buildings materials. 
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‘This is an extremely difficult area’, the Board warned, ‘and the personal safety of 
the inspectorate would be prejudiced in the event of departmental intervention’.
300  
 
The spread of the ‘Black Belt’ was but one side of the postwar housing 
history of Singapore. The British colonial regime, through the clearance efforts of its 
municipal and housing agencies, coordinated under the Master Plan, was attempting 
to bring Chinese families within its control. At the end of the 1950s, public housing 
was expanding at the margins of the City, in many cases supplanting wooden house 
dwellers and driving them into other urban kampongs. By the late 1950s, the 
Singapore Improvement Trust had become the single largest developer of land,
301 
with a tenth of the population living in its houses.
302 In the period 1955-1960, the 
total amount the government had spent on public housing was $94.3 million, the 
largest item of expenditure in the social services and third largest overall after 
transport and public utilities.
303 But the official demolition and clearance policies 
evoked strong resistance from the wooden house dwellers, which gave form to an 
increasingly-organised political contest led by the PAP-affiliated rural associations 
at the urban fringe that had reached Bukit Ho Swee by 1960. As a new plank in its 
endeavours, the Singapore Improvement Trust also began to build ‘emergency 
housing’ in the locality at this time. 
 
300 HB 125/54/47, Memo from Lands Manager, HDB, to Assistant Secretary, HDB, 25 Feb 1960. 
301 SIT, Annual Report 1958, p. 45. 
302 ST, 24 Jul 1958. 
303 Ministry of Finance, State of Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964 (Singapore: 1961), p. 25. Chapter 4  
With Wood and Attap Came Fire 
 
  Just as urban kampong dwellers faced clearance by the state and private 
developers in the 1950s, fire was also a hazard of similar magnitude. The Kampong 
Bukit Ho Swee fire of 1961, albeit the greatest and most important inferno in 
Singapore’s history, was not the sole calamity to strike inflammable areas of 
unauthorised wooden housing in the 1950s. From the end of World War Two, the 
expansion of such housing in the City was accompanied by a series of massive 
blazes, each bearing the moniker of ‘one of the greatest fires in Singapore’s history’, 
only to be equaled or eclipsed by a subsequent inferno. History records the 
conflagrations of Kampong Bugis (1951), Geylang Lorong 3 (1953), Aljunied Road 
(1953), Kampong Tiong Bahru (1955 and 1959), Kampong Koo Chye (1958), and 
finally, Kampong Bukit Ho Swee (1961).  
 
By mapping the great fires of postwar Singapore in the 1950s, this chapter 
underlines the close relationship between society, government and environment. 
While fires straddle the grey area between natural cause and human responsibility, 
they ought to be understood as a ‘trigger’ to deeply-rooted demographic, social, 
economic, political, and consequently historical pressures.
1 In particular, fires reveal 
cities to be ‘sites of disasters’ and are themselves ‘chronic events rooted in everyday 
hazard’.
2 Urban kampong dwellers in Singapore had to negotiate the increased fire 
hazard resulting from the built-up physical environment on the one hand, and the 
failure of the colonial government to genuinely deal with the hazardous problem on 
the other. The great postwar fires were symptomatic of the difficult relationship 
which existed between the state and urban kampong dwellers over the contested 
issue of suitable housing.  
 
                                                 
1  Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis & Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability, and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 22-66. 
2 Mark  Pelling,  The Vulnerability of Cities: Natural Disasters and Social Resilience (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 2003), pp. 16, 19. 
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The Kindling Kampongs  
 
  Urban kampongs suffered severely from the outbreak of periodic fires after 
World War Two. As Table 4.1 shows, the total number of fires in Singapore swelled 
from 187 in 1930 to 442 in 1946 and a record high of 2,917 in 1963. A large 
proportion of the fires naturally occurred within the City,
3 where the bulk of the 
population lived. However, in the rural areas, where the postwar population was 
growing at a faster rate, the number of fires also increased substantially.
4 Fire 
damage rose from $0.4 million in 1930 to $0.9 million in 1946 and $4.4 million in 
1964. The great fires occurred principally in two zones of unauthorised wooden 
housing flanking the Central Area: southwest of the Singapore River and north and 
east of the Rochor and Kallang rivers. In 1951, the Singapore Fire Brigade reported: 
 
Many of the fires which the Department attended during the year 
involved uncontrolled buildings, constructed from combustible 
materials, erected during the Japanese occupation. Frequently the 
fires spread from one building to another with alarming rapidity 
until…the fire assumes conflagration proportions. Not only are these 
buildings a menace to authorised structures but their destruction 
renders sometimes hundreds of persons homeless, means of 
livelihood are destroyed and property which the owners can usually 
ill afford to lose are consumed. The large areas of plank and attap 
unauthorised buildings in both the City and Rural Board areas are 
causing the Department much anxiety, for an outbreak in such an area 
calls for a large attendance by personnel and appliances, leaving 
stations denuded.
5  
 
3 In September 1951, Singapore was awarded the status of a City and the Municipal Commission was 
renamed the City Council. 
4 475 of the 825 (58%) fires in 1949, 291 of 753 (29%) fires in 1950 and 526 of 854 (62%) fires in 
1951 occurred within Municipal limits. 
5 FD, Annual Report 1951, p. 1. Table 4.1: Number of Fires, Fire Risk & Fire Damage in Singapore, 1930-1965 
Year  Total No. of Fires  Fire Risk ($m)  Fire Damage ($m)  % of Loss 
1930 187  18.5  0.4  2.3 
1931 142  10.8  0.2  1.7 
1932 182  8.4  0.4  4.8 
1933 210  6.6  0.2  3.3 
1934 216  4.4  0.08  1.8 
1935 285  5.3  0.03  0.6 
1936 194  0.8  0.01  1.4 
1937 222  1.2  0.1  9.2 
1938 263  1.0  0.03  2.8 
1939 241  3.1  0.2  5.4 
1940 343  2.9  0.1  3.8 
1941 281  1.3  0.6  4.9 
1946 442  12.0  0.9  7.7 
1947 524  43.5  0.7  1.7 
1948 583  16.7  0.5  2.9 
1949 825  12.7  0.2  2.5 
1950 753  34.7  1.4  3.9 
1951 854  89.6  3.2  3.6 
1952 886  59.8  1.1  1.8 
1953 998  58.4  3.6  6.3 
1954 912  31.0  0.7  2.2 
1955 1,348  43.4  3.3  7.6 
1956 1,442  36.7  0.8  2.3 
1957 1,632  18.1  0.7  4.5 
1958 1,735  36.1  1.2  3.2 
1959 1,692  34.9  1.4  4.0 
1960 1,455  81.4  0.7  8.1 
1961 2,313  73.8  4.3  5.8 
1962 1,796  34.3  0.8  2.3 
1963 2,917  38.3  1.1  2.9 
1964 1,459  87.6  4.4  5.0 
1965 1,788  91.4  2.3  2.5 
Source: FD, Annual Report, 1930-1962; SFB, Annual Report, 1963-1965. 
 
In 1954, as shown in Table 4.2, the Fire Superintendent identified 42 urban 
kampongs as serious fire risks, spread out mainly along Havelock, Tiong Bahru and 
Kampong Bahru roads southwest of the Singapore River; Kallang, Geylang and 
Changi roads east of the Kallang Basin; Upper Serangoon and MacPherson roads in 
the northeast of the City; and Balestier and Dunearn roads in the north.
6 Of these 
fire-prone kampongs, 18 were located near the Singapore River and 9 in the Kallang 
Basin. On the recommendation of the 1955 Land Clearance and Resettlement 
Working Party, seven of the kampongs were designated ‘tolerated attap areas’: Bukit 
                                                 
6 SIT 808/50, Memo from Superintendent, SFB, to Manager, SIT, 27 Oct 1954. 
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Theresa, Radin Mas and Heap Guan San southwest of the Singapore River, ranked 
26
th, 29
th and 34
th on the fire hazard list respectively; Geylang Serai and Wak 
Tanjong east of the Kallang Basin, ranked 8
th and 9
th respectively; and Woodleigh, 
ranked 38
th, and Chantek, ranked 12
th, in the northeast and north of the City. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the ‘tolerated areas’ were supposed to have spine 
roads and adequate fire breaks but in 1959, the city authorities admitted failure in 
implementing these public works and preventing further in-filling of wooden houses. 
Of the eleven kampongs slated for clearance by the Land Clearance and 
Resettlement Working Party, seven had been highlighted on the Fire 
Superintendent’s list, including kampongs southwest of the Singapore River, such as 
Silat, ranked 4
th, Bukit Ho Swee and Beo Lane, ranked 5
th and 6
th, Henderson, 
ranked 11
th, Tiong Bahru, ranked 15
th, and at the Kallang Basin, namely, Kampong 
Bugis, ranked 13
th, and Soopoo, ranked 14
th.  
 
Part of the increased kampong fire hazard could be attributed to the physical 
environment and construed as a ‘natural’ cause. The hot and dry seasonal tropical 
weather typical of Singapore made attap and plank highly-combustible materials, 
when winds could quickly fan a small fire into a raging blaze. On the other hand, 
heavy rains in 1954, which flooded numerous parts of Singapore, helped to prevent 
outbreaks of serious kampong fires that year.
7 Conversely, in 1957 and 1960, the hot, 
dry weather increased the number of grass fires.
8  
 
Less apparent but more crucial was the social and political geography of fire 
in postwar Singapore. The Singapore Fire Brigade, established in 1888, was the 
main public agency responsible for dealing with the fire hazard.
9 Unquestionably, in 
the postwar era, it suffered from financial and technological constraints. In 1950, it 
had only 11 officers and 154 fire-fighters for a million people.
10 By 1957, its
 
7 FD, Annual Report 1954, p. 2. 
8 FD, Annual Report 1957, p. 3; Annual Report 1960, p. 8. 
9 The Singapore Fire Brigade was assisted in its fire-fighting role by the Auxiliary Fire Service, 
which came into existence in 1952 as an arm of the Singapore Civil Defence Corps, and the fire 
brigades of the British army, air and naval forces in Singapore until their withdrawal in 1971. 
10 According to the 1947 census, Singapore’s population was 941,000. M. V. Del Tufo, A Report on 
the 1947 Census of Population (London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1949), p. 39. Table 4.2: List of Kampongs in the City Area in Order of Fire Risk, 1954 
Kampong  Main Roads  ‘Tolerated attap 
areas’ 
Clearance areas 
1. Lorong 17  Geylang Road     
2. Lorong 27A  Geylang Road     
3. Lorong 3  Geylang Road     
4. Silat  Kampong Bahru Road    X 
5. Beo Lane  Havelock Road-Tiong Bahru Road    X 
6. Bukit Ho Swee  Havelock Road-Tiong Bahru Road    X 
7. Potong Pasir  Upper Serangoon Road     
8. Geylang Serai  Changi Road  X   
9. Wak Tanjong  Changi Road  X   
10. Engku Aman  Geylang Road     
11. Henderson  Tiong Bahru Road    X 
12. Chantek Bahru  Dunearn Road  X   
13. Bugis  Kallang Road    X 
14. Soopoo  Kallang Road    X 
15. Tiong Bahru   Tiong Bahru Road    X 
16. Bintang  Havelock Road     
17. Pukat  Havelock Road     
18. Chia Heng  Moulmein Road     
19. Amber  Mountbatten Road     
20. Boon Teck Road  Balestier Road     
21. Ah Hood Road  Balestier Road     
22. Jalan Ampas  Balestier Road     
23. Lorong 21A  Geylang Road     
24. Martin  Havelock Road     
25. Ampat  MacPherson Road     
26. Bukit Theresa  Kampong Bahru Road  X   
27. Kasita  Kampong Bahru Road     
28. Purmei  Kampong Bahru Road     
29. Radin Mas  Kampong Bahru Road  X   
30. Pahang  Kampong Bahru Road     
31. Covent Garden  Havelock Road     
32. Lew Lian  Upper Serangoon Road     
33. Pasiran  Dunearn Road     
34. Heap Guan San  Telok Blangah Road  X   
35. Ban Siew San  Telok Blangah Road     
36. Jagoh  Telok Blangah Road     
37. Lorong K  East Coast Road-Changi Road     
38. Woodleigh  Upper Serangoon Road  X   
39. Wayang Satu  Dunearn Road     
40. Pisang  Kampong Bahru Road     
41. Marican  Serangoon Road     
42. Teo Chew  Grange Road-River Valley Road     
Source: SIT 808/50, ‘List of Kampongs in City Area in Order of Fire Risk’, in 
Memorandum from Superintendent, SFB, to Manager, SIT, 27 October 1954. 
 
 
  177strength had increased to 25 officers, 37 subordinate officers and 370 other ranks, 
but Singapore’s population had by then swelled to 1.45 million.
11 The Brigade’s 
rapid deployment and response times to fire calls was a major difficulty. Before 
1949, when it first began to install radio equipment on its fire engines, the Brigade 
had to rely solely on police transmissions to communicate with its mobile units. 
Only in 1953 did it stop sharing the police radio frequency and began transmitting 
on its own network. However, the improvements brought about by the new 
technology could not fully overcome the constraints imposed by geography. Due to 
the historical concentration of urban development in the southern apex of the island, 
traffic congestion on the City’s trunk roads worsened after the war. While received 
wisdom regarded five minutes as the maximum time in a city for a fire truck to reach 
an address in a high risk area,
12 it took twelve minutes in 1950 for a fire engine from 
the Sims Avenue station to reach Hill Street and twenty minutes three years later.
13  
 
To overcome such logistical and spatial limitations, the Brigade began to 
build new fire stations. Its Central Fire Station at Hill Street and the Geylang station 
at Sims Avenue had historically served the City and the eastern part of Singapore 
respectively. In February 1954, the five-bay Alexandra station opened after 
considerable delay in a kampong area.
14 Its main purpose, however, was to service 
Queenstown New Town.
15 Another fire station was envisaged at Thomson to serve 
the planned Toa Payoh public housing scheme in the north but it did not materialise 
as the housing project itself was long-delayed. A smaller station, however, did open 
at Bukit Timah in 1956 to serve the factories and housing estates in the northern 
urban area.
16 The fire stations were intended primarily to protect permanent housing 
or factories and not areas of private wooden dwellings. Similarly, while the number 
                                                 
11 S. C. Chua, Report on the Census of Population 1957 (Singapore: Printed by Government Printer, 
1964), p. 43. 
12 FD, Annual Report 1955, p. 1. 
13 FD, Annual Report 1953, p. 1. Under the law in those days, fire engines had to stop at traffic lights. 
14 OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 Jan 1994. 
15 FD, Annual Report 1954, pp. 1-2. 
16 The fifth station was the Serangoon station, formerly the Auxiliary Fire Service Depot (established 
in 1954). It was commissioned as a fully-operational fire station in 1962 and served the Serangoon 
district after the Auxiliary Fire Service was disbanded at the end of 1961. A sixth was the 
Sembawang station, which took over from the British Admiralty Fire Station in 1971. The 
Sembawang station served the northern areas of Singapore, such as Sembawang, Nee Soon, Mandai, 
and part of Yio Chu Kang. A station had been planned in the area in the early 1950s for Nee Soon 
village but never materialised. The Jurong Fire Station came into being in 1975, serving the Jurong 
Industrial Estate in the west of Singapore. 
  178of fire hydrants in Singapore increased from 3,505 in 1949 to 5,370 in 1960, the 
water supply to the urban kampongs was often inadequate due to either inaccessible 
or hilly ground or the failure to install water mains in the area.
17 Direct fire 
telephone lines likewise connected the Fire Control Room only to strategic public 
and commercial places.
18 In the 1950s, the Fire Brigade consequently conducted an 
increasing number of safety inspections and ‘goodwill visits’ to urban and rural 
areas; its public lectures on fire protection and rudimentary fire-fighting skills were 
reported to have helped reduce the losses from fire in 1952.
19 Nevertheless, the 
Brigade’s rescue emphasis was on schools and other public buildings, entertainment 
places such as cinemas, factories and oil installations, and godowns. 
 
This is not to say that the Brigade ignored the developing fire hazard in the 
urban kampongs. In 1950, to its fleet of five Dennis Rolls Royce fire engines with 
500 gallons per minute (gpm) turbine pumps and two Dennis engines with 900 gpm 
pumps were added two new Dennis engines ‘of the very latest design’, equipped 
with improved 1,000 gpm pumps.
20 In 1953, the Brigade took its most significant 
step to tackle the kampong fire hazard by commissioning a specially-designed 
engine called a water tender, equipped with a portable pump capable of drawing 
water from wells and ponds far off the main roads; two more water tenders were 
acquired the following year.
21 Then in 1956, two lightweight Austin ‘Champ’ water 
tenders, which had rendered valuable service in villages in Southeast Asia and Hong 
Kong, were added to the fleet, vehicles which could negotiate narrow kampong 
lanes and reach fire outbreaks quickly before they grew beyond control.
22 These 
mosquito-like vehicles could also function as ‘water carriers’ to fetch water from 
more distant areas and rapidly return to the fire site.
23 More water tenders were 
acquired subsequently and proved of ‘great value’ in fire-fighting operations in 
congested kampongs.
24 By 1960, the Brigade possessed four Dennis pump escapes 
                                                 
17 FD, Annual Report 1950, p. 15.  
18  Namely, cinemas and theatres within the City and to other public departments, including the 
military fire services and police force, the Civil Airport at Kallang and the Singapore Glass 
Manufacturers at Henderson Road. 
19 FD, Annual Report 1952, p. 12. 
20 FD, Annual Report 1950, p. 11. 
21 FD, Annual Report 1953, p. 2. 
22 FD, Annual Report 1956, p. 1. 
23 SS, 18 Jul 1953. 
24 FD, Annual Report 1957, p. 2. 
  179with 1,000 gpm pumps, five engines with 1,000 gpm pumps, two engines with 
700/900 gpm pumps, six ‘regular’ water tenders with 1,000 gpm pumps, and six 
lightweight tenders. 
 
  The kampong fire hazard also had a critical social dimension linked directly 
to the Fire Brigade. The Brigade historically had a strained relationship with the 
lower-income, Chinese-speaking population. In the colonial era, fire-fighters were 
usually Malays led by Caucasian officers. The latter, according to fire officer Arthur 
Lim Beng Lock, who became Fire Chief in 1972, were ‘discards’ from the fire 
service in Britain and lacked experience in leadership roles and working with the 
Chinese.
25 More crucially, the service had acquired a reputation among the Chinese 
for fire site pilfering and criminal acts. Arthur Lim revealed that before the war, 
Chinese residents in the Central Area called a passing fire engine pah chiu chia 
(‘robbery vehicles’); fire-fighters were encouraged by their officers to pocket 
valuables found at a fire site. In the PAP era, when theft was expressly prohibited, 
fire engines were closely associated with kampong clearance operations, where a 
passing pump was commonly viewed as being ‘on another URA [Urban Renewal 
Authority] job’.
26  Fire-fighters were also commonly secret society members. 
According to Lim, fire-fighter gangsters controlled gambling dens and used street 
alarms to call for assistance in gang clashes!
27 As Neivelle Tan, a former secret 
society member, noted, ‘the fire brigade was very feared and very well known for 
their raids, because they had very natural weapons – their belts with their big heavy 
buckle head’, ‘a weapon that they could carry legally, on or off duty’. Most fire-
fighters, according to Tan, belonged to the ‘08’ secret society, which was influential 
in the Malay-populated Geylang and Kembangan areas.
28 One of its splinters was 
the Double Axe Gang, organised by a City Council fire-fighter in 1954.
29 
 
  The social-communal tensions severely hampered the Fire Brigade’s work. 
When a two-storey wooden shophouse at the junction of Kim Seng Road and River 
                                                 
25 OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 Jan 1994. 
26  OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 Jan 1994. The Urban Renewal Authority, 
established as part of the HDB by the PAP government in 1967, was responsible for the clearance and 
redevelopment of the Central Area. It became a separate agency in 1974. 
27 OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 Jan 1994. 
28 OHC, interview with Neivelle Tan, 7 Feb 1995. 
29 CID, Booklet on Chinese Secret Societies in Singapore, 1958, p. 80. 
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Valley Road was set alight by burning joss in 1949, the Brigade claimed that the 
Chinese dwellers did not call for help but rather concentrated on saving their 
belongings.
30 It was also natural that kampong dwellers instinctively tried to fight 
the fire themselves; Arthur Lim declared that ‘they were quite a nuisance because 
they tended to want to pull our hoses and try to get water to protect their own 
properties’ and ‘we had to get the police in to drive them away’.
31 Street alarm 
boxes, connected to the fire stations by cable and placed in high risk areas in the 
City, became an important feature of the public landscape and alarm system, 
particularly since telephones were not commonly installed in kampongs in the 1950s. 
It is both ironic and telling that, despite these new safety precautions, the Fire 
Brigade still received late calls in many instances of major kampong fires. 
 
An analysis of the causes of fires, shown in Table 4.3, provides a clear 
indication of the main reasons for the postwar kampong fires. The data is not 
conclusive because of the large proportion of fires, particularly between 1949 and 
1958, whose causes were not ascertained. Unfortunately, there is also no specific 
breakdown of the causes of kampong fires. What emerges strikingly from the data, 
however, is the sheer ordinariness of the main causes of fires in the rhythm of 
everyday kampong life.
32 ‘Light thrown down’, ‘rubbish fires’ and the ‘sun’s rays 
striking broken glass’ could be attributed to the discarding of or failure to remove 
used or unwanted items in the kampong; ‘joss burning’ to religious worship and 
celebrations within the home or nearby; ‘sparks from fires and stoves’ to household 
chores and the use of firewood for cooking; and ‘fireworks’ and ‘children playing 
with matches’, to celebrations and recreation in the kampong’s open spaces. Two of 
the six great kampong fires in the 1950s discussed below occurred during Chinese 
festive celebrations in which much burning of joss took place. In Kampong 
Henderson, Joyce Horsley explained, the accumulated debris and refuse lying about 
contributed to the fire hazard.
33  When such everyday activities contribute 
 
30 SFB, Annual Report 1949, pp. 3-4. 
31 OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 Jan 1994. 
32  The main exception is ‘electrical short circuits’, since few kampong dwellers had access to 
electricity. 
33 Author’s interview with Joyce Horsley, 3 Nov 2007. Table 4.3: Main Causes of Fires in Singapore, 1949-1970 
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1949  825  113  41 93 61 36 11  4  3  --  1 325 
1950  753 52 48 61 47 19 17  3  9  -- 70  273 
1951  854 131 57  57  54 143 25  3  18  --  24 165 
1952  886 125 69  87 153 65  17  --  18  --  3  146 
1953  998  174  74 33 71 49 23 16 23 --  6 299 
1954  912  128  118  56 66 68 16 12 20 26  2 182 
1955  1,348  243  151  124 87 128 16  25  26  41  16 237 
1956  1,442  400  122  142 81 115 28  37  15  48  51 108 
1957  1,632  498 145 162  57  139  13  21  9  40  8  221 
1958  1,735  380  164  131 51 198 23  15  7  26  13 287 
1959  1,692  364  191  102  22  245  24 32 15 36 12 96 
1960  1,455  342  179  90 13  133  17 34 20 45  6  21 
1961  2,313  650  213  150 39 316 20  19  24  42  11 116 
1962  1,796  373  249  115  34  191  32 51 12 47 17 40 
1963  2,917  819  223  229  27  434  28 12 10 78 21 82 
1964  1,459  323  276  61 16  100  14 11 15 65 58 36 
1965  1,788  577 235 152  12  165  30  26  14  80  8  42 
1966  1,593  474  256  101  14  96  17  24 4 73 8 56 
1967  1,972  580 307 142  10  129  15  83  7  105  9  58 
1968  2,581  798  287  254 21 285 30 144  6  120 10  71 
1969  1,867  421  328  136  19  133  28 18 11 98 18 97 
1970  2,366  607  325  196 13 157  2  39  13 101 31 115 
Adapted from FD, Annual Report, 1949-1962; SFB, Annual Report, 1963-1970. 
 
consistently to the outbreak of fire, the root cause of the problem, then, can no 
longer simply be blamed on ‘carelessness’ or ‘negligence’, but rather on the social-
environmental pressures which made these activities hazardous.  
 
A history of ‘infernos’ is, by necessity, empirically biased. There was a 
‘silent majority’ of fires which were controlled by the Fire Brigade or the kampong 
dwellers themselves. On many occasions, it is important to note, kampong fires were 
contained before they grew out of control. For instance, Kampong Potong Pasir on 
the east bank of Kallang River was spared destructive blazes in 1954 and 1960 when 
small fires were successfully extinguished. In 1957, prompt action by two water 
tenders succeeded in containing two burning attap houses in Henderson Road and 
  182prevented the flames from spreading.
34 In the same year, a midnight fire in a rubber 
godown at Kim Yam Road threatened to engulf a nearby kampong but was safely 
extinguished.
35 In January the following year, a fire in Kampong Tiong Bahru was 
subdued by several water tenders.
36 In 1959, a fire in two houses in Geylang Lorong 
1 was extinguished before it could reach adjacent wooden dwellings built over the 
swampy ground.
37 In 1960, a large fire, which ravaged a 1-acre area and rendered 25 
wooden house dwelling families homeless, threatened Kampong Henderson before it 
was finally brought under control.
38 Two years later, the Fire Brigade, the Army Fire 
Service and the local fire-fighting squad fended off a large fire in the same 
kampong.
39 And there were certainly many other instances of fire subdued by 
kampong dwellers themselves which were never reported to the Fire Brigade. Yet all 
these cases of positive outcomes belied other highly-dangerous situations; after all, 
serious conflagrations broke out in most of these localities in the 1950s. 
 
Million Dollar Fire: Kampong Bugis, 1951 
 
  The first great postwar fire struck Kampong Bugis on 1 August 1951 in a 
thickly-populated industrial area immediately north of the Rochor River and east of 
the Central Area. The Fire Brigade, alerted at 9.22 am, had great difficulty fighting 
the fire, which threatened the City Gas Works across the road and the godowns and 
shops east of the kampong. A shift in the blaze’s direction due to the wind forced the 
Brigade to summon reinforcements.
40 The heat generated from the flames lifted the 
zinc roofs ‘like dry leaves’ and kept them airborne a hundred feet high for up to half 
a minute at a time.
41 Leo Ah Sin, a plant controller who worked and lived in 
Kampong Bugis, remembered how the heat peeled the paint right off the walls of the 
workers’ quarters in the kampong.
42 
 
                                                 
34 FD, Annual Report 1957, p. 3. 
35 FD, Annual Report 1957, p. 5. 
36 FD, Annual Report 1958, p. 4. 
37 FD, Annual Report 1959, p. 4. 
38 FD, Annual Report 1960, p. 3. 
39 FD, Annual Report 1962, pp. 7-8. 
40 FD, Annual Report 1951, pp. 6-7. 
41 SS, 2 Aug 1951. 
42 OHC, interview with Leo Ah Sin, 9 Oct 1997. 
  183Part of the severity of the blaze was undoubtedly due to the haphazard nature 
of unauthorised wooden housing. Kampong Bugis was ‘a legacy of the Japanese 
occupation’, where ‘[h]uts and shops sprang up in indiscriminate profusion and 
firemen yesterday found the greatest difficulty in running their hoses through the 
very narrow lanes of the area’.
43 The kampong, Leo Ah Sin noted, had an interior 
road wide enough for pedestrian traffic and motorcycles but not cars.
44 For more 
than five hours, the fire engaged ten fire engines and 150 fire-fighters aided by the 
British, Chinese, Malays, and Eurasians, who helped man hoses and smash down 
walls and roofs.
45 The situation, Leo described, was desperate: ‘some people used to 
carry pails, turn by turn….but you cannot do anything, the flame was terrible, very 
high. Because why, a lot of clothing, because that time, they ordered the textile 
clothing, all in bundles, all put inside, something like a warehouse’.
46 However, the 
scale of destruction must also be attributed to the authorities’ failure to provide the 
necessary protection to the kampong against fire. The fire-fighters found the water 
supply in the mains inadequate and had to draw water from the Kallang River. As J. 
G. Shaw, Superintendent of the Brigade, conceded, ‘What we were up against was a 
poor water supply. Lines were laid on but it was found that there was no water’.
47 
There was speculation in the Singapore Standard, the English version of the Sin 
Chew Jit Poh, that the assigned water had been diverted from nearby Sin Koh Street 
to prevent wastage of use.
48  
 
The fire disaster, which devastated eight acres and 400 wooden houses, 
shops and workshops, was attributed to a ‘mysterious explosion’ inside the kampong. 
Pamphlets circulated by the Malayan Communist Party accused the government of 
having started the fire to remove ‘filthy congested huts filled with Chinese’. The 
police maintained that it had found no evidence of arson.
49 Most of the houses in the 
kampong were uninsured and one landowner lost all his seventy houses.
50 The 
number of fire victims, which at an early stage was thought to be 5,000-7,000 
                                                 
43 SIT 1231/53, Minutes of Board meeting, 9 Dec 1953; ST, 2 Aug 1951. 
44 OHC, interview with Leo Ah Sin, 9 Oct 1997. 
45 ST, 2 Aug 1951. 
46 OHC, interview with Leo Ah Sin, 9 Oct 1997. 
47 ST, 2 Aug 1951. 
48 SS, 2 Aug 1951. 
49 ST, 30 Aug 1951. 
50 SS, 2 Aug 1951. 
  184persons, was about 600 families (3,000 persons).
51 The fire damage was estimated at 
$1 million.  
 
Scene of Indescribable Confusion: Geylang Lorong 3, 1953 
 
  A kampong named Orang Laut northwest of Kampong Bugis was also the 
site of a major fire on 16 July 1953, thought to have started from glowing charcoal 
from a cooking stove. The fire engines, arriving from Geylang Fire Station at 9.53 
am, presumably to a late call, found a large area ablaze. The fire spread rapidly due 
to a gusty wind despite the efforts of six engines drawing water from nearby 
hydrants and numerous creeks in the area. It was ‘a scene of indescribable 
confusion’. With the flames rising as high as 200 feet beneath what was described as 
an ‘atomic bomb’ cloud of smoke, some fire-fighters on several occasions had to 
retreat to avoid being engulfed by the smoke and flames. Others found themselves 
holding nozzles from which no water flowed, as the flames had burned through the 
canvas hosepipes. Hordes of panicked villagers plunged into a muddy creek with 
their belongings and struggled to safety.
52 At 10.45 am, the inferno changed 
direction southwest towards Lorong 17, where a creek further obstructed the Fire 
Brigade’s work. The flames were brought under control at 11.30 am and, according 
to Brigade officers, hundreds of other wooden houses in the locality had been 
saved.
53 The fire devastated 9.3 acres and destroyed 244 wooden houses, rendering 
595 families (2,385 people) homeless in the process.
54 
 
The  Singapore Standard found the fire ‘strangely reminiscent’ of the 
Kampong Bugis blaze, given the similar environmental conditions – shortage of 
water, a strong wind and tinder-dry attap roofs.
55 Again, much of the blame was laid 
on buildings ‘sited haphazardly with ill-defined unmetalled lanes and little or no 
space between the buildings, ideal conditions for a conflagration’, forcing fire-
                                                 
51 ST, 16 Aug 1951. 
52 ST, 17 Jul 1953. 
53 FD, Annual Report 1953, p. 5. 
54  It transpired that ‘[t]he area which has been burnt out is only a small portion of this whole 
kampong’,  and half of the fire site belonged to Lee Rubber Company. SIT 601/53, Memo titled 
‘Kallang Basin Fire Relief Scheme’ by Manager, SIT, 17 Jul 1953; and SS, 18 Jul 1953. 
55 SS, 17 Jul 1953. 
  185fighters to negotiate ‘narrow, winding alleyways’.
56 In the aftermath of the fire, 
British administrators and Chinese community leaders focussed on the technical 
issues of how to make the urban kampongs less fire prone. Tan Chin Tuan, Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce representative in the Legislative Council, called for the 
creation of fire lanes in congested urban kampongs and for experts to assess the 
overall kampong fire risk. Governor John Nicoll assured Tan that his proposal would 
be investigated.
57 The City Council, meanwhile, encouraged kampong dwellers to 
replace attap roofing with non-combustible material such as asbestos, zinc or 
aluminum.
58 No consideration was given as to whether this was an economically 
feasible scheme for the kampong population or how the authorities might assist the 
endeavour. More wooden houses with roofs made of zinc or layered with a fire-
resistant rubber sheet locally known as ‘black oil cloth’ appeared in the 1950s but 
they remained a distinct minority. 
 
No to Non-combustible Attap Roofing: Aljunied Road, 1953 
 
  The Geylang Lorongs were hit by another serious fire on 24 October that 
year, in a kampong at Lorong 25 at the junction of Aljunied Road and Sims Avenue, 
inhabited mainly by Chinese and a few Malays, Indians and Eurasians. Once again, 
the Fire Brigade received a late call from a member of the public operating a street 
alarm at 2.58 pm. However, the fire was believed to have started from sparks from a 
baker’s oven which ignited a nearby attap roof and had begun at least eight minutes 
earlier. The kampong faced near total destruction, given the lack of water in the 
locality, which forced a number of jets to be turned off in order to raise the overall 
level of the water pressure. Only the work of the water tenders, by drawing water 
from a small pond on the western flank of the fire, managed to extinguish small 
pockets of flame and averted an even greater catastrophe. The performance of the 
two new water tenders from the Royal Air Force in the Lorong 3 and Aljunied Road 
fires so impressed the Fire Brigade that it subsequently acquired more such pumps. 
                                                 
56 ST, 17 Jul 1953. 
57 SSLCP 1953, 21 Jul 1953, pp. B220-221, B224. 
58 SSLCP 1953, 15 Sep 1953, pp. B258. 
  186Even then, 229 wooden houses in an area covering 4.5 acres were destroyed, 
rendering 263 families (over 1,000 people) homeless.
59  
 
  Occurring so soon after the Lorong 3 fire, the disaster elicited maximum 
censure of the authorities from sections of the public. Much of the blame for the fire 
was placed on the doorstep of the City Council, which had begun to demolish 
newly-built unauthorised wooden dwellings in the City. The Singapore Attap 
Dwellers’ Association was actively involved in the relief work in both Geylang fires 
that year. Its President, Mak Pak Shee, had helped dwellers tear down their attap 
roofs in a bid to prevent the flames from spreading in the earlier Lorong 3 fire.
60 
Mak accused the Council of neglecting the dwellers’ welfare through the ban it 
imposed on the construction of wooden dwellings in the City and urged Council 
members to improve water supply, road access and sanitation in the kampongs.
61 He 
proposed that the Council designate areas of wooden housing as a way to control 
their spread, a precursor to the ‘attap areas’ policy which was taken up by urban 
administrators in 1955. ‘Attap dwellers’, Mak declared, ‘are by no means haphazard 
in their ideas of the type of homes they build. Humble people though they are, they 
are just as anxious as the more fortunate citizens to have decent, clean homes and 
spaced out in such a manner as would keep them safe from fire disasters’.
62  
 
The Straits Times, meanwhile, urged the Council to implement proposals to 
establish more outlying fire stations, replace attap roofs with asbestos sheeting, train 
local auxiliary groups to fight fires, and ensure an adequate water supply in the 
mains. The newspaper warned that should the City Council discuss the fire hazard 
long enough, ‘fire will solve the problem for them’.
63 From the beginning of 
November, the Fire Brigade carried out fire prevention and fire-fighting talks in 
kampongs across the island. On 30 October, four fire-fighters visited Bukit Ho Swee 
and spoke to more than a hundred residents, emphasising the need for ‘at least one 
man to keep his head and summon the brigade’.
64 Chan Kum Chee, City Councillor 
for East ward, urged the government to provide non-combustible attap roofing at 
                                                 
59 FD, Annual Report 1953, p. 7. 
60 ST, 17 Jul 1953. 
61 SS, 26 Oct 1953. 
62 SS, 30 Oct 1953. 
63 ST, 26 Oct 1953. 
64 ST, 31 Oct 1953. 
  187subsidised prices.
65 The proposal was rejected by T. P. F. McNeice, President of the 
City Council, who felt that ‘any method we take should be a constructive one. It 
must not perpetuate the appalling conditions in which attap dwellers are living at 
present’,
66 and that re-roofing with government money ‘would only prolong the life 
of these insanitary huts’. ‘The money would be better spent’, McNeice concluded, 
‘in building new houses complying with Municipal requirements’.
67 Clearly, the 
prevention of unauthorised wooden houses was more important to the colonial 
regime than making them safe from fire. 
 
Mooncake Festival Fire: Kampong Tiong Bahru, 1955 
 
  The Tiong Bahru fire
68  of 30 September 1955 was the first major 
conflagration to strike the unauthorised wooden housing southwest of the Singapore 
River since the Bukit Ho Swee inferno of 1934. The disaster, which occurred during 
the Mid-Autumn Festival,
69 was exacerbated by the fact that the Fire Brigade was 
not notified until 3.45 pm, twenty minutes after the fire started. When the first fire 
engine arrived at the scene, the blaze, fanned by a robust wind, had reached ‘serious 
proportions’.
70 The nearest telephone was reportedly half a mile away down a 
winding kampong path.
71 In 1954, the Fire Superintendent had called the locality 
‘one of the most dangerous fire risks in the town area’.
72 Hampering the fire-
fighters’ work were the narrow approach lanes and numerous ditches which littered 
the area.
73  However, shortage of water, which was a problem of municipal 
administration rather than local geography, was again a significant detrimental factor. 
The fire hydrant nearest to the flames was 250 yards away, while the hoses had to be 
joined, reducing the power of the jets. The ubiquitous water tenders were again in 
action, as were more than a hundred volunteers and policemen, who watered down 
attap roofs and tore down wooden houses to create fire breaks. With the help of the 
                                                 
65 ST, 27 Oct 1953. 
66 ST, 29 Oct 1953. 
67 CC, Minutes of Meetings 1953, 28 Oct 1953, p. 11. 
68 Also called the Kampong Silat fire, given the proximity of the two places. 
69 Also known as the Mooncake Festival for the mooncakes customarily eaten on the occasion. 
70 FD, Annual Report 1955, p. 5. 
71 ST, 1 Oct 1955. 
72 SIT 808/50, Memo from Superintendent, SFB, to Manager, SIT, 13 Aug 1954. 
73 SS, 1 Oct 1955. 
  188Auxiliary Fire Service and Army Fire Service, the Brigade managed to control the 
fire after an hour. The disaster destroyed 150 wooden houses and rendered 181 
families (792 people) homeless.
74 
 
Six Dead: Kampong Koo Chye, 1958 
 
  This conflagration, apparently caused by burning joss used during the 
Chinese Qing Ming Festival on 5 April 1958,
75 occurred near Geylang Lorong 3, the 
site of the 1953 fire. The Fire Brigade, which received the call at 4.25 pm, managed 
to save part of the kampong, but five acres of land were burned out. The fire was so 
ferocious that it had started during a thunderstorm, after which the wind fanned the 
growing flames towards the wooden houses on the opposite river bank. As in the 
previous Lorong fires, a combination of geographical and administrative factors 
were at play that evening which made fire-fighting extremely difficult: the fire-
fighters had a hard time moving through the kampong, there were inadequate fire 
hydrants nearby and the crowd of refugees fleeing the blaze further hindered the 
work of the Brigade.
76 Along Lorong 17, fire engines from Central, Serangoon and 
Geylang fire stations pumped water from the Kallang River and managed to turn 
back the fire and contain it at about 9 pm. It was a tragic blaze: one adult and five 
children were reported dead or missing.
77 Two of the fatalities were a mother and 
child: apparently ‘the mother fell and was trapped by the flames as she tried to 
escape from the fire clutching her child to her breast’.
78 Another victim was a four-
year-old child, whose grief-stricken mother had to be carried away from the fire by 
rescue workers.
79 329 families (2,050 people) were rendered homeless in a calamity 
considered ‘one of the worst in the annals of the [Fire] Brigade’s history’.
80  
 
                                                 
74 FD, Annual Report 1955, p. 5. 
75 ST, 7 Apr 1958. Also known as All Souls Day, the Qing Ming is an occasion for the Chinese to 
remember and honour one’s ancestors, which involves, among other things, the burning of joss sticks 
and paper. 
76 SS, 6 Apr 1958. 
77 FD, Annual Report 1958, pp. 5-6. 
78 ST, 7 Apr 1958. 
79 SFP, 8 Apr 1958. 
80 FD, Annual Report 1958, p. 6. 
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The Voluntary Kampong Fire-Fighting Squads 
 
With proper assistance, low-income wooden house communities can develop 
effective strategies, resources and social networks to cope with urban hazards.
81 
Such efforts, both spontaneous and organised, had evolved in Singapore by the early 
1950s. In 1953, for instance, the residents of Geylang Lorong 17, having witnessed 
the Lorong 3 blaze, formed their own ‘fire brigade’.
82 Following the Aljunied Road 
fire in the same year, the Fire Brigade began to promote greater awareness of the fire 
hazard among kampong dwellers. In 1954, the Brigade credited the residents’ 
success in subduing several kampong fires to this campaign.
83 In July that year, 
when fire ravaged a market in Lorong Tai Seng and threatened the large kampong 
around it, the dwellers quickly doused the roofs of their houses with water.
84 In 
1957, the Fire Brigade began to conduct regular awareness lectures, drills and 
demonstrations in kampongs. 
 
The most concerted effort to combat the kampong fire hazard occurred in the 
aftermath of the December 1957 City Council elections. The 1958 Koo Chye fire 
triggered a fresh initiative by the city administration, now dominated by an anti-
colonial political party seeking to mobilise the low-income Chinese population. In 
May, the Fire Brigade, with the sympathetic support of the City Council, formed 
volunteer fire-fighting squads in 36 urban kampongs (see Table 4.4), local teams 
meant to ‘deal with outbreaks of fire and hold them in check pending the arrival of 
the Brigade’.
85 Each squad of a minimum of twenty men was trained by the Brigade 
with the help of kampong elders and provided basic equipment, comprising six 
knapsack pumps, ten buckets, six 2-gallon soda or acid fire extinguishers, and two 
attap hooks with pole handles to pull off burning attap roofs.
86 Kampongs with more 
resources, such as those in Geylang Lorong 29 and Havelock Road, built lookout 
towers, although it was still difficult to spot a fire in a congested kampong. By the
 
81 Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities, pp. 52-65. 
82 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1953, 31 Aug 1953. 
83 FD, Annual Report 1954, p. 2. 
84 FD, Annual Report 1954, p. 7. 
85 FD, Annual Report 1958, p. 1. 
86 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1958, 19-20 May 1958, pp. 420-422. The extinguisher acid, however, 
was sometimes stolen for use in secret society fights. OHC, interview with Arthur Lim Beng Lock, 7 
Jan 1994. Table 4.4: Fire-Fighting Squads in Urban and Rural Kampongs 
Year Formed  Kampong  Squads* 
1958 Amber  1 
1958 Beo  Lane  3 
1958  Bukit Ho Swee  4 
1958  Heap Chin Geap  1 
1958  Heap Guan San  2 
1958 Henderson  3 
1958 Koo  Chye    2 
1958 Lorong  Tai  Seng  5 
1958 Pisang  Bahru  1 
1958 Potong  Pasir  7 
1958 Silat  3 
1958 Soopoo  1 
1958 Tiong  Bahru  5 
1959  Buona Vista   1 
1959 Boon  Teck  5 
1959 Bukit  Bintang  2 
1959  Ban Siew San  2 
1959 Bukit  Merah  2 
1959 Bugis    2 
1959 Kallang  Basin  3 
1959 Lorong  1  4 
1959 Lorong  3  1 
1959 Lorong  17  2 
1959 King’s  Theatre  2 
1959 Jagoh  1 
1959 Bukit  Kasita  1 
1959 Radin  Mas  3 
1959 Lorong  23  2 
1959 Hock  Soon    2 
1959 Lorong  27  3 
1960 Cheow  Keng  1 
1961 Lorong  29  1 
1962 Delta  5 
1963 Bukit  Purmei  Unspecified 
1963  Lim Teck Boo  Unspecified 
1964 Alexandra  Terrace  Unspecified 
1964 Bedok  Unspecified 
1964 Chia  Keng  Unspecified 
1964 Lorong  5  1 
* Number of squads established in that year. 
Adapted from: FD, Annual Report, 1958-1962; SFB, Annual Report, 1963-1964. 
 
year’s end, as Table 4.4 shows, there were 38 fire-fighting squads in 13 urban 
kampongs.
87 By 1960, there were 82 squads in 30 kampongs, including persons with 
                                                 
87 FD, Annual Report 1958, p. 10. 
  191fire-fighting experience who had served in the regular or auxiliary fire brigades.
88 
Of the 39 kampongs with fire-fighting squads formed between 1958 and 1964, 29 
were areas with high fire risk, including 17 in the locality southwest of the 
Singapore River and 12 in the Geylang area. A total of seven fire-fighting squads 
were established in Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee in 1958.  
                                                
 
In 1961, the fire-fighting squads helped to extinguish more than fifteen 
kampong fires. Soon Eng Boh, a long-time resident of Geylang Lorongs 12 and 27, 
and a grassroots leader, who helped form fire-fighting squads in the locality 
following the Koo Chye disaster, stated that while larger blazes were beyond their 
control, kampong dwellers could prevent a small fire from growing into an 
inferno.
89 In 1960, one of the squads requested to bear its own flag. The authorities, 
however, agreed on a standard flag for all squads, as, according to an official, it was 
feared that having a separate flag for each fire-fighting party ‘might introduce the 
idea of ‘kampongism’ as against unity’.
90 A standard design, bearing a flame, 
helmet and axe placed centrally inside a map of Singapore, and bordered by the 
words ‘Kampong Volunteer Fire Fighting Squad’ in the four official languages, was 
produced.  
 
As another clear sign of the party’s plan to mobilise urban kampong dwellers 
from both within official circles and from the political margins of the anti-colonial 
movement, the PAP, through its leftwing rural and old boys’ associations, sponsored 
fire-fighting squads in the urban kampongs. Bukit Ho Swee’s fire-fighting squads, 
according to Tay Ah Chuan, were recruited from the local branch of the SRRA and 
Chuen Min and Kai Kok old boys’ associations. Tay, who joined one of the fire-
fighting squads when he was in Chuen Min Old Boys’ Association, explained that 
‘our association was not equipped to fight a fire. We merely had to be observant’. 
The regular surveillance at dusk was carried out typically by working adults and 
students like Tay, for in the day, they had to work or study.
91  
 
 
88 FD, Annual Report 1960, p. 10. 
89 OHC, interview with Soon Eng Boh, 16 Feb 1982. 
90 MC 1003/59, Memo from Acting Assistant Secretary, MOC, to PS, MHA, 9 Nov 1960. 
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  192The primary aim of the fire-fighting squads organised by the left, which 
distinguished such teams from the Fire Brigade-trained squads, was the prevention 
of arson. Lily Wee, staying in Henderson, noted that ‘there were a few arson cases in 
the kampong, so they formed some volunteer patrols to go round at night’; on one 
occasion, someone ‘actually threw a burning piece of cloth onto the roof but the 
people were now quite alert so they managed to get it’.
92 Chio Cheng Thun, the 
Singapore Rural Residents’ Association organiser in Lorong Tai Seng, explained: 
 
When kampong dwellers faced eviction, we organised fire-fighting 
squads for fear that the landlord would set fire to the houses. We 
organised them to patrol the village at night. This arson happened in 
many places like Geylang. We didn’t see it or catch the arsonists but 
if you didn’t want to move and if they burned your houses, you 
naturally had to move out, then they could develop the land. The 
squads were not organised in all places but in areas where some 
problem had occurred. If there was fire, they would sound the alarm. 
It was a self-help measure. The aim was not to fight fire but to 
prevent people from setting fire, so they didn’t have much fire-
fighting equipment.
93 
 
Bukit Ho Swee’s fire-fighting squads were established for the same reason. 
My father, living along Havelock Road, did night shifts several times a week as a 
member of a fire-fighting squad; it had been organised because ‘the kampong was 
afraid that people from outside would come and start a fire or a fire would break out 
here’.
94 Before the 1961 fire, as Tay Yan Woon explained, ‘people said that Bukit 
Ho Swee was being evicted, and everybody had to guard their houses. There were 
people keeping watch in shifts in the middle of the night because they were afraid 
that someone might come along and set fire. If a stranger came in, they would be 
questioned, and if they did not answer satisfactorily, they would be beaten up’.
95 
Two cases of arson in Bukit Ho Swee, the Nanyang Siang Pau reported, had been 
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  193prevented by residents in 1960.
96 As Tay Ah Chuan recalled, ‘on several occasions, 
fire was prevented. Until the last time, the fire burned through’.
97 
 
Friday 13: Kampong Tiong Bahru, 1959 
 
The ‘Friday 13 fire tragedy’ of February 1959 surpassed all previous fires in 
its scale of destruction. It was believed to have started in a paper bag maker’s shop 
near Beo Lane before crossing Tiong Bahru Road. Eyewitnesses apparently saw four 
children let off fire rockets, one of which lodged in the bone dry attap eaves of the 
shop. As they recounted, ‘[t]here was an explosion and the next moment the roof 
was in flames’, and, ‘[w]ith the strong wind, the fire instantly spread to our house 
which was quickly gutted’.
98 The Fire Brigade was notified at 1.07 pm and arrived 
on the scene four minutes later. Finding the flames fanned by strong winds 
spreading quickly among the closely-built wooden houses, the Brigade rushed 12 
fire engines to the site. The huge fire destroyed 600-700 wooden houses and 
destroyed property worth an estimated $2 million.
99 It killed a blind, crippled lady, 
aged 76, and left a number of persons still unaccounted for a few days later. It 
rendered 1,016 families (5,220 people) homeless, comprising some 462 families 
with more than five persons, 429 families with five or less persons and 125 single 
persons.
100  
 
This was the first major fire which engaged the services of the kampong fire-
fighting volunteers, and ‘a considerable amount of good work was done to help to 
contain the fire’, including forming bucket chains, manning hoses and helping fire-
fighters pull down houses to create fire breaks.
101 Tan Tiam Ho, a Bukit Ho Swee 
resident, was one of the volunteers, helping to lay out the Fire Brigade’s hoses.
102 
Less than two months earlier, the same squads had contained a fire in three attap 
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houses in the kampong.
103 But they faced a far more difficult situation on this 
occasion. For instance, Mayor Ong Eng Guan and Fire Superintendent J. Angus 
criticised kampong dwellers who, trying to retrieve their belongings from their 
homes, obstructed the work of the fire-fighters and volunteers.
104 More crucial were 
the twin difficulties of access to fight the fire and the inadequate water supply. A 
reader of the Straits Times subsequently asked the government to use a bulldozer to 
open a path for the fire engines in the next kampong fire, because in this case the 
engines had been ‘rendered decorative by lack of sufficient water supplies’.
105 The 
Brigade utilised eight hydrants and water from two open ditches but in some cases 
the jets of water produced were still weak.
106 Labour Front City Councillor of River 
Valley ward, Ho Kok Hoe, who with other Councillors rushed from a Council 
meeting to the fire site and was helping to hold a fire hose, felt ‘all of a sudden the 
hose had a spurt of water, just for a moment, and then it went flop,  flop, and 
flattened. And then there was no more water coming out’. Ho, also an artist, 
subsequently captured the desperation of the scene in a painting highlighting the 
themes of ‘destruction and rising hope’ (see Plate 4.1).
107 According to Mak Pak 
Shee, ironically, the problem was that the area had too many standpipes which 
reduced the water pressure.
108 As discussed in the previous chapter, the City Council 
had recently failed to adopt a motion to install water mains in the kampong. The 
Councillors, which knew the kampong to be a serious fire risk, ‘didn’t expect the 
fire to come so soon, while we were arguing about standpipes’.
109 J. Angus, who 
ordered several hydrants to be turned off to raise the water pressure, explained that 
the pressure was low as no mains had been laid in the area and that the question of 
‘whether this was a main road had still to be settled’.
110 At 3.01 pm, the fire was 
finally subdued. Among the fire victims were Samuel Seetoh and his family of ten; 
their wooden house in Si Kah Teng was gutted by the fire, although they managed to 
save their precious sewing machine and some important personal documents.
111 
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Plate 4.1: Ho Kok Hoe’s impression of the 1959 Kampong Tiong Bahru fire, highlighting 
the themes of ‘destruction and rising hope’ (Courtesy of Ho Kok Hoe). 
 
In 1959, when the Ong Eng Guan group resigned from the City Council to 
contest the Legislative Assembly elections, Tang Peng Yeu, the new Council 
chairman and a member of the Singapore People’s Alliance, pointed out, ‘The 
disastrous fire of Lorong 3 [Kampong Koo Chye] and Kampong Tiong Bahru should 
show to the people of Singapore whether the Mayor and his PAP Councillors have 
taken steps during the 15 months in the Council to minimise the fire risk in 
kampongs’.
112 Despite this, the Fire Brigade claimed in 1960 that the kampong fire 
hazard was ‘being gradually reduced’ as the kampongs themselves were being 
developed.
113 This prediction, which failed to say how the Brigade would contain an 
actual fire outbreak, turned out in any case to be a false belief and prophecy.  
 
The six great fires of the 1950s tell us much about the nature of state-urban 
kampong society relations. While the authorities received a fair share of criticism for 
not installing water mains or sufficient fire hydrants near the urban kampongs, they 
could rightly point to major efforts in acquiring water tenders and forming volunteer 
fire-fighting squads. Kampong dwellers were, conversely, accused of lacking 
awareness of the fire hazard, panicking during a fire and failing to promptly call the 
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  196Brigade. Such damning allegations were in part an attempt by a colonial 
administration, which regarded unauthorised wooden housing as a ‘necessary but 
diminishing evil’, to blame someone else, namely, the urban poor, and distance itself 
from a deteriorating social and housing situation on the urban periphery.  
 
  The fundamental problem was the possible rapid spread of fire among 
closely-built wooden dwellings and was, consequently, political in nature. ‘Natural’ 
forces such as a strong wind, scorching heat and hilly or swampy terrain 
complicated the fire risk and were beyond human control. Inadequate water supply – 
a failure of administration as much as a factor of terrain – plagued fire-fighters. 
However, in the Geylang Lorongs, the fire engines could pump water from the 
Kallang River at a reasonably high pressure but, even with the water tenders in 
action, the Lorongs were frequently devastated by uncontrollable conflagrations. 
Consequently, a fire which occurred among wooden housing in inaccessible urban 
areas and under hot windy conditions and was a recipe for disaster, defeating the 
best efforts of the fire-fighters. Alertness to the presence of fire, as the Sin Chew Jit 
Poh pointed out, could also not be maintained every day of the year.
114 The infernos 
at Tiong Bahru and Bukit Ho Swee occurred despite the combined efforts of the 
professionals and part-timers. Obviously, it was crucial, then, to prevent the rapid 
spread of the flames in an urban kampong. If the Fire Brigade was notified promptly, 
and had at its disposal enough water tenders, good water pressure at the site and the 
residents’ full cooperation, the damage might significantly be reduced. But to 
effectively cope with the kampong fire hazard, fire lanes had to be constructed,
115 
something the authorities had evidently failed to do, either by implementing social 
control from above or by engaging the kampong dwellers from below to create the 
lanes.  
 
Living with Fire 
 
If kampong fires were difficult to control, how did the innumerable kampong 
dwellers live with the daily fire hazard? The Fire Brigade, in lauding its initiative in 
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  197establishing the fire-fighting squads, painted a negative picture of the average 
kampong dweller: 
 
Prior to the formation of kampong fire parties there was practically 
no one in the least fire-minded and when a fire did occur the tendency 
was for kampong dwellers to snatch up their most valued possessions 
and run to safety. It never occurred to them to attempt to extinguish 
the fire which in many instances could have easily been done while in 
its incipient stage; neither was any thought given to calling the 
Brigade until the fire had gained a firm hold. However, since the 
advent of the fire parties the situation has changed, numerous small 
fires which may well have developed into serious outbreaks have 
been dealt with; the Brigade was called but on arrival found the 
situation well in hand and beyond ensuring that the fire was entirely 
extinguished, there was no need for their services.
116  
 
Such official statements by a public institution which was itself unable to 
deal adequately with the growing fire hazard were self-serving. According to fire 
officer Arthur Lim, kampong fires tended to occur on auspicious occasions such as 
the Lunar New Year, when youngsters set off fire crackers, or the Hungry Ghosts 
Festival during the 7
th Moon, with the widespread burning of joss sticks and 
paper.
117 Admittedly, given how far the fire hazard was culturally embedded in 
everyday kampong life, it was difficult to prevent acts which appeared to be due to 
‘carelessness’ or ‘negligence’ by the residents. It was certainly possible to ‘forget’ to 
blow out a candle when one left a wooden house,
118 while kampong children in their 
unsupervised play commonly aimed fire crackers and sky rockets at attap roofs. As a 
kid, Wang Ah Tee revealed how a cruel childhood prank could backfire with dire 
consequences for all concerned, for ‘during the Chinese New Year, we could get a 
big packet of fire crackers for 10 cents. We would catch some rats, pour petrol on 
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  198them and burn them, and then they ran onto the attap roof. Die! Because we didn’t 
know [the risk] then’.
119  
 
Nevertheless, kampong dwellers, if unable to fully prevent or subdue a fire, 
were not necessarily ignorant about the hazard or how to respond to such an event. 
As one resident explained, because they knew that the wooden houses burned easily, 
‘their level of alertness was very high’.
120 To Joyce Soh, ‘living in a kampong, the 
only thing we were afraid of was fire’.
121 Soh Boon Quee (born in 1945), who lived 
in the southern side of Si Kah Teng, agreed that as ‘火不会认识你跟我’ (“The fire 
would not distinguish between you and me”), every home was afraid, because once a 
fire broke out, it might get out of control’.
122 Lee Soo Seong remembered an old 
lady in Bukit Ho Swee, his neighbour, who used to berate the children playing with 
fire crackers.
123 In the kampong, ‘fire is a very public thing’, as Chua Beng Huat 
explained, ‘One thing you were always vigilant about was fire. As soon as there was 
fire, everybody just screamed and yelled. Instantly. As soon as there was fire, the 
first thing most able-bodied young people would do was try to put out the fire’.
124  
 
As with other ‘undesirable’ aspects of kampong life such as the ‘filth’ and 
‘danger’, low-income Chinese accepted fire as part of their everyday life in a way 
which appeared to outsiders as complacent. Tan Ah Kok put it succinctly, ‘We did 
not know enough about fire to be afraid’.
125 On the ambivalent attitude of Kampong 
Henderson residents towards the fire hazard, Joyce Horsley commented: 
 
I don’t think they were aware [of the fire hazard]. I suppose they took 
life as OK, they had no idea that they were likely to have fire. Or if 
they had, they thought they were prepared to cope with it. They all, I 
suppose, had to be on their guard. They lived from day to day. Of 
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  199course they were quite careful in what they did, hoping that nothing 
would happen. I suppose they accepted it like that.
126 
 
In the event of fire, the kampong dwellers’ first instinct was to save what mattered 
most to them – their family and possessions – rather than to attempt to fight the 
flames. This attitude and response applied equally to both men and women. Yap 
Kuai Yong, who stayed near the City Gas Works, recalled that ‘when someone in 
the kampong shouted “Fire!”, we were very frightened and would rush out of the 
house to see where it was, holding tightly to our children. When someone set off fire 
crackers, we were so afraid of fire, everyone, not just us’.
127  
 
  To some degree, kampong dwellers took precautions to minimise the fire risk, 
such as making sure to extinguish their oil lamps at night.
128 According to Tay Bok 
Chiu, ‘if we were burning joss papers, we had to be careful, we had to take the 
responsibility to be around until the burning was over’.
129 Lily Wee, being the eldest 
child in the family, lived with the ‘phobia’ of fire in Henderson: she had to plan how 
to evacuate her seven younger siblings to safety in the event of a fire at night. 
Following the Bukit Ho Swee fire, she developed a ‘survival skill’: ‘when people 
were burning joss papers and joss sticks, I would take the water hose and spray the 
attap in case of fire. I was in Secondary 1 then so it was common sense: wet with 
water so fire would not burn the attap’.
130 Why fire was readily accepted as part of 
kampong life was also partly due to the ease of rebuilding wooden houses. In 
contrast to the official depiction of kampong dwellers as being ‘fire passive’, 
following the Joo Chiat fire of May 1959, which destroyed fifty wooden houses in 
the Joo Chiat-Tembeling Road area, the newspapers reported two days later that the 
fire victims ‘lost no time’ in rebuilding their burnt-out homes.
131  
 
The social organisation of the volunteer fire-fighting squads necessarily drew 
upon the strong fabric of kampong community life and its loose economic structure. 
Chua Beng Huat observed that a ‘[c]ollective vigilance was always maintained 
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  200against the apprehension of the villagers, namely, fire. At the slightest indication of 
fire breaking out, the village men were there attempting to put it out rather than 
rushing home to help their own families prepare for evacuation’. According to Chua, 
it was the unemployed young men such as the secret society gangsters who 
frequently provided the ‘free labour’ for these dangerous relief efforts.
132 To the 
young men at least, fire was perceived as a threat to the kampong, much like hostile 
intruders. Ng Meng Cheng, for example, who as a girl lived briefly in an attap house 
built over the Kallang River from 1959 to 1961, was frequently awakened at night 
by fire alarms, most of which turned out to be false alarms. Once, however, when a 
fire broke out in her home after her mother forgot to put out an insect repellent joss 
stick before going out, their neighbours helped to extinguish the flames.
133  
 
Arson, as Table 4.3 shows, was not a major cause of fire in the official 
statistics, usually constituting 1-2% of the total number of fires in Singapore. 
However, the colonial authorities viewed arson largely within the Cold War 
paradigm of counter-insurgency; it was conflated with ‘incendiarism’ and, in the 
official mind, associated with attacks by the Malayan Communist Party on industrial, 
commercial and public buildings.
134 As Arthur Lim stated, the 1950s and 1960s 
were ‘prominent years’ with communists carrying out numerous acts of arson.
135 
Reported cases of arson and incendiarism were highest in 1950 (70 cases), 1956 (51) 
and 1964 (58) – years in which riots took place in Singapore.
136 Moreover, without a 
comprehensive police investigation and the cooperation of witnesses in the kampong, 
it was difficult to distinguish between arson and other causes of fire; a ‘light thrown 
down’, for instance, could belie an act of arson. Arson directed against wooden 
dwellings was consequently both under-reported and under-investigated because of 
the social and political distance between urban kampong dwellers and officials of 
the state. The widely-held perception among some fire-fighters that Bukit Ho Swee 
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  201was full of ‘bad people’ was markedly similar to the attitude that other members of 
officialdom held towards the residents of urban kampongs.
137 
 
Contrary to the commonly-held views of the authorities, kampong dwellers 
in the 1950s frequently considered fire as an act of arson committed by landlords, 
the government, hired secret society hands, or a spiteful neighbour. As development 
projects increasingly encroached onto areas of unauthorised wooden housing, fire 
came to be readily associated with clearance in the minds of kampong dwellers. ‘It 
was always like that’, they ventured years later, ‘There was eviction and people did 
not want to move. After a while, fire broke out’.
138 Such beliefs were not pure 
speculation but rather based, ostensibly, on first-hand accounts, and possessed of an 
internal logic. One kampong dweller apparently had witnessed how ‘someone put 
fuel into a Pepsi-Cola bottle and threw it onto a roof’, insisting, ‘I saw it with my 
own eyes’.
139 Another had ‘seen a piece of cloth tied up with a metal wire and 
thrown onto the attap. We retrieved this thing. Someone had thrown it’.
140 Fire at 
night was supposedly common in the urban kampongs in the 1950s, ‘many times, 
once or twice a week sometimes. Sometimes at night we had to move our things 
because someone was setting fire. We didn’t call the police! They had run off so it 
was useless to call the police. They were trying to evict the residents, and since they 
didn’t want to leave, they tried to set fire’.
141 Another kampong dweller in the 1950s 
‘knew a friend who belonged to this type of gang, they would set fire to attap houses 
because when the landowner bought over the land, there were people who refused to 
be evicted, so they played dirty tricks’.
142  
 
In the conspiratorial logic of arson, fire was always accompanied by 
suspicious circumstances: ‘people were saying that the fire engines arrived late or 
that there was no water, or that the fire engines were far away from the fire and were 
not really trying to fight the flames’.
143 The power of the belief in arson lay in the 
fact that it could not easily be proved or disproved. The large scale of destruction, in 
                                                 
137 OHC, interview with Jaafar Sabar, 29 Jul 1987. 
138 Author’s interview with Maggie Chong, 13 Feb 2007. 
139 Author’s interview with Maggie Chong, 13 Feb 2007. 
140 Author’s interview with Goh Ah Mong, 24 May 2007.  
141 Author’s interview with Lim Teck Sim, 11 May 2007.  
142 Author’s interview with Johnny Ang, 30 Jun 2007. 
143 Author’s interview with Lim Yew Kuan, 21 Nov 2006. 
  202marked contrast to the minimum loss of lives in most kampong fires, appeared to 
establish the case for a well-crafted plan, that ‘whenever there was resettlement, 
there was arson and no one got hurt’.
144 When three kampong fires broke out within 
the space of a week in 1956, one of which was attributed to arson, a Chinese 
newspaper called for a thorough police investigation into the cause of the fire so as 
to ‘allay suspicion and give peace to the public’.
145 Public allegations of arson 
indicated a genuine wariness of the government, borne out of feelings of uncertainty 
among people dwelling in unauthorised wooden houses at the edge of society, in a 
decade marked by social transition and transformation. 
 
Arson was consequently a major political issue; it was a powerful sign and 
symbol among urban kampong dwellers which appeared to signify why their 
wooden homes could be reduced to ashes overnight. Rural activists like Poh Soon 
Seng of the Singapore Country People’s Association, who lived in kampongs in the 
countryside, stated that ‘every time there was a fire, people would say it was the 
government or the landlord who did it’. He maintained that, while the ‘eyewitness 
accounts’ might not always be reliable, ‘logically speaking, a single fire could settle 
many problems’, ‘because attap houses were built so closely together, it would be 
very difficult, be it for the government or the landlord, to deal with them. They had 
been around for decades so you couldn’t easily evict them. To move these people, 
the compensation would also have been huge’. As Poh explained, ‘If the landlord 
wanted it done’, ‘he would pay a person to throw a torch onto the houses as the risk 
of getting caught was low. There were people willing to do this’.
146 The PAP left 
utilised arson as an issue to challenge the colonial establishment and mobilise 
kampong dwellers. According to Poh, the opposition encouraged the popular belief 
in arson to win votes and embarrass the regime in power.
147 C. C. Chin, who was 
involved in the SCPA and the Singapore Rural Residents’ Association, observed that 
fires in kampongs built on land belonging to private landowners were conveniently 
‘blamed on the government because they were considered as collaborators with the 
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government in carrying out development’. Both rural associations consequently 
issued statements condemning arson in cases of fire.
148  
 
The way in which low-income Chinese living in unauthorised wooden 
housing either accepted the fire hazard as part of daily life or attributed major blazes 
to acts of arson committed by private landowners or the government demonstrated 
the fundamentally social and political nature of the problem of kampong fires. The 
central difficulty in the end was not logistical, financial or technological; it was not 
about having more fire engines, hydrants, telephones, or even funds. The fire hazard 
underlined both the inability and unwillingness of the colonial establishment to 
ultimately assist the kampong dwellers to maintain their own way of life, by 
providing less combustible housing, accessible approach lanes and adequate fire 
breaks. As the Sin Chew Jit Poh explained after the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire, 
‘prevention in the time of safety is better than remedy after the disaster’.
149 The 
authorities had carried out a brief period of engagement at the grassroots level when 
the People’s Action Party controlled the City Council, culminating in the creation of 
the fire-fighting squads. But this pragmatic initiative, underpinned by a desire to win 
votes in view of the general elections in 1959, was politically expedient. As for the 
welfare of the kampong dwellers, upon coming to power, the PAP’s solution to the 
urban fire hazard turned out to be markedly similar to that of the colonial 
government’s. 
 
148 Author’s interview with C. C. Chin, 24 Nov 2006. 
149 SCJP, 20 Feb 1959. Chapter 5 
Fire Emergency 
 
Fire commanded a central place in the state’s emergency programme of 
clearance and resettlement of the urban kampongs in the 1950s. The urban kampong 
fires were not merely products of social and material developments but also a 
potentially powerful political force. This was the case for the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee 
inferno but also, to a lesser extent, the kampong blazes which preceded it. As 
seemingly ‘non-political’, ‘natural’ urban emergencies, the fires provided a 
substantive rationale and proof for the official discourse and policy of urban 
kampong clearance. The fires also constituted both an organisational challenge for 
the British colonial and Labour Front governments to provide relief for the fire 
victims and a pragmatic opportunity to expand its administrative reach into the semi-
autonomous areas, towards realising its vision of a modern Singapore. Fire could 
empower the authorities with a moral and social authority to redevelop the fire site if 
they were able to register the fire victims and shelter them temporarily in a clearly-
demarcated area before moving them more permanently into regulated housing.  
 
In this context, emergency public housing appeared closely in conjunction 
with the kampong blazes of postwar Singapore. Such housing was built below 
municipal by-law standards and differed from permanent housing in lacking a 
reinforced concrete frame.
1 They were consequently semi-permanent and could last 
only 40-50 years compared to 60-100 years for permanent housing and 20-25 years 
for wooden housing.
2 The emergency housing could be built quickly for fire victims 
and serve as an important platform by which a devastated settlement of unauthorised 
houses could be socially, economically and politically transformed. This chapter 
examines the impact of the six great postwar fires previously discussed on the 
provision of emergency relief and emergency housing for the fire victims. The 
responses of the British colonial and Labour Front administrations to these crises, 
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  205while not altogether successful, provide an important insight to the People’s Action 
Party government’s reaction to the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire, which should be 
understood as building upon previous colonial efforts. In his recent study of the 
great 1953 Shek Kip Mei fire in Hong Kong, widely accepted as giving birth to the 
colony’s public housing programme, Alan Smart analysed the British emergency 
housing programme in the aftermath of smaller fires both before and after Shek Kip 
Mei. Smart discovered that the British public housing policy in Hong Kong was ‘a 
learning process punctuated by a continuing series of crises’.
3 The application of a 
similar approach to the postwar fires of Singapore enables us to understand the 
historical role of the Bukit Ho Swee inferno in a parallel context. 
 
‘Not prepared to live far from their work’, Kampong Bugis, 1951 
 
The Kampong Bugis inferno of 1 August 1951 was followed by an organised 
relief effort for the estimated 3,000 fire victims, with the government and voluntary 
organisations working in tandem. The Social Welfare Department hailed the disaster 
as ‘the spark which ignited universal public interest in the provision of relief for the 
victims of fire and other disasters in Singapore’.
4  The Department had an 
established procedure for rendering assistance to persons made homeless by social 
emergencies such as fires, floods and the collapse of buildings.
5 In the event of a 
Major Civil Disaster, which included large kampong fires, the police would notify 
the SWD to promptly commence its emergency relief work.
6  
                                                
 
Chinese newspapers and organisations, such as the Malayan Chinese 
Association, Chinese Chambers of Commerce, Blue Cross, and the Buddhist 
Association, actively organised relief efforts for the fire victims under the SWD’s 
umbrella of coordination. On 13 August, leading charitable organisations met to 
establish a Singapore Joint Relief Organisation (SJRO) to provide for the immediate 
relief and resettlement of the fire victims, and to assist the victims of future disasters. 
 
3 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rulers in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p. 189. 
4 SWD, Annual Report 1951, p. 2. 
5 SWD, Annual Report 1946, p. 46. 
6 SWD 130/57, Radio Division Standing Order No 83: Social Welfare Department Assistance to 
Homeless and Distressed, 9 Feb 1954. 
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of Singapore’.
7 The Department explained that it was not trying to take over the 
relief work but, rather, to advise the public and ‘streamline the activities’.
8 The 
Department distributed relief payments of up to a maximum of $20 per family, a 
small amount compared to the $400 monthly salary of an average low-income 
household in the 1950s.
9 The SWD also offered temporary accommodation in 
Nantina Home and Bushey Park Home, homes for the destitute and the aged. But the 
fire victims found these institutions too far from their workplace and preferred to 
stay with their friends and relatives.
10 Most victims spent their first night after the 
fire out in the open on the five-foot-way.
11 
 
The Singapore Improvement Trust registered 317 fire victim families for 
temporary accommodation, out of which 63% had large families of five or more 
persons.
12 Eventually, only a score of families accepted the barrack-type SIT 
accommodation at the far end of the Malay Settlement at Jalan Eunos. The area was 
serviced by a bus route, but, as the SIT conceded, ‘some way out of town’ from 
Kampong Bugis. The fire victims were mostly Cantonese-speaking carpenters and 
mechanics from the sawmills and factories in the locality. They were either long-
established residents or had moved into the area when a tannery became defunct 
twenty years earlier.
13 Among the 317 families, only 24 earned more than $300 a 
month, while 241 families earned $200 or less, well below the $400-low-income 
poverty line drawn by Goh Keng Swee in his 1956 study.
14 It was estimated that 80 
out of the 127 families of five or more persons seeking SIT accommodation could 
afford a monthly rent of $25, 29 families could afford $30, and only 18 families 
could afford $50.
15 The SIT also realised that ‘Chinese of the labouring class are not 
                                                 
7 SS, 17 Aug 1951. George Webb, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, was appointed the SJRO’s 
Chairman. 
8 ST, 11 Aug 1951. 
9 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Estates Officer, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 4 Dec 1953; Goh Keng 
Swee, Urban Incomes and Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-54 (Singapore: 
Department of Social Welfare, 1956). 
10 SWD, Annual Report 1951, p. 28. The Bushey Park Home offered communal, barrack-type 
accommodation while the Nantina Home, a former hotel, provided greater privacy of living. 
11 ST, 3 Aug 1951. 
12 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Estates Officer, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 4 Dec 1953. 
13 SS, 2 Aug 1951. 
14 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Estates Officer, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 4 Dec 1953; Goh, Urban 
Incomes and Housing. 
15 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Estates Officer, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 4 Dec 1953. 
  207prepared to live far from their work’,
16 and that at least 20% of the fire victims 
would reject its accommodation, mainly because the rents were too high.
17 
 
The authorities struggled to find suitable permanent accommodation for the 
fire victims. Municipal Commissioners A. P. Rajah of the Progressive Party (South 
ward) and Syed Mohamed bin Abdul Hameed Chisty of the Labour Party (Rochor) 
emphasised the need to prevent the fire victims from rebuilding on the fire site and 
called upon the government to provide land for them to build houses with proper 
drainage and water facilities.
18 Less than two weeks after the fire, however, George 
Webb, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, had already observed ‘huts and shacks’ being 
built on the site.
19 At the end of August, Webb, as Chairman of the SJRO, 
announced that the relief fund would be held in reserve for rehousing fire victims.
20 
George Pepler, the Town Planning Adviser, also proposed that the building work be 
carefully directed.
21 He had earlier in the year recommended the building of 
emergency housing in the City for rehousing ‘squatters’. But his suggestion had 
been rejected by the SIT after a lengthy discussion as ‘uneconomical’ and ‘not 
desirable’, with the Trust only prepared to erect such housing in rural areas.
22 When 
an earlier blaze had devastated some wooden houses off Lavender Street in May 
1951, the SIT, when asked to rehouse the fire victims, decided, ‘The Trust cannot 
concern itself with emergency housing but it will endeavour to provide permanent 
housing, to be allocated in accordance with the Points System’.
23 
 
Consequently, it was the local community-based organisations, not the 
government, which undertook to rehouse the fire victims. On 5 August, the MCA, 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Buddhist Association, having agreed to use 
the relief fund to build barrack-type housing for the fire victims, asked the 
                                                 
16  SIT 808/50, Memo titled ‘Resettlement’ by Commissioner of Lands and Acting Secretary for 
Social Welfare, 16 Jul 1952. 
17 SIT 1231/53, Minutes of Board Meeting, 9 Dec 1953. 
18 ST, 3 Aug 1951. 
19 ST, 11 Aug 1951. 
20 ST, 30 Aug 1951. 
21 ST, 2 Aug 1951. 
22 SIT 952/50, Notes of Meeting of Chairman, SIT, Commissioner of Lands, Manager, SIT, and 
George Pepler on 9 Jan 1951. 
23 HB 795/51, Memo from Assistant Estates Officer, SIT, to Secretary, SWD, 20 Jul 1951. 
  208government for land for that purpose.
24 Three days later, the Attap Dwellings 
Special Committee also recommended that the government consider proposals to 
build streets, drains and services at the site, where the MCA would erect houses for 
the fire victims. But on 14 August, the Municipal Commission decided to defer 
further consideration of the proposal.
25 Instead, MCA and Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce representatives, and, several Municipal Commissioners visited thirty 
acres of Crown land off Kolam Ayer Lane, northeast of the fire site, as a possible 
housing site.
26 On 16 August, the SJRO announced that it would build 300 3-room 
houses at Kolam Ayer. Each dwelling, similar to artisans’ quarters and costing 
$3,000, could house a family of 6-8 persons.
27 
 
By the end of 1953, the SJRO had only completed 96 terrace houses – a mere 
third of its initial pledge. Although the $10 monthly rent was heavily subsidised by 
the relief fund, the houses lacked proper sanitation – testimony to the lack of 
adequate work by the City Council – and were not in demand. On 3 November, a 
five-man delegation claiming to represent the fire victims asked the SJRO, since the 
vacant houses could not accommodate all the families, to sell them and distribute the 
proceeds to the fire victims.
28 Given the substantial time lapse that had occurred 
since the fire, most victims had found new homes on their own. The SIT estimated 
that, by December 1953, ‘less than 50%’ of the fire victims had re-established 
themselves at Kampong Bugis,
29 with the rest having moved elsewhere.
30 This 
failure to swiftly rehouse fire victims, which also recurred in subsequent kampong 
fires, only increased the drift of low-income Chinese families into the urban 
kampongs and worsened the fire hazard. The Trust was to soon realise that fire 
victims frequently refused its accommodation due to high rents or other personal 
reasons.
31 The Fire Superintendent’s list of urban kampongs by fire risk in 1954 (see 
previous chapter) cites a rebuilt Kampong Bugis at No. 13. The failure to adequately 
                                                 
24 SS, 5 Aug 1951. 
25 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1951, 14 Aug 1951, pp. 14-15. The Public Works Committee agreed 
to the Special Attap Dwellings Committee’s recommendation, but the Public Utilities Committee had 
not made its decision by that day. 
26 SS, 10 Aug 1951. 
27 ST, 16 Aug 1951; SS, 17 Aug 1951. 
28 ST, 5 Nov 1953; ST, 6 Nov 1953. 
29 SIT 1231/53, Minutes of Board Meeting, 9 Dec 1953. 
30 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Chairman, SIT, to the Colonial Secretary, 17 Dec 1953. 
31 CC, Minutes of Proceedings 1958, 20 May 1958, p. 424. 
  209rehouse the Kampong Bugis fire victims in light of the scale of the disaster was 
stunning. 
 
‘14-day wonder’, Geylang Lorong 3, 1953 
 
In marked contrast to the Kampong Bugis fire, the authorities acted far more 
decisively to rehouse the 2,385 victims of the Lorong 3 fire on 16 July 1953. Some 
1,000 fire victims were temporarily placed in an empty Lee Rubber godown nearby. 
The SWD’s Public Assistance Section registered the fire victims and distributed 
relief payments to them on behalf of the SJRO. Four days later, the SJRO also 
handed out from public donations $20 to each fire victim. The amount was 
significantly larger than in the case of the Kampong Bugis fire; consequently, it was 
stated in the press that large families obtained more relief than the savings they had 
lost in the fire.
32 Governor John Nicoll, upon visiting the fire site, told T. P. F. 
McNeice, President of the City Council, ‘Now that this land is cleared, we must 
build proper houses on it at once’.
33 The day after the fire, the SIT’s heads of 
departments held an emergency meeting to formulate a rehousing plan.
34 The 
Manager of the Trust, J. M. Fraser, stated that the fire site must be acquired and 
cleared immediately to prevent the victims from rebuilding on it.
35 Top Trust 
officials privately felt that the fire was a blessing in disguise and intimated ‘it is 
fortunate that the occurrence of the fire at Lorong 3 resulted in the decrease in the 
area of so-called self-help building as otherwise we would have a bigger problem 
than does in fact exist’.
36  
 
There was little alternative housing available for the Geylang victims, 
although 33 families moved into Norfolk Estate, south of Toa Payoh, at the end of 
August. The SIT consequently issued permits to six families to reconstruct wooden 
houses on the fire site in July and August. While the Trust tried to keep ‘squatters’ 
                                                 
32 ST, 20 Jul 1953. 
33 ST, 17 Jul 1953. 
34 HB 600/53, Report on Action Taken in Conjunction with Rehousing Victims of the Lorong 3 Fire, 
31 Jul 1953. 
35 SIT 601/53, Memo titled ‘Kallang Basin Fire Relief Scheme’ by Manager, SIT, 17 Jul 1953. 
36 HB 808/1/50, Memo from Acting Deputy Lands Manager, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 20 Oct 1953. 
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off the site, this became increasingly difficult.
37 At the end of November, by which 
time its low-cost houses for the fire victims, discussed below, had been completed, 
the SIT decided to demolish the wooden houses.
38 In October, the Lorong 3 fire site 
was gazetted for 190 units of 2-storey low-rental housing, the first time in the 1950s 
when a fire site was acquired for the construction of public housing.
39 
 
Prior to the Lorong 3 fire, however, the SIT had continued to resist pressure 
to build temporary housing, particularly 1-room emergency housing, in the City. In 
1953, it reiterated ‘the policy of the Trust to build good substantial buildings which 
could be amortised over sixty years’. ‘[T]he short term palliative’, the Trust 
emphasised, ‘is neither economical nor an answer to a long-term problem’.
40 
Building costs, however, mitigated against the effective implementation of this 
policy. The SIT was unable to build permanent housing in the City at monthly 
rentals under $40, which, it realised, were far too expensive for low-income families 
earning less than $200 a month. The solution, the Trust proposed in June 1953, was 
to construct semi-permanent, low-rental housing at $20 rentals just outside City 
limits.
41 Immediately prior to the Lorong 3 fire, the SIT had erected 25 prototype 
low-cost terrace houses at the Upper Aljunied resettlement area (also known as 
‘Aljunied Road North’, two miles from Lorong 3).
42 The housing was similar in 
design to the Trust’s artisan quarters, built with concrete, wood and corrugated 
asbestos and had a life span of twenty years.
43 
 
The scale of this low-cost programme grew following the Lorong 3 fire. 
From 22 July, the SIT registered a total of 218 fire victim families for rehousing. 
Using the Upper Aljunied prototype,
44 and money from the Squatter Resettlement 
 
37 HB 650/53, Memo from Chairman, SIT, to the Colonial Secretary, 15 Oct 1953. 
38 HB 600/53, Memo from Acting Deputy Lands Manager, SIT, to Estates Officer, SIT, 30 Nov 1953. 
39 HB 477/53, Revised Building Programme No. 7, 15 Feb 1954. 
40 SIT, Annual Report 1953, p. 9. 
41 HB 477/53, Minutes of Board Meeting, 17 Jun 1953. 
42 SIT 808/2/50, Memo from 2
nd Assistant Secretary, SIT, to Secretary, SIT, 25 Jul 1953; and Minutes 
of Trust Meeting, 17 Jun 1953. 
43 HB 808/1/50, Memo from Acting Deputy Lands Manager, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 21 Jul 
1953. 
44 HB 600/53, Memo from Chief Architect, SIT, to Manager, SIT, 31 Jul 1953.  
Plate 5.1: Prototype emergency housing at Kolam Ayer. Source: SIT, Annual Report 1953. 
 
fund,
45 the Trust began building more than 300 units of single-storey, semi-
permanent, low-cost housing, each costing $2,000, comprising 190 2-room units at 
$22 per month rental at Upper Aljunied Road resettlement area and 136 3-room 
units at $26 rental on Crown land at Kolam Ayer Lane, formerly a swamp which had 
been land filled by the City Council and was used as a dumping ground.
46 The 
Upper Aljunied contract, which began on 28 July, was targeted for completion 
within 2½ months, with a minimum of 50 houses to be constructed by the end of 
August and at least another 50 before the end of September.
47 Earthworks visible at 
the site, which began at the end of August, was hailed by the press, counting back 
from the day of the fire, as a ‘14-day wonder’.
48 Despite initial complaints that the 
contract was badly organised, the standard of workmanship ‘hopeless’ and the 
quality of materials used poor,
49 the work improved markedly by October.
50 At 
Kolam Ayer, the SIT commenced building even though the consolidation and 
settlement of the filled land was not yet complete, because ‘the whole essence of the 
scheme was speed’.
51 Both building contracts were completed within three months. 
Small families were allowed to share a house, with the minimum number of persons 
                                                 
45 SIT 601/53, Memo by Chairman, SIT, to the Colonial Secretary, 21 Jul 1953. 
46 SIT 638/53, Memo from Architect, SIT, to Chief Architect, SIT, 1 Apr 1957. 
47  HB 477/53, Memo on Financial Provisions for Squatter Resettlement and Low Rent Housing 
Scheme, undated, c. 1953. 
48 SS, 30 July 1953. 
49 HB 600/53, Memo from Assistant Architect, SIT, to Chief Architect, SIT, 26 Aug 1953. 
50 HB 600/53, Report on Progress of Relief Housing Scheme by the Assistant Architect, SIT, 1 Oct 
1953. 
51 SIT 638/53, Memo from Architect, SIT, to Chief Architect, SIT, 1 Apr 1957. 
  212for each unit stipulated at five.
52 In late August, just five weeks after the fire, the 
Lorong 3 fire victims began moving into the first 50 houses completed. For one of 
them, Chong Chai Koi, a textile shop assistant with a wife and two children who had 
lost everything in the fire, the $22 rental was high. But relief payments from the 
SJRO and help from relatives and friends enabled him to buy $600’s worth of new 
possessions.
53 Chong happily proclaimed, ‘I now think that the fire was a blessing, 
for I never dreamed of living in such a modern house’.
54 
  
The SIT’s decision to build the emergency housing was a significant measure, 
no longer confining low-rental housing to rural areas but also permitting such 
accommodation in ‘suitable areas’ in the City.
55  The houses were the first 
constructed by the government for victims of a major fire and were manifestly of a 
emergency design.
56 Subsequently, the SIT built more semi-permanent housing at 
low monthly rentals ($20-25) which could last 40 years for working class families at 
Upper Aljunied Road as a supplement to its main housing programme.
57 The Trust 
was sensitive to the fact that it had crossed an architectural and social boundary, 
taking care to defend the low-cost housing as ‘in no way temporary’, being built 
from precast concrete hollow blocks.
58 
 
‘Units of this type should in future be built only in rural areas’, Aljunied Road, 1953 
 
Following the Aljunied Road blaze on 24 October 1953, the SWD 
temporarily sheltered about 600 of the 1,000-odd fire victims at the nearby 
Singapore Badminton Hall. Rehousing was far easier in this case, given the 
measures already taken for the Lorong 3 fire. At the end of the month, some families 
moved into the emergency housing at Upper Aljunied and Kolam Ayer estates, 
joining the victims of the earlier fire, with a handful accepting the more expensive 
housing at Norfolk Estate. By November, the SIT had rehoused 135 Chinese 
                                                 
52 HB 600/53, Minutes of Estates Committee Meeting, 26 Aug 1953. 
53 SS, 26 Aug 1953. 
54 ST, 26 Aug 1953. 
55 HB 477/53, Memo from Manager, SIT, to Chairman, SIT, 4 Aug 1955. 
56 SIT, Annual Report 1954, p. 16. 
57 SIT, Annual Report 1953, pp. 9, 44. 
58 SIT, Annual Report 1954, p. 16. 
  213families, while Malay families were taken care of by the Malay and Arab Unions 
and Indian families by the Malayan Indian Congress. A rapid response characterised 
the rehousing programme in both Geylang fires. The Trust reported that, in swiftly 
rehousing the fire victims, ‘the risks taken were merited by the problems confronted 
and that they were greatly outweighed by the success of the operation and the great 
amount of public good that was done’.
59 In the aftermath of the fire, the Aljunied 
Road site, like the Lorong 3 site previously, was gazetted in December 1953 as part 
of the Aljunied Road South low-cost housing project.
60 United States Vice-President 
Richard Nixon, who had just arrived in Singapore on an official visit, went to the 
fire site on the day of the fire and predicted, ‘There is only one consolation – in this 
very place another SIT housing estate will rise’.
61 
 
The two Geylang Lorong fires forced the SIT to reassess its role in rehousing 
fire victims. Initially, even after the Lorong 3 fire, the Trust had been reticent, if not 
uncertain of this responsibility. In September, when the SIT was asked to take over 
the management of the 96 SJRO houses at Kolam Ayer Lane built for the victims of 
the Kampong Bugis fire, J. M. Fraser replied, 
 
If Government is to undertake responsibility for the Kampong Bugis 
fire victims as it has done in the case of the Geylang fire victims, then 
I think it would have to undertake responsibility for all victims of 
future fires. I do not know if Government is prepared to do this. I 
certainly do not think that the Singapore Improvement Trust can 
undertake such a responsibility, and any work that the Trust 
undertook in this connection would clearly have to be as Agents of 
Government and at Government’s expense. 
 
Government, through the Commissioner of Lands, would require to 
find suitable sites and the Trust would then take over the building and 
the managements of the houses under similar arrangements as are 
now being worked out for the Geylang fire victims. This would only 
                                                 
59 SIT 1201/53, Memo from Estates Officer, SIT, to Estates Manager, SIT, 19 Nov 1953. 
60 SIT 1076/53, Minutes of Board Meeting, 9 Dec 1953. 
61 SS, 25 Oct 1953. 
  214be possible if the Trust had full control and if the SJRO were 
prepared to hand over complete control of the project, including 
building, allocation and management, to the SIT.
62 
 
In December, however, following the Aljunied Road fire, T. P. F. McNeice, 
Chairman of the SIT, stated that fire victims in future could register for rehousing 
and would receive hardship points in their application for Trust housing.
63 When the 
Secretary of Chinese Affairs asked the SIT to purchase the 96 unwanted SJRO 
houses and distribute the proceeds to the Kampong Bugis fire victims, McNeice 
went a step further, recommending the SIT take over from the SJRO the 
responsibility of rehousing the Kampong Bugis fire victims. He preferred the Trust 
build 250 low-cost houses on Crown land at Guillemard Road in Geylang, which 
would cost $100,000 more than buying the SJRO houses. However, McNeice would 
conceivably persuade the SJRO to surrender the houses to the government:   
 
It is now 2½ years since the fire occurred and most of the families 
have established themselves elsewhere. A large number of them have 
returned to their old sites at Kampong Bugis where they have erected 
huts which are considered to be a serious fire risk. It is felt, therefore, 
that although the immediate necessity for rehousing the victims of 
this fire no longer exists, they remain as a housing liability which 
would not in any way be discharged by the distribution at this time of 
cash payments. The extent of this liability is estimated at 250 houses, 
having regard to the fact that some of the victims are successfully 
resettled elsewhere while some consist of small families who could 
be accommodated at the rate of two per house.
64 
 
This proposal caused friction between the SJRO and the government and 
undermined the SJRO’s role in rehousing victims of subsequent fires.
65 In 1954, 
when questioning why the government had not bought the SJRO houses, an editorial 
                                                 
62 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Manager, SIT, to Chairman, SIT, 29 Sep 1953. 
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  215in the Nanyang Siang Pau demanded, ‘[W]hy does the Government not render 
assistance when the SJRO is experiencing difficulties at the crossroads?’ The paper 
went on to bluntly accuse the government of being ‘indifferent’ towards the plight of 
the fire victims and that taking over the SJRO houses, which had been built with 
relief donations, amounted to ‘confiscating donations from the public-spirited people 
and the property of the fire victims’.
66  
 
But the authorities continued to waver over a broad policy for rehousing fire 
victims. Finances were a critical stumbling block. After the Aljunied Road fire, the 
SIT wanted the government to acquire the Kampong Bugis fire site and develop it 
into an industrial area, since ‘the opportunity occurs now to clean up the greater part 
of the area before it becomes thickly covered with attap buildings’.
67  The 
Commissioner of Lands, however, disagreed, explaining that land, valued at $2 per 
square feet, was too expensive for low-cost housing.
68  The SIT was also 
discouraged by the lack of enthusiasm for the emergency housing, even among 
homeless fire victims. Following the successful completion of the Upper Aljunied 
and Kolam Ayer estates, the Trust assumed that it would be asked to expand the 
emergency housing programme.
69 However, of the more than 882 families affected 
by the two Geylang fires, only 415 families accepted the emergency housing and 
SIT accommodation elsewhere.
70 This was largely because most of the Lorong 3 fire 
victims worked in Lee Rubber’s factories nearby, who naturally wanted to return to 
homes close to their workplace.
71  
 
In their reluctance to fully embrace emergency housing, the Trust’s European 
officials were not only concerned with the possible costs entailed but also the 
problem of regulation and the impact this might have on their international 
reputations.
72 As Lee Kuan Yew stated in the Legislative Assembly in 1958, ‘their 
predominant intention was to make sure that what they built did not subsequently 
                                                 
66 NYSP, 26 Mar 1954. 
67 SIT 1231/53, Minutes of Board Meeting, 9 Dec 1953. 
68 SIT 1231/53, Memo from Acting Commissioner of Lands to Chairman, SIT, 5 Feb 1954. 
69 SIT 1001/52 Vol. I, Preliminary Report of the Architectural Department, 1953. 
70 SIT, Annual Report 1953, p. 54. 
71 SIT 601/53, Memorandum by Manager, SIT, 17 July 1953. 
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  216degenerate into slums’.
73 For 1-room housing, maintenance costs were high;
74 at 
Kolam Ayer, for example, ‘floors, aprons and walls [would] crack and sink, partly 
causing roof leaks’.
75 The Upper Aljunied residents, the SIT discovered, soon had 
transformed the estate into a site of unauthorised activities, constructing unapproved 
structures like kitchens and dinner areas, using the premises for small-scale business, 
like preparing hawker food and storing charcoal and firewood, and rearing poultry in 
the open spaces.
76 In 1954, SIT planners S. C. Woolmer and D. H. Komlosy 
deplored the 1- and 2-storey low-rental Trust housing as ‘highly undesirable’ and ‘at 
best only a palliative which could in the end become a heavy liability, both 
financially and on health and social grounds’. ‘Their appearance’, it was added, 
‘leaves much to be desired, and unless strict control is maintained they will 
degenerate into slums’.
77 Disappointed by these negative results, the SIT proposed 
in 1955 that emergency housing be limited to the rural areas.
78 The low-cost 
programme, however, was not completely abolished. The Trust, faced with 
escalating building costs and shortage of skilled labour in the mid-1950s, continued 
to ‘experiment’ with inexpensive housing.
79 In 1956, it began to build 2- and 3-room 
units with communal kitchens for the urban redevelopment programme in the 
Central Area, where the families were reportedly smaller. 
 
‘Permitted to rebuild accommodation themselves within the fire area’, Kampong 
Tiong Bahru, 1955 
 
The SWD registered the victims of the Kampong Tiong Bahru fire of 30 
September 1955 at nearby Chong Teck Primary School and collaborated in the relief 
work with other government departments and voluntary organisations like the Blue 
Cross, Salvation Army, British Red Cross, and St. John’s Ambulance.
80  Of 
particular note was the raising of more than $10,000 by the kampong dwellers of 
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74 HB 74/59, Memo from Maintenance Officer, SIT, to Chief Architect, SIT, 4 Jul 1959. 
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  217Tiong Bahru, Silat and Henderson.
81 Each of the 792 fire victims eventually 
received $100, a five-fold increase over the relief payment received by the victims 
of the Lorong 3 fire. The SWD had attempted to establish a single Public Calamity 
Fund for victims of civil disasters, with representatives from the Singapore, Chinese 
and Indian Chambers of Commerce, British Red Cross, St. John’s Ambulance, 
Salvation Army, the SJRO, and the press, to expedite the disbursement of relief 
assistance.
82 However, the representatives decided in their meeting on 3 October not 
to establish an overarching common fund but rather a localised Kampong Tiong 
Bahru Fire Relief Fund.
83. The SWD was disappointed, since, ostensibly, victims of 
smaller fires would now receive much less relief, perhaps as little as $5 per person.
84 
The Department initially sheltered 93 fire victims at the Kallang Airport Terminal 
Building located on the eastern side of the City.
85  The Aerodrome was a 
considerable distance from Kampong Tiong Bahru and underlined the real difficulty 
of rehousing fire victims southwest of the Singapore River. Despite this problem, the 
number of families at the terminal building rose to 280, among whom were 
numerous children, while a third of the adults were unemployed. But by late October, 
the number had fallen to 52 families (105 adults and 119 children), and Ko Teck Kin, 
Chairman of the relief fund, asked the government to rehouse the fire victims.
86  
 
The government, despite its previous experience with emergency housing in 
the Geylang fires, failed to do so. The SIT and the Ministry of Local Government, 
Lands and Housing had previously agreed that semi-permanent housing could be 
built in the rural areas at monthly rentals not exceeding $20.
87 The SIT estimated 
that 115 out of the 181 Tiong Bahru fire victim families required about 90 units of 
low-rental Trust accommodation in the vicinity.
88 However, there was insufficient 
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  218SIT housing to meet this level of demand within the next few years.
89 In November 
1955, some of the homeless fire victims, through the Blue Cross, asked the Trust to 
permit two families to share a house, which would reduce the monthly rental to an 
affordable $25 or $30.
90  The SIT agreed to consider such applications for 
Queenstown New Town, where the rental was $50, but cautioned that such 
accommodation was not likely to become available soon.
91 Earlier, on 3 November, 
the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing had decided that the fire 
victims ‘be permitted to rebuild accommodation themselves within the fire area’ and 
had asked the Relief Fund Committee to ‘give them every possible assistance in this 
matter’.
92 The SIT later stated that it had, since the war, attempted to build ‘housing 
of good and permanent quality’, and in reference to 1-room dwellings, ‘none would 
suggest that it is desirable for a family of six or seven to live in less than two 
rooms’.
93  
 
The government’s financially conservative, hands-off policy aroused much 
displeasure within the Chinese community. In 1956, when three kampong fires 
occurred, the Nanyang Siang Pau strongly urged the SIT to build more low-cost 
housing for the fire victims.
94 But SIT planners maintained an ambivalent attitude at 
best towards low-cost housing, which at different times reflected distrust, inertia and 
a confused assessment of the costs of the actual housing. In 1956, the Trust stated 
that building standards should be reduced no further and that in some cases had to be 
raised as maintenance costs had been found to increase for its low-rental housing.
95 
In mid-1957, however, the authorities held that while 1-room flats should not be part 
of the SIT’s general housing policy, they could be built at Old Kallang Airport, 
Tiong Bahru cemetery and Covent Garden to accommodate families affected by 
clearance policies; families who could not afford rentals for permanent housing and 
who were unable to afford more than $20 monthly rentals.
96 In addition, the SIT felt 
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  219that 5-storey blocks of 1-room flats, without lifts installed, could be constructed 
quickly and would be economical at a cost of $2,950 per flat. While it recognised the 
potential dangers of overcrowding and slum conditions, the Trust believed 1-room 
flats to be more suitable for families of not more than six members in the Central 
Area,
97  as opposed to suburban areas, where schools could also be more 
economically built for the children of larger families.
98 
 
‘Happy to return to their former neighbourhood’, Kampong Koo Chye, 1958 
 
Following the Kampong Koo Chye fire of 5 April 1958, the SWD housed 
about 1,500 out of the 2,050 fire victims who could not find accommodation with 
relatives or friends at the Geylang English School for three weeks.
99  The 
government contributed to the relief fund for the fire victims on a dollar for dollar 
basis, and Mayor Ong Eng Guan announced a donation of $100,000 from the 
Municipal Fund. The British Red Cross, St. John’s Ambulance and other voluntary 
associations looked after the fire victims at the relief centre, while the City Council’s 
nurses cared for the children.
100 The SWD and public organisations such as the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, SJRO, Nanyang Siang Pau, Singapore Buddhist 
Association, and the Rubber Packers Association raised more than $160,000 and 
paid out $82 to each fire victim. Trishaw-riders contributed their day’s earnings to 
the fund, while the Singapore Attap Dwellers’ Association donated milk, green peas 
and money.
101  
 
The Koo Chye inferno was important because it was the first major fire to be 
politicised. Despite pledges of unity in the relief work from the political parties, the 
right to administer relief on behalf of the fire victims was deeply contested. On 8 
April 1958, the SWD instituted a ban on the presence of political parties at the relief 
centre. W. S. Woon, its Director, who had observed political party workers 
distributing gifts to fire victims, declared, ‘We do not want to allow a tragedy to be 
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  220exploited for political propaganda purposes’. He elaborated how the ‘PAP had sent 
hundreds of young supporters to markets and stalls to collect vegetables and meat. 
By noon, they had gathered lorry loads of vegetables and meat – enough to meet the 
victims’ requirements for weeks’, although there was no fridge at the relief centre. 
The Workers’ Party, he said, had also established collection centres at the fire site, 
decorated with party symbols and banners, while the Labour Front had turned its 
headquarters at De Souza Street into a fire relief collection centre.
102 Meanwhile, in 
the PAP-controlled City Council, Mayor Ong Eng Guan voiced the authority of his 
office and party, lecturing the fire victims at the relief centre to ‘clean up the 
shambles’, since ‘[y]our place is filthy. Today 19 babies were sick because of 
insanitation. The people of Singapore have helped you. Now you must show them 
that you are willing to help yourselves’. The fire victims obeyed the popular 
Mayor.
103 
 
The politicisation of the relief operation stemmed from the shift in the 
political climate. Singapore had taken a step towards self-government in 1955, when 
the Labour Front had been elected as a minority government under the Rendel 
Constitution, albeit on limited suffrage, with partial control over the island’s 
domestic affairs, including housing. The more radical PAP, though numerically a 
small opposition in the Legislative Assembly, held sway in the City Council 
following the 1957 elections. Within a year of the Koo Chye fire, in May 1959, the 
political parties would contest the general elections in the hope of presiding over a 
self-governing state. It was in such a context of significantly raised political stakes 
that the relief and rehousing operations for the Koo Chye fire, and the subsequent 
inferno in Kampong Tiong Bahru, were formulated and subsequently contested. 
 
The SWD also found itself embroiled in public controversy. On 21 April, W. 
S. Woon announced in a press statement that the relief centre would be closed to 
enable the school to commence term on 5 May. He assured the public that the 
Department had convinced the fire victims that they would not be forgotten once 
they left the relief centre.
104 On the same day, the Sin Chew Jit Poh had carried the 
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  221headline, ‘The Social Welfare Department told the fire victims to leave the 
temporary relief centre’.
105 The SWD’s relations with the Chinese press and the fire 
victims quickly degenerated. Woon alleged that some fire victims were enjoying 
themselves, passing the time of day drinking beer and stout. He also released the 
names of imposters, who were relatives of the fire victims and had collected relief 
payments, to the police.
106 
 
There was considerable drama at the relief centre on the final day. The pro-
establishment Straits Times, carrying the header ‘High-living agitators fan stay-put 
revolt’, reported that ‘a group of Kampong Koo Chye bachelors who lived in style at 
the expense of the Singapore Government at the Geylang Methodist English School, 
turned “agitators” yesterday’. It claimed that while 99% of the families at the centre 
agreed to move out, the remaining 17 families refused to leave. SWD officials, who 
had organised the move, stated that the recalcitrant families had been encouraged by 
the bachelors having ‘a fine time living at the school’. The families held out at the 
centre for about two hours, repeatedly rejecting offers of new housing at Kallang 
and Queenstown. They finally left at 8 pm, realising that they had no other choice 
but to accept the Department’s offer.
107 On the following day, W. S. Woon claimed 
that the relief centre had been ‘the best run so far’.
108 The government formally 
closed the centre at the end of the month and provided temporary accommodation 
for 244 families (1,432 persons) in newly-completed SIT flats at Kallang Estate and 
Queenstown New Town without initial payment of rent ($40 monthly) and other 
charges, with only four families registered for Trust housing rejecting the offer.
109 
The authorities also implemented a new Rent Subsidy Scheme to assist fire victim 
families unable to pay the full rentals.
110 According to the Singapore Free Press, the 
rehoused families were ‘happy in [the] new SIT homes’.
111 
 
Differences of opinion on the separate question of permanently housing fire 
victims came sharply to the fore, testament to the growing importance of urban 
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  222kampong fires in national politics. Some, such as Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock in 
his radio broadcast of 6 April 1958, felt that the fire provided a singular opportunity 
to remake Singapore: 
 
In these congested areas of wooden houses which are a symbol of the 
old Singapore, which we are striving to replace, fire, although 
accidentally begun, spreads quickly and destructively, and creates 
havoc before it can be brought under control….And this will give us 
all a new urgency in facing our problem of building houses in areas 
which are less vulnerable to fire, and meanwhile we will study what 
measures can be taken to reduce fire risks in the present areas of 
congested wooden houses.
112 
 
The Chief Fire Officer, J. Angus, concurred, ‘This fire again illustrates what we 
must expect in congested, attap-roofed and wooden-built kampongs like Koo 
Chye’.
113  The Straits Times, too, argued for the densest kampongs to be 
progressively cleared and underlined the need to brush aside ‘opposition from 
squatters and from politicians out for cheap popularity’.
114 Mak Pak Shee, SADA 
President and Assemblymen for Geylang, who had defended wooden housing 
following the 1953 Aljunied Road fire, now admitted that they were ‘veritable death 
traps’ and called upon the government to build properly zoned ‘quarter-brick’ 
housing with asbestos or zinc roofs for kampong dwellers.
115 
 
Other sections of society, however, held rather different views and still 
believed that the kampongs could be maintained. The fire spurred kampong dwellers 
in the Geylang Lorongs to establish fire-fighting squads; in January 1960, kampong 
dwellers at Lorong 23 established a squad, followed by a 45-man squad formed in 
November in a settlement of 30,000 at Lorong 33. With contributions from the 
residents, a small fire station was also built in Lorong 33, with the government 
supplying the fire-fighting equipment.
116 Soon Eng Boh, the community leader who 
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  223was consulted on the matter, felt that by simply sacrificing some time and money to 
buy basic equipment, the fire-fighting squad was a well-organised form of protection 
for one’s houses and property.
117 On 14 April, the Singapore Standard, owned by 
the Chinese tycoon Aw Boon Haw, warned of ‘attap death traps’ and worse 
tragedies than Kampong Koo Chye. But the article concluded that the solution lay in 
making the urban kampongs safe from fire rather than removing them altogether 
from the cityscape: 
 
The answer is to redevelop attap areas. The way was shown by the 
Singapore Government about 5 years ago when it launched its 
resettlement project in Upper Aljunied Road…..Government carved 
up the land into housing plots, laid in light, water and sanitary 
services and then invited the attap dwellers to build whatever type of 
attap housing they could afford. In this way, houses were well spaced 
out, the area kept sanitary and the people generally were more 
comfortable and happier. 
 
This plan may be emulated elsewhere, though with some 
modifications. It may entail the shifting of a few houses in each 
kampong to make way for proper roads and drains and to keep the 
homes a safe distance from each other. It will cost a lot of money but 
if the project is spread over several years the annual cost should not 
be too burdensome to the taxpayer.
118 
 
The official view, however, emerged victorious. The greatest significance of 
the fire was that part of the donations raised were used to finance the Kampong Koo 
Chye Fire Housing Scheme, a project which the SWD hailed as ‘the first of its type’ 
for fire victims.
119 The project was organised by the government, which also 
provided special interest-free loans to the SIT.
120 Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, 
after visiting the fire site, had promised that the government would give the fire 
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  224victims priority in obtaining Trust flats.
121 Lim and Ong Eng Guan, after conferring, 
proposed the formation of a Committee of Trustees for the Kampong Koo Chye Fire 
Fund to help the SWD distribute relief for the fire victims, and if low-cost houses 
were to be built for them, decide how the houses would be allocated.
122 Plans for 
building of emergency housing for the fire victims were drawn up within a few days 
of the fire.
123 On 17 April, the City Council Architect submitted the preliminary 
plans to the government, while on the same day, approval was sought from the 
Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing for the SIT to construct the 
houses and for the Commissioner of Lands to acquire the fire site.
124 In a landmark 
decision, the Trust, acting on behalf of the government, purchased seven acres of the 
fire site under the Land Acquisition Ordinance from owners Lee Kong Chian and 
Lee Yoke Sang.  
 
While the establishment had decided in favour of building emergency 
housing on the fire site, it was unsure about the height of the dwellings. The original 
plan envisaged single-storey emergency housing, similar to that built at Kolam Ayer 
after the 1953 fires. The authorities were aware that such housing would be the 
quickest to build but would not provide sufficient units for all the fire victims, while 
the communal facilities could potentially cause friction among the residents; multi-
storey housing, on the other hand, would be cheaper but would take longer to 
complete and would be less popular.
125 The SIT stated that single-storey housing 
had ‘more or less been abandoned’ because it did not provide adequate 
accommodation.
126 On 16 April, the Building Committee asked the SIT to draw up 
plans for ‘as many two-storey units as possible on the site with statutory access’.
127  
 
The houses were also to be sold to the fire victims. Initially, the SIT had been 
hesitant to do this since rapid reconstruction was of the greatest essence: 
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  225[I]f, as was understood, it was the intention to build substandard or 
emergency type housing, then these should be rented in order that 
proper maintenance and management could be carried out. If it was 
intended that the houses should ultimately be sold, then the layout 
should from the beginning provide for proper legal access, plot size 
etc. in accordance with planning requirements. This would greatly 
reduce the number of units which the site could accommodate.
128 
 
Moreover, not all the fire victims were willing or able to buy the SIT houses. It was 
originally noted that close to 1,000 persons would not want to purchase the new 
houses but would prefer cash relief.
129 The building scheme did not take off until the 
government realised that press reports had been ‘misleading’ the fire victims over 
the terms of the rehousing, and that it had first to provide a clear idea of the 
rebuilding programme before the victims could decide on returning to Kampong 
Koo Chye.
130  
 
These questions on the terms of the rehousing slowed the project. On 18 
March 1959, after a long delay, the Legislative Assembly instructed the SIT to 
construct 192 2-storey, 3-room terrace houses and 28 shops for sale to the fire 
victims.
131 Each house had a living room and kitchen on the ground floor and two 
bedrooms on the first floor, similar to the nearby SIT flats at Lorong 3. There was 
some concern expressed over the housing design; Lim Koon Teck, Progressive Party 
Assemblyman for Paya Lebar, claimed that some families preferred a two-storey 
house accommodating two families, each occupying one level.
132 The actual living 
space in the house, at 461.88 square feet, was below municipal bylaw standards.
133 
Some Trust officials worried that ‘dangerous precedents may well be created if basic 
standards are lowered to extreme limits to accommodate this project’.
134  
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  226Consequently, despite a strong start to the rehousing programme, it was not 
until the end of 1960, more than one and a half years after the fire, that the victims 
obtained their new homes. On 29 June 1959, at a meeting with the heads of fire 
victim households, it was agreed that the cost of the houses be subsidised by 
donations collected from the public, government and City Council, totalling 
$298,000. The sale prices of the dwellings and shops were set at $4,940 and $6,339 
respectively. Of the 329 families affected by the fire, 196 families (1,237 persons), 
some of which had as many as thirty persons,
135 had applied for the new houses. The 
scheme was completed in 1960, reportedly one and a half months ‘ahead of 
schedule’ by the Housing and Development Board (established in February that 
year), although the fire had occurred in April 1958. Those who could not purchase 
the houses comprised the unemployed and indigent and those in financial difficulty, 
all of whom preferred cash payments.
136 What was historically significant was, as in 
the PAP leadership’s case in 1961, the Labour Front government’s determination to 
ensure that no fire victim requiring a house was left out of the scheme.
137 The 
applicants, who were allocated their units by public ballot on 26 November, received 
the keys to their houses on 30 December. They paid a ‘low deposit’ of $350 and 
would service the balance of the payment in interest-free monthly installments over 
15 years. They were reportedly ‘happy to return to their former neighbourhood’.
138  
 
The Koo Chye fire rehousing scheme marked a major turning point in the 
official policy on emergency housing. In a crucial report in 1958, the Planning 
Coordination Committee,
139 formed in 1951 to advise the government on the 
development of land, had conceded that experiments in emergency housing at 
Kolam Ayer had not been financially successful. However, the committee, citing the 
inadequate number of permanent housing built, urged that ‘the possibility of 
evolving an economic type of semi-permanent housing estates with the advantages 
of speedy, low-cost construction must not be denied and experiments must continue’. 
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Plate 5.2: The Kampong Koo Chye Fire Rehousing Scheme. Source: HDB, Annual Report 
1960. 
 
The committee proposed a supplementary programme of emergency housing. But it 
admitted great reluctance in reaching this conclusion due to the higher standards of 
housing normally built by the Trust, and that the envisaged emergency housing 
would only be ‘as good as the limits of finance and the needs of the situation permit’. 
The committee carefully weighed the merits of multi-storey and lower (1- and 2-
storey) emergency housing. Inexpensive five-storey blocks, which would not have 
lifts installed and have communal cooking and sanitary facilities, would still be 
costly to maintain and supervise. The greatest problem, however, would be to 
persuade people to take up such housing and pay rent for them, since it ‘assumes the 
movement of tenants to new areas – generally from the City centre to the suburbs’, 
where ‘[t]enants are asked to uproot themselves from their present communities and 
to move in amongst strangers and, in addition, to increase their distances from places 
of work and to incur additional transport costs’.
140 It was considered feasible, 
however, to move low-income families into emergency housing for a temporary 
period before relocating them in permanent housing.
141 The committee prepared a 
list of sites for the construction of emergency housing (see Table 5.1), including 
Tiong Bahru cemetery, marked as ‘available’ for housing development.  
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  228Table 5.1: Possible Housing Sites for Emergency Housing, 1958 
Site Gross  Residential 
Acreage 
Availability of Utility 
Services 
Other Remarks 
St. Michael’s Road  54  Within a few months  -- 
Queenstown 
Neighbourhood 3 
90 Available  1960-61  -- 
Queenstown 
Neighbourhood 4 
116 Available  1960  -- 
Queenstown 
Neighbourhood 5 
50 Available  1959  -- 
Thomson Road  48  No main sewers 
Other services 1961-62 
Squatter clearance 
Kallang Airport  84  Available  Includes area now 
being developed 
Bukit Timah Village   5  No main sewers 
Electricity, water 
available 
Site preparation will 
be lengthy 
Squatter clearance 
Tiong Bahru 
Cemetery 
15 Available  Site  preparation 
1961-1962 
Clearance of graves 
Tanjong Rhu  20  Available  -- 
MacPherson Road 
West 
20  Available 1960  Squatter clearance 
MacPherson Road 
East 
56  Available 1960  Squatter clearance 
Toa Payoh  587  Services available on 
completion of site 
preparation, 1961-64 
Substantial squatter 
clearance 
Bukit Theresa  27  --  Squatter and graves 
clearance 
Rifle Range Road   12  --  Squatter clearance 
Malay Settlement   60  --  -- 
Ulu Pandan   50  --  Squatter clearance 
Woodlands 900  Sewerage depends on 
completion of City 
Council Ulu Pandan site 
and construction of 
main trunk. Electricity 
and water available. 
Little squatter 
clearance  
Further areas being 
acquired 
Source: HB 477/53, Supplementary report to report titled ‘Housing’ by the Planning 
Coordination Committee, undated, c. 1959. 
 
In early 1959, the SIT found itself with increasingly diminished funds for 
housing – the British colonial authorities had allocated only $2 million for new 
projects, partly because it did not want to tie the hands of the newly-elected 
government by embarking on too many new public projects.
142 Private housing 
developers were at the same time undercapitalised and catering to the higher income 
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  229group, while the ‘tolerated’ urban kampongs continued to proliferate beyond official 
control. Added to these problems was mounting political pressure as the general 
elections drew closer. Through the last quarter of 1958, the Trust was roundly 
criticised by various members of the Legislative Assembly for failing to adequately 
resolve the housing shortage and, in particular, for building housing beyond the 
financial reach of the low-income population.
143 In explaining the limited housing 
budget to the Assembly in December 1958, the Financial Secretary T. M. Hart was 
compelled to state, ‘I have felt for some time that we should explore the one-room 
flatlet concept more thoroughly than we have done’.
144 Finally, the Trust was 
persuaded to seek economies of scale by reviewing building standards to permit 
multi-storey emergency housing.
145 In January 1959, SIT and Ministry of Local 
Government, Lands and Housing officials proposed a revised building plan 
comprising permanent housing and a combination of single- and multi-storey 
emergency housing.
146 The 1959 provisional building programme, drawn up in the 
first quarter of the year, envisaged the construction of emergency housing at 
MacPherson Road (South) resettlement area, where conditions had deteriorated and 
where a pilot scheme of 1-storey emergency housing was proposed.
147 Similar 
emergency housing was also planned at Selegie Road,
148 and Tiong Bahru cemetery. 
 
‘The opportunity to clean up the area must not be lost’, Kampong Tiong Bahru, 
1959 
 
The second Kampong Tiong Bahru fire on 13 February 1959 had rendered 
5,220 persons homeless. The Singapore Council of Social Service (SCSS), 
established in December 1958 to coordinate relief work in civil disasters, collected 
donations for the Kampong Tiong Bahru Relief Fund totalling $600,000 and paid 
out $141 to each fire victim through the SWD.
149 The amounts distributed represent 
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  230a continuous increase in relief payments compared to previous fires, indicating both 
a greater ability of the authorities to organise relief work and a more enthusiastic 
response from the public and voluntary organisations. Company officials of the 
Singapore Glass Manufacturers located at nearby Henderson, which employed many 
of the fire victims, in making the donation explained, ‘We are part of the area, and 
we feel that we should do something to help the people’.
150 Similarly, Kai Kok Old 
Boys’ Association in Bukit Ho Swee collected $22,000.
151 The Federation of 
Malaya also sent a cheque for $50,000. Lim Yew Hock, in expressing his gratitude 
for the donation, stated that this was ‘another proof of the close ties which exist 
between the people and the Governments of the two territories’.
152 The SWD 
converted four schools at Kim Seng Road into a relief centre. There, working with 
the SIT, SCSS, Public Works Department, Health Department, Rural Board, Armed 
Services, and the voluntary organisations, the SWD housed and fed about 2,500 
people who could not find accommodation with relatives and friends. Compared to 
the drawn-out Koo Chye relief saga, the centre was closed within just thirteen days. 
By 17 February, all but 75 families had registered for SIT housing.
153 
 
Following a special meeting that day, the SIT carried out ‘Operation Shift’ 
on the 20
th, temporarily moving 854 fire victim families to 784 flats (496 units of 2-
room and 288 units of 1-room dwellings) at Kallang Estate under Temporary 
Occupation Licences in the eastern part of the City. The estate, commenced in 1957, 
had by 1959 3,004 units of 1-, 2- and 3-room dwellings ‘built to the most 
economical standards possible’ and shops. Kallang Estate had initially been built 
with the clearance of the overcrowded shophouses in the Central Area,
154 and 
contained ‘experimental’ 1-room dwellings which were allegedly both low-cost and 
low-maintenance.
155 The fire victims received initial rent and public utilities waivers 
for three months but this concession was later extended for a further month by the 
government in view of the general elections in May (after which the fire victims 
paid subsidised rates). Priority rehousing was given to the bigger households, 
families staying at the Kim Seng relief centre, with larger families of seven persons 
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  231or more allocated 2-room flats and the rest provided 1-room flats.
156 However, the 
considerable distance to Kallang underlined the SIT’s failure to clear the 
unauthorised wooden housing in the Tiong Bahru locality even three and a half years 
after the 1955 fire. Those able to find lodging with relatives and friends were 
reportedly a small minority,
157 but some 162 families still preferred to find their own 
accommodation. 
 
  As in the case of the Koo Chye fire, there was widespread discontent with 
the relief work. Some of the fire victims, encountering a radically different home 
environment after the disaster, were pleased with the modern sanitation and facilities 
at Kallang.
158 But many families were enraged and disappointed, upon realising that 
the ‘2-room’ flats had only a bedroom and a living room and ‘1-room’ flats were 
simply a hall. The ‘misunderstanding’ was a result of the official practice of 
labelling the hall as a room, rather than confining the term to a proper room. The fire 
victims were also unhappy with the lack of privacy in the smaller flats, with some 
claiming to have to sleep with the doors and windows shut to avoid embarrassment. 
Similarly, a couple, sharing the flat with the man’s brother and grandmother, 
complained, ‘There is no privacy, no place to eat and not enough money’. Other 
grievances included living on the upper floors (which reduced water pressure in the 
taps and forced the women to collect water from neighbours on the ground floor),
159 
the lifts not stopping on the 3
rd and 4
th floors, the distance from the schools, and the 
inability to rear poultry to supplement one’s income. When the rent-free period 
expired, 265 of the original 854 families moved out of the estate, mostly to return to 
the wooden houses in or near Kampong Tiong Bahru.
160  
 
In particular, extended families, which had lived together in large wooden 
houses in the kampong, discovered to their horror that their flats were too small. 
Madam Seah Guay Nee, 63, and her two sons, two daughters-in-law and ten 
grandchildren, were shocked to discover only one bedroom in their flat. Seah 
demanded to be allocated two flats: 
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  232 
I have two grown-up sons and 2 daughters-in-law, and 10 
grandchildren. How can we all stay together? There is only 1 room 
for all of us. The SIT should provide us with another flat – if possible, 
next door.
161 
 
In late March, four large families were finally given 2-room and 3-room 
accommodation.
162 The difficulty of the extended families obtaining flats of suitable 
sizes demonstrates the fact that the colonial government did not merely view SIT 
housing as a superior form of accommodation to replace wooden housing. Trust flats 
were targeted primarily at nuclear families, possibly with grandparents or a relative 
living with them, which was the desired basic social unit of modern Singapore. 
Consequently, by moving nuclear or semi-extended kampong families into public 
housing, the official housing programme aimed to integrate them into the social 
structure of a high-modernist nation-state. 
 
Far more so than the Koo Chye fire, the Tiong Bahru disaster, having 
occurred closer to the time of the general elections, produced a series of remarkable 
scenes of one-upmanship among the politicians. In the City Council meeting on 3 
March, Ong Eng Guan, matching the Council’s previous contribution for the Koo 
Chye fire, sought a $100,000 donation for the fire victims. Lee Bah Chee, Liberal 
Socialist Councillor for Tiong Bahru, countered with a $150,000 vote, with the 
rationale that more people were affected this time. Ong, however, rejected the higher 
amount, citing financial stringency and arguing that it was the government’s duty, 
not the Council’s, to provide relief. He told Lee that he would oppose any attempt to 
make political capital out of the fire by raising the amount of the donation. Lee 
replied, somewhat wildly, that since Ong had been Mayor, there had been two 
serious fires and that if he had the people’s interests at heart, he would return to his 
hometown in Batu Pahat! Ong pointed out that while Lee had worked hard on behalf 
of the Tiong Bahru fire victims, he had not done so in the case of the Koo Chye fire. 
The mayor’s motion was carried.
163  
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On the same day in early March, Tang Peng Yeu, Labour Front Councillor 
for Queenstown, proposed to provide street lights, sewerage and fire hydrants in 
Kampong Tiong Bahru, while S. M. Vasagar, Liberal Socialist Councillor for Sepoy 
Lines, asked that immediate measures be taken to establish fire hydrants and enlarge 
the water mains in all kampongs. According to Labour Front Councillor Ho Kok 
Hoe, the opposition charged the PAP with delaying the provision of an adequate 
water supply to the kampong because of party politics, Tiong Bahru being the ward 
of a rival party.
164 Liberal Socialist Lee Bah Chee bluntly blamed the fire on the 
PAP:  
 
I knew this would happen. One of my first moves when I was elected 
to the City Council was to ask for fire hydrants to be installed 
INSIDE the kampong. The PAP said the Council had no money and 
could not accede to my request. If they had, the firemen would not 
have been hampered in their work and many hundreds of people 
would not have lost their homes. The PAP must accept the blame. If 
they had only thought of the welfare of these poor people, millions of 
dollars would not have gone up in smoke.
165  
 
On 31 March, the Fire Brigade agreed to increase the number of fire hydrants in 
Kampong Tiong Bahru from 12 to 14 and re-site two existing hydrants near more 
accessible mains, although the volume of water remained unchanged.
166 On the 
same day, the Council also heard that the Acting Chief Fire Officer and the Water 
Engineer had taken preliminary measures to examine the feasibility of installing 
additional hydrants in kampongs.
167 On 30 April, the Council adopted Tang’s 
motion to provide sewerage to Kampong Tiong Bahru.
168 
 
The Tiong Bahru disaster also ignited a fire of sorts in the Singapore 
Legislative Assembly, a sign that kampong blazes had attained a newfound political 
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  234importance at the highest level of politics. The Sin Chew Jit Poh reminded its 
readers that the disaster relief work on behalf of kampong dwellers constituted the 
‘first step’ in the country’s practice of self-government.
169 The relocation of the fire 
victims to Kallang became a point of conflict in the run-up to the elections on 30 
May, as Polling Day, Saturday, was a public holiday. Previously, on 3 March, 
William Tan Ah Lek, Democratic Party Assemblyman for Tiong Bahru, had 
requested the government to either set up polling stations in Kallang or provide 
transport for the fire victims to vote in Tiong Bahru. Lee Kuan Yew, PAP 
Assemblyman for Tanjong Pagar, referring to the government’s promise to build 
flats in Tiong Bahru within three months (by May), wondered if ‘pleasure-loving 
and indolent Ministers are rehousing the fire victims in record time for reasons not 
unconnected with the elections’.
170 Lee also called Lim Yew Hock an ‘amateur fire-
fighter’, whose photograph had appeared on the front page of the Straits Times the 
day after the fire, showing him at the fire site with his shirt sleeves and trousers 
rolled up and holding a bucket to douse attap roofs.
171 Lim countered that he had 
never harboured a desire for publicity, ‘unlike certain leaders of the PAP’, and that 
on the day of the fire, ‘there was a PAP propaganda machine out there saying that 
the Government was responsible for the fire!’
172  
 
The following day, the politicians continued to engage in ‘fire politicking’ 
while claiming to deplore it. Having had Lee Kuan Yew imply that he was trying to 
win votes for the elections, William Tan moved a motion against the electioneering 
propaganda which took place at the fire site and blamed the PAP City Councillors 
for not installing bigger water pipes in the area. He also accused PAP relief workers 
at the fire site of asking university medical students who had come to help to put on 
party armbands, and of making political speeches claiming the PAP to be the only 
political party in Singapore which assisted the unfortunate.
173  The PAP, Tan 
continued, had also organised students of Kai Kok Public School and Chong Teck 
School to spread propaganda and set up a registration post in a coffeeshop, although 
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  235the government had already established registration centres.
174 In response, Lee 
Kuan Yew wondered why, if the government was indeed against using acts of 
charity for publicity, a picture of Lim Yew Hock with his trousers rolled up and 
holding a bucket of water had appeared on the front page of the Singapore People’s 
Alliance organ.
175  To Lee’s accusation, Lee Choon Eng, Labour Front 
Assemblyman for Queenstown, who seconded Tan’s motion, observed that Lee was 
not at the scene himself, while the Chief Minister held a hose to fight the flames, the 
PAP, including the Mayor of Singapore, had brought with them photographers.
176 
Tan’s motion was passed.  
                                                
 
Most crucially, the fire set the government on a course of rehousing which 
eclipsed those efforts of previous fires. On 16 February, the SIT’s Acting Chief 
Architect S. C. Woolmer and Planning Adviser D. H. Komlosy emphasised that the 
fire presented a valuable opportunity to implement the Master Plan’s proposals: 
 
This area is part of one of the worst attap slums in Singapore. The 
opportunity to clean up the area presented by the occurrence of the 
fire must not be lost. A snap decision, for instance, to replace the 
attap huts with single-storey dwellings without considering its impact 
on the surrounding areas might in the end only perpetuate the present 
slum conditions….  
 
We consider that the redevelopment of the area should be carefully 
planned, in relation to the needs of the district as a whole. The area to 
be considered ultimately should be that bounded by Henderson Road 
to the west, Tiong Bahru Road in the north, the new ring road to the 
south, and Tiong Bahru [Estate] to the East. This composes an area of 
160 acres, and at present houses 21,500 people. 
 
The Master Plan proposes that ultimately within this area residential 
development should be provided for persons, that two sites for 
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  236schools should be provided, a shopping centre, community centre etc. 
It also provides for a main N.S. road which cuts through the fire site. 
 
The redevelopment of the fire site should be considered in relation to 
these developments. We think that the fire area should be rounded off 
to include some of the surrounding attap slums, to form a 
Redevelopment Scheme. The fire site should be planned in relation to 
the Scheme area, and the first phase would be the fire site itself. The 
total area of the Scheme would be 69 acres, at present containing 
about 9,600 persons.
177 
 
The fire site, Woolmer emphasised, ought to be used as the focal point to 
redevelop the entire kampong,  
 
[I]t is strongly recommended that only a planned redevelopment of 
the site with permanent housing should be carried out, and that 
haphazard rebuilding with attap or timber barrack building should be 
strongly resisted and prevented….This kampong is one of the largest, 
most congested and most insanitary. It is very near to the heart of the 
city and is sandwiched between good quality public housing, on the 
one side at Tiong Bahru and Kampong Silat, and on the other at 
Redhill and Queenstown. The fire, tragic though it is for the victims, 
gives an opportunity to carry out clearance and redevelopment, not 
only of the fire area itself, but of a substantial portion of the rest of 
the existing slum…. 
 
The redevelopment of the fire area should be regarded as Phase I of 
the whole redevelopment referred to in the accompanying 
memorandum [by the Chief Architect and Planning Adviser] and 
decanting from other parts of the scheme area could be carried out, a) 
into the rebuilt fire area, b) into the transit camp at Queenstown 
Neighbourhood V, and c) into similar emergency development which 
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  237could be provided on the old cemetery site at Tiong Bahru behind 
Boon Tiong Road, if funds could be provided for development 
immediately….It will be noted that the redevelopment proposals 
provide for accommodating more occupants within the area than were 
there before, with a far higher standard of living, open space, 
community facilities etc.
178  
 
Included in the SIT’s long-range plan for Tiong Bahru was the building of single- 
and multi-storey permanent housing; the site was suitable for both such housing and, 
the Trust emphasised, ‘should not be wasted on temporary structures’.
179   
 
With the fire victims temporarily rehoused in Kallang, the fire had provided 
the government with a key strategic foothold in Tiong Bahru to commence its 
emergency housing project. On 17 February, Lim Yew Hock assured the fire victims 
that the government would acquire the fire site and build low-cost, prefabricated 
houses for them within three months.
180 On 3 March, Lim quoted the SIT almost 
verbatim in his speech to the Legislative Assembly: ‘only a planned redevelopment 
of the site with permanent housing should be carried out and that haphazard 
rebuilding with attap or timber barrack buildings should be strongly resisted and 
prevented’.
181 The Singapore Standard showed a photograph of a make-shift coffee 
shop, supposedly erected on the fire site 24 hours after the inferno, with its business 
in operation as usual.
182 But Lim subsequently authorised the police to stop fire 
victims from putting up temporary structures. He assured the victims, ‘This will be a 
real low cost housing scheme. We will try to have sufficient accommodation for all 
and the rent is going to be within the means of the people’. Already, ‘[l]ittle huts 
here have meantime mushroomed’ at the fire site ‘as soon as the ashes cooled off’, 
to which fire victims were soon returning.
183  
 
The Chinese community appeared to concur with the government on the 
kampong fire hazard; a Nanyang Siang Pau editorial on 15 February called for 
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  238wooden houses to become ‘historical relics’, urging the authorities to build proper 
housing for the fire victims and hold excess housing in reserve for wooden house 
dwellers cleared from the locality.
184 Most of the fire site was owned by nine private 
landowners with only a small portion belonging to the Crown. City Councillor Lee 
Bah Chee warned that the landowners would stand to profit if the government 
acquired the land.
185 The Sin Chew Jit Poh revealed that some of the landowners 
were holding out for high prices and urged that, since landowners in Singapore 
typically received little income from their land, they ‘should not go beyond what is 
proper and place an undue burden on the Treasury and society’.
186 The Ministry of 
Local Government, Lands and Housing declared that it would compel landowners 
seeking a higher price to sell their land at the value fixed under the Land Acquisition 
Ordinance, which empowered the government to compulsorily acquire land required 
for public development.
187 Under the Land Acquisition Ordinance, the government 
eventually purchased 37 acres of land belonging to the Hokkien Huay Kuan (of 
which only 13½ acres were the fire site) at a cost of $711,000 and, equally 
significant, 16 acres of the disused Tiong Bahru cemetery (Ma Kau Thiong) for an 
estimated $500,000.
188 As in the case of the Koo Chye fire, it provided interest-free 
loans to the SIT to build a combination of 2-storey terrace houses, 5-storey self-
contained and communal flats, and 9-storey self-contained flats, totalling 1,015 units 
of flats and shops, at the fire site.
189  
 
At the cemetery site, the Trust planned to erect a further 1,360 units, 
comprising 904 units of 1-room and smaller numbers of 2-room and 3-room flats, in 
multi-storey blocks of emergency housing with communal sanitary facilities 
following the exhumation of the 3,000-odd graves.
190 The cemetery, as noted in 
Chapter 3, had as early as October 1956 attracted official interest as a possible site 
for emergency housing. In January 1959, SIT and Ministry of Local Government, 
Lands and Housing officials had again recommended it as suitable for multi-storey 
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  239emergency housing.
191 Just days before the fire, on 4 February, the Trust observed 
that the hill had ‘very good loadbearing characteristics’, although ‘[s]ome clearance 
remains to be done’.
192 Upon acquiring the cemetery site, the SIT Chief Architect 
urged that clearance proceed as fast as possible.
193 In October 1960, the HDB, now 
having taken over the SIT’s building schemes, echoed the Trust’s belief that, ‘with 
the completion of the one-room blocks in the Cemetery Site, clearance of the settlers 
in Covent Garden becomes possible’.
194 By then, as Plate 5.6 shows, the cemetery 
scheme was already underway. 
 
Unlike the Koo Chye housing scheme, the Tiong Bahru units were for rent. 
Because the government wanted to build the maximum number of units possible in 
the shortest time and because the houses were intended simply as the spearhead of a 
larger project of kampong clearance and redevelopment, the accommodation was not 
built for sale.
195 A further 15.8 acres in Tiong Bahru were compulsorily acquired by 
the HDB in 1961, an area on which lived some 155 families, but the Board saw ‘no 
difficulty in undertaking expeditious clearance’.
196 The HDB readily concurred with 
its predecessor on the redevelopment of Tiong Bahru: 
 
The Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire Site is part of a very extensive and 
unhealthy slum in the town area. The Board is preparing a plan for 
the gradual clearance of these slums and, with the cooperation of the 
squatters, it may be possible to achieve good results in slum clearance 
in the course of the next few years. The existing slum population will 
then be provided with housing in a more decent and healthy 
environment.
197 
 
Lim Yew Hock had predicted that Phase I of the Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire 
Site Scheme (comprising the 2-storey, 3-room terrace houses) would be completed 
in three months, while the remaining two phases of multi-storey flats would be 
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  240finished in six to eight week intervals thereafter, with the whole scheme to be 
completed in a year.
198 The building commenced on 6 March, but it proved more 
difficult than anticipated and took much longer to complete. The fire site was 
difficult to control, with its former dwellers trying to reclaim it. In mid-February, 
when two revolvers were recovered at the site, the police admitted, ‘The site is too 
big and everything is in shambles’. The Straits Times had commented on the 
seemingly-lawless nature of the site: 
 
Kampong Tiong Bahru was one of the island’s biggest secret society 
hideouts and numerous gang wars have been fought there. The main 
triad society at the kampong was Group 18 (major gangs: Gi Kun 
Tong and Gi Ho), with Group 08 a close second. A Group 24 affiliate, 
Gang 969, also operated there. The Straits Times understands that the 
fire has not disrupted the secret society organisation although their 
members are scattered at the moment.
199 
 
Building contractors were initially pressed for protection money and 
experienced ‘organised terrorism’ until the secret society members were removed 
from the site by the police. But they continued to suffer thefts of building material, 
fittings and electrical wiring, while ‘[e]very evening, between 5 pm to 6.30 pm, 
crowds of teenagers run all over the building site damaging the doors, windows, 
walls and fittings, and scratching the paintings with all sorts of drawings and 
slogans’.
200 The clearance of the large number of graves, which required the 
government to award tenders for the exhumation, was also time-consuming. On 27 
April 1959, the fire victims were warned of a three-week delay in construction due 
to the clearance.
201 But it was not until after the SIT exerted pressure on the Land 
Office that exhumation was actually completed.
202 Clearance of the living from the 
site was just as difficult, with the families residing there reluctant to leave. In 
October, the SIT reported a possible delay in Phase 1 of the Fire Site Scheme while 
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  241enforced eviction from the cemetery site might be necessary.
203 Only two of the six 
families residing at Phase 1 of the Fire Site Scheme had accepted SIT 
accommodation by then,
204 while at the cemetery site, notices to quit the cemetery 
were issued to 17 of the 59 affected families and court proceedings instituted against 
16 others.
205 But in May 1960, 22 families residing at the cemetery had yet to move 
out.
206  
 
The political fallout between Ong Eng Guan, the PAP Minister for National 
Development, and the rest of the party leadership in June 1960 further hindered the 
project. The PAP government established after the 1959 elections had instructed the 
SIT to ‘reduce the building cost and to produce the maximum number of housing 
units within the limits of available financial resources’, by using the most 
economical materials for walls and partitions, avoiding piling and using hard ground 
for building, reducing floor areas, and increasing the residential density.
207 In 
August 1960, however, Toh Chin Chye, the Deputy Prime Minister, revealed that 
‘our housing development programme has not got off to a fine start’. He declared 
that tenders for the first two phases of the Tiong Bahru Fire Site Scheme had been 
submitted to Ong Eng Guan in June 1959, but were repeatedly rejected and revised 
due to Ong’s ‘indecision and frequent changes of mind’; the contracts consequently 
were approved only in November 1959 and January 1960, a half-year delay.
208 Ong 
in turn accused the PAP of freezing the funds allocated in 1959 by the Lim Yew 
Hock government for housing and in particular for the Kampong Koo Chye and 
Kampong Tiong Bahru fire site schemes.
209 PAP Assemblyman Low Por Tuck 
countered that Goh Keng Swee, the Minister for Finance, had released the funds for 
the fire site schemes in 1959.
210 The SIT records show that in July that year, Ong, as 
SIT Chairman, had appointed Chan Choy Siong, PAP Assemblywoman for Delta, as 
his personal representative for the rehousing of the fire victims staying in Kallang, 
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  242as ‘I am unable to devote much time to this work’.
211 In August, however, he had 
approved the clearance priority for the fire site.
212 The truth of the matter regarding 
Ong’s actions is difficult to establish. In September 1959, Ong, as Minister for 
National Development, had sought a $415 million housing loan from the 
government to build over five years 84,000 1- and 2-room houses on 1,160 acres of 
government land for the lower-income group.
213 By that time, however, Lee Kuan 
Yew himself and his PAP colleagues had come to view Ong as lacking competence 
as a minister.
214 Ong’s ambitious pronouncements led the British Commissioner 
William Goode to wonder if Lee was indeed giving Ong ‘sufficient rope to hang 
himself’.
215  
 
  Of the 759 fire victim families staying in Kallang Estate in June 1959, 630 
families wished to return to the fire site, while 80 families wanted to remain in 
Kallang, with a further 49 families undecided.
216 As Plate 5.5 shows, Phases I and II 
of 5-storey, 2-room self-contained flats and 1-room tenement flats of the Fire Site 
Scheme were completed by the HDB in 1960. The entire scheme of 1,015 flats was 
completed in early 1961, with families of five or less persons to be offered 1-room 
flats, and those of six persons or more 2-room flats or terrace houses, although the 
cemetery scheme was still under construction.
217 Priority was accorded to those 
living in Kallang, since ‘[m]any of these families have been making their living in 
and around Kampong Tiong Bahru area for years and at present they are still doing 
so’.
218 Similarly, most of the families not living in Kallang, the HDB observed, were 
residing in or near Kampong Tiong Bahru. The Board concluded that ‘these people 
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  243have a very strong preference to remain in the area where they have been brought up 
or where they can more easily find their livelihood’.
219 
 
 
Plate 5.3: The 3-room terrace houses of the Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire Site Phase I.   
Source: HDB, Annual Report 1960. 
 
 
Plate 5.4: The 1-room emergency and 2-room flats of the Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire Site 
Phase II.  Source: HDB, Annual Report 1960. 
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Plate 5.5: The completed SIT emergency housing of the Tiong Bahru Fire Site Scheme, 
October 1960. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 81/635, 1960 (Courtesy of Ministry of 
Defence). 
 
 
Plate 5.6: Ongoing construction at the Tiong Bahru Cemetery Scheme (Ma Kau Thiong), 
October 1960. Note that earthworks are already visible. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 
81/635, 1960 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence).  
 
  245But the fire victims’ return to Tiong Bahru threw up a new set of problems. 
The high rentals, charged at full economic rates, and conservancy and service 
charges deterred many families: $40 total for the 1-room flats, $55 for 2-room flats 
and $68 for the 3-room terrace houses. Eighty percent of the fire victims had a stated 
income which apparently could not pay a rental of more than $25.
220 When fixing 
the rental price, the Board had decided that  
 
sufficient would appear to have been done for the fire victims in 
rehousing them over the last 2 years and since it has been decided 
that the scheme should now be a Housing Board scheme the 
completed units should be offered to the fire victims at the economic 
rents set out in my letter of 17 November 1960. To do otherwise 
would create a special group of favoured tenants of the Housing & 
Development Board at a time when the Board should make every 
effort to streamline its administration by laying down a policy for the 
equalisation of all rentals.
221 
 
In April 1961, out of the 1,016 fire victim families, 452 families remained in 
Kallang Estate, paying the subsidised rentals of $25 for 1-room flats, $35 for 2-room 
flats and $45, $50 and $55 for 3-room flats. By this time, 397 families were already 
living in their own accommodation (presumably near the fire site) and only 167 
families accepted the Tiong Bahru flats. Of the 262 families which had moved out of 
Kallang and applied for the HDB flats, only 53 eventually accepted them. The low 
acceptance rate was ostensibly due to ‘unfounded promises’ made previously to the 
fire victims that they would be given cheap accommodation at the fire site.
222 The 
fire victims had been led to believe that the Tiong Bahru rentals would be lower than 
those at Kallang, at around $17 per month for 1-room communal units and $30 for 
2-room flats.
223 In December 1960, a delegation of 200 female fire victims had 
protested to Lim Kim San, Chairman of the HDB, over the high rentals to be 
charged at Tiong Bahru and urged him to fulfill the Board’s alleged promise to let 
                                                 
220 HB 25/59 Vol. I, Minutes of Trust Meeting, 8 May 1959. 
221 HB 25/16/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 30 Dec 1960. 
222 HB 25/59 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 19 Apr 1961. 
223 HB 25/16/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 30 Dec 1960. 
  246the flats out at lower rates.
224 The protest should have alerted the Board to the fire 
victims’ unhappiness with the high rents: its officials had known that ‘it will still be 
easier to let out a three room flat at $90 than a one room unit at $35 or $40’. The 
HDB was subsequently forced to consider housing labourers employed by the Board 
in the 280 vacant 1-room communal flats in Tiong Bahru,
225 which would help 
release the labourers’ housing to the public.
226 But only about 25 units were so used 
by January 1962, partly because many of the labourers had large families of seven or 
more persons.
227  
 
By April 1961, only 168 flats had been utilised for the victims of the Tiong 
Bahru fire. The breakdown of figures is telling: all the 91 3-room terrace houses 
were taken up by the fire victims, but only 72 of the 190 2-room flats and a mere 
five of the 280 1-room flats with communal toilets!
228 The fire proved to be a 
blessing in disguise for Samuel Seetoh and his large family of ten, who had been 
living at Kallang Estate and had been struggling to eke out a living. They moved 
happily into one of the 2-storey, 3-room terrace houses. With more than $1,000 
collected from relief payments, they were able to pay off the loans taken out for 
Seetoh’s father’s business and buy some furniture for the house. It was, according to 
Seetoh, the beginning of ‘good times’ for the family.
229 However, the vacant 
emergency housing was soon to become extremely useful for another fire in the 
locality. 
 
Even as the Tiong Bahru emergency housing was being completed by the 
HDB, the Board was carrying out a second prong of the plan to redevelop the 
kampong areas. In April 1960, the HDB began to regularise some 3,800 tenancies in 
Kampong Tiong Bahru, MacPherson South and Toa Payoh.
230 This measure sought 
to bring dwellers of unauthorised housing under official regulation when ‘new areas 
are acquired and management is to be assumed by the Board pending clearance and 
                                                 
224 ST, 18 Dec 1960. 
225 HB 25/59 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 17 Nov 1960; Minutes of Board Meeting, 
11 Nov 1960. 
226 HB 25/59 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 21 Oct 1960. 
227 HB 25/16/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Acting PS, MND, 17 Jan 1962. 
228 HB 25/59 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 19 Apr 1961. 
229 Report of the Hawkers Inquiry Commission, p. 8. 
230 HB 364/58, Memo from Lands Manager, HDB, to Assistant Secretary, HDB, 25 Apr 1960. 
  247development, e.g. Covent Garden, Kampong Tiong Bahru’.
231 Because the tenancy 
agreement contained full details of the structures and occupation of the land, it was a 
more effective instrument of control than the TOL and served as ‘a valuable guide to 
future clearance commitments’.
232 The Board aimed to issue tenancies to the owners 
of 450-odd wooden houses (occupied by approximately 900 families) on land 
acquired after the Tiong Bahru fire and to require the owners to pay rentals to the 
Board. The Board explained to the owners that the SIT, after acquiring the land, had 
not regularised the tenancies and had not collected rent from them. In July, 
anticipating dissent against the regularisation work, the HDB started a pilot scheme 
for 20 dwellings located on a thickly-populated section of the fire site. The Board 
initially experienced some resistance, including personal representations from the 
wooden house dwellers and their Assemblyman.
233  One letter signed by 32 
petitioners to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew protested against the high rates and 
pointed out that Ong Eng Guan, the former HDB Chairman, had promised to assess 
the land ‘at a nominal monthly rental in order not to let us suffer’. The petition 
pleaded that ‘many of us, squatters, are unemployed and are in fact unable to make 
ends meet’ and that ‘although we luckily escaped from the big fire, we are not lucky 
enough to get a fair deal from the Housing and Development Board. Instead of 
sparing us the chance of living, the Board is in fact trying to squeeze us dry and let 
us, poor squatters, die of starvation’.
234  Following a representation to the 
government by Lee Teck Him, PAP Assemblyman for Tiong Bahru, the ten house 
owners anticipated their rentals would be reduced.
235 Aware that the surrounding 
houses had not been issued with the notices, they adopted a waiting game. However, 
eventually all the ten owners except one (who owned seven wooden houses) 
accepted the scheme. The HDB imposed a 40% levy on the revenue the house 
owners collected from their tenants, in order to discourage the building and renting 
of unauthorised wooden housing on Board land.
236 Many of the house owners paid 
nominal rentals of $1-$3 to the landowners but collected full rents totalling up to 
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234 HB 364/58, Letter from 32 House Owners in Tiong Bahru to the Prime Minister, 25 Oct 1960. 
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$195 from each of their tenants.
237 The HDB pilot scheme was subsequently 
expanded to the whole kampong. By February 1961, 355 out of 426 cases had 
accepted their tenancy agreements.
238 By June, only 35 cases remained outstanding, 
although 22 were expected to be difficult.
239 
  
The attempts of the British and Labour Front administrations to build a new, 
modern Singapore on the ashes of burned-out urban kampongs were not often 
successful. It was consistently easier to provide immediate fire relief for the fire 
victims than to find permanent accommodation for them. Through the Social 
Welfare Department, the British and Labour Front governments were able to 
coordinate efforts to temporarily shelter fire victims and collect and distribute larger 
amounts of relief payment. But in the provision of long-term accommodation, the 
authorities’ record was unimpressive. The Singapore Improvement Trust’s 
emergency housing programme was, really, a half-hearted endeavour to fight fire by 
building allegedly low-cost but superior modern housing on wasted urban spaces 
like dumping grounds, cemeteries and sites of burnt out kampongs. The Trust’s 
planners, however, frustrated in their attempts to regulate unauthorised wooden 
housing, worried about emergency housing similarly escaping official control to 
become new ‘black areas’. The SIT’s efforts were consequently ambiguous and 
reactive. In terms of the quality of housing, many low-income fire victim families 
evidently saw little difference between emergency housing and wooden dwellings, 
and many in fact returned to the latter after a fire. However, a major slowdown in 
the Trust’s permanent housing programme and the increasing politicisation of 
rehousing fire victims led to an important shift in policy by the end of the 1950s. 
Following the 1959 Kampong Tiong Bahru fire, an emergency housing project was 
commenced at the fire site and the nearby cemetery. Although the response from the 
fire victims was again disappointing, the development of the project was to coincide 
with a far greater inferno that would mark a turning point in the history of Singapore.
 
237 HB 364/58, Letter from CEO, HDB, to Member of Legislative Assembly for Tiong Bahru, 7 Sep 
1960. 
238 HB 364/58, Memo from Lands Manager, HDB, to Financial Officer, HDB, 4 Feb 1961. 
239 HB 69/57 Vol. I, Memo from Lands Manager, HDB, to Financial Officer, HDB, 1 Jun 1961.  
 Chapter 6 
The Unprecedented Inferno 
 
174-A Kampong Tiong Bahru, about 3 pm 
 
  Sometime around 3 pm on Thursday, 25 May 1961, an attap house behind 
King’s Theatre in Si Kah Teng began to smoulder. Chinese newspaper reports 
placed the time at 2.50 to 3 pm,
1 while the Singapore Fire Brigade stated that it 
received ‘obviously a late call’ at 3.15 pm.
2 The burning house, according to the 
Nanyang Siang Pau, was No. 174-A atop the highest point of Tiong Bahru hill.
3 
According to an old lady who claimed to have stayed in the house for more than ten 
years, it had been burned down during the Japanese Occupation but was 
subsequently rebuilt.
4 Tay Bok Chiu, who lived along Tiong Bahru Road about 200 
yards away from 174-A, was awoken from his afternoon nap by shouts of ‘Fire!’. 
Rushing out of his house, Tay saw the blaze swirling powerfully. 174-A, he 
maintained, was occupied by a couple, their mother, two daughters, and a son; the 
family made buns at home and their stove had caught fire that afternoon.
5 
 
The cause of the fire at 174-A was attributed to emotive albeit inconsistent 
claims of arson on the very day. The Nanyang Siang Pau carried interviews with fire 
victims claiming to have resided nearby and who ‘confidently’ recounted how ‘the 
fire was caused not by Heaven but by scoundrels more evil than wild beasts’.
6 A 
middle-aged man staying behind 174-A was, by his own account, resting at home by 
his window when he heard a whisper, ‘Bo lang, bo lang, kin!’ (‘No one here, no one, 
quick!’). Peering out of the window, however, he saw a Chinese man squatting in a 
small lane between his house and the opposite house two to three feet away. A 
young man standing next to him proceeded to throw a flaming torch onto the roof of 
                                                 
1 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
2 FD, Annual Report 1961, p. 6. 
3 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
4 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
5 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. Tay’s account is corroborated by his friend, 
Tay Ah Chuan. Author’s interview with Tay Ah Chuan, 21 Feb 2006. 
6 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
  251the opposite house. It brushed the rooftop and fell back onto the ground. The man 
hurled another torch, which landed on the attap, which immediately began to burn. 
A third torch landed on another side of the roof. The middle-aged man yelled out a 
warning and threw open his door but the arsonist and his lookout had fled into a 
small lane at the side of the burning house. Being physically weak, he had not taken 
but two strides before the two men totally disappeared from sight. He stumbled back 
into his own house to save his eight children; the fire was already beginning to move 
down the hill. Residents in nearby houses, now alerted and crying out in panic, 
assisted the young and elderly, salvaged what personal belongings they could and 
fled for their lives. Interestingly, by his own account, the middle-aged man had 
prevented an arson attempt on another nearby house five months ago, extinguishing 
a torch which had fallen off the roof and landed on an altar.
7  
 
An elderly Chinese man standing on the side of Tiong Bahru Road that day, 
speaking animatedly to people around him, partially corroborated the account. He 
had, he maintained, also stayed near 174-A. One of his neighbours was a taxi driver 
who was standing outside his house that afternoon and had seen two young men 
throw something onto an attap roof, which began to burn soon afterward. The 
elderly man kept shaking his head, saying, ‘This fire was started by someone, some 
heartless person(s) started the fire!’.
8  
 
Another self-proclaimed eye-witness told a variant of the story – a lady who 
was also a neighbour of 174-A. The house, according to her, belonged to a Hokkien 
woman in her 50s and was rented out to a taxi driver and his family. At the time of 
the fire, the eye-witness was collecting her laundry at the side of her house. She 
went to pick up her month-old baby who had crawled into the small lane beside 174-
A. There she saw a person throw a flaming torch onto the roof of the house. She 
panicked and, grabbing her child in her arms, shouted, ‘Someone is starting a fire! 
Fire!’ The arsonist fled and quickly disappeared from sight. Upon hearing her cries, 
the taxi driver, who had returned home earlier and was taking an afternoon nap, 
rushed out of the house and tried to stamp out the flames from the torch which had 
fallen onto the ground. The burning object was made of cotton wool, drenched in oil 
                                                 
7 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
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  252and bundled up with wire, resembling a cleaning brush. But the fire was already 
beyond control and the occupants of nearby houses were beginning to flee. Most of 
the adults, it appeared, were out at work and there were consequently few able-
bodied persons around to fight the flames.
9 
 
The Sin Chew Jit Poh reported what appeared to be the definitive account. 
The newspaper interviewed the aforementioned ‘taxi driver’ at the fire site, whose 
name was Huang Qingchao, a young Hokkien man who managed pirate taxis. 
According to Huang, he was not at home at the time of the fire and came to know of 
it only from others. Huang claimed, ‘Someone had set the fire’, but was unable to 
say who or why. His neighbour was Mrs Zhang, Hokkien, 35, the owner of a fried 
kway teow stall in Tiong Bahru. Zhang maintained that she was inside her house 
when she heard someone outside yell out ‘Fire!’. She rushed out to see the roof of 
174-A already ablaze.
10 
 
  The flames fed on the strong wind and searing heat. A drought had recently 
descended upon the island, producing temperatures as high as 32 degrees Celsius.
11 
The attap on the roofs of wooden houses were scorched tinder-dry and had become 
highly flammable.
12 The scale of the unfolding calamity and the speed with which it 
moved was extremely difficult for the residents to comprehend. Madam Lee Ah 
Moh, 39, living on Tiong Bahru hill, explained,  
 
Everyone thought that the fire would not reach us. I wanted to borrow 
a phone to call the Fire Brigade but no one would lend their phone. In 
the past, phones were uncommon. Then the fire came towards the top 
of the hill at us. Si ah! [‘Die!’] This side was burning, that side was 
burning. We ran from the foot of the hill. Wah, at first the fire 
appeared to be quite small. When we had taken a few of our 
belongings from our house, wah, the great fire had already set our 
roof alight. It burned like bing bing biang biang. The fire was 
                                                 
9 In this account, a young owner, in his teens, of a provisions shop nearby, who saw the attap roof 
catch fire, also shouted out aloud, ‘Fire!’. NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
10 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
11 NFWP, 26 May 1961. 
12 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
  253relentless. Run, run! We took out our belongings. Some of the 
belongings we dragged away. Other people dragged our belongings 
and we dragged theirs, it was the same.
13 
 
Within approximately ten minutes, Si Kah Teng had become a ‘hill of fire’, engulfed 
by high walls of flame and clouds of smoke billowing into the sky; within the space 
of five minutes, most of the wooden houses on the hill had already been destroyed.
14 
The Three Kings’ Temple situated on the hill was swiftly reduced to ruins. Bob 
Peries, a Straits Times reporter at Si Kah Teng at 3.40 pm, summarily reported, ‘The 
whole hillside is ablaze’.
15 At about 4 pm, all that remained of the northern section 
of Si Kah Teng were scattered piles of charred tree branches and the blackened 
ashes of dwellings.
16 
 
The expanding zone of fire was prevented from moving eastwards by a block 
of SIT flats north of King’s Theatre. To the west stood another group of SIT flats 
built after the 1959 fire; there, Samuel Seetoh and his family, victims of the earlier 
blaze, watched the growing conflagration but were not duly worried in their public 
housing.
17 But to the north, there was no effective fire break or barrier, and the 
northwesterly wind drove the flames down the hill so quickly that within twenty 
minutes, the houses standing on the southern side of Tiong Bahru Road were 
destroyed.
18 Sheets of burning zinc and attap roofing were lifted into the air ‘like 
kites’, enabling the flames to jump Tiong Bahru Road.
19 Tan Kok Kiem (born 1945), 
staying in a Singapore Improvement Trust flat at Boon Tiong Road, saw the zinc 
sheets fly ‘半天’ (‘halfway into the sky’).
20  
 
The blaze advanced towards a barber shop along the main road. The owner, 
who had lived there for many years, was attending to a customer when he heard 
                                                 
13 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. 
14 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
15 ST, 26 May 1961. 
16 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
17 Author’s interview with Samuel Seetoh, 27 Apr 2007. 
18 ST, 26 May 1961. 
19 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
20 Author’s interview with Tan Kok Kiem, 8 Feb 2007. 
  254about the approaching fire; alarmed, he told the customer to leave. Realising that the 
fire would soon reach the shop, his family hastily brought their belongings outside. 
Suddenly the wind changed direction and turned the flames away from the shop and 
across the road into Bukit Ho Swee. The fortunate barber had also escaped the 1959 
Kampong Tiong Bahru fire.
21 Another barber shop in the area, owned by Pang Ming 
Toh’s family, was also threatened by the fire. After Pang’s mother packed ‘a bit’ of 
their belongings, they quickly fled. But their house, made of brick, survived.
22 
 
Wang Bao, an old widow who had lived in a wooden house on the lower 
slopes of the hill for thirty years, miraculously escaped disaster for a third time:  
 
28 years ago, when my eldest grandson was born, a great fire broke 
out in Bukit Ho Swee. At that time, the fire burned across Tiong 
Bahru Road to this side [Points at Si Kah Teng], reached our 
neighbour’s house but did not burn our house….At that time, the fire 
was also very great. The whole of Bukit Ho Swee was destroyed. I 
still remember that year was the year of the Dog.…Counting back, it 
has been exactly 28 years. After the first great fire 28 years ago, the 
second fire was the 1959 fire. At that time, the fire also reached the 
side of my house. Those houses that were burned down have now 
been replaced by new flats, and people have already moved 
in…..This time, the fire reached the front of my door. The nearest 
house that was burned down was very nearby but again my house 
was not burned’.
23 
 
Tay Bok Chiu’s family had a similar fortunate experience. His father had 
been prepared for the worst, telling the family, ‘It’s OK as long as we are safe. If the 
fire comes, we will run, no need to bring anything. It’s also useless to bring anything 
along’. But the blaze veered away from their house; ‘when the fire was very great, 
there was a female spirit medium, who was a Guanyin, 40-50 years old and wearing 
the medium’s clothes. She was holding rice and salt in her hands and when she 
                                                 
21 NYSP, 26 May 1961.  
22 Author’s interview with Pang Ming Toh, 2 Nov 2006. Pang’s family’s barber shop was not the one 
described immediately prior, as his father had passed away by the time of the fire. 
23 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
  255reached our house, she said, “Don’t be afraid, I will not let the fire burn your house”. 
And then she scattered some rice and salt around our house. I have no idea where the 
medium came from. I don’t know her. It was miraculous’.
24 
 
A fog of thick, black smoke soon descended upon Tiong Bahru Road, 
forcing the crowd which had gathered there, both fire victims and onlookers, to 
retreat. The din in the area – of the roar of fire and people shouting and crying – was 
tremendous. The sudden fiery onslaught both surprised and dispersed many families. 
At the eastern end of Tiong Bahru Road, as Plate 6.1 shows, a woman flees from the 
fire with four children in tow – two boys and a girl holding one another’s hands and 
a toddler strapped to the back of one of the boys – but her husband is nowhere to be 
seen.
25 Elsewhere, a volunteer from a kampong fire-fighting squad carries an old 
man piggy-back away from the fire, while a young Malay man similarly guided an 
old Chinese man to safety.
26 
 
 
Plate 6.1: A family fleeing from the fire at Tiong Bahru Road. HDB, audio-visual recording 
titled Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 1961 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore).  
 
Along Tiong Bahru Road, regular fire-fighters and Si Kah Teng’s volunteer 
fire-fighting squads, including a squad organised by the Singapore Rural Residents’ 
Association, struggled against the towering inferno which had engulfed the row of 
                                                 
24 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. Mediums purportedly receive the spirit of 
Chinese deities. Guanyin is the Goddess of Mercy. 
25 HDB, audio-visual recording titled Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 1961. 
26 ST, 26 May 1961; SWD, Annual Report 1961, Special Pictorial Section. 
  256shophouses and wooden houses on both sides of the road.
27 Here, as in fire spots 
further north, the residents used hoses, buckets and any containers they could lay 
their hands on to fight the blaze.
28 But the wind-driven fire could not easily be 
halted by the few available water hoses that had not been burned through by the 
flames.
29 A fire-fighter said helplessly, ‘It is impossible to fight a fire of this size, let 
alone trying to control it’.
30 The water pressure was far too weak, with five fire 
engines rendered useless on Tiong Bahru Road. At 3.30 pm, the Fire Brigade 
attempted to raise the water pressure by closing off mains in other areas but this 
measure was not totally successful as several hydrants were connected to the single 
mains in Tiong Bahru.
31 When a fire-fighter, standing on a turntable ladder on the 
fire engine, applied his jet, a mere trickle of water came out, which only wet his 
uniform.
32 In general, water was in such short supply that fire-fighters were forced 
to recycle water from the hoses which had flowed into drains.
33  
                                                
 
Further compounding these problems for the fire victims were the difficult 
terrain and lack of access to the wooden houses. Much of the fire-fighting that day 
was directed at the flanks of the inferno, not its heart. At Si Kah Teng, the Fire 
Brigade’s fire engines drew water from hydrants located at Jalan Membina and 
Tiong Bahru Road and could only aim seven jets at the flames raging along these 
roads.
34 There was, according to Jaafar Sabar of the Auxiliary Fire Service, no 
precise information about the fire site: ‘We did not know the exact place. The 
squatters were all over the place. It was difficult to walk and the fire engines could 
not go very far’.
35 Fire-fighters had to join as many as five hoses together in a zig 
zag fashion to get close to the kampong houses; this, according to Sabar, 
substantially weakened the water pressure.
36 Soh Boon Quee, living at Silat Road, 
helped to unload hoses from a fire engine which had arrived there. But he found that 
 
27 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
28 ST, 26 May 1961. 
29 NYSP, 26 May 1961; SFP, 26 May 1961. 
30 ST, 26 May 1961. 
31 SLAD, 31 May 1961, p. 1593. 
32 Joan  Hon,  100 Years of the Singapore Fire Service (Singapore: Produced & published for 
Singapore Fire Service by Times Books International, 1988), p. 78. 
33 Hon, 100 Years of the Singapore Fire Service, p. 78 
34 FD, Annual Report 1961, p. 7. 
35 Oak3 Films, Jalan 2: The Bukit Ho Swee Fire, broadcast on 11 Dec 2006. 
36 OHC, interview with Jaafar Sabar, 29 Jul 1987. 
  257the hoses could only reach a few houses and then ‘the houses went up like – woom! 
Just like that’.
37 
 
The struggle against the blaze was also seriously hampered by the lack of 
manpower immediately available for fire-fighting and crowd control. As it was a 
public holiday for Muslims – Hari Raya Haji
38 – most of the fire-fighters, being 
Malay Muslims, had been on leave. The Fire Brigade had initially despatched only 
two fire engines which, upon arriving, found the wooden houses on both sides of 
Tiong Bahru Road ablaze.
39 They quickly radioed Fire Control to ‘Make Pump 3’ 
(to despatch another fire engine to make three pumps in total) and four minutes later 
to ‘Make Pump 6’.
40 But apparently, it was, as the Straits Times reported, at least an 
hour – 4 pm – before an island-wide radio alert recalled fire-fighters and policemen 
who were on leave to their posts, and another hour before they straggled onto the 
fire site, with many police arriving with helmets but not uniforms.
41 Consequently, 
the Fire Brigade had to seek assistance from other fire services; as fire officer Arthur 
Lim later recalled, ‘We could not cope really, we had to call the British army to 
help’.
42 The Fire Control Room was also flooded with calls of frightened residents 
living in the locality and those residing further away worried about the spread of the 
blaze.
43 The Sin Chew Jit Poh lamented that forty minutes after the fire began, ‘on 
the four sides of Tiong Bahru, there was still no sign of the police or riot police’.
44 A 
‘security officer’ at the scene, speaking to the paper’s reporter at this time, 
complained, ‘When the fire broke out, I made a phone call to them [the police]. Why 
have they not arrived till now?’
45 The full fire-fighting force that day totalled 22 fire 
engines, comprising 16 from the Singapore Fire Brigade, 4 from the British Army 
Fire Service, 1 from the Royal Air Force, and 1 from the Harbour Board Fire 
Service.
46 Three million gallons of water, some of which was drawn from the 
                                                 
37 Author’s interview with Soh Boon Quee, 4 Feb 2007. 
38 A religious festival celebrated by Muslims in the twelfth month of the Islamic calendar, marking 
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  258Singapore River to the northeast, and 33,650 feet of hose were used.
47  The 
Singapore Fire Brigade maintained that the pumps, which supplied 51 jets in total, 
were directed to ‘strategic positions in Tiong Bahru Road, Havelock Road, Ganges 
Avenue, Delta Circus, Nile Road and Beo Lane’.
48 But by this time, the inferno had 
established new and growing fronts north of Tiong Bahru Road.  
 
 
Plate 6.2: A fire engine is immobilised on the side of the road amid the surging crowd as 
Kampong Bukit Ho Swee burns in the distance (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
 
Traffic on the carriageway swiftly came to a standstill, with 25 buses of the 
Hock Lee Bus Company stranded by the roadside at the mouth of Boon Tiong Road. 
Opposite King’s Theatre, police erected a roadblock to stop incoming traffic. At 4 
pm, the traffic piled up a kilometre long from the City area. Tan Ah Kok, living in 
‘Big Town’, was coming to King’s Theatre to watch a movie. Seeing the traffic jam 
and hearing about the fire, she panicked, alighted from the bus and rushed back to 
                                                 
47 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983; OHC, interview with Goh Leng Huat, 1 Feb 
2001. 
48 FD, Annual Report 1961, p. 7. 
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elf, ‘People’s houses have already been burned down yet 
e is still here painting’.
50 
eo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee, from 3.30 pm 
 
still standing on the hill was half-razed, while only the front portion of the roof of
                                                
the school where she had dropped off her eldest son. ‘I heard that the fire was flying 
about’, Tan explained, ‘and I was so scared that it would fly over to my home’; 
afterwards, she hurried home, for ‘I had two kids at home and my mother’s feet was 
bound, so she could not have carried kids to safety. If she panicked, that would have 
been the end’.
49 A young painter, carrying a three-legged easel, stepped out of the 
crowd on Tiong Bahru Road. He faced the fire and started sketching, attracting a 
crowd of curious spectators. The artist, they saw, was working on an oil painting of 
Si Kah Teng, showing the raging fire destroying wooden houses and the fire-fighters 
and volunteers struggling against the mounting flames. A passerby, struck by the 
painting, muttered to hims
h
 
B
At about 3.30 pm, the fire reached Beo Lane. Here, as was the case in the 
1934 disaster, there was no water available on the high ground or ready access to the 
heart of the blaze, although Beo Lane was wide enough for a car to pass through.
51 
‘The worst damage and which left the most horrible impression’, the Nanyang Siang 
Pau reported, ‘was at Beo Lane’, where ‘the fire burned the houses like a child burns 
paper houses’.
52 The flames swiftly fanned out in all directions, burning the Tiong 
Bahru sewerage works and engulfing numerous wooden houses in a sea of fire. A 
large, 2-storey house close to Tiong Bahru Road with brick tiles, which had 
accommodated about 30 families totaling more than 200 people, was quickly 
reduced to ashes.
53 The encounter of the flames with the soya sauce, cooking oil, 
charcoal, and flammable chemicals stored in the warehouses and factories in the area 
intensified its ferocity, with fingers of fire shooting high into the sky and rumbling 
explosions ringing out continuously. The Taishang Laojun (‘太上老君’) Temple
54 
 
49 Author’s interview with Tan Ah Kok, 22 Mar 2007. 
50 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
51 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
52 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
53 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
54 Honouring the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu, who was subsequently deified. Map 6.1 Path of the 1961 Kampong Bukit Ho Swee Fire 
 
Compiled from Maps 80-81, Street Directory and Guide to Singapore (Singapore: Survey Department, 1957); ST, 26 May 1961; NYSP, 26 May 1961; SCJP, 26 
May 1961. 
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Plate 6.3: The inferno rages in the distance as onlookers observe dark clouds of billowing 
smoke (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
another temple, Qingzhai Si (‘清斋寺’), remained intact. But when the middle 
portion caved in, the debris extinguished the flames and saved the house of a family 
residing in front of the temple.
55 The Nanyang Sawmill behind Boon Tiong Road, 
which was insured, was spared but its warehouse containing  goods worth nearly 
$10,000 was razed to the ground. Behind the sawmill, however, were more houses, 
which would have been gutted if the mill had not escaped disaster.
56 Bella Leong, 
staying at Kim Tian Road, rushed to the coffee beans warehouse where she worked 
as a supervisor, worried that her workplace would be destroyed; miraculously, she 
watched the fire go around the warehouse.
57 The seemingly-arbitrary and erratic 
nature of the path of destruction – in which some buildings survived by the barest 
margin – added to the mythic power of the inferno in the imagination of the fire 
victims and the public at large.  
 
                                                 
55 NYSP, 27 May 1961. 
56 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
57 Author’s interview with Bella Leong, 5 Oct 2006. 
  262The struggle to contain the fire at two major buildings in Beo Lane, Kwong 
Joo Seng Sauce Factory and Da Dongrong (‘大东荣’) Warehouse, captured the 
ferocity of the fiery assault and the devastation of the local economy. Fire-fighters 
from the Singapore Fire Brigade, the British military and the local fire-fighting 
squads battled desperately to save both buildings. At Da Dongrong, stores of 
sulfuric acid and paint caught fire, causing a series of mighty explosions, flashing 
sparks and thick acrid smoke. Fire-fighters, organised into small teams with four or 
five hoses each, continued to hose down the flames but the advancing fire and toxic 
smoke, fanned by a strong wind, forced them to abandon their hoses and retreat. At 
Kwong Joo Seng factory, as fire-fighters vainly aimed water jets at the flames from 
outside, the fire swallowed the oil drums within minutes and consumed the entire 
factory in flame, causing further explosions.
58 Workers hastily moved some of the 
factory’s goods to the brick buildings opposite, believing them to be safe from the 
fire there. Afterwards, they found that all that remained of the brick buildings were a 
few collapsed walls.
59 Kwong Joo Seng burned for three hours.
60  
 
By 7 pm, the wooden houses in Beo Lane and Bukit Ho Swee were no more, 
although the flames, feeding on the flammable chemicals deposited on the near side 
of Havelock Road, continued to rage.
61 At 8 pm, the Straits Times journalist Francis 
Rozario reported, ‘Fire [is] still at its height’.
62 The inferno destroyed Kai Kok 
Public School and about sixty premises in the locality, including various coffeeshops, 
teahouses, provisions shops, laundry shops, trading companies, and an eating house, 
a sawmill, a clinic, a beer house, a hairdresser, a departmental store, an automobile 
company, a car repair shop, and a goldsmith.
63 The fire engulfing Kwong Yuan 
Heng Sauce Factory only burned itself out at around 9 pm, with the factory’s 
Chinese name, ‘广源兴’, still visible on a blackened wall.
64   
 
                                                 
58 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
59 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
60 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
61 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
62 ST, 26 May 1961. 
63 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
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  263The speed at which the inferno rampaged through the kampong defeated the 
residents’ attempts to contain the flames and punished most gestures of mutual self-
help. Tay Ah Chuan was revising for his third year Senior Middle examinations at 
the premises of the Chuen Min Old Boys’ Association. Some of his school mates, 
being part of the association’s fire-fighting squad, rushed to help fight the fire but 
returned home only to find their homes razed to the ground. Tay and several family 
members had rushed to help his uncle save the goods from his provisions shop but 
also returned home to find his own house gutted.
65 Lee Boon Eng, 67, similarly 
recounted that his friends tried to help the villagers remove their belongings, only to 
be told that their own houses had been destroyed.
66 Wong Pok Hee was working in 
the provisions shop at the Or Kio Tau shophouse. He had initially gone to Tiong 
Bahru Road to watch the fire but because he was working, ‘I couldn’t watch too 
long and didn’t see the fire fly over’. Later in the afternoon, he heard that ‘the fire 
was spreading to many places, so I ran back home. The fire had already burned 
down my house. I had no time to move out our things. My family was not at home. 
My mother and siblings were out working’.
67 
 
                                                 
65 Author’s interview with Tay Ah Chuan, 21 Feb 2006. 
66 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. 
67 Author’s interview with Wong Pok Hee, 19 Apr 2007. 
  264Plate 6.4: Sweat-drenched men attempt to establish a fire break by demolishing a wooden 
house. Note that the house on the right is fairly well-maintained. Both houses also have zinc 
roofing (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
Many of the residents in the thickly-populated area encountered unmitigated 
tragedy. Sim Kim Boey’s house was totally gutted; she managed to retrieve only 
some clothes and was personally struck gong (‘stunned’) by the scale of the 
disaster.
68  Chen Yin Foo (born 1948), son of a lorry driver, and his family 
abandoned their house, furniture, clothes, and a sealed Ovaltine tin to the flames; 
when they retrieved the tin afterwards, they found the coins inside blackened.
69 As 
the fire neared their house at 10 Beo Lane, policemen and Gurkhas took Lim Soo 
Hiang and her siblings to the relief centre. Lim’s mother, however, insisted on 
remaining in her provisions shop, as her goods had not been insured. She was finally 
persuaded to leave, when the fire reached Kwong Joo Seng factory nearby, and was 
reunited with the children only at nightfall. When they returned later to the fire site, 
they found their shop still standing but ‘there was nothing left – canned food, drinks, 
rice, sweets – everything had been carted away by people’. The family had saved 
some clothes and jewellery but their looted provisions and cash were lost to the 
inferno.
70 At 22 Beo Lane, Lim You Meng, wearing only a pair of shorts and 
barefoot, had watched his house burn down before running away. ‘It was’, he 
recalled, ‘like burning a paper house during funerals, over in an instant’. His family 
moved their belongings to the upper storey of the medical hall in the Or Kio Tau 
shophouse but the medical hall was also later gutted. His parents lost everything, 
except for the children’s birth certificates and their own citizenship papers – ‘they 
were very mindful of this and were not concerned with other things’. The family ran 
to Delta Estate to watch the subsequent course of the fire. Lim admitted that he did 
not feel anything about the fire as he was young but ‘[m]y parents were very sad. 
They had just lost everything, clothes, photographs, but they didn’t cry’.
71  
 
Nor were material losses the sole cause of anguish. Throughout the day, the 
fire dispersed numerous families and intensified the general sense of panic and 
pandemonium. Zhong Guiying, staying at No. 83 Beo Lane, sat dumbly on a grass 
                                                 
68 Author’s interview with Sim Kim Boey, 14 Feb 2007. 
69 Author’s interview with Chen Yin Foo, 2 Feb 2007. 
70 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
71 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
  265patch bordering the fire site, weeping silently. At 2 pm, she had gone to visit her 
husband, an unemployed tailor suffering from tuberculosis who was warded at Tan 
Tock Seng Hospital. She left behind her four children at home, aged 3, 5, 9, and 15 
years old. Halfway through her journey, Zhong saw the sky lit up by the fire and 
hurried back home but her house and children were gone. Despite the efforts of the 
police and the staff of the Delta-Ganges Community Centre, she still had no news of 
the fate of her children at 9 pm.
72  
 
Brothers Lee Ah Gar and Lee Soo Seong and their family were also 
separated by the fiery rampage. As it was a public holiday, Soo Seong was out with 
his friends. Ah Gar was at home at 12-E Beo Lane washing green beans (preparing 
the tau suan which his father would sell the following day), while his young son had 
accompanied his father to Or Kio Tau market to buy groceries. Alerted about the fire, 
Ah Gar, who was bare-chested and wearing only a pair of shorts and without trying 
to salvage the family’s belongings, immediately brought his mother and young 
daughter to the safety of a 4-storey block of flats at Boon Tiong Road, following 
which  
 
I rushed back to Or Kio Tau and asked the house owner, if the fire 
reached the house, whether I could cut off the attap roof. He said OK. 
But just after saying this, the fire arrived, and it was hopeless. I was 
preparing for the fire in front but the flames had come up behind my 
back. 
 
Ah Gar abandoned the house, hurrying back to his mother and daughter and bringing 
them to a 2-storey SIT flat at Jalan Membina, where a former neighbour was 
staying.
73 Soo Seong, returning home, was stopped at a roadblock along Tiong 
Bahru Road. His first thought was, ‘Where is my family?’ After asking around, 
friends informed him that his family was in Jalan Membina. Of the catastrophe, Soo 
                                                 
72 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
73 Author’s interview with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. Ah Gar does not remember how the family was 
finally reunited with his father and son. 
  266Seong recalled, ‘At that time, I could not accept it. Even in our dreams, we could not 
accept it’.
74 
 
For long-established or elderly residents, the fire was an acutely traumatising 
experience severing tangible links to a familiar way of life. At 597-E Bukit Ho Swee, 
the parents of Oh Boon Eng and his younger sister Oh Gek Heok had not expected 
the fire at Si Kah Teng to jump over to their side of the hill and had simply hosed 
their attap roof with water. As the fire neared, they realised that the children had 
followed their neighbours to the Giok Hong Tian temple at the foot of the hill. They 
hurried down the hill in search of their children, leaving their house and belongings 
to the inferno, except for the birth certificates which they had the presence of mind 
to take with them. Gek Heok also recalled, ‘Initially my grandfather didn’t want to 
leave, he simply refused to leave. We shouted for him to come out of the house but 
he remained upstairs. His whole fortune was in the house. So my father went 
upstairs and carried him down. He was very upset afterwards’.
75 
 
By sheer chance, some families had a comparatively less difficult experience. 
Beh Poh Suan was at home and carried her three-year-old child to safety, who 
otherwise would have been burned to death.
76 A young couple staying at Beo Lane 
had gone to watch a movie at King’s Theatre and when it finished at 4 pm, they 
found their house reduced to ashes but fortunately, their two children inside had 
been brought away to safety by their nanny.
77 Every member of Chua Beng Huat’s 
family was at home at 60 Bukit Ho Swee. Leaving their furniture to the flames, they 
and their neighbours jumped onto one of their two lorries parked outside their house, 
picked up his aunt’s family living close by and made their way to Thomson Road, 
where their uncle had an empty house.
78 In other cases, families had tried to prepare 
for speedy evacuation in the event of a kampong fire. Wang Ah Tee had also gone 
out but found a way past the police roadblock into Beo Lane through the sewerage 
works. He found his family hastily packing and moving out their belongings. Their 
                                                 
74 Author’s interview with Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006; OHC, interview with Lee Soo Seong, 19 No 
1996. 
75 Author’s interviews with Oh Boon Eng, 4 Apr 2007 and Oh Gek Heok, 1 Apr 2007. The temple 
referred to is the Giok Hong Tian Temple. 
76 Author’s interview with Beh Poh Suan, 14 Feb 2007. 
77 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
78 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
  267house at 37 Beo Lane, ‘shielded’ by a warehouse and sauce factory, escaped the 
inferno.
79 James Seah’s mother had brought the children to their aunt’s house and 
were on their way back when they saw a great column of smoke. They hurried back 
to their house at 20 Beo Lane, where Seah’s mother swiftly packed some clothing 
and their birth certificates before they left. Seah surmised, ‘In those days, most of 
those dwellers were always prepared in case of fire. So maybe they set aside some 
important things into one box’.
80 
 
The minority whose homes survived the blaze pondered deeply about the 
meaning of their good fortune and the disaster. Peter Lim (born 1943) was at home. 
He initially asked his five brothers and sisters to line up and spray water all over the 
garden. As the fire approached, they packed some of their books and clothes and left 
the house. Lim’s father, however, remained behind. The family heard no news of 
him into the night and thought, ‘He’s gone’. The next morning, Lim donned his 
cadet corps uniform and, dressed like a soldier, gained entry into the fire site. He 
made his way to his house: 
 
And as I walked on the left, all hundreds of houses, all completely 
wiped out, not even one house remained, including the Chinese 
temples. And as I approached nearer, I couldn’t imagine that my 
house could still remain, the whole house was not burned. The garden 
was burned, one section of the roof was burned, and the neighbouring 
3-storey building had also collapsed. And the houses of my 
neighbours on our left and our neighbours behind, all Christian 
families, were not burned. All around us, including the house of the 
Malay family, all were burned. As I went into my house, because my 
father had used mosquito nets to cover his goods, the nets all had 
black dots, traces of the fire sparks that had come in. But thank God 
the fire had not come in. I found my father inside the house, and he 
was kneeling down on the ground praying to God, for mercy, for 
grace. He told us that the fire from the neighbouring 3-storey house 
had come into the garden and also wanted to come into the house, but 
                                                 
79 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
80 Author’s interview with James Seah, 21 Oct 2006. 
  268the hand of God was so miraculous that the wind somehow had 
redirected the fire outwards.
81 
 
Panic and desperation produced individual acts of courage, which were later 
lost in the grand narrative of the fire. Tay Yan Woon was alone at home: her father 
had gone on a tour of China, her mother was out hawking and her brothers were also 
working. It was clear that, although it was a public holiday, it was still a working 
day for many low-income families engaged in irregular or part-time employment. 
Tay panicked: ‘I ran quickly for my life and didn’t think to bring our belongings. I 
feared that our ducks would be burned to death, so instead I grabbed a few ducks 
and ran. I was so shocked that I did not think clearly’. She made it to Havelock Road 
and then Kim Seng.
82 Sim Ah Tang (born 1932) and her husband had moved into a 
terrace house along Jalan Membina built by the Housing and Development Board 
after the 1959 blaze. But her family, comprising her blind mother and her brother 
and sister, were still living at Bukit Ho Swee. Upon seeing the flames and thick 
smoke, Sim asked a neighbour to take care of her daughter and ran barefoot from 
Jalan Membina to the fire site. Upon reaching her mother’s house, her feet blistered, 
Sim took her to safety, while her sister brought along her young children. The fire, it 
appeared to Sim, seemed to be coming from everywhere.
83 
 
 
                                                 
81 Author’s interview with Peter Lim, 8 Feb 2007. 
82 Author’s interview with Tay Yan Woon, 28 Sep 2006. 
83 Author’s interview with Steven Teo, 3 Apr 2007. 
  269Plate 6.5: Residents move their belongings as the flames, visible in the background, 
approach. Note the narrow passage they are moving through, and also the laundry hung out 
in the open which, most likely, would soon go up in flames (Courtesy of National Archives 
of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 6.6: Mutual help in a calamity. Men carry bulky furniture up the hill, while others rush 
in the opposite direction to render assistance (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 6.7: Another group of young men, carrying a heavy cupboard, reach the foot of Ma 
Kau Thiong (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
At the junction of Beo Lane and Havelock Road, fire victims, having 
struggled down the hill, dumped what personal belongings they had brought out 
  270  271
                                                
with them – bags of clothes, various pieces of furniture and pots and pans.
84 Small 
teams of men worked feverishly to carry bulky furniture and other heavy household 
items down the hill. Some of the items were pre-bundled or tied up in case of fire or 
just before the family had fled. Other fire victims deposited their rescued belongings 
on the ground floors of the 4- and 5-storey, partially-built HDB blocks of flats on the 
southern part of Ma Kau Thiong, and at other blocks of flats in Tiong Bahru Estate 
and Kai Fook Mansion at Kim Tian Road.
85 One or two individuals stood guard 
watching over these piles of salvaged items, but it was painfully clear that the 
number of fire victims vastly outnumbered the amount of property that had been 
saved from the flames. The flats of Ma Kau Thiong, which had escaped the blaze, 
became popular ‘fire watching spots’, with hundreds of onlookers clambering onto 
the upper floors and even the rooftop to observe the unfolding fiery path of 
destruction in the area opposite the cemetery.
86 
 
As the wooden houses on Bukit Ho Swee were rapidly destroyed, all the 
authorities could do was to set up a police roadblock at the entrance of Beo Lane to 
prevent people and possible looters from entering the fire site.
87 A long traffic jam 
stretched from Delta Circus to Delta and River Valley roads and as far as Alexandra 
Road. Fire victims, shell-shocked, slumped by the roadside. At about 8 pm, army 
soldiers cordoned off the main roads leading to the roundabout to prevent any 
further people from entering or leaving the stricken area.  
 
84 Author’s interview with Tan Ah Poh, 29 May 2007. 
85 NYSP, 26 May 1961; author’s interview with Bella Leong, 5 Oct 2006. 
86 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
87 NYSP, 26 May 1961.  
Plate 6.8: In the top left corner of the photograph, onlookers are clearly visible inside the 
partially-completed block of emergency flats at Ma Kau Thiong. In the foreground, more 
onlookers and fire victims, with their belongings, have gathered at the foot of the cemetery 
(Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 6.9: Fire victims guard their families’ possessions at the foot of Ma Kau Thiong 
(Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 6.10: The flames and towering clouds of smoke are visible from the foot of Ma Kau 
Thiong (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 6.11: An aerial view of the fire as it heads north towards Havelock Road, bypassing 
the partially-completed HDB flats on Ma Kau Thiong (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
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Plate 6.12: The fire, driven by a strong wind, changes direction and moves northwest from 
Beo Lane towards Delta Estate. In the foreground are the Tiong Bahru Fire Site emergency 
housing and the Tiong Bahru sewerage works (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 6.13: The charred ruins of a kampong: Beo Lane after the fire. The MCA shophouse is 
to the right of the picture (Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
  274Or Kio Tau and Havelock Road, from roughly 4.30 pm 
 
The blaze rolled down the hill towards Or Kio Tau at about 4.30 pm, 
engulfing a godown storing oil drums fronting Havelock Road. Havelock Road had 
become a temporary refuge for the homeless. As Jackie Sam, a Straits Times 
reporter covering the area, put it, Havelock Road now degenerated into 
pandemonium: ‘Panic sweeps through the whole area. Crowd is getting out of 
control. Mad scramble on narrow road as fire fighters shoulder their way against the 
surge of fleeing people’. He added that ‘a sea of humanity streams away from the 
fire’, as ‘[s]creaming women, dragging children and personal belongings, stagger 
and fall as they run from the red fury’.
88 Fire victims, as the Malay-language Berita 
Harian reported, were ‘swaying from side to side as they tried to run away from the 
fire’.
89 Many of them, like Madam Chng Ah Bek, an elderly lady, felt that ‘the fire 
was very big…I can’t describe it. I was overwhelmed by the sight of the fire. My 
legs felt weak even as I was running away’.
90 Inching their way through the dense 
human traffic were lorries, other vehicles and carts full of clothes, mattresses, 
furniture, and other personal belongings, while desperate fire victims on foot pushed 
sewing machines and lugged cupboards, tables and other furniture and personal 
belongings down the road.  
 
The mass confusion along Havelock and Tiong Bahru roads worsened after 
4.30 pm, as shocked men and women began returning home from work. Fragmented 
families sought frantically to locate their missing members. Among them was a 
middle-aged lady who had been working in a factory. Upon arriving home late in the 
afternoon and finding her house reduced to ashes, she cried out, ‘Where is my child? 
My house is totally burned down, where is my child?’ She fainted.
91 A Malay 
grandmother, 69, one of the forty-odd Malay families living along Havelock Road, 
was at home with her two grandchildren, one of whom was a 21-day-old baby, as 
their parents had gone out to celebrate Hari Raya. When the fire broke out, the 
grandmother, panic-stricken, rushed out of the house carrying both grandchildren – 
                                                 
88 ST, 26 May 1961. 
89 BH, 26 May 1961. 
90  SBC, audio-visual programme titled Diary of a Nation: Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 
broadcast on  25 May 1988. 
91 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
  275or so she thought. It turned out that instead of the baby, she was carrying a ti lam 
(‘mattress’). She hurried back and ‘with the help of God’ managed to save the other 
grandchild.
92 
 
At Or Kio Tau, courageous residents and more than ten fire engines 
attempted to make a stand against the inferno. Lim You Meng saw fire-fighters 
quickly alight from one fire engine along Havelock Road to cut off the gas supply to 
his uncle’s coffee shop at the Or Kio Tau shophouse.
93 Local youths climbed onto 
the roofs of wooden houses to pull off the attap while other residents doused the 
roofs with water or used axes, parangs and wooden poles to smash down walls and 
create fire breaks. Jackie Sam, reporting on the spot, applauded the ‘[m]agnificent 
teamwork’ being displayed as numerous hands reached out to unload the hoses. But 
such gestures were in fact motivated by sheer desperation, since ‘[a]t many points, 
youths snatch the hoses from the firemen. A bedraggled woman kneels on the water-
soaked road and begs fireman to save her burning house. Another youth, his face 
stained with tears, threatens to beat up a firemen because there is not enough water 
coming out of the hose’.
94 The Fire Brigade later stated, 
 
Large numbers of willing helpers who numerically overwhelmed the 
firemen were quite uncontrolled and in some cases deliberately 
obstructed members of the Brigade from carrying out their duties (the 
driver of the SFB lorry carrying the spare hose to the fire-ground 
reported that when he arrived at Havelock Road, panic-stricken 
members of the public snatched all the hose from his lorry)…. 
 
Fire appliances had difficulty arriving at the fire-ground particularly 
on the Havelock Road side, and having arrived, found it almost 
impossible to proceed to vantage points for fire fighting operations 
owing to hundreds of private cars full of sight-seers attracted by the 
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93 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
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  276smoke from the huge fire, which almost completely obstructed roads 
in the immediate vicinity.
95 
 
Fire officer Chan Thai Ho stated that ‘we were trying to rush in, and the crowds and 
occupants rushing out. And all the onlookers. In fact it made our job a nightmare’.
96  
 
 
Plate 6.14: Fire-fighters and policemen attempt to control the fire-fighting effort as 
volunteers unroll and even direct the fire hoses (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
 
The blaze, still driven by the swirling wind, could not be tamed. The 
Singapore Rural Residents’ Association’s Branch Office at Havelock Road Office 
was burned down. A local resident who had been out, upon hearing about the fire, 
drove back to Si Kah Teng but was stopped at the roadblock along Havelock Road. 
He left his car but returned later to find it ravaged by the flames.
97 By 5 pm, the 
inferno had become more ferocious than ever, forcing fire-fighters and fire engines 
to withdraw from both sides of Havelock Road. Two hours later, the row of 
shophouses facing Havelock Road was still ablaze. The Malayan Chinese 
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Plate 6.15: A shop on the ground floor of the MCA shophouse gutted by the flames 
(Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
 
Plate 6.16: Inspecting the damage to the shop. Note the adjoining shop is untouched by the 
fire (Courtesy of Wong Pok Hee). 
 
Association shophouse at 778 Havelock Road survived, although many of the shops 
on its ground floor and the homes on the upper floor were gutted. One of the shops 
not destroyed was Hiap Soon, the charcoal shop owned by Ong Ah Sai’s family. It 
  278was, incredibly to Ong, spared by the fire. She was ‘frightened to death’ about the 
safety of her three children but a shop worker drove the family away from the fire 
zone.
98 Tan Nam Sia had almost finished selling his noodles at the Or Kio Tau 
market and was about to leave. He saw the blaze approach and pushed his cart away 
quickly.
99  
 
Along Havelock Road, as elsewhere, the fire continued to wreck havoc with 
life as 
The children grabbed the back of my blouse. And I was still carrying 
                                                
the residents had known it. Tan Tiam Ho had gone out to watch a movie but 
rushed home to bring his wife, Beh Swee Kim, who had been preparing porridge for 
dinner, and their two children to safety. They took with them their sewing machine 
and money but not the furniture. His house, which his family was subletting to 
tenants, was burned down. ‘I was stunned’, Tan explained, ‘I realised that we would 
be bankrupt’.
100 Zhou Lian Che was alone with her five children, the youngest just a 
week past his first month. Ah Lau, her husband, had, at her behest, gone into Bukit 
Ho Swee to help her elder sister save her belongings. Zhou, like so many others, had 
thought the fire would not reach Havelock Road. However, she watched the progress 
of the blaze from a window and soon realised that it would reach her house. She 
panicked. Recalling that she was ‘quite stupid’, she forgot to contact her father, who 
lived across Havelock Road from her. She took her most important valuables – her 
children and her sewing machine, a common heirloom for married Chinese women, 
and joined the displaced throng moving along Havelock Road towards Kim Seng 
Road: 
 
my baby. I kept pushing my sewing machine. That time I was kong 
(‘panicked’) and I just kept pushing until Kim Seng. My voice was 
totally gone. My baby was only a month old. The fire started from 
that side [Si Kah Teng]. Why after burning that side, it would jump 
over here? Why was it flying here and there? I kept looking one way. 
Then I realised that the other side was also burning. It was very fast. 
 
98 Author’s interview with Ong Ah Sai, 19 Apr 2007. 
99 Author’s interview with Tan Nam Sia, 3 May 2007. 
100 Author’s interviews with Tan Tiam Ho, 12 Mar 2007, and Beh Swee Kim, 22 Jan 2007. 
  279There was a sauce factory at Or Kio Tau. Bing bing biang biang! I 
was very frightened when I heard that.
101 
 
The police initially directed the fire victims to the Delta-Ganges Community 
Centre but it quickly emptied as the flames approached. A sudden last-minute 
change in the wind direction saved the centre and the nearby Pepsi-Cola factory but 
not before burning down the wooden houses nearby. Teo Khoon Wah’s brother had 
a friend, ‘Ah Si’, who lived in a wooden house near the community centre and went 
to help his friend in Bukit Ho Swee move their belongings at the start of the fire but 
came home to find his house burned down.
102 In the same area also stood Ho Sing 
laundry shop, owned by Lum Siang Ho’s family. Her brother-in-law, returning from 
King’s Theatre, said that Si Kah Teng was burning. His father asked, ‘What has it 
got to do with you? We are in Havelock Road, the fire is in Tiong Bahru. It’s several 
streets away, how will the fire come over here?’ When the blaze was approaching, 
Lum recounted, her father-in-law still could not believe it. By a fortunate twist of 
fate, their shop was spared.
103 On the other hand, my father had seen the fire when 
he came out of a cinema at Great World Amusement Park and had rushed home. 
There, he found that his family had packed their clothes. They fled to Kim Seng 
Road, where ‘we stood there watching, to see if the fire would still come down to us 
or not’. When they finally returned home, their house was still standing. The scene 
of fire victims moving along Havelock Road, he recalled, was ‘just like in a war’.
104  
 
The residents of Hong Lim Pa Sat, who could see the flames clearly, heaved 
a collective sigh of relief. Teo Khoon Wah’s family had moved their belongings, 
including cupboards and three-quarters of the furniture, onto the doorstep of their 
wooden house as the fire neared Delta-Ganges Community Centre; they were ‘all 
struck dumb, children and adults’. The family thought ‘that the belongings would be 
safe outside the house but of course the fire could as easily burn them up outside the 
house as inside. As the fire had not reached our place yet, we kept bringing out more 
things, including our pots’.
105 Joyce Soh had feared for her second sister, who had a 
                                                 
101 Author’s interview with Zhou Lian Che, 21 Feb 2006. 
102 Author’s interview with Teo Khoon Wah, 23 Mar 2007. 
103 Author’s interview with Lum Siang Onn, 4 Aug 2007. 
104 Author’s interview with Loh Tian Ho, 13 Jan 2006. 
105 Author’s interview with Teo Khoon Wah, 23 Mar 2007. 
  280lame leg and would have to be carried away if the fire moved in the direction of their 
house at 52 Covent Garden. As the blaze veered away, leaving the Giok Hong Tian 
temple at Carey Road unscathed, she felt that Ti Kong (‘the Heavenly God’) had 
protected both the temple and her invalid sister.
106  
 
The throng of fire victims along Havelock Road, according to the Sin Chew 
Jit Poh, looked ‘as if they had been through a war’.
107 Madam Hu, caretaker at Fuk 
Tak Tong Temple, helped fire victims fleeing down the hill to move their belongings; 
she observed, ‘They weren’t heading anywhere, they just ran to places where there 
wasn’t fire and then they would stop. There was no destination in their minds’.
108 
Writer-poet Tian Liu later captured the sheer desolation of the landscape in a poem 
titled ‘Fiery Plunder’. In the ‘sea of humanity’ moving along Havelock Road, he 
recalled, ‘the woeful cries of fleeing people resemble those of wailing spirits!’ There 
were, Liu observed, ‘men, women, old, and young; their faces are a sheet of pale’, 
among whom ‘some mourn the loss of decades of savings and property’, while 
‘others weep by the streets, uncertain of the whereabouts of separated family 
members!’.
109 
 
Policemen began to direct the human mass of refugees and spectators 
eastwards towards Kim Seng Road but their attempt at crowd control was resisted 
desperately by individuals at various points in the area. ‘Now and then’, Jackie Sam 
reported, ‘a man or a woman tries to rush into flaming houses. They are pulled back 
by Police and St. John Ambulance men’.
110 A woman broke out of the crowd asking 
to be allowed to go to the other end of the road to look for her only child. A Punjabi 
milkman, with a trance-like smile on his face, walked to the edge of the fire. Pulled 
back by a policeman, he told him to mind his own business, for he wanted to be in 
his house when it caught fire.
111 An elderly woman dashed out of her house with 
two chickens but the police would not allow her to bring them. The crowd shouted 
to her to leave the chickens behind, and she finally did so, walking away sadly and 
                                                 
106 Author’s interview with Joyce Soh, 5 Apr 2007. Soh was referring to the Giok Hong Tian Temple. 
107 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
108 Author’s interview with Madam Hu, 8 Feb 2007. 
109 SCJP, 2 Jun 1961. Tian Liu’s real name is Zhong Wen Ling. 
110 ST, 26 May 1961. 
111 ST, 26 May 1961. 
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with her hand covering her face.
112 At the other end of the road at Delta Circus, a 
middle-aged man broke through the police cordon and headed towards the fire, 
shouting, ‘I want to see my father! I want to see my father!’
113 The painful and 
involuntary separation from one’s house and property was particularly felt by elderly 
residents. Koh Chuan Seng, a fire victim, had to pull his grandfather from the house, 
since ‘[m]y grandfather, he came down all the way from China. He wanted to stay 
inside the house. He says this is my property. “I think I will stay here inside, I will 
be safe, and my house will be safe, because this is mine”’.
114 There was, Tay Ah 
Chuan remembered, a shop making paper bags from newspapers in the kampong. 
‘When the fire burned the shop’, Tay related, ‘the shop owner wanted to jump in but 
many people grabbed him. His whole fortune was ther
 
Effective crowd control, however, also involuntarily separated fire victim 
families. Ong Chye Ho was out at work in a sawmill in the Central Area; he rode 
back hurriedly on a bicycle but was halted at a roadblock at Great World 
Amusement Park. It was only much later, when he was finally allowed into the fire 
site, that he found ‘everything was gone, everything was flattened’.
116 Similarly Tan 
Geok Hak was working in Sembawang and was informed by her British employer 
that Beo Lane was on fire. She hurried back in a taxi and, because of the traffic jam, 
alighted at Great World. She tried to reach Bukit Ho Swee on foot but was unable to 
gain entry. She was frightened; her husband, a Rediffusion employee, was also out 
at work and it was 6 pm, and already growing dark. She telephoned her mother-in-
law but her three children were not with her. Tan discovered only later that the 
nanny had taken the children to their grandfather in the Kampong Bugis area.
117  
 
The fire victims gradually headed eastwards towards Kim Seng Road, with 
hundreds soon sheltered in the Havelock Road police station. But at the junction of 
River Valley Road and Jervois Road, Madam Chua Kim Neo, 31, sat on the roadside 
sobbing; six of her children, from ages 3 to 12, were missing.
118 At 5 pm, there was 
 
112 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
113 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
114 RCS, audio programme titled Then and Now: A Look At Housing, 16 Sep 1972. 
115 Author’s interview with Tay Ah Chuan, 21 Feb 2006. 
116 Author’s interview with Ong Chye Ho, 14 Feb 2007. 
117 Author’s interview with Tan Geok Hak, 5 Oct 2006. 
118 ST, 26 May 1961.  
Plate 6.17: A lorry belonging to ‘广源兴’ soy sauce company in Bukit Ho Swee drives away 
the family’s possessions along Zion Road (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
reportedly a degree of crowd control. ‘A human barrier is formed across a wide area’, 
with policemen using poles to hold back the crowd.
119 Policemen Mohamad Yusoff 
experienced ‘a lot of havoc’ and heard ‘the screaming’. He found it difficult to 
distinguish between fire victims and onlookers and ‘sometimes we had to use force 
to do the crowd control’.
120 At about 6 pm, British army soldiers from Alexandra 
Camp and Singapore Military Forces stationed at the Beach Road Camp began to 
arrive at the main roads, helping the police to enforce law and order. By 8 pm, an 
effective cordon, comprising 141 police officers and 1,205 policemen and 35 army 
officers and 600 other ranks, had been formed around the fire zone.
121 
 
                                                 
119 ST, 26 May 1961. 
120 OHC, interview with Mohamad Yusoff bin Kassim, 23 Apr 1994. 
121 SLAD, 31 May 1961, p. 1594. 
  283Delta Estate, about 5.30 pm 
 
At 5 pm, the blaze turned northeast and crossed a second main road, 
Havelock Road. Littered about in this area up to Ganges Avenue were more 
haphazard collections of highly-flammable materials, as well as a car tyre shop and a 
battery shop. Upon contact with the flames, the sulfuric acid inside the batteries 
exploded, producing acrid green smoke with a strong corrosive smell. Two timber 
yards, two junk shops, two tyre shops, three motor workshops, and one coffee mill 
in this area were also gutted, while the Delta Branch Office of the Liberal Socialist 
Party had its back wall burned away. Goh Yong Soo saw the fire approaching his 
house from the shophouses at Or Kio Tau; his family quickly loaded onto the small 
pickup his father used for transporting cloth and fled.
122 
  
Half an hour later, the fire reached the 2- to 4-storey Singapore Improvement 
Trust flats at Delta Estate along Ganges Avenue.
123 The residents, having seen the 
flames shift in their direction, had started throwing mattresses and clothes out of 
their windows and removing beds, tables and other belongings from the flats before 
moving away from the danger zone. Madam Chua Geok Sim, 37, a housewife, left 
her house and pushed a sewing machine ahead of her, loaded with clothes with five 
children tugging at her trousers.
124 Eva Hamsha (born 1952) and her family stayed at 
Block 58, a 4-storey SIT block of flats. Her father and their neighbour used a hose to 
wet the walls of the flats, while Eva and her mother, grandmother and seven children 
left and walked to their grandmother’s house at Farrer Park. But ignoring the fire-
fighters’ calls for him to leave, her father, Eva recalled, refused and wanted ‘to stay 
put to fend for his house. He said he would come later but he did not come. He 
thought that he and his neighbour would protect the house’. In the end, the block 
was not attacked by the flames.
125  
 
                                                 
122 Author’s interview with Goh Yong Soo, 25 Jul 2007. 
123 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
124 ST, 26 May 1961. 
125 Author’s interview with Eva Hamsha, 2 May 2007. 
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Plate 6.18: The fire has reached Delta Estate. Note the crowd of fire victims and onlookers 
spilled along Alexandra and Delta roads (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
By 6.30 pm, the blaze was solidly centered around Delta Estate. Here was 
supposedly ‘a barrier of concrete flats’,
126 but the rooftops of two blocks of flats and 
a nearby 3-storey building caught fire within an hour. Fire engines were hastily re-
deployed from Si Kah Teng to this new emergent fire front, while army technicians 
entered the SIT flats to cut off the electricity supply. The great difficulty at Delta 
Circus, as Straits Times journalist Roderick Pestana surmised, was once again the 
inadequate water supply. Soldiers in desperation resorted to damming the drain at 
Ganges Avenue with wooden planks and grass and used drain water to fight the 
flames. Nevertheless, the fire still managed to destroy a portion of the rooftops of 
the two SIT blocks.
127 At one point, the flames approached within twenty yards of 
the Singapore Steam Laundry, threatening the large stores of oil in the factories and 
warehouses nearby. With the night sky aglow with raging fire, fire-fighters 
commenced ‘an all-out bid to halt the wall of flames’; at about 10 pm, it was 
reported that ‘[t]he battle against the fire was fought – and won – near the Delta 
                                                 
126 ST, 26 May 1961. 
127 ST, 26 May 1961. 
  285Circus’.
128 Nearly seven hours after the start of the disaster, the fire finally began to 
be brought under control, or more accurately, had burned itself out against the 
facades of the SIT blocks.
129 Thick smoke continued to billow into the sky, 
obscuring the moonlight. The Havelock Road area had been plunged into complete 
darkness because the two sub-stations supplying power to the area had been knocked 
out. Deep into the night, City Council wiremen worked feverishly to repair electrical 
installations which had been short-circuited by the fire, while fire-fighters 
extinguished small pockets of flames and continued the damping-down operation 
until the evening of 28 May.
130 
 
Arc of Destruction 
 
The Chinese press labelled the Bukit Ho Swee fire ‘the unprecedented 
inferno’ (‘空前大火’). It was an apt description in terms of the scale of destruction, 
which carved out an arc of devastation from Si Kah Teng, Beo Lane, Or Kio Tau to 
Delta Estate. The disaster devastated 2,200 dwellings and a large number of brick 
and concrete buildings standing on 100 acres of land and destroyed property worth 
an estimated $2 million.
131 The number of registered fire victims was 2,833 families 
totaling 15,694 persons, nearly three times the number in the next largest fire, the 
1959 blaze which had ravaged the other side of Tiong Bahru Road. The 1961 fire 
victim population was a young one, comprising 7,816 persons 15 years and above 
and 7,878 persons under 15, many of whom had escaped only with the clothes on 
their back.
132 Most of the homeless had not purchased fire insurance, which was 
beyond the means of a low-income population.
133 Many school-going fire victims 
did not attend class the following day: at Delta East School, for instance, the 
attendance was only 88 out of 645 pupils for the morning session and 209 out of 647 
pupils for the afternoon session, while there were only 327 out of 620 pupils for the 
                                                 
128 ST, 26 May 1961. 
129 The Fire Brigade sent a ‘Stop Message’ to Fire Control at 8.20 pm. FD, Annual Report 1961, p. 7. 
130 FD, Annual Report 1961, p. 7. 
131 ST, 26 May 1961. The Nanyang Siang Pau estimated the damage to be $10 million. NYSP, 26 
May 1961. 
132 SLAD, 31 May 1961, pp. 1565, 1605. 
133 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
  286morning session at Havelock Road School.
134 Of the 805 pupils of Kai Kok Public 
School, 526 were fire victims.
135 Although some of the houses and shops had been 
insured, many were not.
136 An elderly owner of a medical hall gutted by the blaze, 
which had previously been insured but not at the time of the fire, estimated his 
losses to be $6-7,000.
137 Littered throughout the fire site were the charred carcasses 
of pigs, poultry, cats, and dogs, the putrid odour of which filled the area with a 
sickening stench.
138 Among the ashes and carcasses, the kampong economy also lay 
in ruins. However, some livestock had been saved, causing journalists to wonder if 
‘among the fire victims, some had apparently lost their minds’, ‘emerging from the 
fire site with their pigs, chickens and ducks’.
139 
 
 
Plate 6.19: Safe from the fire but heart-broken (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
                                                 
134 ME 2213/61, Memo from Principal, Delta East School, to Director of Education, MOE, 27 May 
1961; and Un-Authored Memo titled ‘Kampong Ho Swee Fire’, 26 May 1961. 
135 ME 913/57, Memo titled ‘Kai Kok School’ by Chin Boon Kwong, MOE, 13 Jun 1961. 
136 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
137 NYSP, 27 May 1961. 
138  SBC, audio-visual programme titled Diary of a Nation: Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 
broadcast on 25 May 1988. 
139 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
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Plate 6.20: The Bukit Ho Swee fire in the public imagination. The disaster was the subject in 
the works of several social-minded artists in the 1960s. Here, Koeh Sia Yong depicts a 
family’s grief in ‘失去家园’ (‘Lost Homes’). The son is wearing a mourning band on his 
arm, indicating that his father, and probably the family’s main breadwinner, has recently 
passed away. Koeh saw the towering cloud of black smoke from his house in Hougang. He 
went to see the fire site afterwards. Author’s interview with Koeh Sia Yong, 15 Mar 2007. 
 
 
Plate 6.21: Artist Liu Kang’s painting, titled ‘After the Fire’, on the sorrow of Chinese 
families who had lost their homes in the inferno (Courtesy of National Museum of 
Singapore). 
 
  288There were only four reported fatalities in the disaster. The first alleged death 
from the fire was Kee Hock Lian, a 50-year-old Chinese man formerly residing at 
253 Tiong Bahru Road, who was brought to the General Hospital at about 3.40 pm 
but died shortly after. Further medical investigation, the Sin Chew Jit Poh warned, 
was necessary to establish the exact cause of death.
140 It turned out that Kee had 
died of heart failure shortly before the fire occurred and had been ill for 6-7 
months  
blaze.
145 Ironically, Lim had been born just after the 1934 Bukit Ho Swee 
fire.
146 
 
                                                
.
141
 
The first confirmed fatality was a young Chinese man named Lim Tong Seng, 
27, whose remains were found at 25-D Bukit Ho Swee, about fifty yards from the 
Boon Tiong Road flats, on 27 May.
142 Lim had been mentally ill for more than ten 
years and had received treatment at Woodbridge Hospital. He had studied at Kai 
Kok School and had worked for a few months as a compositor at the Nanyang Siang 
Pau, a job he had to leave as his illness progressed.
143 According to Lim’s third 
brother, who discovered his remains upon returning to their former house to look for 
him, the family had locked Lim up in his room as he could occasionally become 
violent. When the fire broke out, his father, a lorry driver, was at work while his 
mother had gone to visit a friend. The second brother had the presence of mind to 
unlock Lim’s room but the family had concentrated on helping their aged 
grandmother, 77, who had to be carried away. Someone, according to the Nanyang 
Siang Pau, had seen Lim ‘run out from the house but when he saw the great fire 
burning outside, he laughed out loudly. Then he ran back into his house’.
144 The 
Straits Times, however, reported the younger brother as stating that when the fire 
was approaching, his sister had tried to drag Lim out of their home but he had 
struggled. As the flames reached the house, the sister dashed out and turned round to 
see it a
 
140 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
141 Coroner’s Court, Master Record Book, View No. 329 Kee Hock Lian, 26 May 1961; SFP, 27 May 
1961. The Coroner gave a ‘natural causes’ verdict. 
142  Coroner’s Court, Master Record Book, Inquest No. 346 Lim Tong Seng, 27 May 1961; FD, 
Annual Report 1961, p. 3. 
143 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
144 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
145 ST, 27 May 1961. 
146 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
  289The second death was an unidentified elderly Chinese female, whose charred 
body was discovered on the same day at 23 Bukit Ho Swee in a wooden house about 
a hundred yards from where Lim’s body had been discovered.
147 According to a 
neighbour of the deceased, she was already in her 70s and was staying with a 
relative. Her eyesight was poor and she was nearly blind. She had also been ill for 
long periods and had been bed-ridden. In the confusion caused by the fire, it seemed, 
the neighbours had assumed that someone had taken the old lady to safety and had 
concentrated all their efforts on helping the young children.
148 The third fatality was 
Ong Chee Chai, an elderly Chinese man aged 70, who had lived at 13-B Bukit Ho 
Swee.
149 Ong’s body was discovered by his son, who had returned on the 29
th to 
look for the family’s belongings. It appeared that Ong did not manage to escape in 
time and was burned to death inside his own house.
150 The final body found was 
another Chinese man, Gan Khek Seng, also aged 70, whose remains were discovered 
much later – in mid-June – at 612 Havelock Road.
151 The small number of fatalities 
was testament to the ability of the vast majority of fire victims, however much they 
were possessed by panic, to both sound the alarm and find their way through the 
small lanes of the kampong to safety at the main roads. 
 
Teams from St. John’s Ambulance and the Red Cross tended to the injured 
on-site. The number of registered casualties who sought treatment at the General 
Hospital was about 85.
152 Among them were elderly people, children, women, and 
fire-fighters who had suffered burns, fallen down in the confusion, inhaled smoke, 
fainted in the crush of bodies, or had been hurt by objects. One fire-fighter had 
accidentally inhaled the corrosive fumes produced by burning sulfuric acid in a 
                                                 
147 Coroner’s Court, Master Record Book, Inquest No. 349 unnamed, 28 May 1961. The remains 
were discovered by a Tan Boon Ann and an ‘open’ verdict was ruled. The Fire Brigade reports the 
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  290battery shop and fainted.
153 Most of the casualties suffered relatively light injuries 
and were treated as outpatients, except for a 60-year-old Chinese man, a 11-year-old 
girl and a 1½-year-old toddler, who had more serious injuries and were hospitalised 
for further treatment, but they were not considered to be in serious danger.
154  
 
Five hours before the fire had been brought under control, a semblance of 
law and order had been established on the main roads by the police and military.
155 
But incidents of theft, robbery and looting had been reported throughout the day, as 
opportunists took full advantage of the mayhem to pilfer the contents of vacated 
houses or the piles of salvaged items dumped on unguarded open ground.
156 At 
about 3.30 pm, a man staying in Si Kah Teng, whose house was burned down, had 
already lost a leather case, in which he had kept the family’s valuables and which he 
had placed outside his house.
157 Similarly, Roy Chan was watching a Brazilian 
circus performance at Great World Amusement Park when he noticed a giant cloud 
of smoke at Havelock Road. When his friend warned him that his house might be on 
fire, Chan’s first thought was, ‘Don’t anyhow say. It cannot be, the smoke is so far’. 
He nevertheless went back to his house at 585 Havelock Road, taking a shortcut 
through the wooden houses of Hong Lim Pa Sat, to find his house still standing but 
vacated and locked. He forced his way into the house, whereupon a large crowd of 
‘50-60’ strangers entered the house and, over his protests, began to ransack his home. 
‘These people’, Chan maintained, ‘were curious onlookers. If one started taking 
something, the others followed suit. Everybody copycat, all stealing things’. He lost 
his watch and stamp collection and the family’s porcelain and jewellery, but the 
greatest loss for his mother was her monthly expenses of $300. There was one fire 
engine standing outside his house, with a single driver but no fire-fighters or 
                                                 
153 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
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155 ‘Profiteers’ and looters had long been observed at the sites of Singapore’s postwar fires. The 
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  291policemen. Chan eventually found his family at Delta-Ganges Community Centre, 
and was berated for opening the doors to the looters.
158 
 
At nightfall, Pang Ming Toh and his family returned to their barber shop 
along Tiong Bahru Road. All around were the burned out ruins and ashes of former 
buildings. They could still feel the heat emanating from their shop – it ‘was 轰轰的’ 
[‘hot’] and even the walls were hot. Afraid that the walls and ceiling would collapse 
and crush them, the family waited out the night outside the shop.
159 
 
Besides its scale, the Bukit Ho Swee inferno was also unprecedented in being 
the first massive fire which confronted the People’s Action Party government, only 
elected to power less than two years earlier. Throughout the afternoon of the 25
th, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the police made frequent radio broadcasts urging 
fire victims not to panic, to stay clear of the roads to prevent obstructing the fire-
fighters, and to report to designated relief centres.
160 Following the abandonment of 
the original relief centre at Delta-Ganges Community Centre, a permanent relief 
centre was established at Kim Seng Road at 4.30 pm, while temporary centres were 
set up at Seng Poh Road Chinese School and Tiong Bahru English Primary School 
for fire victims from the Tiong Bahru area. Between 6-8 pm, for instance, about 300 
fire victims arrived at Tiong Bahru School.
161 At about 6 pm, the health services, 
Red Cross and St. John’s Ambulance moved into the Kim Seng relief centre.
162 At 8 
pm, Lee Kuan Yew arrived at Delta Circus in a Police Land Rover. He toured the 
fire site before departing to visit the Delta and Kim Seng relief centres. Mobbed by 
distraught fire victims who had been separated from their children, he asked them 
not to worry excessively, assuring them that the children would be found and 
brought to the relief centres. He suggested that they patiently wait until the 
following day to report the missing children to the Social Welfare Department.
163 
On the same day, almost the entire cabinet and other key PAP officials like Chan 
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Choy Siong, Assemblywoman for Delta, visited the fire site and helped fire victims 
move their belongings away from the fire. At 7.30 pm, Chan and her partner, Ong 
Pang Boon, Minister for National Development, arrived at the Kim Seng relief 
centre to supervise the relief operations, while K. M. Byrne, Minister for Labour and 
Law, looked after the Seng Poh School relief centre.
164 An organised relief effort on 
the spot began to take shap
 
164 Including the Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye, Minister of Culture S. Rajaratnam, Minister 
for Labour and Law K. M. Byrne, Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee, Minister of the Interior Ong 
Pang Boon, Minister for National Development Tan Kia Gan, and Assemblyman for Tiong Bahru 
Lee Teck Him. SCJP, 26 May 1961.  
 Chapter 7 
State of Emergency 
 
Out of the devastation and pandemonium on the day of the inferno emerged a 
massive effort by the People’s Action Party government to remake a shattered Bukit 
Ho Swee community. The rehabilitation and emergency housing of the fire victims 
commenced on the very night of the fire and culminated in the successful 
completion of a public housing estate on the fire site just nine months later. The 
relief work constituted part of a PAP campaign, conducted within a national state of 
emergency occasioned by the calamity. It aimed to rapidly rehouse the fire victims 
in public housing built on the fire site and transform a burned-out area of ‘Old 
Singapore’ as an icon of modernity. This chapter examines the crucial initial stage of 
the relief operation from the provision of shelter and food at the disaster relief centre 
to the fire victims’ relocation in temporary Housing and Development Board flats 
within the space of several months. The relief work was driven by both historical 
expedients and new political forces: the PAP had inherited the colonial policy and 
practice of fire relief developed from the kampong blazes of the 1950s. However, 
the party also possessed a greater determination to push through its social welfare 
programmes more quickly and with less tolerance for political and social opposition 
than the British colonial regime countenanced. Yet, as this chapter reveals, many fire 
victims also responded vigorously to two contentious issues arising from the Bukit 
Ho Swee fire: the economic costs of the new public housing and the actual cause of 
the fire. The resistance to the social changes being imposed from above threatened 
to unhinge the relief operation.  
  
Fire Site 
 
Comprehensive control of the fire site was integral to the government’s plan 
to build a modern housing estate upon the blackened ashes of Bukit Ho Swee and 
prevent the emergence of another settlement of unauthorised wooden housing. Tan 
Kia Gan, who had replaced Ong Eng Guan as Minister for National Development, 
blamed the fire on the unauthorised buildings built by ‘unscrupulous racketeers who 
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live off the miseries of the poor’; he announced later that he had ordered the Chief 
Building Surveyor to demolish any unauthorised buildings as soon as they were 
spotted.
1 As the fire burned itself out at Delta Estate on the night of 25 May, more 
than 1,500 policemen, Singapore Military Forces soldiers and steel-helmeted 
Gurkhas with fixed bayonets maintained a cordon around the fire site.
2 On the 
following morning, with dark clouds of smoke still overhanging the area, armed 
police and soldiers established checkpoints at the entrances of Beo Lane and at other 
strategic entry points into the fire site. They scrutinised the identification cards of 
fire victims standing in long queues to prevent unauthorised access into the area. 
Even so, former residents who knew the kampong’s geography well could still 
bypass the checkpoints and find their own way into the blackened site.
3 Granted 
official access to their former homes, other fire victims searched for their belongings 
beneath burnt sheets of zinc under the watchful eyes of policemen and soldiers, 
while detectives patrolled the area to prevent looting.
4 The Police Commissioner, A. 
E. G. Blades, toured the fire site the morning after the fire. Two men who entered 
without authorisation, reportedly ‘out of curiosity’, were arrested and fined $10 
each.
5 Nonetheless, incidents of looting occurred at the fire site. On 29 May, cash 
and cigarettes were stolen from a coffeeshop which had escaped destruction.
6 Three 
days later, in two separate cases of theft, a sewing machine, and jewellery and cash 
were also stolen.
7 In subsequent months, the HDB patrolled the site to prevent the 
rebuilding of unauthorised housing and demolished half-burnt buildings.
8 
 
For some fire victims, returning to their former homes was rewarded with the 
recovery of pots, sewing machines, pans, basins, dishes, and even money and 
jewellery. One family retrieved thousands of dollars hidden in jars buried in the 
ground.
9 For some, the recovered items were not merely tangible material assets but 
also signified the social glue required to rebuild personal and family lives. When
 
1 SLAD, 31 May 1961, pp. 1567-68. 
2 ST, 27 May 1961. 
3 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
4 SFP, 26 May 1961. 
5 SFP, 28 Jun 1961. 
6 ST, 29 May 1961. 
7 ST, 1 Jun 1961. 
8 HB 993/50 Vol. III, Assistant Lands Officer’s Report, May 1961. 
9 SFP, 26 May 1961.  
Plate 7.1: Fire victims search through the debris at the fire site (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 7.2: Families with buckets search in the charred ruins. A girl walks away with a bucket 
of what she has salvaged. Two bulldozers stand ready in the background (Courtesy of 
National Archives of Singapore). 
 
Tan Geok Hak’s family returned to their former house in Beo Lane, they searched 
for and found their sewing machine. Tan repaired it for $200. ‘After that’, she 
explained, ‘it was OK, and I’m still using it. It had been charred. It is a Singer [an 
  297American brand of sewing machine], not the normal Japanese brand, that was no 
good. Mine is a Singer’. The repair of the sewing machine, an important family asset 
in the 1950s, at a cost equal to the monthly salary of a low-income worker, heralded 
the reconstruction of Tan’s family life.
10  
 
 
Plate 7.3: Tan Geok Hak’s Singer sewing machine, still being used, in her flat in Bukit Ho 
Swee, 2006 (Photograph by author). 
 
Nevertheless, in other cases, what little was salvaged from the ashes merely 
underscored the enormity of the personal loss. Goh Sin Tub, Deputy Director of the 
Social Welfare Department, recalled, 
 
It’s strange what people rush to save from fires – an old broken-down 
sewing machine looking more like junk, old kitchen pots and dented 
pans and (would you believe it?) a chamber-pot! Here I saw a child 
clutching her dirty plastic doll and there a man with a battered 
suitcase filled with rags and old shoes. Others were just as pathetic: a 
lady with a stack of patchwork blankets; an old man naked to the 
waist seated with a protective hand on a faded picture of an ancestral-
                                                 
10 Author’s interview with Tan Geok Hak, 5 Oct 2006. 
  298looking old lady; some ladies with mysterious cloth bundles, big and 
small; a boy with a stack of school books and some comics.
11 
 
For instance, a middle-aged sailor retrieved a few burnt washbasins and metal 
buckets near his former house. As he was at work during the fire, only his wife and 
children had been at home and had not taken along their savings when they fled.
12 
An elderly man, about 70, also returned to the site of his medical shop. There, 
poking at the charred earth with a blackened stick, he managed to recover some 
medicine containers in relatively good condition. But the mainstay of his life, the 
shop itself which he had owned for decades, had been completely destroyed. It had 
once been insured but the insurance company had later refused to offer insurance. 
He estimated his losses to be about $6,000-7,000.
13  
 
A Maelstrom of Activity at the Relief Centre 
 
To the northeast of the fire site was the relief centre, the second and by far 
the most important arena of official regulation. Lee Kuan Yew stated that the 
government’s responsibility was to provide the fire victims with water, food and 
clothing, and at the same time help them find new homes.
14 The government’s first 
efforts to organise a proper venue where the fire victims could be sheltered, fed and 
registered were tentative. The SWD had originally estimated the number of fire 
victims at only 6,000.
15 On the night of the fire, about 2,200 fire victims had sought 
shelter at the five schools along Kim Seng Road which had been designated as the 
main relief centre: Kim Seng East (English), Kim Seng West (Integrated), River 
Valley Government Chinese Middle, River Valley Primary (Chinese), and River 
Valley Primary (English).
16 At about 8.30 pm, fire victims had begun streaming into 
the classrooms of the River Valley English School, which the principal and his staff 
                                                 
11 Goh Sin Tub, ‘The Bukit Ho Swee Fire’, Goh's 12 Best Singapore Stories (Singapore: Heinemann 
Asia, 1993), p. 161. 
12 NYSP, 27 May 1961. 
13 NYSP, 27 May 1961. 
14 RCS, audio programme titled Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s Speech On Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 26 
May 1961. 
15 SFP, 26 May 1961. 
16 Classes for the schools’ students were held provisionally at Havelock and Delta schools. 
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17 Another 1,070 persons moved into the Seng 
Poh School and Tiong Bahru School temporary relief centres.
18 At about 11 pm, 
after the fire was brought under control, fire victims and their relatives housed at the 
Delta-Ganges Community Centre were told that the SWD would transfer them to the 
Kim Seng relief centre, where they would be registered and fed. However, there 
were still about 13,000 unaccounted fire victims who stayed with relatives and 
friends or went elsewhere on the night of the fire. Beh Poh Suan, who lacked 
supportive friends and relatives before the fire, spent the night out in the open. As 
she starkly put it, ‘I just took my child and his milk powder and we went to sleep at 
Ma Kau Thiong. We slept with the dead’. The unfortunate pair were brought to the 
Kim Seng relief centre the following day.
19  The next morning, army trucks 
transferred the fire victims from the temporary school centres and Delta-Ganges 
Community Centre to the Kim Seng centre. On the same morning, the SWD’s 
Public Assistance Section handed out $10 relief payments, clothing and household 
utensils to 10,261 fire victims.
20 
 
Within a week, the number of fire victims at the centre grew to more than 
8,000, over half of the total number of homeless. This meant, however, that a large 
minority were still able to obtain temporary accommodation with relatives and 
friends or, in rare cases, find a new house. Lim You Meng’s family, for instance, 
sought shelter in their uncle’s coffeeshop in the Or Kio Tau shophouse on the night 
of the fire. Once the fire site was sealed off, they moved into an attap house near the 
Tiong Bahru sewerage works, where they stayed for the next several months.
21 
Similarly, Sim Kim Boey and her sister-in-law moved further away into a friend’s 
house at Hougang,
22 while Tan Tiam Ho’s family moved in temporarily with a 
friend, going to the relief centre only to register as fire victims in order to be eligible 
for relief assistance.
23 
 
                                                 
17 ME 2213/61, Memo from Principal, River Valley English School, to Director of Education, MOE, 
31 May 1961. 
18 SFP, 26 May 1961. 
19 Author’s interview with Beh Poh Suan, 14 Feb 2007. 
20  SWD 81/61 Vol. I, Minutes of Meeting of the Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund 
Committee, 27 May 1961. 
21 Author’s interview with Lim You Meng, 13 Apr 2007. 
22 Author’s interview with Sim Kim Boey, 14 Feb 2007. 
23 Author’s interview with Tan Tiam Ho, 12 Mar 2007. 
  300‘A maelstrom of activity’ quickly engulfed the relief centre.
24 Throughout 
the 26
th, the authorities worked feverishly around the clock to organise the schools 
as emergency camps. The SWD was at the forefront of this massive operation and 
would later hail it as ‘the greatest challenge ever to be met in its fifteen-year-old 
span of existence’.
25 W. S. Woon assured the fire victims that it was only a matter of 
time before the Department got organised.
26  But communications between 
government departments at times broke down and threatened to derail the unfolding 
organisational work. At River Valley Middle School, which had not originally been 
designated as one of the schools for the relief operation, students turned up for class 
in the morning and had to be dismissed. The fire victims arrived at the school shortly 
afterwards at 9 am but had to queue ‘4-5 deep’ for several hours before being 
properly registered by SWD officials and teachers from the schools. The fire victims 
became so frustrated by the long wait that teachers trying to control the crowd were 
abused and threatened in the process. It was only at 4 pm that the police were able to 
take over the crowd control duties.
27  
 
The classrooms in the 3- and 4-storey buildings in the five schools were 
hurriedly converted into living quarters. Every room soon became congested with a 
family occupying each corner, sleeping on mattresses and surrounded by possessions 
salvaged from the fire piled up on the floor. Infants slept on chairs which parents 
had improvised into makeshift beds. Besides the fire victims, there was also the odd 
unexpected resident; Tay Yan Woon, for instance, had saved her family’s ducks 
from the fire and brought them to the centre. There, she reared them for a few days 
before a relative took them away.
28 As the number of fire victims rose in the course 
of the following days, families spilled out into the corridors and jammed the 
staircases of the school buildings. To ease the congestion, the British Army set up 
twenty tents in the open school compounds on 29 May. The tents, ringed by barbed 
wire, provided accommodation for 600 persons but living in the open subjected the 
tent dwellers to the unrelenting heat of the sun. Ong Chye Ho, who lived in such a 
                                                 
24 OHC, interview with Goh Sin Tub, 12 Oct 1993. 
25 SWD, Annual Report 1961, p. 1. 
26 ST, 27 May 1961. 
27 ME 2213/61, Memo from Principal, River Valley Government Chinese Middle School, to Chief 
Inspector of Schools, MOE, 26 May 1961; and Memo from Principal, River Valley Government 
Chinese Middle School, to Chief Inspector of Schools, MOE, 27 May 1961. 
28 Author’s interview with Tay Yan Woon, 28 Sep 2006. 
  301tent, found that it was hot and impossible to sleep, and people frequently watered the 
canvas to keep the tent cool.
29 Many fire victims soon left the stifling confines of the 
classrooms and tents in droves for the somewhat cooler corridors and staircases of 
the buildings, leaning against or sitting on the parapets, or resting in grassy areas 
around the buildings which were under shade. 
 
 
Plate 7.4: Fire victims at the relief centre (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
The organisation and establishment of the relief centre, as HDB architect 
Alan Choe later observed, ‘tested the whole machinery of the government in 
action’.
30 When the PAP government was first elected to power, its relationship with 
the civil service had been strained by its strident anti-colonial posture, which briefly 
resulted in a pay-cut for civil servants in June 1959. By the time of the fire, however, 
with the expulsion of the populist Ong Eng Guan from the government, the PAP had 
largely obtained the cooperation of the bureaucracy. As Goh Sin Tub explained, the 
civil service was modeled on the British ministerial system and trained to be loyal to 
the government of the day, while the PAP leaders were also considered honest and 
dedicated, the very qualities which the civil service upheld.
31  
 
                                                 
29 Author’s interview with Ong Chye Ho, 14 Feb 2007. 
30 OHC, interview with Alan Choe, 1 Jul 1997. 
31  OHC, interview with Goh Sin Tub, 12 Oct 1993. The civil service also supported the PAP 
government because of the rapid Malayanisation of the service and the creation of a Political Study 
Centre in 1959 to obtain the support of the civil servants for the government’s policies. Singapore, 
Annual Report 1959, p. 14. 
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he civil and military services consequently cooperated with the government 
and pla
ompared to the earlier efforts of the British colonial regime and Labour 
Front g
                                                
T
yed crucial roles in assisting the relief operation, putting into practice the 
valuable experience they had gained from previous kampong fires. The British 
Army supplied 8,000 blankets and 6,000 mattresses for the fire victims. Its Catering 
Corps initially prepared the large quantities of food and drinks required before the 
SWD took over the kitchens the following day. On the 26
th, the Gas Department 
installed gas burners for the central kitchen in the centre, while the Work Brigade, 
an organisation established by the PAP in 1960 to provide some form of work for 
unemployed school-leavers, helped to cook and distribute three meals a day. Lunch 
and dinner consisted of rice with chicken, duck, pork or fish (mutton proved 
unpopular), with porridge, coffee and biscuits served for breakfast. Three British 
Army trailers initially supplied the water for the centre but on 28 May, Water 
Department engineers completed a new pipeline extension at Kim Seng Road to 
increase the water supply to the centre and installed more than ten additional 
standpipes.
32  This engineering achievement contrasted sharply with the 
government’s failure to provide sufficient water to the kampong before the inferno 
and highlighted which situation the authorities really regarded as a genuine 
emergency. Women regularly gathered at the standpipes, collecting water, bathing 
their children and doing their laundry. The children, as they had previously done in 
the kampong, stood in long queues with the adults and collected water, food and 
drinks for their families. Mobile toilets, temporary bathrooms and a milk feeding 
unit for infants were also set up.  
 
C
overnments, however, the PAP leadership also possessed new means of 
mobilising a relief effort on a nation-wide scale. On 1 June, army trucks brought to 
the relief centre hundreds of bundles of clothing donated to the fire victims, which 
had been sorted by volunteers at the People’s Association (PA). The PA also 
organised entertainment at the Tiong Bahru and Delta-Ganges community centres. 
The association was a statutory body established by the PAP government in July 
1960 to engage the grassroots, particularly the rural population, and managed the
 
32 ST, 27-29 May 1961; SFP, 27-29 May 1961.  
Plate 7.5: Boys and girls bathe at the standpipes installed in the relief centre, while women 
wash their laundry nearby (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 7.6: A British army blanket, held by Jack Chia, still in the possession of Tan Geok Hak, 
2006 (Photograph by author). 
 
community centres. The PA, most importantly, had mobilised volunteers for the 
relief work through the community centres. My father, then a worker in a transport 
company, was approached by neighbours involved in the PA activities of the Delta-
Ganges Community Centre to offer his services as a volunteer. He stopped work for 
  304two days to go to the centre, wearing a red armband for identification, and 
distributed milk for the babies and blankets for the fire victims.
33 
 
The relief centre, like the fire site, was closely regulated, with police and 
soldiers manning the gates to prevent unauthorised entry. Initially, relatives and 
friends of the fire victims had freedom of entry but on 27 May, visits were limited to 
between 4 and 6 pm, so as not to interfere with the SWD’s work and to prevent 
people from cashing in and depriving the fire victims of food and the use of the 
amenities.
34 On 30 May, the SWD started two rosters: one for duty officers to 
manage the centre from 8 am to 10 pm daily and another 24-hour roster for officers 
to supervise the individual school buildings.
35 Loudspeakers were installed in the 
centre and broadcast continuously in English, Mandarin, Hokkien, Cantonese, and 
Teochew over the cries of infants and the general bustle, helping families to locate 
missing children and relaying official messages to the fire victims.
36  
 
Plate 7.7: Controlled entry. Relatives and friends wait in queue at the gate of the relief 
centre while the fire victims wait within the school compounds (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
                                                 
33 Author’s interview with Loh Tian Ho, 13 Jan 2006. 
34 ST, 27 May 1961. 
35 SWD 78A/61, Duty Roster for Fire at Bukit Ho Swee, 30 May 1961. 
36 ME 2213/61, School Report by Principal, Kim Seng West School, 31 May 1961. 
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Registration, as an instrument of social control, was a crucial component of 
the relief work. Goh Sin Tub stated that ‘[t]he first big job was to register the victims 
for distribution of money, goods etc., providing them with an identification card’.
37 
SWD staff did much of the registration work. On 2 and 3 June, they were assisted by 
126 teachers from the five designated schools who were mobilised to register the fire 
victims for duplicates of identity cards and citizenship certificates lost in the fire.
38 
Fire victims who had found accommodation with relatives and friends were also 
urged to register with the SWD in order to collect relief payments. By the end of the 
day on 26 May, more than half of the total number of fire victims had been 
registered.
39 The registration work also sought to remove accidental ‘duplicate’ and 
‘fake’ cases.
40 As Roy Chan explained, 
 
Some fire victims, they were so daring. They registered as fire 
victims to claim compensation. A lot claimed their identity cards 
were lost and used our house number as their address. If they were 
thoroughly checked, they were not fire victims. Some had been 
moved out of the area for a few years, not only Bukit Ho Swee but 
also Tiong Bahru. Most fire victims were temporarily housed at Kim 
Seng, and so before some of them moved there themselves, they 
claimed they were staying with relatives and friends. So they used 
their relatives’ and friends’ address, say, OK, if there’s any 
compensation, the letter will come to them and they will go to Kim 
Seng and queue up to collect the money.
41   
 
Registration and fraudulent behaviour consequently posed a daunting 
administrative challenge. Walter Kwek from the SWD’s Public Assistance Section 
had been out fishing on the day of the fire when he was recalled, while his colleague 
Alan Choo was notified by a policeman at his Tanglin Halt home. Kwek and Choo 
reported for work the next day at the relief centre to register the fire victims for cash
 
37 ST, 6 Aug 1963. 
38 ME 2213/61, Report on the Use of School Staff by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 2 Jun 1961. 
39 SWD, Annual Report 1961, p. 1. 
40 ST, 6 Jun 1961. 
41 Author’s interview with Roy Chan, 2 Apr 2007.  
Plate 7.8: Registration at the relief centre. Note the absence of official papers produced by 
the fire victims, showing that the registration relied chiefly on verbal statements (Courtesy 
of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
payments and worked there for two days. Both felt that the relief work was not well-
organised, as Kwek explained, 
 
Payment, sometimes you just got to take their word for it. If they said 
they had lost their ICs [identification cards], you just took their word 
for it. Because at that moment, all was chaos. There were frauds: they 
were relatives living somewhere else, not staying there but they said 
they were staying there. They registered not for the money but 
because they wanted to get the housing flats, so they would get 
priority. But sometimes it was double registration, not intentional. 
The husband would register, the wife would register, the son would 
register, then you got three registrations for one family. We resolved 
it very fast because we had the registration cards and their addresses 
were in the cards.
42 
 
Another key aspect of the rehabilitation work was a concerted official effort 
to keep the relief centre clean. Health workers regularly sprayed disinfectant and 
                                                 
42 Author’s interviews with Walter Kwek, 25 Jul 2007, and Alan Choo, 25 Jul 2007. Interestingly, 
one of their SWD colleagues was a fire victim who lost his belongings in the fire. According to Kwek, 
the Department was so preoccupied with the relief work that they did not collect any money for him, 
who did not take leave but worked at the relief centre with his colleagues. 
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control measures. The Ministry of Culture, in reflecting on the health measures, 
stated, ‘Whatever setbacks occur, Singaporeans must always be clean. The first 
impulse is to wash away everything, wash away the sorrows and start afresh’.
43 The 
health concerns, the authorities emphasised, also mandated a need for speed in the 
rehousing of the fire victims. Fears were voiced of a possible epidemic breaking out 
in the congested living conditions of the relief centre with the discovery of eleven 
cases of measles and dysentery, and the fact that most of the children had not been 
inoculated against diphtheria, whooping cough or smallpox. Ahmad Ibrahim, the 
Minister for Health, urged the rapid relocation of the fire victims to HDB flats, since 
the five schools were designed to accommodate only 600 students each but were 
presently housing over 8,000 fire victims, nearly triple the intended capacity. 
Speaking in the language of the same pejorative discourse of overcrowding and filth 
previously deployed by the British colonial regime, Ibrahim warned, ‘This is a 
condition of extreme overcrowding and provides ideal circumstances for the spread 
of serious upper respiratory infection such as diphtheria, influenza, poliomyelitis, 
pharyngitis, whooping cough and the like’.
44 On 1 June, Lee Kuan Yew told the fire 
victims that they had to be rehoused as soon as possible as ‘[t]he hygiene situation is 
a little dangerous’.
45 Such fearful apprehensions had some basis. At River Valley 
Middle School, for instance, the sewerage system and drainage were found to be 
choked, while the whole school was in ‘a deplorably untidy condition – caused by 
thrown food stuff and night-soil’.
46 Likewise, Yong Nyuk Lin, the Minister for 
Education, wanted the fire victims to leave the relief centre as soon as possible to 
enable over 7,000 students of the schools to resume their studies and prepare for 
their year-end examinations. This expressed concern was due to representations 
from the school principals, who in particular wanted over 2,000 graduating students 
to resume lessons in order to prepare for their respective examinations.
47  
 
                                                 
43 MC, audio-visual programme titled The People’s Singapore: Fire Relief, broadcast in the 1960s, 
exact date unknown. 
44 SLAD, 31 May 1961, pp. 1598-99. 
45 RCS, audio programme titled Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s Speech To Bukit Ho Swee Fire 
Victims, 1 Jun 1961. 
46 ME 2213/61, Memo from Principal, River Valley Government Chinese Middle School, to Chief 
Inspector of Schools, MOE, 26 May 1961. 
47 ME 2213/61, Memo from Acting Chief Inspector of Schools to Minister for Education, 30 May 
1961; RCS, audio recording titled Speeches On Bukit Ho Swee's Fire By Ministers, 1 Jun 1961. 
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government to make personal contact with previous residents of a ‘black area’ which 
had largely been outside official regulation. The Yang di-Pertuan Negara (Head of 
State) Yusof Ishak, Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow ministers, and Chan Choy Siong, 
Assemblywoman for Delta, regularly visited the centre.
48 On the 26
th, Lee consoled 
a middle-aged lady, with a five-year-old boy, who said tearfully, ‘This is my 
youngest child. There are still more than ten others, I don’t know where they are’. 
He replied, ‘They shouldn’t be lost but there are too many people here now so it 
can’t be helped. I believe they will be found tomorrow’.
49 Lee also comforted Malay 
fire victims who felt doubly unfortunate to have lost their possessions on Hari Raya 
Haji. Lee explained to them that the fire was an accident and quoted the Chinese 
saying that it was ‘ten thousand fortune’ that no one had been hurt. He added that if 
they were willing to work hard, they would soon be able to rebuild their homes.
50 
On 27-28 May, Lee also consoled other fire victims, inspected the social and 
medical services and was satisfied that the preparation of milk for the infants was 
hygienic.
51 On the 28
th, Lee had asked a young man, whose parents had passed away 
and who had more than ten brothers and sisters, haltingly in colloquial Hokkien, ‘吃
什么头路?’ [‘What is your livelihood?’] The man’s belongings had all been lost but 
Lee assured him, saying, ‘As long as we are alive, there is a way out, right?’ To an 
old lady, who had eight family members, including six children, and whose 
belongings were also destroyed, Lee said, ‘Never mind, we’ll find a way to help 
you’. The Prime Minister also met a male Middle 4 student, about 15, from Kai Kok 
Public School, whose family of four had also lost all their belongings. The boy said 
he was a little sad that his school had burned down, to which Lee replied, ‘Never 
mind. The people of Singapore are wholly helping you. You are not alone’.
52  
                                                
 
 
48  Chan Choy Siong and her partner, Ong Pang Boon, married on 29 May but she returned 
immediately to her work at the relief centre. 
49 SCJP, 26 May 1961. 
50 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
51 RCS, audio programme titled Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew Tours Tiong Bahru After Bukit Ho 
Swee Fire, broadcast on 28 May 1961. 
52 RCS, audio programme titled Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew Tours Tiong Bahru After Bukit Ho 
Swee Fire, broadcast on 28 May 1961. 
  309The PAP government took upon itself the responsibility for rehabilitating the 
homeless by establishing a Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund (BHSFNRF) 
on the very night of the fire. This measure signalled its intent to mobilise the nation 
and conduct the relief work on a country-wide basis. The Fund was managed by a 
National Committee chaired by K. M. Byrne, the Minister for Labour and Law, with 
W. S. Woon appointed as the Secretary-cum-Treasurer. Its aim was to ‘raise funds 
for the relief and rehabilitation of the fire victims on a national basis’.
53 The 
committee’s composition was significant in projecting an image of national unity by 
including representatives from the political parties, trade unions, chambers of 
commerce, newspapers, people’s associations, student unions, hawkers’ associations, 
and the leftwing rural associations. Its formation was also telling because, as an ad-
hoc committee headed by the government to deal with an emergency, it took over 
work which would ordinarily have been performed by the Singapore Council of 
Social Service, a non-governmental umbrella body which coordinated the work of 
voluntary organisations in Singapore.
54 At the meeting of an earlier committee 
responsible for relief work for civil disasters in January 1960, it had unanimously 
been agreed that since the SCSS had successfully collected large sums of money for 
victims of past fires, it should continue to be the authority for raising funds.
55 
However, in the aftermath of the scale of the Bukit Ho Swee fire, the SCSS itself 
pushed the government to establish a nation-wide relief fund.
56 At the first meeting 
of the BHSFNRF committee on 27 May, Byrne explained, ‘Normally this would be 
the responsibility of the Singapore Council of Social Services but in view of the 
magnitude of the task due to the widespread damage and sufferings caused by the 
fire, this has become a national issue’. Byrne repeated Lee Kuan Yew’s earlier 
declaration that ‘as this was a national effort there should be no party politics’, with 
which the other committee members concurred. The committee resolved that only 
the receipts and collection tins it issued were to be used for fund-raising and 
authorised Byrne and Woon to make payments to the fire victims on the committee’s 
                                                 
53 SLAD, 31 May 1961, p. 1606. 
54 Theresa Ee-Chooi, Father of Charity and My Father (Singapore: Raffles Editions, 1997), p. 226. 
55  SWD 81/61 Vol. IV, Extracts of Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of the Committee with the 
Overriding Authority to Issue Orders in Times of Civil Disasters Etc., 15 Jan 1960. Byrne was the 
Chairman of this committee, which was represented by government departments involved in relief 
work. 
56 SWD, Annual Report 1961, pp. 33-34. 
  310behalf.
57 Donations to the fund were thereafter jointly handled by the SWD and the 
SCSS.  
 
Notwithstanding the government’s lead in organising the relief effort, social 
and political organisations and, to a lesser extent, members of the public played 
important roles in its eventual success. Among the established voluntary 
organisations in Singapore which had taken care of victims of calamities, the Red 
Cross and St. John’s Ambulance ran a first-aid tent at the centre and provided 
medical services, while Blue Cross volunteers assisted in the kitchen. The Red Cross 
declared in its 1961 annual report that ‘[t]he most outstanding service rendered by 
the Detachments was at a disastrous fire at Kampong Bukit Ho Swee’.
58 
 
On 26 May, W. S. Woon called for contributions from the public, stating, 
‘Funds are very urgently needed’.
59 He firmly believed that voluntary organisations 
in Singapore were more successful than the government or government-sponsored 
organisations in raising funds.
60 The government contributed $250,000 to assist the 
fire victims while the HDB donated an additional $2,700.
61 The Sin Chew Jit Poh 
surmised that the government’s contribution, while substantial, was insufficient to 
meet the needs of the large number of fire victims and served more as a catalyst to 
elicit generous donations from the public.
62  The Ministry of Education also 
announced the provision of free textbooks and exercise books and the waiver of 
school fees for the rest of the year for school-going fire victims.
63 The first major 
private contribution to the relief work, however, was a sum of $25,000 from Lee 
Kong Chian, the well-known and -regarded Chinese businessman and community 
leader and the Chairman of the SCSS. His example was followed by other 
established businesses and business leaders, including the Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation ($15,000), Friesland (Malaya) Limited ($12,000), Chen Su Lan Trust 
                                                 
57  SWD 81/61 Vol. I, Minutes of Meeting of the Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund 
Committee, 27 May 1961. See also SFP, 27 May 1961. 
58 Singapore Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1961, unpaginated. 
59 SFP, 27 May 1961. 
60  SWD 81/61 Vol. IV, Extracts of Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of the Committee with the 
Overriding Authority to Issue Orders in Times of Civil Disasters Etc., 15 Jan 1960. 
61 HDB staff donated $397.93. HB 595/51 Vol. III, Memo from Assistant Secretary, HDB, to Chief 
Architect, HDB, 21 Jun 1961. 
62 SCJP, 28 May 1961. 
63 ME 2213/61 Memo from Minister for Education to Principals of all Government and Government-
Aided Schools, 1 Jun 1961. 
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($10,000), Chinese Chambers of Commerce ($10,000), Loke Wan Tho ($10,000), 
Ngee Ann Kongsi ($10,000), Shaw Foundation ($10,000), Singapore Buddhist 
Federation ($10,000), Singapore Rubber Packers’ Association ($7,760), Kuah Leong 
Plate 7.9. The Pepsi-Cola Factory at Havelock Road and the PAP Delta Branch jointly set 
up a drinks stall at the relief centre to raise funds. Note the girl in floral dress collecting a 
carton, reflecting the economic and social role of children in the Chinese nuclear family in 
postwar Singapore (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 7.10: Nestle Company provides hot drinks for the fire victims. Queues such as this 
were part of a range of organised everyday routines at the relief centre (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
Bee ($5,897), Ng Quee Gam and Ng Quee Lam ($5,000), Rediffusion ($5,000), 
Singapore Shell ($5,000), the Turf Club ($5,000), Lim Poon Chong ($3,704), 
  313Singapore Fish Merchants’ Association ($3,375), Cathay Organisation ($2,981, 
being proceeds of a charity show held on 18 June), Singapore Tobacco ($2,500), 
Hock Lee Bus Company ($2,000), Singapore Glass Manufacturers ($2,000), Tong 
Fong & Co. ($2,000), General Rubber Trading House ($1,500), C. K. Tang ($1,000), 
Lau Loke Ying ($1,000), and Mrs Loke Yew ($1,000). 
 
On 27 May, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of 
Malaya, sent a note to the fire victims, stating, ‘Deeply distressed to learn of fire 
havoc in Tiong Bahru and wish to express to you, on behalf of the Government and 
people of Malaya, our heartfelt sympathy for the thousands made so suddenly 
homeless and especially to those afflicted families who suffered casualties’.
64 The 
Tunku visited the relief centre on 29 May, accompanied by Lee Kuan Yew, and 
promised material aid to the fire victims. His government eventually contributed 
$20,000 to the relief fund, the largest donation received from a foreign government, 
although still less than half the sum ($50,000) given to the victims of the 1959 Tiong 
Bahru fire. Other governments which sent aid included the United Kingdom 
(GBP5,000), the United States (US$10,000), Australia ($17,000), Brunei ($10,000), 
North Borneo ($10,000), and Sarawak ($5,000).
65 
 
The contributions to the relief fund, not surprisingly, came mainly from 
institutions and much less from individuals, due to the large sector of the population 
on low incomes.
66 Various institutions encompassing the main language, religious 
and ethnic groups in Singapore soon started their own collections, including the 
newspapers, political parties, schools, overseas students’ unions, clan associations, 
civil organisations, the Tong Chai Medical Association, World Red Swastika 
Society, Catholic Welfare Services, Methodist Church of Malaya, Kesatuan 
Kampong Melayu (Malay Settlement Union), Central Sikh Temple, Ramakrishna 
Mission, and the Singapore Amateur Basketball Association. Other organisations 
donated relief in kind, including the Blue Cross (bread and rice), Fraser & Neave 
(6,000 tins of milk and soft drinks), Standard Vacuum Oil (gift packages), Beach 
                                                 
64 ST, 27 May 1961. 
65 The lists of donors and donations are derived from newspapers (ST, SFP and NYSP), ME 2213/61 
Kampong Ho Swee Fire, and MC 253/61 Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund Committee. They 
are not exhaustive and particular donors have been cited only for analytic purposes. 
66 Author’s interview with Walter Kwek, 25 Jul 2007. 
  314Road market (greens), Nestlé (free milk and milk powder), the American School 
(gifts), Catholic Welfare Services (a pair of shoes and a piece of cloth for each 
school-going fire victim), and Cold Storage (100 cartons of milk powder and 2,000 
pounds of bread daily). Some volunteer workers established a Fire Relief Labels 
Committee to sell car stickers and labels donated by the Straits Times Press to raise 
funds. Rediffusion installed 60 of its entertainment sets at the relief centre while the 
Indonesian community and Amateur Artistes organised a puppet show and a show at 
Happy World respectively to raise funds.
67 On 3 June, in what the press called 
‘Operation Haircut’, 50 barbers from the Singapore Barbers’ Association 
volunteered their services free of charge to fire victims,
68 while trishaw riders also 
contributed their earnings to the relief fund.
69 On 9 June, more than one hundred 
members of the Taxi Drivers’ Association also donated their day’s earnings. One 
taxi driver related, ‘The response from all walks of life was not bad. Some people, 
upon seeing my flag [identifying his participation in the relief effort], booked my 
taxi for the whole shift’.
70 Most interesting were the inmates of Changi, Pulau 
Senang and Outram prisons, who raised $1,702 and helped cooked meals for the fire 
victims on the night of the fire. A prisons officer remarked, ‘Convicts get very small 
allowances for working and it is amazing that they manage to save so much 
money’.
71  
 
The widespread response to the relief effort was also indicative of the more 
organised nature of late-1950s Singapore society and involved social groups which 
had previously been on the margins of society and which had also been involved in 
the upsurge of opinion against the colonial system. A number of militant, left-
leaning unions and associations were involved in the relief work, including the 
Singapore Rural Residents’ Association, the Singapore Teachers’ Union, the 
Singapore Chinese School Teachers’ Union, the Singapore General Employees’ 
Union, the Naval Base Employees’ Union, and the Public Daily-Rated Employees’ 
Union. Students were also particularly active in the relief work. On 26 May, labour 
unionist Fong Swee Suan appealed to workers to donate generously in the spirit of 
                                                 
67 The lists of donors and donations are derived from newspapers (ST, SFP and NYSP), ME 2213/61 
Kampong Ho Swee Fire, and MC 253/61 Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund Committee. 
68 ST, 31 May 1961. 
69 RCS, audio recording titled Speeches On Bukit Ho Swee's Fire By Ministers, 1 Jun 1961. 
70 NYSP, 10 Jun 1961. 
71 Sunday Times, 11 Jun 1961. 
  315class solidarity and support.
72 The Tiong Bahru branch of the SRRA established a 
special committee immediately after the fire to begin its relief work and appealed to 
its members for support. Together with the Petty Traders’ Union and Chong Teck 
and Kai Kok old boys’ associations, the SRRA also exhorted the government to 
adopt the principle of ‘collective responsibility’ and to form a social organisation to 
fully take over the relief work, which it was ready to support.
73 Chinese Middle 
School students put on performances at the relief centre to entertain the fire victims, 
while Chung Cheng High School organised a stage show on 11 June to raise funds.
74 
The students’ activism, according to Han Tan Juan, a Senior Middle 2 student of 
Chung Cheng, was due to their strong organisational ability. Han and his classmates 
worked at the centre for two nights, going there straight after school and staying till 
dawn before returning once again to school. They comforted crying children, 
brought them to the toilet at night, boiled water for the families and collected 
breakfast and night snacks for them.
75 More than two hundred University of Malaya 
Students’ Union (UMSU) members and fifty Medical students also helped in the 
registration, and the UMSU, Nanyang University students and teachers and the 
Singapore Polytechnic Students’ Union also started their own relief funds.
76  
 
The total nation-wide collection for the BHSFNRF was $1,586,422.16.
77 
Four payments were made to the fire victims by the end of 1961, totalling $1.4 
million, with each adult receiving $10, $20, $40, and $50, totalling $120, and each 
child receiving $10, $10, $20, and $25, totalling $65; consequently a family of three 
adults and three children would have received $555.
78 The amounts, however, were 
not particularly large compared to payments in the past; the victims of the 1959 
Tiong Bahru fire had, for instance, received $141 each, while in the 1958 Kampong 
Koo Chye fire, the fire victims had received $82 each and the relief collections had 
also been used to help them purchase 3-room houses. A family’s economic 
                                                 
72 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
73 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
74 OHC, interview with Lim Kok Peng, 16 May 2005. 
75 Author’s interview with Han Tan Juan, 3 Feb 2007. 
76 The lists of donors and donations are derived from newspapers (ST, SFP and NYSP), ME 2213/61 
Kampong Ho Swee Fire, and MC 253/61 Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund Committee. 
77 SWD 81/61 Vol. I, Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund Statement of Receipts and Payments 
as at 30 June 1964. 
78 NYSP, 15 Dec 1961. A fifth payment of indeterminate amount was made on 23 January 1962. The 
five payments totalled $1,382,760. SWD 81/61 Vol. I, Bukit Ho Swee Fire National Relief Fund 
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  316rehabilitation required both the usual daily household expenses and the costs of 
rebuilding from the calamity, such as buying furniture, clothes and other household 
items, or business assets like hawking carts and livestock. Chen Yin Foo, one of 
seven young dependents in the family, stated that the relief payments were simply 
insufficient.
79 Added to the official payments were varying amounts of private 
assistance which some fire victims obtained from relatives, friends and colleagues. 
Lee Soo Seong, earning $190 a month then as a teacher at a Chinese school, 
received some money and clothes from his colleagues and students, which helped 
his family buy new furniture and tide over the crisis.
80  
 
Plate 7.11: Lee Ah Gar’s relief card issued by the Social Welfare Department for his family 
of eight, including his two children and younger brother Soo Seong. In all, Lee collected 
four cash payments, totalling $449, and three batches of ‘goods’ (two of which were in fact 
cash payments totalling $490 (Courtesy of Lee Ah Gar). 
 
At the relief centre, the minds of the adult fire victims vacillated daily 
between the tragedy of the past and the uncertainty of the future. There was a 
                                                 
79 Author’s interview with Chen Yin Foo, 2 Nov 2006. 
80 OHC, interview with Lee Soo Seong, 19 Nov 1996. 
  317constant cacophony of cries, highlighting a collective story of social and personal 
tragedy, as Tay Yan Woon recounted: 
 
Everyone spent the whole night crying. Everyone said that their 
houses were burned down, everything was burned. Every single one 
did not think of saving their belongings, and by the time they reached 
Kim Seng, they all started crying.
81 
 
Another lady was so traumatised that she was unable to walk for several days after 
losing all her family’s belongings in the blaze.
82 Etched onto many adult faces, a 
journalist observed, was an expression of sheer panic, and, he surmised, ‘perhaps 
they were still imagining a familiar person or an unfamiliar home suddenly 
appearing in front of them’.
83 At the same time, they displayed a nervous alertness, 
for ‘they were not able to sit still for ten minutes. Mentally, they were very alert, and 
any news from outside would cause them to rush to the door to find out about it’.
84 
A coolie, when asked about living conditions at the centre, however, replied, ‘Good! 
Don’t have to worry about this place being burned down’.
85 Another man joked of a 
‘miracle’ he had witnessed during the fire, laughing bitterly, ‘When the fire was at 
its most ferocious, I saw a person rush madly out of a house. His shadow was on 
fire’.
86 
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Plate 7.12: A woman with toddler recalls her tragedy and reviews the uncertainty of life in 
the future (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
Operation Shift 
 
The next major task confronting the PAP government was to move the fire 
victims out of the relief centre into proper temporary housing. On the night of the 
fire, Tan Kia Gan and Lim Kim San, the HDB Chairman, had surveyed the fire site 
and on the following day began planning how to rebuild the area and rehouse the fire 
victims as quickly as possible.
87 The decision to press ahead with the plans came 
from Lee Kuan Yew, who had already visited the fire site.
88 On the 26
th, the PAP 
cabinet held a special meeting to discuss the relief operations, followed by a 
conference between Lee and the HDB officials. The government then announced 
that it would acquire the fire site and build low-cost flats on it for the fire victims, 
while those who refused the HDB housing would receive cash relief payments 
                                                 
87 SLAD, 31 May 1961, p. 1614. 
88 Author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. 
  319instead. On 27 May, Lee optimistically declared that ‘[e]ven if there are 5,000 
families affected, we can build enough flats for them’.
89 Four days later, Tan Kia 
Gan announced in the Legislative Assembly that about 40% of the fire victims could 
move immediately into 1,150 flats on a short-term basis before the Bukit Ho Swee 
flats were completed. Of these, there were 600 flats in Queenstown,
90 300 in Tiong 
Bahru (the site of the 1959 blaze), 150 in Kallang, and 100 in Clarence Lane, 
Alexandra. The remaining fire victims would be successively rehoused in HDB 
housing elsewhere – 450 2-room flats at the Tiong Bahru fire site within a few days; 
904 flats at the Tiong Bahru cemetery site (Ma Kau Thiong) in August; 804 flats at 
MacPherson Road Estate within the next few months; and a further 1,448 2- and 3-
room flats in Queenstown at some point in the future.
91 In comparison with previous 
fires in the locality in 1955 and 1959, the PAP government was able to provide 
temporary housing for the Bukit Ho Swee fire victims much closer to their former 
homes; in the 1959 Tiong Bahru inferno, for instance, the fire victims had been 
offered accommodation at Kallang Estate. This more appropriate response was due 
to the development of the Queenstown project and construction in Tiong Bahru after 
the 1959 fire. On 30 May, Lee made a pledge to the fire victims, saying, ‘In nine 
months’ time a sufficient number of units will be completed by the Housing and 
Development Board to house every fire victim family’.
92 On 2 June, the HDB began 
registering the first fire victims for the available 1,150 flats.  
 
On 4 June, ten days after the fire and amid National Day celebrations,
93 more 
than 1,000 families, totalling an estimated 6,500 persons, began leaving River 
Valley Primary School (Chinese) and River Valley Middle School at about 9 am. 
Assisted by relatives, friends and volunteer workers and directed by SWD and HDB 
officials, policemen, soldiers, and school teachers, and carrying their surviving 
belongings, they boarded army lorries to be transported to 1- and 2-room flats in 
Queenstown, Tiong Bahru, Alexandra, and Kallang. About 400 families moved into 
                                                 
89 ST, 27 May 1961. 
90 The HDB had planned to open up to the public the register for housing in Queenstown, for which 
demand had been poor, but some of these flats were subsequently occupied by the Bukit Ho Swee fire 
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92 ST, 30 May 1961. 
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nearby flats built on the Tiong Bahru fire site, while about 100 Malay fire victims 
moved out to the SWD’s Bushey Park Home and elsewhere.
94 The concern with 
overcrowding at the centre had produced, the Sunday Times reported, ‘an air of 
urgency’ in what the paper termed ‘Operation Shift’. In some cases, technicians 
were still fixing the water and electricity supply in the flats when the families 
arrived.
95 All adult fire victims had been given a rehabilitation allowance of $20 
each while children 15 years old and below received $10. W. S. Woon also gave the 
assurance that all fire victims, whether residing in HDB flats or with relatives and 
friends, could apply to return to the houses built on the fire site.
96 The following day, 
Ministry of Health and Work Brigade teams began cleaning up the vacated schools, 
which reopened for classes on the 6
th. More homeless families departed from the 
other schools in the following days, with River Valley Primary School (English) re-
opening on the 7
th. Kim Seng West Primary School (Integrated) and Kim Seng East 
Primary (English) reopened on 10 June, thirteen days after the fire. The speed and 
effectiveness of the rehousing effort compares favourably with that of the 1959 
Tiong Bahru fire, where the fire victims left the relief centre within a week. 
 
In a subsequent Ministry of Culture documentary about the post-fire shift, a 
Chinese fire victim family, comprising a couple, 3-4 children and a grandmother, all 
smiling, were depicted to be moving happily into an HDB flat, as the narrator stated, 
‘With new homes, the dangers of such devastating fires will be gone forever’.
97 
However, a small-scale study of 30 Bukit Ho Swee fire victim families rehoused in 
Kallang Estate by Jacinta Chen in 1965 shows that many families were totally 
confused upon moving into an HDB flat. Among eleven informants, only two 
women had ever visited friends living in such flats, while the others had never set 
foot inside a flat before. The physical layout of the estate itself, neatly-organised in 
form compared to the closely- and haphazardly-built wooden housing in the 
kampong, initially posed problems of orientation and navigation. As Chen explained, 
the very neatness of appearance was disorientating: ‘Two housewives told me with 
some amusement that they used to get confused about their flats. The blocks looked 
 
94 ME 2213/61, Memo from Principal, River Valley English School, to Director of Education, MOE, 
5 Jun 1961. 
95 ST, 4 Jun 1961. 
96 ST, 3 Jun 1961. 
97 MC, audio-visual programme titled The People’s Singapore, broadcast in the 1960s, exact date 
unknown.  
Plate 7.13: Operation Shift. In the background are the makeshift army tents ringed by barbed 
wire (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 7.14: A family of five, assisted by two students of River Valley Middle School, 
prepare to enter their temporary HDB flat. They have scarcely any belongings. A family 
member, partially obscured, peers over the parapet at the height of the building (Courtesy of 
National Archives of Singapore). 
 
  322all the same to them at first. They took hours to walk back to the flat from the 
market’.
98 
 
To many families, moving into the allocated HDB housing was less a matter 
of choice than of accepting what appeared to them at that point in time to be the only 
feasible option. Wang Ah Tee, whose house was fortunately spared by the fire, put it 
succinctly, ‘我们没有路可以走了’ [‘We had no other roads to walk’].
99 According 
to Goh Sin Tub, there were both fire victims who wanted HDB flats and those who 
still preferred to build wooden houses on the fire site.
100 For the former, it was a 
singular opportunity to pragmatically jump to the front of the HDB housing register 
to obtain a non-flammable flat with modern amenities. To a large extent, however, 
the actual speed at which the rehabilitation work moved in the end often made it 
difficult for shell-shocked families to obtain alternative housing.
101 The family of 
Lee Ah Gar and Lee Soo Seong, totalling eight persons, accepted a 2-room flat at 
Margaret Drive in Queenstown. In explaining the decision, Ah Gar simply said, ‘We 
had no choice at the time’. However, the family soon had to split up because the flat 
was too small, with Ah Gar and his father renting a room in an attap house near Beo 
Lane, which had escaped the fire, while Soo Seong and the rest of the family lived in 
the flat.
102 For Lim Soo Hiang and her family of nine, who moved into a 3-room flat 
at Stirling Road, Queenstown, the sum of relief they collected was only enough to 
buy some furniture for the new house.
103 Beh Poh Suan and her three-year-old son, 
who had spent the night of the fire on Ma Kau Thiong among the graves, gratefully 
accepted a flat at the Tiong Bahru fire site, because ‘as long as it was safe, that was 
good enough. We didn’t worry about whether it was good or not’.
104 
 
But despite the operation having a smooth appearance of success, half of the 
fire victims initially did not move to the HDB flats. On 4 June itself, about 600 
families at the relief centre, comprising more than a fifth of the total number, left to 
                                                 
98 Chen, Rehousing Upheaval and Readjustment, pp. 36, 43-44. 
99 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. 
100 Goh, ‘The Bukit Ho Swee Fire’, p. 161. 
101 See also Chen, Rehousing Upheaval and Readjustment, p. 31. 
102 Author’s interviews with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006, and Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006; OHC, 
interview with Lee Soo Seong, 19 Nov 1996. 
103 Author’s interview with Lim Soo Hiang, 2 Jan 2008. 
104 Author’s interview with Beh Poh Suan, 14 Feb 2007. 
  323stay with their relatives and friends after collecting their rehabilitation payments. 
They joined 950 other families (4,546 persons) who had already done so. In fact, 
only 1,300 out of a total of 2,833 fire victim families had registered for HDB 
housing.
105 In fact, by 1 July, a total of 1,387 families had rejected the offer of an 
HDB flat and collected cash payments in lieu of the rent subsidies.
106 But later in the 
year, 600 families who had been living with relatives and friends applied for and 
were rehoused in HDB flats.
107 Although this meant that only 787 families (28%) 
eventually rejected the offer of an HDB flat, the fact that the initial number of 
rejections was nearly double indicates a strong preference for alternative housing 
among the fire victims. 
 
  Among those who did not move into an HDB flat were those families whose 
wooden houses had survived the fire. Peter Lim’s family went back to 16 Beo 
Lane,
108 while Roy Chan’s family, who did not register as fire victims or collect 
relief, returned to their looted house at 587 Havelock Road.
109 When Tay Bok 
Chiu’s family moved back into their house in Si Kah Teng, they found in the 
devastated area an eerie silence, and as Tay said, ‘We were very afraid because there 
was no one else in the vicinity’.
110 Those who chose not to move into an HDB flat 
fell into two categories: they were either unable or unwilling to afford the costs of 
living in a flat or were able to find alternative housing. In the case of the latter, those 
who were either financially better off or had social or business support networks 
were able to dictate the terms of their rehousing. Chua Beng Huat’s family, for 
instance, did not stay in the relief centre but moved temporarily into a vacant house 
belonging to his uncle at Thomson Road. Subsequently, diverging from the 
experiences of most other families, they moved into an SIT flat at Dawson Road. 
Later, due to the efforts of Chua’s mother, who wanted to return to the Bukit Ho 
Swee area, they obtained a large Singapore Improvement Trust flat with three 
bedrooms in Tiong Bahru Estate.
111 For Oh Boon Eng and his younger sister Gek 
Heok, their father, a painting subcontractor, managed to obtain help from his 
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  324business associates, who gave the beleaguered family ‘large boxes of clothes’ 
several days after the fire. Through one such friend, the family moved into a wooden 
house along Havelock Road, below Ma Kau Thiong, and later found a private house 
nearby, where they stayed until 1968.
112 Deterred by the high rent of HDB housing, 
Tan Tiam Ho and Beh Swee Kim also moved into a wooden house in Hong Lim Pa 
Sat.
113 
 
Other fire victims, however, were determined to resume their traditional 
kampong lifestyle. Tay Yan Woon and her family moved into an attap house at Po 
Lay Long [referring to the Singapore Glass Manufacturers in Kampong Henderson], 
explaining ‘we didn’t want a flat because we still wanted to rear pigs. So we went to 
Poh Lay Long and rented an attap house to rear pigs’.
114 The family of Goh Hin 
Choo, comprising his wife and nine children, also rejected the HDB offer of a flat at 
Margaret Drive as it was too far. Goh rented a cubicle in a shophouse at New Bridge 
Road instead and started working as a bicycle repairman. On 14 July, about six 
weeks later, the shophouse was also gutted by a fire. A desolate Goh, sobbing, said, 
‘I have lost every stitch of clothing except what I am wearing now. We are really 
destitute now’.
115 
 
The Big Singapore Fire Debate 
 
The PAP government did not merely take the lead in organising the Bukit Ho 
Swee fire relief operation. Together with the mass media, it also framed the event in 
terms of a discourse of national unity, in which the government celebrated the 
successful response to a devastating calamity by a young nation-state, one which 
only recently obtained full self-government. This story of national unity and a 
responsible swift response to calamity stood in marked contrast to the revelations of 
ugly partisan politics in the relief work following the 1958 Kampong Koo Chye and 
1959 Tiong Bahru fires. The SWD hailed the relief effort as  
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  325one of the proudest chapters in our annals, when the sufferings of 
fellow citizens evoked such a spontaneous and generous reaction 
from all levels of the people of the country. Indeed history will record 
that this was an occasion of common suffering which has tested and 
gloriously proved the unity of our people.
116 
 
Nevertheless, the façade of national cohesion belied both political and social 
disagreements over the methods and terms of the government’s relief work. In mid-
1960, Ong Eng Guan and two fellow PAP Assemblymen had joined the opposition 
in the Legislative Assembly.
117 Ong then resigned his Hong Lim seat but regained it 
by crushing his PAP rival in a by-election in April 1961, which signalled his 
popularity in the constituency and exposed the government’s political 
vulnerability.
118 The PAP, however, soon experienced a more serious and widening 
fracture between the Lee Kuan Yew group of Fabian socialists and the radical left 
led by Lim Chin Siong which had not yet become manifest at the time of the fire. It 
was in this factional context that disagreements over relief work surfaced during the 
special Legislative Assembly session of 31 May, which the Straits Times termed 
‘The Great Singapore Fire Debate’.
119 The session centered on a motion proposed 
by Tan Kia Gan: ‘that to prevent a recurrence of such disastrous fires the site of the 
fire be acquired by the Government for the Housing and Development Board for 
rebuilding, and to this end that no one be allowed to rebuild on this site structures of 
a temporary or permanent nature’. The motion also stipulated that compensation for 
the owners of land on the fire site be calculated at a much lower value of the land in 
its encumbered state before the fire. These proposed terms of wholesale land 
acquisition necessitated an amendment to the Land Acquisition Ordinance.
120 Both 
the motion and amendment were eventually passed, and the debate was significantly 
less politically divisive than that which took place in the Assembly after the 1959 
Tiong Bahru fire, but the importance of the various issues raised became all too 
apparent in the ensuing months. 
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  326Although the Lim Yew Hock government had previously acquired the Tiong 
Bahru fire site after the 1959 inferno for public housing, the PAP leadership’s 
proposed amendment to the Land Acquisition Ordinance now gave it far greater 
power in determining the terms of acquiring fire sites in general. Almost the entire 
Bukit Ho Swee fire site belonged to 53 private owners, comprising a few large 
owners possessing up to 12 acres of land and the remainder owning one-half to two 
acres. Lee Kuan Yew argued that ‘it is heinous in the extreme to allow profit to be 
made out of this fire and in fact, if any profit is allowed to be made, then it will only 
be an inducement, a temptation, to arson by those who possess land with squatters 
on it’. Land without tenants, as was the case for the fire site, he maintained, was 
worth about three times more than land with tenants, according to the government 
land valuer. In assessing its value, Lee contended, the Bukit Ho Swee fire site should 
not be regarded as land cleared of structures, which would fetch a higher valuation, 
but as encumbered with tenants. He referred to land valuations made in 1954 by the 
City Assessor of the area, then encumbered, at 43 cents per square foot, and by the 
government valuer at 41 cents. The onus, Lee continued, was on landowners to 
prove that their land was vacant at the time of the fire, whereupon the Minister for 
National Development would have the discretion of raising the amount of 
compensation.
121 
 
A. P. Rajah, Singapore People’s Alliance Assemblyman for Farrer Park, 
accepted the acquisition principle in general but questioned the provisions allowing 
the government to acquire any land free of tenants adjoining the fire site. He also 
disputed the discretionary power given to the Minister for National Development to 
raise the amount of compensation, suggesting instead that the compensation be fixed 
at market value.
122 Lee replied that the adjoining vacant land ought to be acquired at 
the same value as the devastated land ‘from the point of view of expeditious land 
acquiring in a fair manner’. In addition, Lee added, the ‘one-third’ principle would 
effectively discourage landlords from attempting arson to clear their land and indeed 
encourage them to set up facilities to prevent the outbreak of fire.
123  
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  327Rajah also took the government to task for ‘the absolute mishandling of the 
situation’ in allowing the fire to jump two roads, particularly the second road since 
the Fire Brigade should have been prepared after the first flare-up. He argued that 
the Government should bear ‘a great deal of blame’ for the low water pressure, 
asking ‘why was the pressure in these fire hydrants allowed to run down, 
particularly in the Bukit Ho Swee area where such a fire is likely to occur?’ Rajah 
called for the government to appoint a commission of inquiry into the causes of the 
fire and its subsequent spread so that future disasters would be averted.
124 Ong Pang 
Boon, the Minister for Home Affairs, replied that while the water pressure was 
admittedly low that day, the real difficulty was the lack of road access to the fire. He 
also stated that the police were still investigating the cause of the fire and that arson 
had not been ruled out.
125 Lee Siew Choh, PAP Assemblyman for Queenstown, 
accused Rajah of being an ‘armchair critic’ and likened him to a ‘robber taking 
opportunity of the fire to rob’ [From a Chinese saying, ‘趁火打劫’].
126 
 
Tan Kia Gan also announced that fire victims temporarily rehoused in HDB 
flats would pay full rents at economic rates normally charged to members of the 
public. Tan stated that this was based on principles of equity and good public 
finance; the government, he explained, did not intend to ‘upset the very complex 
rent structure of the Housing and Development Board by introducing rent-free 
periods or by waiving rents’, which was ‘ill-considered’ and unfair to the tax-paying 
population and victims of smaller fires who had also paid normal rents. The fire 
victims consequently had to pay different rents depending on the size, location and 
building costs of the flats they rented, ranging widely between $20 for a 1-room 
HDB-built flat to $89.10 for a 3-room SIT flat.
127 To help the fire victims cope, the 
government permitted families to either share accommodation with relatives or 
friends already living in HDB flats or for two small families to jointly apply for a 
single flat. In addition, instead of rent waivers, the government would give the fire 
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  328victims a three-month rental subsidy, amounting to $7 per person up to a maximum 
of $35 per family.
128 The subsidy, according to K. M. Byrne, was worked out on the 
basis of the lowest monthly rent payable for HDB housing at the time, being $35 per 
flat for a family of five.
129 Responding to the government’s rental subsidy, Ong Eng 
Guan, who had scored a resounding triumph in the Hong Lim by-election only a 
month before the Bukit Ho Swee fire, pointed out that the subsidy was considerably 
less than the assistance given in previous fires at Upper Chin Chew Street and 
Geylang Lorong 3, which amounted to three months’ free rental, water and 
electricity and the flexibility of paying arrears in installments.
130 In fact, in mid-
1960, the PAP government had already been concerned over the loss of rents, 
amounting to $81,425.10, suffered by the HDB in providing rent-free periods of 
temporary housing for fire victims between February 1959 and March 1960, mostly 
to subsidise the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire victims. In July 1960, the Board had been 
asked ‘to economise and to concentrate on building houses to let’.
131 Later, W. S. 
Woon informed him that ‘it is expected that the fire victims should pay for such 
accommodation in future’.
132  
 
The issue of reasonable rent was of deep concern to the fire victims. It was 
very apparent in an exchange between Lee Kuan Yew and a fire victim at the relief 
centre on 28 May. The latter, who earned ‘$100 plus’ a month and had a family of 
four, had lost all his belongings except for some clothes. He felt that the relief 
provisions provided at the centre were adequate but was more concerned about the 
prospects of rehousing, particularly the rent, location of housing and proximity to 
relatives: 
 
Man:  In future, I think have to get housing, cheap housing. $15-20. 
Lee: $25  OK? 
Man: $20  lah. We are all poor people mah. $20 is OK. 
Lee:  We will all try to help – is Queenstown or Redhill OK? 
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  329Man:  Any in Tiong Bahru? 
Lee:  No. Queenstown or Redhill? 
Man:  Queenstown is OK. As long as close to work, it’s OK. 
Lee:   Where do you work? 
Man:   Cross Street [in ‘Big Town’]. 
Lee:   From Queenstown to Cross Street is not too far, right? 
Man:   Not far. 
Lee:   Only 4 people in your family, right? I think we will definitely be able 
to give you a flat. 
Man:   2 flats is OK too. 
Lee:   Oh, 2 flats, we will give to bigger families. 
Man:   But then my elder sister can also move in. 
Lee:   Did your elder sister stay with you last time? 
Man:   No. 
Lee:   Now we must take care of the fire victims, then the elder sister and 
relatives of the fire victims. Do you think this is fair? 
Man:   Fair.
 133 
 
The Anger and the Rumours 
 
The political debate in the aftermath of the fire was relatively muted, given 
the PAP government’s numerical dominance in the Legislative Assembly. More 
persistent was the fire victims’ anger over two key issues raised by the politicians, 
namely, arson and rent, as well as the rumours through which much unhappiness 
was articulated and sustained. The government, attempting to maintain control over 
the relief operation, viewed the persistent rumours with apprehension. It tried to 
undermine them by representing the rumours as baseless and contradictory. 
Nonetheless, such efforts were not completely successful. As Arlette Farge observed 
of rumours circulating in working class districts in 18
th century Paris, ‘there was 
nothing more powerful…than those exchanges of words between neighbours’ (or in 
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  330the case of Bukit Ho Swee, former neighbours).
134 The fire victims’ ‘exchanges’ 
clearly demonstrated the social cohesion of the former kampong community and its 
continued social and political distance from the ruling government.  
 
The cause of the fire, which remained unascertained despite the 
government’s assurances to solve the mystery, sustained a strong undercurrent of 
anger. There were admittedly different types of rumours, such as the ‘moderate’ 
ones attributing the inferno to a cooking accident like an overturned stove.
135 The 
most powerful and persistent rumour by far, however, was the certainty expressed 
by many fire victims that the government had deliberately set the fire in order to 
clear the ‘squatters’. This association in the victims’ minds of fire and clearance had 
already been formed after previous kampong fires but was now substantially 
hardened by the scale and local circumstances of the Bukit Ho Swee disaster. The 
local fire-fighting volunteers, as discussed previously, had been looking out for 
arsonists in the kampong prior to the outbreak of the fire. Tay Ah Chuan explained 
that ‘this suspicion was because in the past, things like that had happened. Like 
throwing burning rags onto attap roofs, the things we saw’.
136 The rumour of 
government-inspired arson was persistent because it possessed an inner logic which 
could not readily be proved nor disproved. Its proponents were able to link the local 
circumstances both before and after the fire into part of a powerful web of 
conspiracy, a theory supported seemingly by evidence and history. Government 
officials complained that the fire victims were naïve and gullible to believe in the 
idea of officially-inspired arson but the theory was consistent with the world-view 
and everyday experience of the former dwellers of a place deemed a ‘black area’. 
 
In the view of many fire victims, the first possible indication of arson was 
that 25 May was a public holiday. This meant that the kampong children were not at 
school, but the men were fortunately at home to take care of their families and 
consequently a minimum number of lives were lost.
137 It was widely-believed that 
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  331‘the arson was in several spots within the whole complex, so it looked like a very 
organised type of thing and then no one was burned or hurt and were all safely 
evacuated’.
138 Moreover, the fire managed to jump two roads and was burning in 
different places at the same time. As one fire victim wondered, ‘Why did the fire not 
just burn this area but jump to other places? Why were there fires at different places? 
First it was at Jalan Membina, then it jumped over here, and there’.
139 It was not 
possible, some people reasoned, that even with the strong wind, for the fire rolling 
down Beo Lane to leapfrog the 3-storey Or Kio Tau shophouse, leave it untouched 
and advance towards Delta Estate. Such a ‘curious’ path of destruction suggested 
that a plane, visible in the air that day, had separately set the area north of Or Kio 
Tau ablaze.
140 As a contemporary of the time explained, ‘There were people saying 
that the government set the fire to evict the residents in the area. It is hard to say, it 
was speculation. Because they had been living there for so long and there had been 
no fires, so suddenly....And then some people said that there were fires at different 
places in the kampong at the same time’.
141 
 
The government’s culpability, it was argued, also lay in the marked contrast 
between its failure to subdue the fire and its success in swiftly rehousing the fire 
victims. As one fire victim maintained, ‘the fire engines that came did not fight the 
fire but sat in the middle of the road and only obstructed the traffic. The government 
was there but didn’t fight the fire but just stood there. The government wanted to 
evict the people, so why fight the fire?’
142 In the aftermath of the inferno, the 
authorities also appeared to have prepared a coherent plan to quickly acquire and 
clear the fire site and build public housing on it. Even before the fire, the HDB had 
begun to build multi-storey housing in the vicinity, and the completed, mostly 
vacant flats at the Tiong Bahru fire site and the partially-completed flats at Ma Kau 
Thiong were pragmatically used to swiftly rehouse the fire victims.
143 Some families 
had already been served with notices to quit their wooden houses before the fire.
144 
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  332One fire victim observed that ‘the government had great difficulty trying to evict the 
kampong residents. So many of them, and they also didn’t want to move. So if there 
was a fire, you had to move even if you were unwilling’.
145 
 
Some of the allegations were of course factually erroneous. Many men, for 
instance, were in fact working that day while the plane seen in the air was likely to 
be taking photographs of the blaze. On 1 June, government officials at the relief 
centre tried to suppress the rumours by attacking the logic of conspiracy and 
attributing the allegations to malicious ‘outsiders’ and ‘agitators’. An emotional 
Chan Choy Siong, speaking in Hokkien, urged that it did not make sense for the 
government to set the fire and then carry out a comprehensive relief operation to 
help the fire victims: 
 
Only people who have not gone to see the plight of the fire victims 
can laugh and talk wildly about it from the outside, can spread 
rumours without evidence to confuse our residents here….As for the 
government’s plans to provide relief, the Legislative Assembly 
session yesterday has already reached an agreement, including 
members from the opposition parties. If we had not prepared a good 
plan, how would the opposition parties have supported the 
government’s relief efforts? So I hope that the fire victims staying 
here or with relatives and friends will not believe what the outsiders 
are saying. Because all these rumours are without evidence. You can 
see that our government has taken care of the fire victims after the 
fire, regardless of whether they are adults or children or 
students….Many opportunists are spreading rumours so that you 
would be agitated and would not cooperate with the government, so 
that the government’s relief work would fail. So then they would be 
able to reap political capital from this fire. This is their motive. But I 
declare here and now that, having seen the great suffering of more 
than 10,000 fire victims, these people who are trying to reap political 
capital from the fire disaster are heartless people! [Applause]….So I 
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  333hope that you will not listen to rumours from outside preventing 
cooperation between you residents and the government. Who will 
lose out if this happens? It would be the 16,000 people’s loss, 
because we would then not be able to proceed with our relief work.
146 
 
An un-named SWD official, also speaking in Hokkien, similarly argued that the 
rumours were baseless, although, interestingly, he implied that someone else had set 
the fire: 
 
People outside are spreading malicious rumours that this fire was 
started by the government. [Laughter] If the fire was started by me, I 
would not dare to come here. Why dare not come? I would be beaten 
up, right? This is straightforward, this is plain language, this is the 
reality. See, when the fire was raging, Prime Minister Lee and the 
ministers came to fight the fire. But it was not possible, the fire was 
too powerful. So brothers and sisters, your pains are the pains of our 
government. [Some clapping] Your joy, your happiness are the joy 
and happiness of our government. This is the truth. So let us all face 
the truth together. So whoever started this fire is a heartless person 
who started this fire. Our government definitely did not start this fire. 
Who started this fire definitely would not come to this place, and 
would not dare to come here and face the truth.
147 
 
The rumours, however, persisted even after the fire victims left the relief 
centre, sustained in part by the authorities’ failure to provide a definitive answer on 
the issue and by revelations in the press of alleged arson in the locality. The 
Nanyang Siang Pau had reported on 28 May that various theories on the cause of the 
fire were circulating, with some people attributing the fire to arson, and that the 
Criminal Investigations Department was conducting an inquiry into the matter and 
had summoned for questioning two residents living near 174-A Kampong Tiong 
Bahru, where the fire had started.
148 By early June, more than ten alleged witnesses 
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  334of arson had been questioned, leading the newspaper to remark that their combined 
testimonies were sufficient reason to believe that the fire was caused by arson but 
that only concrete evidence was lacking.
149 On 27 May, an attempt at arson was also 
made on a vacated attap house at Kampong Henderson, although the fire was 
discovered in time by the neighbours and extinguished. The residents retrieved a 
piece of oil-soaked kindling material at the scene.
150 Further attempts were made on 
another attap house in the same kampong on 8 and 9 June but the local fire-fighting 
squad, formed after the first incident, quickly contained the fire. The Nanyang Siang 
Pau declared that ‘the daring of the arsonists has made them Singaporeans’ public 
enemy’ such that ‘the Kampong Henderson arson incident does not merely concern 
its residents but all Singaporeans’. The paper hailed the collective effort of the fire-
fighting squad in suppressing the fire but called for the 1.6 million urban dwellers in 
Singapore to work together with the police to resolve the issue.
151 Another arson 
attempt in Kampong Henderson on 9 June was also foiled by the local fire-fighting 
squad, although not before 50 people had been rendered homeless.
152 On 14 June, a 
Sin Chew Jit Poh editorial concluded that ‘[f]rom the several cases of attempted 
arson reported within the last two weeks so soon after the big Bukit Ho Swee fire, 
there is every possibility that the recent biggest fire was caused by some wicked 
elements’.
153 Two weeks later, two alleged attempts of arson on the wooden housing 
at Carey Road below Ma Kau Thiong, which had survived the Bukit Ho Swee fire, 
were also foiled.
154  In a press statement, the Singapore Country People’s 
Association declared that these attempts at arson were not the work of individuals 
but of a group.
155 
                                                
 
As the result of police investigations into the cause of the Bukit Ho Swee 
blaze, a suspect was detained and interrogated by the police on 9 June but was later 
released, reportedly due to a lack of evidence.
156 At this point, local news coverage 
of the police investigations ceased. Goh Sin Tub later claimed that ‘the investigation 
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  335was very quick and it was made very clear how the fire had started. I think it was 
some cooking utensil somewhere or other that fell’.
157 However, to date, I have not 
come across any published official report on the cause of the fire. 
 
From the standpoint of urban social history, the rumours, regardless of their 
validity, are important social facts. For the fire victims, the rumours constituted a 
persuasive interpretation of local circumstances and a sufficient explanation for a 
colossal calamity, which suddenly rendered them homeless. In time, the rumours 
developed into a new social mythology, powerfully associating the clearance of 
urban kampongs directly with the building of public housing. Subsequent kampong 
fires came to be widely-perceived, by many of the victims at least, as ‘又是好象河
水山’ [‘just like another Bukit Ho Swee’].
158 
 
The other festering issue which troubled the PAP government was the 
economic costs and liability of the temporary public housing. The fire had rendered 
jobless the heads of at least 1,000 households and placed them on the SWD’s Public 
Assistance Scheme.
159  The Sin Chew Jit Poh warned that many fire victims’ 
livelihoods had been severely disrupted, as the inferno had destroyed various aspects 
of the kampong economy, such as the local factories, home industries and semi-rural 
economic activities.
160 Among the fire victim families who initially rebuffed the 
offer of an HDB flat and had collected cash payments in lieu of the rental subsidies, 
about 22% later decided to accept a flat and consequently had to pay full rent for the 
first three months of occupation. The subsidies themselves, pegged to a maximum of 
$35 per family, were also inadequate for larger families living in the bigger flats or 
flats built by the SIT and let out at higher rentals. Lim Peng Chye, a driver with two 
children earning only $125 a month, had to pay $45 rent for his temporary HDB flat, 
three times the rent for his former wooden house at Beo Lane. He said, ‘I am 
grateful to the Government subsidy of $35 a month for three months. This means I 
have to pay only $10 each month. But at the end of the three months, I’ll have 
                                                 
157 OHC, interview with Goh Sin Tub, 12 Oct 1993; Goh, ‘The Bukit Ho Swee Fire’, p. 165. 
158 Author’s interview with Lim Yew Kuan, 21 Nov 2006. 
159 SWD, Annual Report 1961, p. 38. 
160 SCJP, 31 May 1961. 
  336difficulty in getting $45 to pay the rent’.
161 Tan Geok Hak’s family, which moved 
into a flat at the Tiong Bahru fire site, was unable to pay rent for a full year, for 
‘[e]veryone had no money. How do you collect the rent?’
162 In addition, Jacinta 
Chen’s study of fire victims rehoused in Kallang Estate suggests that the further a 
family was rehoused from their relatives, the more difficult it was to obtain financial 
assistance from them.
163 
 
Tan Kia Gan’s announcement in the Legislative Assembly on 31 May that 
the rents for the HDB flats would be charged at full economic rates triggered 
widespread rumours of high rents. On 2 June, Lee Kuan Yew and his ministers, after 
explaining the rehabilitation plans to the fire victims at the relief centre, were 
‘mobbed’ by the audience, who demanded further discussion of the relief provisions. 
After a 45-minute meeting between the ministers and three representatives of the fire 
victims, the government agreed to a three months’ period of grace to pay the water 
and electricity deposits for the HDB flats.
164 The previous day, Chan Choy Siong 
had tried to dispel such fears at the centre but without actually stating how much the 
rents would cost: 
 
I know that now there are many people who are repeatedly talking 
about the $70, $80 and $90 [rental] problem. This is not the problem 
we should be discussing now. Do you think that, when you are not 
able to pay a single cent, we will ask you to pay $90?! This is not 
possible. So now, please do not listen to other people saying that the 
government’s housing over there are $90, $70 or $80. At present, 
these are the rents for the government’s housing but when the fire 
victims are unable to pay a single cent, can they afford these rents?! 
[Applause and shouts of ‘No!’] So please do not believe rumours that 
the government will charge you $90 now.
165 
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  337As in the case of the arson issue, Chan attempted to suppress the rumours by 
disassociating them from the fire victims themselves and attributing them to 
‘outsiders’. Goh Sin Tub also spoke of encountering ‘subversives’ and ‘agitators’ at 
the relief centre, allegedly from the PAP left, who claimed to be representatives of 
the fire victims but were not fire victims themselves. The ‘representatives’ sought 
his permission to hold a mass rally of the fire victims in the centre. According to 
Goh, ‘They may be out to cause even riots…because they were out to agitate against 
the government. What they were trying to tell the people by word of mouth even 
was that the government was not doing enough for them, that if they ganged together, 
they could persuade the government to rebuild their attap houses in Bukit Ho Swee’. 
Such ‘agitation’, Goh maintained, reinforced accusations made by the same 
‘representatives’ that the Government had set fire to the kampong to clear the area 
for redevelopment. He turned down the request and screened ‘some blockbuster 
Chinese films’ to distract the fire victims when the ‘agitators’ attempted to organise 
an unauthorised meeting.
166 At a meeting of the BHSFNRF committee in 1965, W. 
S. Woon revealed the existence of ‘a plot to stage a “stay put” in the relief centre’.
167  
                                                
 
On 1 July, when Lee Kuan Yew and Tan Kia Gan paid surprise visits to fire 
victims rehoused in Queenstown and Tiong Bahru, they encountered numerous 
complaints. Lee realised that while ‘[a]t present, what we are doing for them has 
helped them’, ‘[w]hat they are concerned [about] now is their future’.
168 The main 
anxiety, particularly for those advanced in age or unemployed, was over the $55 
monthly rental, which would be unsubsidised after the third month of residence. Lee 
assured them that new flats would be ready for occupancy within three months at 
$20 rentals and that, if they were not, there would be further subsidies. Other 
grievances were also primarily economic: the added burden of having to pay for 
water and electricity and the difficulty of obtaining transport to school for the 
children. In addition, the new estates were still lacking adequate amenities like 
clinics and telephones, and the lifts were frequently out of order. Lee acknowledged 
that Queenstown, unlike Bukit Ho Swee, did not have a good bus service but 
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  338promised the fire victims that he would get a bus service to run there.
169 He stated 
that the government would make further payouts from the relief fund but also urged 
the fire victims to be thrifty in using water and electricity.
170  
 
The question of rent became politicised later that year, by which time the 
Lim Chin Siong group had left the PAP to form the Barisan Sosialis.
171 The new 
party took on the cause of the fire victims in its struggle with the ruling government 
to attain political legitimacy. On 21 November, a committee purportedly chosen by 
the fire victims, called the Bukit Ho Swee Fire Victims’ Representatives (‘河水山灾
民代表团’), submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of National Development, 
detailing the problems encountered with the HDB flats. It called for rentals to be 
lowered, for a waiver of rent for the first three months of occupation, and for fire 
victims in rental arrears, who had already received ‘urgent’ notices of arrears from 
the HDB, to be permitted to pay them in installments. Grievances over rentals were 
partly economic in nature but also political. As the notices of arrears issue 
demonstrates, living in an HDB flat entailed one’s increased integration into a 
national system of public housing financially managed by the state. For the fire 
victims, used to an informal system of credit in the kampong, be it in the form of 
payment of rent or purchase of provisions, having now to pay rent, at a stipulated 
time of the month or to handle official letters, was both psychologically mortifying 
and politically disempowering because one had to deal directly with officialdom. 
The 15 fire victim families rehoused in Kallang Estate surveyed in Jacinta Chen’s 
study were intensely unhappy with the high rent and its administration, because in 
the kampong they had been familiar with the landlords and chief tenants and could 
                                                 
169 NYSP, 2 Jul 1961. 
170 ST, 1 Jul 1961. 
171 The Barisan Sosialis was formed in September 1961 by members of the PAP radical left, such as 
Lee Siew Choh (Chairman), Lim Chin Siong (Secretary-General), S. Woodhull (Vice-Chairman), and 
Fong Swee Suan, who had broken away from the PAP in July. The party adopted a militant anti-
colonial posture, demanding immediate full and complete independence from colonial rule and the 
creation of a socialist, democratic Malaya, including Singapore. It opposed the PAP’s plan to join 
Malaysia under the terms of the British-sponsored ‘Grand Design’. The Barisan challenge threatened 
the PAP’s control of the Legislative Assembly, with 13 Assemblymen switching sides, leaving the 
PAP with only a majority of one (26) in July 1961. It also greatly weakened the PAP’s hold over the 
Chinese-speaking population, with 37 of the 51 party branches, 19 of 23 of its organising secretaries 
and many of its grassroots organisers and activists joining the new party. Chan Choy Siong, 
Assemblywoman for Delta, however, remained loyal to the PAP. The Barisan’s influence in the rural 
areas and among wooden house dwellers in Singapore is discussed in the following chapter. 
  339ask for a payment to be deferred, but it was impossible with the HDB.
172 As Tay Ah 
Chuan put it simply, many former residents of Bukit Ho Swee did not relish moving 
into an HDB flat partly because at the end of the month, they had to pay rent.
173 
 
On 27 November, a 6-man delegation from the committee, accompanied by 
Lee Siew Choh, now Barisan Assemblyman for Queenstown, met Tan Kia Gan to 
discuss these issues. On 5 December, the Ministry of National Development released 
a press statement accusing the committee of milking a social problem for political 
capital. It claimed that some of its members were from the Barisan Sosialis, who 
‘had used the housing question to create dissatisfaction among the fire victims’ and 
‘engineered for a group of the fire victims more gullible than the rest to petition or to 
go in groups from Minister to Minister in order that more could be obtained for these 
victims’.
174 On 14 December, the problem of rent faced by the fire victims was 
brought up in the Legislative Assembly by Lee Siew Choh and other opposition 
members from other political parties. Tan Kia Gan defended his Ministry’s 
rehousing work, stating that the government had done its utmost in rehousing the 
fire victims. He pointed out that the ministry had given a 3-month rent subsidy and a 
bundle of food and clothing each valued at $22 to each fire victim and also made 
four cash payments from the relief fund. Tan also assured that fire victims would be 
allowed to pay their arrears in installments and would not be evicted from their flats. 
He conceded, however, that there were grounds for unhappiness, as large families 
given 1-room flats had yet to be allocated bigger apartments because the larger flats 
being built at the Bukit Ho Swee fire site were still unfinished.
175 
 
On 18 December, the committee issued a reply, denying that it was stirring 
up the fire victims at the Barisan’s instigation. It insisted that it was not seeking new 
concessions but was merely asking the government to fulfill its promises – for the 
rent to be waived for three months, the rent to be lowered, the arrears to be paid 
through installments, the amount collected for and distribution of the Bukit Ho Swee 
Fire National Relief Fund to be announced, and the fire victims to be given priority 
                                                 
172 Chen, Rehousing Upheaval and Readjustment, pp. 50-52. The informants felt strongly that the 
rentals they had to pay were extremely ‘unfair’ because they were higher than those paid by earlier 
tenants in the same flats. The HDB revalued the rents upwards before the fire victims had moved in. 
173 Author’s interview with Tay Ah Chuan, 13 Sep 2006. 
174 NYSP, 15 Dec 1961; ST, 19 Dec 1961. 
175 NYSP, 15 Dec 1961; SLAD, 14 Dec 1961, pp. 2192-93; 2200-2204. 
  340for the new flats in Bukit Ho Swee. The committee claimed that following the 
submission of its memorandum to the Ministry, the HDB had served more notices of 
arrears to fire victims, demanding, allegedly, that they pay the arrears within three 
days or face eviction. The committee also stated that in their delegates’ meeting with 
Tan Kia Gan, he had begun the meeting by demanding, ‘你们灾民住屋子一定是不
必付屋租吗?’ [‘Are you fire victims living in the flats sure that you don’t have to 
pay rent?’] Tan, allegedly, turned down the request for rent reduction as 
unreasonable, since there were tenants paying $90 rentals or more elsewhere (a point 
which Chan Choy Siong had tried to downplay). Tan was said to have wanted the 
fire victims to use the relief payments for the rent instead of spending the money on 
clothing and furniture, as ‘the question of restoring your family life to normal can 
take its time’. The committee’s appeal for a 3-month rent waiver was also rejected, 
although it had argued that precedents already existed in the rehousing of victims of 
the 1959 Kampong Tiong Bahru and 1961 Upper Chin Chew Street fires. Tan, it 
seemed, had also denied that Lee Kuan Yew had promised to extend the duration of 
rent subsidy if necessary, a guarantee made on 1 July. Instead, Tan had assured the 
committee that he would stop the HDB from sending out notices of arrears but fire 
victims apparently continued to receive them. In a bid to exert pressure on the 
government, the committee asked the politicians to account for the amount of money 
remaining in the BHSFNRF, supposedly totalling $618,000. Finally, the committee 
called on Tan to hold a mass meeting of the fire victims to allow them to establish 
their claim as bona-fide representatives. The statement ended by stating that the 
committee would organise the fire victims to carry out a protest and petition the 
minister.
176  No such protest materialised, although a Complaint Bureau was 
established that month to look into the fire victims’ grievances, which allowed them 
to pay the arrears in installments.
177 
 
                                                 
176 NYSP, 18 Dec 1961; ST, 19 Dec 1961. W. S. Woon subsequently informed the NYSP that the 
committee’s estimations of the size of the relief fund were incorrect, that $1,581,923.22 was collected 
and $1,430,592.38 paid out to the fire victims, leaving a balance of only $151,330.84. SWD 81/61 
Vol. I, Letter from W. S. Woon, Secretary-Treasurer of BHSFNRF National Committee, to Editor, 
NYSP, 18 Dec 61. 
177 Chen, Rehousing Upheaval and Readjustment, p. 53. It appeared that some of Chen’s informants 
had been part of the delegation which went to see Tan Kia Gan on 27 November or had done so 
separately. 
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Despite the apparent concern and social resistance, the relief operation 
moved inexorably forward. The government had decided to acquire the fire site for 
public housing less than a week after the towering blaze and prevented wooden 
housing from being re-erected amidst the ashes. Half of the fire victims were 
rehoused in temporary Housing and Development Board flats within two weeks, and 
by the end of the year, the proportion had risen to more than three-quarters. The 
People’s Action Party leadership’s performance in the emergency had been 
characterised by speed and political resolve. Its actions were markedly superior in 
these two basic aspects of emergency relief to what previous governments had 
accomplished for victims of fire. What was at stake was not merely the rehabilitation 
of a large number of disaster victims but also the establishment of a modern housing 
estate in place of a former ‘black area’. This initiative involved asserting control 
over what was formerly a mobile urban population residing in a largely autonomous 
place outside the Central Area. As part of the PAP’s endeavour to transform postwar 
Singapore society, the relief work was of necessity a national operation. As rumours 
of arson and high rents continued to circulate, it became imperative to the 
government that the final stage of rehabilitation – the rehousing of the fire victims in 
modern flats built on the fire site – be successfully accomplished within the 
stipulated time-frame that Lee Kuan Yew had promised.  
 Chapter 8 
Nine Months 
 
While the victims of the Bukit Ho Swee inferno were temporarily living in 
Housing and Development Board flats or with relatives and friends, feverish 
building activity was taking place on the fire site itself. This chapter discusses how 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate, the first major housing project started and completed by the 
HDB, provided the People’s Action Party government with an important head start 
to its ambitious plan to replace the semi-autonomous ‘black areas’ of Singapore with 
planned modern public housing estates. The Bukit Ho Swee project was robustly 
underpinned by the principles of high modernism which has since characterised the 
PAP’s social policy: scientific-rational planning and organisation, and rapid and 
determined implementation. Rebuilding the fire site, as Lim Kim San, the first HDB 
Chairman, later stated, ‘was a question of management. How to bring together all 
the components of such massive construction and put them on schedule?’
1 The 
emergency housing process readily overcame isolated instances of resistance to land 
acquisition and clearance from both the landowners and tenants in the locality, and, 
the fire victims. It also gave the HDB a strategic foothold towards transforming the 
urban spaces south and west of the Singapore River. The rapid emergence of Bukit 
Ho Swee Estate consequently signalled a major turning point in the history of 
postwar Singapore. The public housing policy resettled a previously-mobile people 
by dictating the terms on which they now could obtain their housing. The 
government was consequently able to begin the large-scale process of integrating 
low-income Chinese kampong dwellers into the formally reorganised social fabric of 
the young state and usher Singapore into the modern era in the mid-twentieth 
century. 
 
‘A war on the all too familiar ogres and giants’: The PAP’s Public Housing Policy, 
1960 
 
                                                 
1  SBC, audio-visual programme titled Diary of a Nation: Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 
broadcast on 25 May 1988. 
  343For the PAP government, the very identity of the new citizen and where they 
lived were questions which were inextricably bound up with the future development 
of the state. On the surface, the alleged purpose of providing public housing was 
purely altruistic. In a meeting with the American Consul General in July 1959, Ong 
Eng Guan, the Minister for National Development, explained that building low-cost 
housing was the government’s top priority because it raised living standards and 
provided employment for low-income families.
2 However, by the time the PAP 
came to power, it had become acutely aware of the British attempts to clear wooden 
house settlements and to build emergency housing on fire sites in the 1950s, and 
consequently, of the social and political importance of rehousing the previously-
mobile, semi-autonomous urban kampong population in regulated public housing.  
 
Although it was originally an anti-colonial party which advocated the 
interests of low-income Chinese, the PAP had well-defined ideas on how to integrate 
the population socially and politically into the structure of the state once some 
degree of independence from colonial rule had been achieved. The people’s partial 
‘liberation’ from colonial dominion in 1959 was consequently quickly followed by a 
radical reconfiguration of the society and economy, undertaken by the popularly-
elected government. As Lim Kim San reflected, ‘Once the severance between the 
colonial masters and us becomes apparent…then you’ll have to adopt a different 
kind of stand, isn’t it? No more destroying, fighting. It’s more about construction, 
development and building’.
3 Significantly, the 1959 Constitution did not give 
Singapore independence but it granted the elected government full control over 
housing.  
 
The importance of housing development to the PAP was manifest in the run-
up to the May 1959 general elections. In its election campaign, the party drew up an 
ambitious 9-point programme which envisaged a thorough restructuring of 
Singapore society.
4 The PAP declared that it would take a leading role in providing 
                                                 
2 RG 59, 746F.00/7-959, Memo of Conversation between US Consul General and Ong Eng Guan, 9 
Jul 1959. 
3 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
4 PAP, The Tasks Ahead: The PAP’s Five-Year Plan, 1959-1964, Part 2 (Singapore: People’s Action 
Party, 1959). The 9-point programme also aimed to industrialise the economy, develop the rural areas, 
protect the rights of labour, achieve the emancipation of women, expand the education system, 
improve health standards, streamline the civil service, and build a non-communal Malayan nation. 
  344low-cost housing for the people, by replacing the Singapore Improvement Trust with 
a housing authority under the government’s direct control.
5 With leftwing leaders 
like Lim Chin Siong and Chan Chiaw Thor still under detention, Lee Kuan Yew’s 
faction was in complete control of the party.
6 Lee’s group subscribed to modernist 
ideas about housing. Ong Eng Guan’s speech at a mass rally in February revealed 
the party’s attempt both to initially declare its ideas about modern housing and to 
allay fears of eviction among the kampong population whom constituted its mass 
base. Ong, adopting a decidedly anti-colonial tone, promised that the PAP would 
build 10,000 units of low-cost housing yearly, unlike the SIT, which had failed 
miserably. He also assured the victims of the Tiong Bahru fire that the party would 
seriously consider their wish to continue to live in wooden housing. However, Ong 
also endorsed the SIT’s modernist concepts of planned neighbourhoods, satellite 
towns and organised kampongs which assumed a greater importance in the party’s 
public housing programme. He also aimed to have the 1958 Master Plan revised, not 
rejected, and land use in Singapore properly planned.
7 
 
The PAP cabinet formed after the elections was a young one, with an 
average age of only 37 years and possessing a collective determination to undertake 
ambitious social projects. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was 35, while Goh Keng 
Swee, his deputy and the Minister of Finance, was 40. The 1959 Singapore Annual 
Report described the nine ministers as possessing ‘ability, confidence and courage, 
and a clear programme, well and long-debated beforehand among themselves, and in 
public’.
8 Scholars have hitherto focussed on the political side of this programme, 
that is, Lee’s struggle against the left and to obtain independence for Singapore 
through a merger with Malaya. However, his government was just as determined to 
launch radical social and economic programmes to remake Singapore and fashion 
the people into loyal citizens of the new state. The British Commissioner of 
Singapore, who admired the Lee Kuan Yew group as practical-minded and 
                                                 
5 Petir, May 1959, pp. 1, 3, 11. See also Lee Kuan Yew’s comments in the Legislative Assembly on 
26 Jan 1959. SLAD, 26 Jan 1959, p. 1827. 
6 The detained leftists were released after the elections but not given ministerial positions in the PAP 
government. Chan Chiaw Thor was appointed the Field Secretary in the Primary Production 
Department dealing with agricultural matters. 
7 PAP, The Tasks Ahead, Part 2, pp. 28-31. 
8 Singapore, Annual Report 1959, p. 9. 
  345intelligent individuals,
9 nevertheless warned that they possessed a ‘totalitarian streak 
that rides roughshod over all opposition or criticism’.
10 After the elections, the PAP 
established a Ministry of Culture which intervened in matters of social leisure and 
culture to ‘engender the feeling of something new and something shared between 
communities’.
11 The People’s Association, chaired by the Prime Minister himself, 
similarly sought ‘to instill in the youth of Singapore a sense of national identity and 
a spirit of dedicated service to the community….which transcends communal and 
racial loyalties’. Through the community centres, the PA attempted to draw the 
population into the orbit of a social life and values endorsed by the government.
12 
Such integrative policies aimed not only to break down communal and religious 
divides but also to remove the social and political distance between dwellers of 
‘black areas’ and the official establishment. 
 
Housing was considered the most important pillar of the government’s social 
programmes because it could kickstart the entire process of social and political 
engineering. The PAP leadership aimed to transform the entrepot-based economy 
into an industrial one in order to provide jobs for Singapore’s rapidly-growing 
population.
13 By 1960, the island’s population, buoyed by a high annual birth rate of 
4.5% between 1947-1957, had risen to 1.6 million. However, a third of the 
economically-active population was gainfully employed that year, with most of the 
remainder engaged in casual employment. Nearly half of the population (46%) was 
also 15 years old and younger,
14 although this high dependency ratio masked the 
fact that young people typically did some work to support their families. The full 
extent of unemployment at this time was also difficult to gauge because there was no 
                                                 
9 CO 1030/562, Despatch from British Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 Jun 
1959. 
10 CO 1030/562, Despatch from British Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 Sep 
1959. 
11  Singapore,  Annual Report 1960, pp. 7-8; MC, Towards a More Just Society (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 5. 
12 Singapore, Annual Report 1960, p. 7. 
13 Economic views of housing had already begun to enter official thinking in the late 1950s. In 1957, 
F. C. Bentham, the Economic Adviser to the Chief Minister, identified public housing as a major 
source of capital formation for Singapore’s economy, necessary to provide for its growing population. 
F. C. Benham, Economic Survey: Singapore 1957 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 
11. 
14 MOF,  State of Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964 (Singapore: 1961), p. 2; Singapore, 
Annual Report 1960, p. 9. 
  346compulsory registration of the unemployed.
15 Nevertheless, the PAP duly declared 
that the main economic problem facing Singapore was the provision of 
employment.
16  In August 1961, the government established the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) to attract foreign investors to establish manufacturing 
industries in Singapore. However, this industrialisation programme was painfully 
slow to take off. In mid-1960, the Australian Commissioner in Singapore observed 
that the government had failed to deal with the unemployment problem after thirteen 
months in office.
17 The following year, Albert Winsemius, a practical-minded Dutch 
economist who had headed a United Nations mission to examine the feasibility of 
industrialisation for Singapore, advised the government to ‘show something very 
early’ to attract foreign investors, ‘which at least gave the impression that we were 
making progress’. ‘The only thing we could do’, Winsemius concluded, ‘was 
building flats’. When he asked Howe Yoon Chong, formerly Chief Executive 
Officer of the HDB before becoming the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
National Development, how many flats the Board could build yearly, Howe replied 
without hesitation, ‘Physically and from a financial point of view, 18,000’. 
Winsemius viewed this figure as risky but Howe was adamant it could be 
accomplished.
18 British and Australian observers likewise believed that the PAP’s 
housing targets were overly-ambitious in view of what the SIT had managed to build 
previously.
19 
 
But the new government was firmly committed to waging ‘a war on the all 
too familiar ogres and giants in a subservient society – poverty, disease, ignorance, 
squalor, and idleness or unemployment’.
20 The party envisaged its first year in office 
as one of ‘peaceful revolution’, in which public funds would be generously used to 
meet ‘the needs of the neglected masses, the slum and kampong dwellers and the 
                                                 
15 Singapore, ‘Labour and Welfare’, Annual Report 1960, p. 150. The authorities used the number of 
people seeking work at two government-run Employment Exchanges to estimate the unemployment 
figures, although such job-seekers included those in full, irregular or casual employment. 
16 Petir, Apr 1959, p. 2. See also PAP, The Tasks Ahead, Part 1, pp. 19-27. 
17 A1838/751/2 Part I, Despatch from Acting Australian Commissioner to Department of External 
Affairs, 9 Jul 1960. 
18 OHC, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982. 
19 CO 1030/562, Despatch from British Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 Jun 
1959; A1838/751/2 Part I, Despatch from Acting Australian Commissioner to Secretary, Department 
of External Affairs, 20 Oct 1960. 
20 MC,  Democratic Socialism in Action, June 1959-April 1963 (Singapore: Publicity Division, 
Ministry of Culture, 1963), unpaginated. 
  347rural people’.
21  An article in Petir, the PAP’s official organ, pledged the 
government’s all-out effort to build more houses for the low-income population.
22 
Ong Eng Guan subsequently announced a $415 million plan to build 84,000 houses 
over five years. The Australian Commissioner felt that the government was 
incapable of funding such a massive budget either through taxes or loans.
23 After 
Ong fell out with the party in 1960, the PAP’s ‘replacement’ plan turned out to be 
equally ambitious and comprehensive in launching Singapore’s housing 
development.  
 
In April 1961, Goh Keng Swee presented the State Development Plan for 
1961-1965 to the Legislative Assembly as the government attempted ‘to match our 
population growth with at least a similar rate of expansion to provide jobs for your 
growing population’.
24 Of the Plan’s $871 million budget, $350 million (40%) was 
allocated to the social services, compared to 58% for economic development, with 
$153.6 million assigned to building 51,031 units of housing over four years.
25 
Although this sum was only a fifth of Ong Eng Guan’s original budget, it was still 
the largest item of expenditure for the social services and the second largest overall 
after industry and commerce. Goh Keng Swee hailed the housing budget ‘an all-time 
record for Singapore’ unmatched anywhere else in Asia;
26 it contrasted favourably 
with the $94.3 million the Labour Front government had spent on housing in 1955-
1960.
27 Goh was confident that the government had the financial resources to 
undertake this massive building programme.
28 The PAP had inherited a financially 
solvent administration from the British regime, which also continued to provide 
loans to the Singapore government.
29 The full budget was funded by the state’s 
revenue surplus ($116 million) and assets ($245 million), and local private loans to 
the government ($230 million), with the remaining third of the budget coming from 
                                                 
21 MC, One Year of Peaceful Revolution, June 3, 1959 to June 3, 1960 (Singapore: Ministry of 
Culture, 1960), unpaginated. 
22 Petir, Jul 1959, p. 5. 
23 A1838/751/2 Part I, Despatch from Acting Australian Commissioner to Secretary, Department of 
External Affairs, 21 Sep 1959. 
24 SLAD, 12 Apr 1961, p. 1231. 
25 Singapore, ‘Finance & Development’, Annual Report 1961, pp. 103-105. 
26 SLAD, 12 Apr 1961, p. 1233. 
27 MOF, State of Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964, p. 25. 
28 A1838/751/2 Part I, Despatch from Acting Australian Commissioner to Department of External 
Affairs, 30 Nov 1959. 
29 Robert E. Gamer, The Politics of Urban Development in Singapore (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1972), p. 41. 
  348foreign loans and assistance. Indicative of the importance of housing to Singapore’s 
overall development, the Minister for National Development was appointed to a 
Development Planning Committee which oversaw the implementation of the 
Development Plan,
30 while the Chairman of the HDB was also made a member of 
the EDB.
31  
 
The government’s dominant role with respect to housing in the Development 
Plan was striking. The Plan estimated that 14,000 new units of dwellings needed to 
be built yearly to meet the demand arising from the annual population increase, the 
existing housing deficiency and slum clearance. In 1961, a commission led by Lim 
Tay Boh, an economist, concluded that private developers should build housing for 
the middle and lower-middle classes to complement the government’s housing 
programme for the low-income population.
32  But under the government’s 
Development Plan, the HDB shouldered the main responsibility to build 11,500 
units of housing, with the private sector considered incapable of building more than 
2,250 units.
33  
 
The PAP’s housing programme was wholly high modernist in character. In 
February 1960, the new government brought the Housing and Development 
Ordinance into force, thereby replacing the SIT with a statutory housing authority 
under the Ministry of National Development with full legal powers and a mandate to 
build.
34 The HDB’s first 5-Year Building Programme sought to erect low-cost 
housing in properly-planned estates ahead of a longer-term plan to redevelop the 
City area.
35 To enable the Board to focus on housing, the Trust’s planning duties 
were transferred to a newly-created Planning Department.
36 The HDB, conceptually, 
was a child of the Lim Yew Hock government, which had supported the passing of 
                                                 
30 Singapore, ‘Finance & Development’, Annual Report 1961, pp. 90-91. 
31 Singapore, ‘Finance & Development’, Annual Report 1961, p. 97. 
32 Singapore,  Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Constructional Capacity of 
Singapore (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 48-52. The Commission’s report was 
published in September 1961, after the Bukit Ho Swee fire. HDB housing was open for application to 
Singaporeans above 21 years old in a family of five or more persons, with no member earning more 
than $500 per month and the total monthly family income not over $800.  
33 MOF, State of Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964, p. 6. 
34 The Minister for National Development had the formal authority to appoint the Board’s Chairman, 
Deputy Chairman and three members. CO 1030/1597, Memo titled ‘Public Housing in Singapore’ by 
the UK Commission, 16 Apr 1963. 
35 HDB, Annual Report 1960, pp. 8-10. 
36 Singapore, Annual Report 1959, p. 85. 
  349the Housing and Development Board Bill in January 1959 before the elections. 
Indeed the call for a proper housing authority had been made as early as 1947 by a 
Housing Committee.
37  
 
To the PAP government, housing was not merely living space but rather was 
a crucial instrument for forging a desired identity and social values for the making of 
the modern Singaporean. In December 1960, a week-long HDB exhibition on low-
cost housing attracted 80,000 people and introduced the Board’s potential tenants to 
a new way of life. It explained the rationale behind the HDB’s efforts to clear 
‘squatters’, decentralise housing outside the Central Area and plan land use 
systematically.
38 An instructional film denounced as anti-social the rearing of 
poultry in flats, urinating in lifts, littering, and the peddling of insanitary food by 
‘lazy and irresponsible residents’, and showed instead, contrasting photographs of 
the clean, litter- and obstruction-free public spaces of the idealised new housing 
estates.
39  
 
Not surprisingly, the PAP government and its colonial predecessor held 
similar views on the future of unauthorised wooden housing. In 1960, when 4,500 
such buildings stood on Board land,
40 the government declared that no such new 
housing was permitted on either State or Board lands and any ‘encroachments’ 
found would be summarily demolished. Current wooden house dwellers would be 
evicted if the land was required for immediate public development or would 
otherwise have to obtain a Temporary Occupation Licence regularising their 
occupation until such development took place.
41 In September 1961, the HDB was 
delegated the authority, previously held by the Chief Building Surveyor under the 
Ministry of National Development, to administer the building bylaws for the 
reconstruction and repair of temporary housing on Board land. The HDB adopted a 
simplified and tough procedure, whereby applications to build new temporary 
                                                 
37 Singapore, Report of the Housing Committee, 1947 (Singapore: Government Printing House, 1948), 
p. 9. 
38 HB 74/1/59, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Secretary, HDB, 8 Dec 1960; HDB, Annual 
Report 1960, p. 43. 
39 HB 74/1/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Acting PS, MND, 30 Nov 1960; HB 544/52, Minutes of 
the Public Relations & Advisory Committee Meeting, 5 Jul 1960. 
40 HB 266/46, Memo from Acting Chief Building Surveyor to PS, MND, 19 Aug 1960. 
41 SLAD, 11 May 1960, pp. 534-35. 
  350buildings would be rejected, with discretionary powers to approve only minor 
extensions to existing buildings for health reasons. The Board also allowed only 
minimum essential repairs, and treated ‘all applications for repairs as requests for 
rehousing so that the huts can be demolished and rehousing effected’.
42 By mid-
1962, the PAP government had already demolished 615 unauthorised buildings on 
State land since coming to power. 
 
Unlike the SIT, however, the HDB adopted a firmer policy towards 
emergency public housing, although such accommodation contradicted the Board’s 
basic ‘principle of providing flats of sound construction, clean design and pleasant 
surroundings for the lower-income group for rents which they can afford’.
43 In 1960, 
the Treasury, aware of the high maintenance costs of emergency housing, had 
viewed it as a retrograde step.
44 Teh Cheang Wan, the HDB’s Chief Architect, 
agreed that while the capital cost of a 1-room emergency unit was 49% cheaper than 
that for a standard 1-room unit, the former incurred an additional $13.35 in monthly 
maintenance costs.
45 But pressure from the PAP government forced the Board to 
construct 30% of its housing under the State Development Plan as 1-room flats, 
compared to 40% and 30% for 2- and 3-room units respectively. Although the HDB 
viewed the 2-room flat as its minimum housing standard, it accepted the necessity of 
building at least 10,000 1-room flats, most of them emergency units, near the 
Central Area as a short-term measure to accommodate the inner-city low-income 
population. Privately, the Board’s members felt that such emergency housing would 
constitute ‘controlled slums’ which were ‘inadvisable if not impolitic’ to build, but 
accepted that ‘political considerations were more pressing and that the Housing 
Board might have to sacrifice its ideas on what units should be constructed’.
46 The 
PAP government’s position on emergency housing concurred with the SIT’s view in 
its final year of existence. Toh Shung Pie, the Acting Deputy Manager of the Trust, 
had emphasised the need to concentrate on building emergency housing in the short-
term in order ‘to cut costs to the minimum, and to increase efficiency to the 
                                                 
42 HB 266/46, Memo from Secretary, HDB, to Lands Manager, HDB, 20 Sep 1961; and Memo from 
CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 21 Sep 1960. 
43 HDB, Annual Report 1963, p. 1. 
44 HB 1095/49 Vol. II, Memo on Public Housing & Rental Policy from Deputy Secretary, Treasury, 
to Cabinet, 25 Jul 1960. 
45 HB 16/59 Vol. I, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Secretary, HDB, 9 Mar 1960. 
46 HB 871/57, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Members of the Board, 10 Oct 1960. 
  351maximum’. Toh also suggested that the Trust build 2-room thick emergency housing 
blocks with the flats facing each other across a common corridor, a design which 
became characteristic of the HDB’s emergency housing.
47 In October 1960, officials 
from the Board, the Ministry of National Development and the Ministry of Finance 
considered a proposal to build the maximum number of 1-room units near the 
Central Area in 1960-1961 and particularly at the Tiong Bahru cemetery site at $20 
monthly rentals.
48 The next month, the Ministry instructed the Board to continue the 
SIT’s experiment with regard to 1-room emergency housing by preparing a suitable 
design for the government’s consideration.
49  
 
The Board also decided to build multi-storey housing, due to the shortage of 
land for large-scale housing in the City and its low initial construction and 
maintenance costs.
50 The decision to go high-rise could also be traced to the SIT’s 
proposal in late 1959 to build ‘skyscrapers’, with lifts equipped only for blocks of 
ten or more storeys.
51 The monthly rentals of the HDB’s flats were $20, $40 and $60 
for 1-, 2- and 3-room flats respectively, inclusive of service and conservancy 
charges for emergency housing with communal toilets and kitchens, but exclusive 
for standard housing with its own toilets and kitchens. Such rents were lower than 
the actual economic rates and were made possible only by a five-year government 
subsidy amounting to $11.7 million.
52 
 
In May-June 1960, Lim Chong Keat, a prominent architect and a member of 
the HDB Board, and Teh Cheang Wan attended an international housing conference 
in Israel. The photographs of the Board’s housing which were presented at the 
conference were subsequently published. The publication stated that the Board’s 
housing projects and land use would conform strictly to the 1955 Master Plan. It 
contained plans and photographs of the ongoing construction at the Tiong Bahru fire 
                                                 
47 HB 74/59, Memo by Acting Deputy Manager, SIT, undated, c. Jun 1959. 
48 HB 16/59 Vol. I, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, and PS, MOF, 11 Oct 1960. 
49 HB 16/59 Vol. I, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 28 Nov 1960; Memo from PS, 
MND, to CEO, HDB, 23 Nov 1960; and Notes of a Meeting at the MND, 6 Oct 1960. 
50 HDB, Annual Report 1960, pp. 10, 32-33; HB 188/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MOF, 26 
Jan 1961; OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985; author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 
Nov 2006. Piling increased the cost of building a 1-room unit by $500-600. HB 999/48 Vol. I, Memo 
from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 17 Oct 1960. 
51 HB 74/59, Memo by Acting Deputy Manager, SIT, undated, c. Jun 1959. 
52 HDB, Annual Report 1961, p. 1; CO 1030/1597, Memo titled ‘Public Housing in Singapore’ by the 
UK Commission, 16 Apr 1963. 
  352site, including the 1-room emergency flats. The presentation of these plans to an 
international professional audience demonstrated that the Board had accepted the 
necessity to build emergency housing as a short-term measure.
53 The opportunity to 
discuss with delegates from other countries also gave the HDB added confidence 
that it could achieve its building goals. The Board’s representatives concluded that 
‘Singapore was building permanent dwelling accommodation equipped with all the 
facilities of water, electricity, gas and modern sanitation, at much lower cost per unit 
than anywhere else’.
54 
 
‘You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs’: The HDB’s Managers and 
Architects 
 
The PAP leadership assembled a hard-headed and single-minded group of 
individuals to achieve its ambitious housing goals. Alarmed by the anti-colonial 
stance of the new government and the consequent lack of job security, J. M. Fraser 
had left the SIT along with most of his expatriate colleagues.
55 In December 1959, 
Ong Eng Guan, the new Chairman, revealed that 30 out of the Trust’s 35 senior 
expatriate officers had been dismissed or released.
56 By 1961, only two of the 38 
senior officers in the HDB were expatriates, with the Board having recruited eight 
locally domiciled senior officers and 116 junior officers.
57 This was akin, as Lim 
Kim San remarked later, to a case of ‘fools rushing in where angels fear to tread’.
58  
 
The HDB, however, had Goh Keng Swee, arguably the second most 
important member of the PAP cabinet, as the intellectual and financial sponsor of its 
public housing programme. Goh had been heavily involved in social research with 
the Social Welfare Department and had briefly been its Director before resigning in 
                                                 
53 HDB, Low Cost Housing: Photographs Illustrating Some Recent Public Housing Projects and 
Building Activities in the State of Singapore (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1960), 
unpaginated. 
54 HB 188/59, Letter from CEO, HDB, to Chairman, Building Industry Inquiry Commission, 8 Sep 
1960. 
55 HB 800/56, Brief from Singapore Improvement Trust Staff Officers’ Association, 27 Jan 1958. 
56 SLAD, 14 Dec 1959, pp. 1183-84; CO 1030/562, Despatch from British Commissioner to Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 7 Sep 1959. 
57 HDB, Annual Report 1961, p. 7. 
58 Melanie Chew, interview with Lim Kim San, in Leaders of Singapore (Singapore: Resource Press, 
1996), p. 163. 
  3531958 to contest the general elections. Whilst in the Department, he had undertaken 
two influential studies of housing: A Social Survey of Singapore (1947), and an 
extended study which became Urban Incomes and Housing (1956).
59 In the latter, 
Goh had identified the difficulties of mapping and controlling unauthorised wooden 
housing as major cartographic and social problems to be tackled.
60 As a PAP leader 
and a member of the colonial civil service, Goh provided the thread of continuity 
between the British colonial and PAP governments in their similar approaches to 
socially remake Singapore society.  
 
Goh Keng Swee’s former classmate at Raffles College, and a successful 
banker and entrepreneur, was Lim Kim San.
61 Lee Kuan Yew, who had appointed 
Lim as the Deputy Chairman of the Public Service Commission, asked him to head 
the HDB,
62 because, Lee later rationalised, ‘[i]t was crucial, life and death. If we 
failed, we would not be re-elected’.
63 As Tay Kheng Soon, a contemporary architect, 
observed, ‘It was Dr Goh who turned the nuts and bolts together, and Lim Kim San 
who actually carried out the plan. The strategic thinking of Dr Goh, while Lim Kim 
San did the legwork’.
64 Lim had no prior experience in housing but this was indeed 
part of the government’s staffing policy for the public housing programme.
65 As a 
former businessman, Lim was fully focussed on achieving building targets and, 
unlike Ong Eng Guan, did not worry about the fact that disgruntled evicted 
‘squatters’ might cost the government votes.
66 In fact, Lim was appointed to the 
                                                 
59 Goh Keng Swee, while doing his doctoral dissertation in Economics at the London School of 
Economics, formed the Malayan Forum with Toh Chin Chye, also doing his doctorate in Medicine in 
London. The organisation became a platform for political discussion among overseas Malayan 
students in Britain. They were joined later by Lee Kuan Yew, then pursuing his law degree at 
Cambridge University. Upon their return to Singapore, the three men became acquainted with the left 
and, together, formed the PAP in 1954. Chew, interview with Goh Keng Swee, in Leaders of 
Singapore, pp. 144-46; and Tan Siok Sun, Goh Keng Swee: A Portrait (Singapore: Editions Didier 
Millet, 2007), pp. 50-52; 67-74. 
60 Goh’s survey of the urban kampongs is discussed in Chapter 3 under ‘Sanitation and Surveillance’. 
61 Thomas H. Silcock, A History of Economics Teaching and Graduates in Singapore (Singapore: 
Department of Economics and Statistics, National University of Singapore, 1985), pp. 62-63. 
62 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985; ST, 22 Jul 2006. Lim received no salary for his 
work with the HDB and frequently called himself a volunteer. 
63 Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez & Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and his Ideas 
(Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings and Times Editions, 1998), p. 334.  
64 Author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006. 
65 In his interview with the Oral History Centre in 1985, Lim spoke of his complete shock at seeing 
first-hand the dilapidated housing and widespread poverty among the Chinese living in the Central 
Area. He had grown up in a well-to-do family. OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
66 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press 
Holdings, 1998), pp. 333-44. Lee also related an anecdote of a disagreement between Lim Kim San 
  354HDB partially to oppose Ong, his immediate superior, whom he characterised as a 
‘megalomaniac’ and ‘rabble-rouser’.
67 The challenge of achieving tangible housing 
targets was consequently something Lim could relate to as a businessman. ‘Within a 
year, the building is up’, Lim recalled, ‘The HDB was so interesting and I so 
thoroughly enjoyed it, that it became full-time’.
68 His business background was also 
invaluable because Goh Keng Swee wanted to ensure that the money given to the 
Board for housing the people would be well spent.
69 Lim found that ‘money was no 
problem. Any money I wanted, I was given a free hand in the spending of money’.
70 
Lim in turn recruited Howe Yoon Chong, a senior civil servant in the Public Service 
Commission and an Economics graduate from the University of Malaya, to liaise 
between the HDB and the Ministry of National Development but especially to 
communicate with the Board’s officers.
71 Howe was another ‘no-nonsense guy’ who 
understood the challenge of achieving tangible results,
72 and quickly obtained the 
nickname ‘Bulldozer’ for his single-minded determination to overcome red tape in 
pursuing government projects.
73 
 
The HDB management hurriedly recruited a group of young architects and 
planners.
74 Lim Kim San had found the early HDB staff afflicted by low morale and 
a ‘sense of persecution’, because, he claimed, Ong Eng Guan had planted his own 
‘cronies’ and ‘spies’.
75 Lim removed most, though not all, of Ong’s men and 
recruited young architects who had been trained in Australia and returned to 
Singapore between 1959 and 1965. Lim acknowledged later that ‘anybody with a 
degree in engineering, in architecture, we grabbed; degree or diploma’.
76 Because 
                                                                                                                                           
and Ong Eng Guan, who wanted to bypass the local contractors and hire construction workers for 
HDB projects directly. But Lim was only concerned to finish the housing project within the stipulated 
time. Ong had wanted to win over the construction workers’ union, which decried the contractor 
system as exploitative and wanted labour to be directly employed. Lee overruled Ong and supported 
Lim. Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MOF Finance, 26 Jan 1961; Singapore, Final Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Constructional Capacity of Singapore, p. 10. 
67 Chew, Leaders of Singapore, p. 163 
68 Chew, Leaders of Singapore, p. 163. 
69 Lee, The Singapore Story, pp. 333-44. 
70 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
71 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
72 Author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006. 
73 ST, 23 Aug 2007. 
74 Lim Kim San and Howe Yoon Chong themselves were relatively young, being 44 and 37 years old 
respectively in 1960. 
75 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
76 SBC, audio-visual programme Diary of a Nation: Homes for Our People, 12 Feb 1964, broadcast 
in 1988. According to Lim Kim San, the HDB was so desperate to recruit new officers to replace the 
  355Australian architectural ideas were received second-hand from Britain and the 
United States and were consequently less experimental, the Australia-trained 
architects were more predisposed to build the low-cost emergency housing which 
the PAP government desired. Some of the architects had also been politically-active 
in Australia and subscribed to a form of socialism which was materialist in nature 
and coincided with the PAP’s low-cost housing policy. They were, in short, 
‘intensely practical people, and they were no-nonsense, no human rights, “let’s get 
on with the job”’.
77  
 
Teh Cheang Wan, born in 1928, had been active in Sydney University’s left-
leaning Socialist Club. Upon his graduation in 1956, Teh had worked briefly for the 
Public Works Department and the Housing Commission of the New South Wales 
government, and in the Federal Housing Trust and the Penang City Council in 
Malaya before joining the SIT’s Building Department in August 1959.
78 A firm PAP 
supporter, he became the HDB’s Chief Architect when the Board was formed half a 
year later. Teh, like his superiors, believed whole-heartedly in the need to replace 
unauthorised wooden housing with modern housing; he reputedly coined the inside 
phrase, ‘You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs’.
79 Alan Choe, born in 
1931 and a graduate of Melbourne University with a postgraduate diploma in Town 
and Regional Planning, became the HDB’s first architect-planner. Ng Chee Sen, 
born in 1924, the Board’s Senior Architect, had also been educated at the University 
of Melbourne and had been a close associate of Ong Eng Guan in the SIT.
80 Another 
of Ong’s associates who played an important role in the campaign against 
unauthorised wooden housing was Ho Pak Toe, also from Melbourne University, 
where he had acquired a reputation for being ‘pink’ in his political orientation.
81 Ho 
                                                                                                                                           
SIT staff who had resigned that, in interviewing prospective candidates, they merely asked simple 
questions like, ‘Do you have a diploma? Are you a qualified architect? You are? Join us!’ Chew, 
interview with Lim Kim San, in Leaders of Singapore, p. 164. 
77  Tay Kheng Soon, ‘The Architecture of Rapid Transformation’, in Kernial S. Sandhu & Paul 
Wheatley (eds), Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 862; author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006; and 
author’s interview with William Lim, 25 Oct 2006. According to William Lim, who received his 
architectural training in Britain and the United States, it was in these two countries that cutting-edge 
architecture was being taught.  
78 A2998/1, Telegram Ref. No. 51/4300, 11 Apr 1957. 
79 Author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006. 
80 Author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. Ong Eng Guan was an accountancy graduate 
from Melbourne University. 
81 Author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006.  
  356became the Chief Building Surveyor of the Public Works Department, overseeing 
the approval of building plans and taking action against unauthorised buildings. 
Chee Teck Chiang, born in 1932, and Chu Pak Chow, the Board’s freshly-recruited 
assistant architects, were also Melbourne graduates.
82 
 
With its robust, hard-headed leadership and forward-looking young 
architects and planners, the HDB was well-suited to implement the government’s 
housing plan. Lim Kim San, delegated the Board’s executive authority, viewed the 
SIT’s subcommittees as time-wasting and abolished them. He was unchallenged to 
the extent that he could claim, ‘I’m the Committee’.
83 Lim knew how to organise the 
youthful talent at his disposal, understanding that young people liked to have a sense 
of responsibility.
84 Alan Choe found his superiors ‘really dynamic’, who ‘knew 
what they wanted. They were not scared that they had no experience but they had 
the conviction that they would be able to carry it through’.
85 In addition, according 
to William Lim, a contemporary architect, both Lim and Teh Cheang Wan 
understood the contractual side of housing.
86 Lim realised that the contractors and 
suppliers of material ‘must be paid promptly and then they will do business with you 
and they will give you the best prices available’.
87 As Liu Thai Ker, later the Chief 
Architect of the HDB, explained, Teh was also ‘a great strategist’, who ‘had a mind 
of the businessman, an entrepreneur. So he was resourceful in finding ways to 
deliver what the government expected of him. And he related very well with 
contractors’.
88 
                                                
 
The HDB staff’s lack of practical experience was, in Alan Choe’s words, a 
case of ‘the blind leading the blind’.
89 This apparent inadequacy, however, was 
actually useful for building the maximum number of low-cost housing units in 
 
82 Author’s interview with Chee Teck Chiang, 31 Jul 2007. Chee had joined the HDB because the 
private sector then was quiet. 
83 Chew, interview with Lim Kim San, in Leaders of Singapore, p. 164. 
84 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
85 OHC, interview with Alan Choe, 1 Jul 1997; author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. 
86 Author’s interview with William Lim, 25 Oct 2006. 
87 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
88 Author’s interview with Liu Thai Ker, 14 Dec 2006. 
89 Among the pioneer architects recruited to the HDB in Aug 1960, Teh Cheang Wan, 32, had only 
three years of practical experience. Ng Chee Seng, 36, had five and a half years, while Chee Teck 
Chiang, 27, had none. HB 188/59, Supplementary List of Professional Staff as at 1 Aug 1960; and 
Details of Professional Staff as at 1 Aug 1960. 
  357record time. The ease of building standardised housing, Lim Kim San explained, 
was ‘that we could more or less turn it out like in an assembly line’.
90 Chee Teck 
Chiang, a fresh architectural graduate, agreed that ‘we were given a guideline – 1-
room, 2-room, 3-room – the size of the unit, and the type of the materials we were 
allowed to use, and the structure was usually concrete, so it was very 
straightforward’.
91 Alan Choe, who had only six months’ prior experience in minor 
architectural work in Australia, concurred that with low-cost housing, ‘you are 
talking about purely functional needs. All architectural trimmings and fanciful things 
are out of your mind’. Most importantly, Choe understood that the clearance of the 
urban kampongs was necessary for the planned development of Singapore:  
ur roads, and 
offer sites for development, unless the site is cleared.
92 
 
 God-sent opportunity’: Emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate 
 
                                                
 
If you are a government or a planner, you know that when you want 
to upgrade a country, you cannot leave pockets of slums here and 
there. You can leave it if it is out of your path of growth. But it’s a 
matter of time….so you will prioritise your clearance of squatter 
areas and slums according to the path of growth. If it’s in the growth 
belt…you cannot put through your infrastructure, yo
‘A
In practice, however, the actual clearance of unauthorised wooden housing 
on the urban fringe was as deeply problematic for the HDB as it had been for the 
SIT. In October 1960, Lim Kim San, identifying clearance as his top priority, asked 
Goh Keng Swee for ‘close liaison with your Assemblymen as well as strong 
political backing’.
93  Under the State Development Plan, the HDB aimed to 
redevelop 1,300 acres of land within five miles of the Central Area. It targeted the 
construction of 7,832 units in Queenstown, MacPherson, St. Michael’s, and on the 
Tiong Bahru fire and cemetery sites at a cost of $34.1 million in 1961, 9,735 units in 
 
90  SBC, audio-visual recording titled Diary of a Nation: Homes for Our People, 12 Feb 1964, 
broadcast in 1988. 
91 Author’s interview with Chee Teck Chiang, 31 Jul 2007. 
92 OHC, interview with Alan Choe, 1 Jul 1997; author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. 
93 HB 999/48 Vol. I, Memo from Chairman, HDB, to Minister of Finance, 11 Oct 1960. 
  358Queenstown, Farrer Park and Kallang in 1962 ($40.7 million), 9,690 units in Toa 
Payoh in 1963 ($33.8 million), 12,750 units in Toa Payoh, MacPherson and 
Thomson in 1964 ($44.5 million), and 11,760 units in Toa Payoh, MacPherson and 
Covent Garden in 1965 ($44.1 million).
94 The building work would be concentrated 
in the more peripheral northern and eastern parts of the City in Queenstown and Toa 
Payoh,
95 the latter envisaged as a massive satellite town with 50,000 flats and a 
population of 300,000.
96 In 1960, the HDB continued to remove kampong dwellers 
from the Queenstown area and also established a committee to coordinate the 
clearance of Toa Payoh.
97  But kampong dwellers quickly began to make 
representations to the Ministry of National Development in protest.
98 Kampongs 
closer to the Central Area like Bukit Ho Swee were even more difficult to clear. As 
Teh Cheang Wan indicated in a memorandum in 1960, housing development in the 
City was also hindered by the high cost of land and the need to carry out piling on 
most such sites. Teh worried that ‘unless some solution is found, the development of 
housing in the central areas for the very low-income groups without Government 
subsidy is virtually impossible’.
99  
 
The acquisition of land at the margins of the City became a serious stumbling 
block. Under the Housing and Development Board Ordinance, the HDB had 
replaced the Land Office as the authority responsible for land acquisition. By late 
1960, the Board warned that it would soon use up all the vacant lands available for 
construction except for 135 acres of small, heavily encumbered and unsuitable sites. 
It stressed the urgency of acquiring a further 1,000 acres, given the ‘patent need for 
small central area sites and larger areas of land at the perimeter of the town for 
extensive housing development’.
100 In October, the Board established a Housing 
Sites Committee to study the possibility of acquiring small sites under both public 
and private ownership, such as Crown land at Henderson Road and cemeteries in 
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  359Bukit Merah and Buona Vista.
101 J. W. Hill, the Lands Manager, was confident 
about acquiring 300-400 acres of land per year but uncertain whether there were 
sufficient funds for the purchases.
102  By that time, the Board was intent on 
extending the development of the Tiong Bahru cemetery site; the Committee had 
marked out several plots of land in Bukit Ho Swee for future acquisition: Lots 62-11 
(12 acres of private land), 63-19 (40,000 square feet) and 61-17 (150,000 square feet 
of Crown land located between Nos. 549-588 Havelock Road).
103 
een 
advised by Teh Cheang Wan, had replied without hesitation, ‘Nine months’.
106  
 
The HDB consequently experienced a slow start to its building project. By 
April 1961, just before the outbreak of the Bukit Ho Swee fire, the Board had built 
only 2,112 units of housing in the 14 months since its inception, not overly-
impressive compared to the SIT’s average of 2,200 units per year.
104 It was in this 
context of an intractable clearance problem that the Bukit Ho Swee inferno took 
place. Two days before the fire, the HDB had decided to expand its low-cost 
building programme for the second half of the year to 5,674 self-contained and 
2,448 emergency flats.
105 The May 1961 fire provided the perfect opportunity to 
accomplish these targets and shift the building programme into a higher gear. The 
blaze had cleared the ‘squatters’ in an instant, while the scale of the calamity had 
given the government the moral authority to acquire the land at low cost. Lee Kuan 
Yew’s pledge to build permanent homes on the fire site within nine months was not 
a haphazard promise but a calculated risk based on the potential strength of the HDB: 
namely, the building of the maximum number of standardised units of housing in 
minimal time by a determined group of managers and architects. When Lee asked 
Lim Kim San how long it would take to rebuild Bukit Ho Swee, Lim, who had b
 
Moreover, what the British Commission viewed as a ‘crash plan’
107 to 
redevelop Bukit Ho Swee enjoyed firm public support. The enormity of the disaster 
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  360forged a collective social will to support a popularly-elected government towards 
transforming the landscape of ‘Old Singapore’. The Nanyang Siang Pau stated that 
the political leadership should ‘shoulder this responsibility to build many houses for 
the ordinary people and give them priority in applying for them’.
108 It was necessary, 
e newspaper urged, in order to stop the proliferation of unauthorised wooden 
housing
 
houses….Now we can understand why the Ministry of 
National Development opposes the construction of unauthorised 
to a fire trap’.
112 What was at stake, the 
aper emphasised, was not merely the threat of future fires but the need to clearly 
define 
 
 
uilding unauthorised houses for their own convenience, thus 
marring the look of the city and sowing the cause for future fires.
113 
 
                                                
th
: 
Let us remember permanently the lesson of the fire on the minimum 
standards for the construction of houses and the basic conditions for 
designing the 
structures.
109 
 
The  Sin Chew Jit Poh also fully supported the government’s campaign against 
unauthorised housing.
110 The Straits Times, which had been critical of the PAP 
before the elections but was now ‘meekly endorsing’ ministerial statements, lauded 
the government’s acquisition of the fire site as the sole consolation in the 
calamity.
111 It also stated that ‘[w]e do not want this valuable land once more locked 
by squatters or permitted to develop again in
p
the responsibilities of a good citizen: 
The observance of law and regulations is the first lesson for the 
citizens and an important condition for community life. It is hoped 
that all citizens will cultivate a good civic habit and refrain from
b
 
108 NYSP, 26 May 1961. 
109 NYSP, 1, 15 Jun 1961. 
110 SCJP, 8 Jun 1961. 
111 CO 1030/562, Despatch from British Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 Sep 
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Plate 8.1: A sign of the widespread social support for the PAP government’s emergency 
rehousing programme for the victims of the Bukit Ho Swee fire. Artist Tan Choo Kuan’s 
impression of the rapid rebuilding of the fire site, illustrated by three housing blocks in 
different stages of construction (Courtesy of National Museum of Singapore). 
 
Still, Lee Kuan Yew’s promise of nine months was a major gamble, since 
building a multi-storey housing block normally took ten to fourteen months.
114 The 
building of what was planned to be a ‘mini-town’ consisted of four main building 
phases between 1961 and 1965.
115 The first project, already advanced at the time of 
the fire, was the Tiong Bahru cemetery site scheme, renamed Bukit Ho Swee Phase I 
after the fire (see Map 8.1).
 116 The scheme aimed to build 904 1-room, 240 2-room 
and 200 3-room semi-communal flats with shared bathrooms, toilets and kitchens in 
two contracts at a cost of $2.3 million. Phase II involved the fire site proper, 
primarily Kampong Tiong Bahru and the southern half of Beo Lane, where 1,668 1-
room, 636 2-room and 576 3-room self-contained flats with their own bathrooms, 
toilets and kitchens were to be built at a cost of $6.9 million. The first two contracts 
of Phase II were scheduled for completion by July and November 1962 respectively. 
Phase III comprised 3,322 flats on the northern portion of Beo Lane, the area above 
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  362Delta Estate, and the area south of Tiong Bahru Road flanked by Jalan Membina, 
while a further 1,715 flats were to be built on Phase IV .
117 
 
For a considerable time, the housing programme was bogged down by the 
protracted process of acquiring the fire site. Three weeks after the inferno, 39½ acres 
of the site had been gazetted for housing and was in the process of being ‘urgently’ 
acquired for an estimated amount of $700,600, with 14 acres of Crown land in the 
vicinity also to be redeveloped.
118 The Board planned to make inquiries for the 
acquisition in June-July 1961, issue the awards in July-August and complete the 
acquisitions ‘within 3-4 months if possible’.
119 However, the low compensation 
values offered under the amended Land Acquisition Ordinance hampered the 
clearance effort. In October-November, four landowners were still disputing the 
HDB’s offer of compensation and wanted their cases referred to the High Court, 
forcing the Board to review its original offers.
120 The acquisition of the whole fire 
site had yet to be completed by May 1962,
121 and as late as October, leaving the 
HDB concerned that ‘the acquisition cost for Bukit Ho Swee Fire Site had not yet 
been worked out and therefore no provision had been made for the acquisition of the 
site’.
122 
 
The clearance of the remaining buildings on and near the fire site was also 
proving difficult, while demonstrating how the blaze had been a blessing in disguise 
by levelling most of Bukit Ho Swee. In October 1961, the HDB conducted a census 
of these buildings ahead of evicting the residents and rehousing them in Board 
accommodation. By December, however, a total of 10 and 25 families on Phase I 
and II sites respectively had rejected the Board’s offers of rehousing.
123 On 3 May, 
Teh Cheang Wan emphasised that ‘the clearance of the remaining sites in Bukit Ho 
Swee, MacPherson Road (South), Alexandra Hill Cemetery Site, Erskine Hill etc. 
                                                 
117 HB 842/1/52, Memo from Acting Lands Manager, HDB, to Financial Officer, HDB, 31 Aug 1962; 
HB 842/1/52, Amended Building Programme for 1960 and 1961 Phase 1, 5 Oct 1962; and HB 
962/2/57, Memo from Estates Officer, HDB, to Estates Manager, HDB, 8 Jan 1962. Bukit Ho Swee 
Phase I was previously named Tiong Bahru Cemetery Site Phases I and II. 
118 HB 1045/53, Details of Land Acquisition by Lands Manager, HDB, 15 Jun 1961; HB 993/50 Vol. 
III, Lands Department Report, May 1961. 
119 HB 993/50 Vol. III, Lands Department Report, May 1961. 
120 HB 993/50 Vol. III, Lands Department Reports, October & November 1961. 
121 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Chairman, HDB, 3 May 1962. 
122 HB 16/59 Vol. II, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Secretary, HDB, 5 Oct 1962. 
123 HB 147/51 Vol. IV, Statement of Rehousing Scheme by Estates Department, Dec 1961. 
  363should be implemented in accordance with the time schedule for clearance or else 
the building programme would eventually come to a standstill’. By February 1963, 
all wooden buildings on Phases I and II sites which were in the path of development 
had been completely removed, but not without some resistance.  
 
There were, however, still other buildings which had to be cleared in the near 
future: 42 cases on Phase III sites, 46 cases on Phase IV sites (mostly shophouse 
tenants), 28 cases on Phase V-A sites, and 58 cases on Phase V-B. Most of the 
families involved were holding out for cheaper accommodation nearby. The HDB 
planned to forcibly seize 98 out of the 174 dwellings and evict the tenants, although 
many of the shop cases were unable to afford the minimum rentals of Board 
shops.
124  At Jalan Membina and Delta Circus, there were also 141 and 25 
outstanding clearance cases respectively; in the former area, the Board admitted that 
the clearance would be difficult, as ‘[u]ndesirable characters are predominant’.
125 By 
the end of 1963, out of the 436 families staying on Phases III-V and Delta Circus 
sites who had registered with the HDB for rehousing, 57 families had cancelled their 
registration and another 52 registered families had not yet been rehoused.
126 At the 
beginning of 1964, when the Board started to clear Delta Circus and the Tiong 
Bahru sewerage works,
127 three small pockets of wooden houses continued to delay 
the construction of 1,000 flats and two schools.
128 Half of the 28 cases remaining on 
Phase III sites had built unauthorised wooden houses, which the Board proceeded to 
demolish. There were also seven outstanding cases in the path of the road-widening 
project at Jalan Membina.
129 By February, the two wooden houses which still 
remained standing there had become ‘more than an embarrassment’ to the Board.
130 
In the following month, the rate of clearance of the outstanding houses and factories 
was still very unsatisfactory; the Kwong Joo Seng Sauce Factory at Beo Lane, due to 
                                                 
124 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Administrative Officer, Resettlement, HDB, to CEO, HDB, 15 
Feb 1963; and Annex titled ‘Projects Delayed by Squatters as at 3 Oct 1962’, in Memo from CEO, 
HDB, to PS, MND, 12 Oct 1962. 
125 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Annex titled ‘Projects Delayed by Squatters as at 3 Oct 1962’, in Memo from 
CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 12 Oct 1962. 
126 HB 147/51 Vol. V, Statement of Rehousing Scheme by Estates Department, Dec 1963. 
127 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Director, Public Works, to PS, MND, 5 Dec 1963. 
128 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Chairman, HDB, 4 Jan 1964. 
129 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Administrative Officer, Resettlement, HDB, to Chief Architect, 
HDB, 25 Jan 1964. 
130 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Senior Civil Engineer, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 21 Feb 
1964. 
  364be cleared by the end of 1963, was still delaying the construction of two secondary 
schools.
131 The HDB was ‘informed that this site will be cleared by the Resettlement 
Department by 31
st March 1964’ without further delay.
132 By the end of the month, 
the sauce factory, a key social symbol of the kampong and source of employment 
before the fire, finally vacated its premises, together with the remaining wooden 
house dwellers in the vicinity.
133 
 
Set against the background of this context, for former dwellers of Bukit Ho 
Swee whose houses had survived the fire, insecurity of residency became a 
dominant frame of mind in their experiences. Wang Ah Tee’s family of eleven 
reluctantly moved into a 2-room HDB flat in Bukit Ho Swee Estate after their 
wooden house was demolished after the fire. The family did not want to leave but, as 
Wang explained, ‘我们没有路可以走了’ [‘We had no other roads to walk’]’.
134 
Peter Lim, whose house in Beo Lane had miraculously survived the flames, endured 
the relentless booming sounds of piling in the following weeks. However, they were 
finally evicted in 1963 without any compensation or priority for an HDB flat but 
managed to find an SIT apartment in Prinsep Street in the Central Area.
135 Soh Boon 
Quee’s family, evicted from Kampong Silat, was given priority for a 1-room flat in 
Tiong Bahru.
136 Similarly, Roy Chan’s family returned to 585 Havelock Road for a 
time but was evicted within several years with little compensation, by which time 
they had acquired a 3-room flat in Bukit Ho Swee.
137 My father’s wooden house 
facing the foot of Ma Kau Thiong was demolished to make way for road works in 
the late-1960s, after which his family, including his parents, moved into a 3-room 
flat in Block 29, Havelock Road; he was happy to be living in a modern flat.
138 
 
                                                 
131 HB 1013/50 Vol. I, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to CEO, HDB, 18 Mar 1964. 
132 HB 16/59 Vol. I, Memo from Secretary, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 23 Mar 1964. 
133 ME 1129/62, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Director of Education, 6 Apr 1964. The 
factory was relocated to Tanglin Halt Industrial Estate. 
134 Author’s interview with Wang Ah Tee, 22 Jan 2007. The new blocks of flats in Bukit Ho Swee 
Estate were initially unnumbered. 
135 Author’s interview with Peter Lim, 8 Feb 2007. 
136 Author’s interview with Soh Boon Quee, 4 Feb 2007. 
137 Author’s interview with Roy Chan, 2 Apr 2007. 
138 Author’s interviews with Loh Tian Ho, 13 Jan 2006 & 2 Feb 2006. 
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Plate 8.2: Roy Chan with author at Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, 2007 (Photograph by author). 
 
From a historical perspective, however, the Bukit Ho Swee inferno had 
clinically accomplished most of the clearance work. The on-site building activity 
was feverish in the aftermath of the fire; within a week, a preliminary plan to 
redevelop the fire site had already been prepared.
139 ‘The moment the fire site had 
been cleared’, Alan Choe recalled, ‘Plans were made in record time to rebuild on the 
site’.
140 According to Chee Teck Chiang, who helped to implement the plans, the 
HDB architects ‘moved very fast. We didn’t spend much time discussing this or 
that’.
141 Lim Kim San revealed that the HDB made Bukit Ho Swee its top priority: 
 
The fire in Bukit Ho Swee cleared a large area of timber and other 
light structures, thus making it possible and advantageous to put in 
hand immediate development of this area. Extensive building at Bukit 
Ho Swee therefore took emergency priority over some earlier 
approved projects and work at this site is making good progress.
142 
 
                                                 
139 HB 99/48 Vol. II, Report of the Building Department, May 1961. 
140 OHC, interview with Alan Choe, 1 Jul 1997. 
141 Author’s interview with Chee Teck Chiang, 31 Jul 2007. 
142 HB 16/59 Vol. I, Memo from Chairman, HDB, to Minister of Finance, 20 Oct 1961. 
  366In September 1961, the four 6-storey blocks and a single 4-storey block of 
904 1-room emergency flats of Phase I Contract II, built at a cost of $1,485 each, 
were completed. The HDB had been increasingly anxious about the progress. The 
Board duly announced that the flats, partially-built at the time of the fire, had been 
completed one month ahead of schedule, but Tan Kia Gan had earlier stated that 
they would be ready in August. In fact, the flats belonged to the Tiong Bahru 
cemetery site project begun after the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire.
143 More than 700 of the 
new flats were allocated to Bukit Ho Swee fire victims. At the flats’ official opening 
on 24 September, celebrated with fire crackers and lion- and dragon-dances, Lee 
Kuan Yew was cheered by the new residents when he arrived. He promised that by 
the end of the following year, all fire victims would be rehoused in more than 13,000 
flats, mostly 1-room units at $20 monthly rentals, built on the fire site.
144 Lee had 
subtly extended the time-frame for rehousing the fire victims from nine to nineteen 
months. To avoid complaints about high rents which had plagued the Tiong Bahru 
fire rehousing project, the HDB set the monthly rentals for the Bukit Ho Swee 1-
room emergency flats at $20,
145 and in January 1962 reduced the rentals of similar 
housing in Tiong Bahru to the same level.
146 The initial successful rehousing of the 
Bukit Ho Swee fire victims consequently was due in large part to construction which 
had taken place under the SIT after the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire, both at the Tiong 
Bahru fire and cemetery sites. The Board acknowledged this crucial connection: 
 
Singapore has just experienced two of the worst fires in recent years, 
one in Kampong Tiong Bahru and the other in Bukit Ho Swee, and it 
is a rather ironical coincidence that the flats erected at the first fire 
site were completed just in time to house the victims of the second 
fire.
147 
 
                                                 
143 HB 99/48 Vol. II, Report of the Building Department, May 1961; HDB, Annual Report 1961, pp. 
29-30. 
144 ST, 24 Sep 1961. 
145 HB 1095/49 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Chairman, HDB, 9 Mar 1961; HB 204/3/60 
Memo from PS, MND, to CEO, HDB, 2 Sep 1961. In March 1961, the government had standardised 
the rents of its new properties. HB 1095/49 Vol. II, Minutes of Board Meeting, 10 Mar 1961. 
146 HB 25/16/59, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Acting PS, MND, 17 Jan 1962. 
147 HDB, Annual Report 1961, p. 22. 
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Plate 8.3: The official opening of the newly-completed modern emergency housing at Ma 
Kau Thiong. Some of the emergency flats are already occupied (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
But the progress of the remaining contract of Phase I was slow due to the 
shortage of sand; it was only completed in May 1962 (see Table 8.1).
148 Phase II 
was completed in November that year, within Lee Kuan Yew’s second deadline, 
with Phases III and IV finished only in January 1965. By the end of 1962, the HDB 
had built 3,732 flats in Bukit Ho Swee – more than the number of fire victim 
families. By 1965, more than 11,446 units of high-rise flats in slab housing blocks 
were standing on the former fire site and adjoining lands, now dramatically 
transformed into a planned, modern public housing estate. In 1963, the HDB had 
proudly and confidently declared, 
                                                
 
The appearance of Bukit Ho Swee Fire Site had been completely 
changed from one of the most congested slums in Singapore into that 
of a healthy housing estate with modern community services and 
amenities.
149 
 
148 HB 99/48 Vol. II, Reports of the Building Department, Sep-Dec 1961. 
149 HDB, Annual Report 1963, p. 28. 
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Table 8.1: Type and Pace of Construction of Bukit Ho Swee Estate, 1961-1967 
Contract Type  1-room  2-room  3-room  Others  Completed 
Phase I Contract I 
3 blocks of 9-storey flats & 2 
blocks of 10-storey flats 
Standard  --  240  200  8 shops  May 1962 
Phase I Contract II 
4 blocks of 6-storey and 1 
block of 4-storey 
Emergency 904  --  --  --  Sep  1961 
Phase I Contract III 
4 blocks of 9-storey flats 
Standard --  36 288 -- Dec  1962 
Phase II Contract I 
5 blocks of 6-storey 
emergency flats 
Emergency  588 60 120 --  Mar  1962 
Phase II Contract II 
3 blocks of 6-storey 
emergency flats 
Emergency 1,080  72  144  --  Nov  1962 
Phase II Contract III 
3 blocks of 6-storey flats  
Emergency 30  --  456  --  Mar  1963 
Phase III Contract I 
3 blocks of 10-storey flats  
Standard --  90 240 --  May  1963 
Phase III Contract II 
3 blocks of 10-storey flats 
Standard --  80 388  1  clinic  Jun  1963 
Phase III Contract III 
3 blocks of 10-storey & 1 
block of 6-storey  
Standard --  90 270 -- Jul  1963 
Emergency 264  24  24  -- 
Phase III Contract IV 
4 blocks of 10-storey flats 
Standard --  72 320 40 
shops 
Dec 1963 
Phase III Contract V 
1 block of 16-storey flats 
Standard --  --  280 23 
shops 
Apr 1964 
Phase III Contract VI 
Market & Hawker stalls 
-- --  --  --  Market 
& 40 
stalls 
Dec 1964- 
Jan 1965 
Phase III Contract VII 
1 block of 12-storey flats & 3 
blocks of 10-storey flats 
Standard --  664 120 -- Dec  1963 
Phase III Contract VIII 
6 blocks of 6-storey 
emergency flats  
Emergency 1,300  --  --  70 
shops 
Jan 1965 
Phase III Contract IX  Standard --  96  --  --  1966 
Phase III Contract X  Standard 452  142  200  --  1967 
Phase IV Contract I 
3 blocks of 6-storey 
emergency flats 
Emergency 1,008  --  --  --  Jan  1965 
Phase IV Contract II 
1 block of 12-storey flats & 2 
blocks of 2-storey shops 
Standard --  --  100 25 
shops 
1965 
Phase IV Contract III 
3 blocks of 16-storey flats 
Standard --  605  2  --  1966 
Total   5,626  2,271  3,152     
Emergency breakdown    5,176  156  744     
Emergency total  6,076  Grand total (flats)  11,049 
Sources: HB 99/48 Vols. II & III, Reports of the Building Department, 1961-1965; HDB, 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1967), p. 40. Map 8.1 The Building Phases & Housing Blocks of Bukit Ho Swee Estate 
 
  370Key: 
A  SIT flats at Boon Tiong Road 
B  SIT flats of Tiong Bahru Fire Site Scheme 
C  SIT flats of Delta Estate 
1.1 & 1.2  Bukit Ho Swee Phase I Contracts I & II (Tiong Bahru Cemetery Site Scheme Phases I & II) 
2.1 – 2.3  Bukit Ho Swee Phase II Contracts 
3.1 – 3.8  Bukit Ho Swee Phase III Contracts 
  HDB flats built in the 1970s 
Compiled from :   
HDB, Annual Report 1961. 
HDB, Bukit Ho Swee Estate (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1967).  
Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre, Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre Official Opening 
Souvenir Magazine, 31
st July 1982 (Singapore: Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre, 1982). 
Archives & Oral History Department, Kim Seng Citizens’ Consultative Committee & Bukit 
Ho Swee Area Office, HDB, Emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: From Desolation to 
Progress (Singapore: Singapore News & Publications Limited, 1983). 
 
 
Plate 8.4: The emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate, November 1962. Phases I and II of the 
building programme, in the centre of the picture, have been completed. Construction is still 
ongoing in Beo Crescent. Note the wooden housing still standing in Hong Lim Pa Sat to the 
northeast and Si Kah Teng to the south down to the Malayan Railway. Royal Air Force, 
RAF Ref. No. 81/1377, November 1962 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
 
  371 
Plate 8.5: The southern half of Bukit Ho Swee Estate, April 1963. The newly-completed 
emergency flats on both sides of Tiong Bahru Road (Phase II) links up with the older SIT 
accommodation of the Tiong Bahru fire site scheme, and the Boon Tiong Road and Tiong 
Bahru Estate housing. The Tiong Bahru sewerage works on the left are being demolished to 
make way, in part, for Kai Min Primary School. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 81/1439, 
April 1963 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
 
 
Plate 8.6: A picture of Bukit Ho Swee Estate taken from the direction of Delta Estate, year 
unknown, showing Beo Crescent and Havelock Road. The estate’s dominant building, in the 
left centre of the picture, is the long slab of 16-storey flats, Block 22. The block towers over, 
to its right, the partially obscured MCA shophouse (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
 
  372The overriding concern with building flats meant that the provision of social 
amenities lagged behind. Lim Kim San admitted that the original plan was ‘sheer 
housing’, where ‘no artistic license was given to the architect’.
150 Similarly, Alan 
Choe conceded that because ‘all we were interested in were the number of units and 
the time of completion’, the Bukit Ho Swee project was ‘not a good plan’, with too 
many people crowded into a small housing estate which lacked social amenities.
151 
It was only in 1964 that a shopping centre, a large children’s playground and a 
market at Beo Crescent for 150 stalls were completed, with two more playgrounds to 
be built the following year in Beo Crescent and Nile Road.
152 Still, Lim Chong Keat 
emphasised the need to build more communal and commercial amenities and 
parking facilities in the estate.
153 
 
The gradual development of social amenities in Bukit Ho Swee Estate drew 
the population firmly within the official orbit. In 1963, the HDB built a crèche, run 
by the Social Welfare Department.
154 The crèche, which was to encourage home-
makers to take up factory and other types of regular employment, aimed to forge the 
nuclear family into a functioning economic unit to contribute to the nation’s 
development. As a social worker explained, it was also a means of training young 
children and 
 
prevent children from falling lower and becoming worse. You see, a 
child can smoke a cigarette like an adult and walk like a gangster! 
This is a bad habit. They can swear, having learnt the words from 
outside. If they are not happy at home, they can beat up their brothers 
and sisters.
155 
 
Similarly, the Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre, completed in 1965 and managed 
by the People’s Association, sought to transform the pai kia into ‘loyal and efficient 
                                                 
150 OHC, interview with Lim Kim San, 13 Feb 1985. 
151 Author’s interview with Alan Choe, 27 Nov 2006. 
152 SLAD, 12 Nov 1964, pp. 335-36. 
153 HB 267/64, Memo from Secretary, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 28 Aug 1964. 
154 HB 149/10/61, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Director, SWD, 12 May 1962;  
155 RCS, audio programmes titled Opening Of Bukit Ho Swee Crèche, broadcast on 8 Aug 1963, and 
This, Our Singapore: Social Welfare, broadcast on 21 Aug 1963. 
  373young people to collectively shoulder the responsibility in nation-building’.
156 The 
registration and movement of local hawkers also came under official regulation. In 
October 1963, 88 covered hawkers’ pitches were completed to accommodate the 
itinerant hawkers congregating in large numbers along Jalan Bukit Ho Swee.
157 In 
1966, a 2-storey hawker centre was built at Beo Crescent at the foot of a block of 2-
room flats, containing 80 stalls selling cooked food on the ground floor, and 91 stalls 
selling dried goods on the first floor, with the priority of rent given to hawkers living 
in the estate. At the hawker centre’s opening, the Parliamentary Secretary of the 
Ministry of National Development enthused that hawkers would no longer be a 
cause of traffic obstruction or a health hazard but could now ‘do their business in 
sheltered comfort’, while the residents could ‘enjoy the many varieties of cooked 
food in clean, sanitary surroundings’.
158 
 
The protracted and ultimately futile attempts to rebuild Kai Kok Public 
School demonstrated clearly how another key aspect of social life in the former 
‘black area’ – Chinese-medium education – was brought under firm government 
control after the fire.
159 Admittedly, both Kai Kok and the nearby Chuen Min Public 
School were already receiving financial assistance from the PAP government in the 
form of grants-in-aid before the fire but a far greater degree of official control was 
subsequently exercised.
160 After the inferno, Kai Kok’s school management sought 
the Ministry of Education’s help to rebuild the school,
161 to which request the 
authorities professed to be supportive.
162 As an interim measure, the Ministry 
granted the school the use of premises at the newly-completed Outram Primary 
School for the rest of 1961 and at Delta West Primary School throughout the 
following year.  
 
                                                 
156  RCS, audio programme titled First Anniversary Celebrations Of Bukit Ho Swee Community 
Centre, broadcast on 7 May 1966. 
157 HB 433/46 Vol. II, Memo from Estates Officer, HDB, to Acting Estates Manager, HDB, 9 Mar 
1963. 
158 RCS, audio programme titled Opening Of New Hawker Centre At Bukit Ho Swee, broadcast on 26 
Mar 1966. 
159 In Dec 1959, Kai Kok School requested for a site to rebuild the school from the Ministry of 
Education but was unsuccessful. ME 913/57, Letter from Director of Education, MOE, to Principal, 
Kai Kok Public School, 4 Feb 1960.  
160 ME 2271/57, Memo from Lands Manager, HDB, to Director of Education, MOE, 3 Jul 1961; ME 
2421/57, Letter from Registrar of Schools to Principal, Chuen Min Public School, 13 Nov 1957. 
161 NYSP, 27 May 1961. 
162 NYSP, 28 May 1961. 
  374However, the Kai Kok management’s attempts to find a suitable site in Bukit 
Ho Swee for the school clashed with the Ministry’s own school-building plans. The 
authorities foresaw that the estate, which would house a much larger population, 
required more schools than the 1958 Master Plan had allocated.
163 In September 
1961, the Ministry decided that vacant land at the fire site be used to build four 
government schools – two primary and two secondary schools.
164 Kai Kok and 
Chuen Min schools
165 were consequently each allocated small half-acre lots at the 
site of the Tiong Bahru sewerage works, which would be relocated to Ulu 
Pandan.
166 Privately, however, the Ministry was not keen to rebuild Kai Kok School 
and preferred to build its own Chinese-medium primary school in the estate. Its 
officials, by 1963, felt that the government had done enough to help Kai Kok by 
loaning temporary premises for its classes and that ‘the school has not done enough 
to help itself’.
167 To forestall possible criticism from the Chinese community that it 
had flatly refused to provide land for the school, the Ministry allowed Kai Kok’s 
students to be placed in the newly-completed, government-run Bukit Ho Swee West 
School (Integrated, with both Chinese and English sessions). The latter, together 
with its sister primary school, Bukit Ho Swee East (English-medium), which catered 
to a total of 4,000 students, had been completed in record time under nine months 
and opened for classes at the beginning of 1963.
168 By the end of the year, most of 
Kai Kok’s former students had been enrolled in Bukit Ho Swee West, while its 
former teachers had also been recruited into government-aided Chinese schools.
169 
In February that year, the Kai Kok management had asked to hold classes at Hua 
Kong School at Alexandra Road but the Ministry turned down the request on the 
grounds that the school could only hold 90 students.
170 
 
                                                 
163  ME 2875/61, Notes of a Meeting to Discuss the Requirements of the Health and Education 
Ministries Relative to the Development of the Bukit Ho Swee Fire Site, 24 Aug 1961. 
164 ME 913/57, Memo from Minister for Education to Minister for National Development, 26 Sep 
1961. 
165 ME 2271/57, Letter from Chairman, Chuen Min Public School Management Committee, to Prime 
Minister, 29 May 1961. The Chuen Min School management had also asked the government for land 
to rebuild, since its wooden buildings had been partially damaged in the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire. 
166 ME 2271/57, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to PS, MND, 9 Sep 1961. 
167 ME 913/57, Memo to Parliamentary Secretary, MOE, 8 Jan 1963. 
168 HDB, Annual Report 1962, p. 20. 
169 ME 913/57, Memo from Acting Director of Schools, MOE, to Parliamentary Secretary, MOE, 16 
Oct 1962; Letter from Director of Education, MOE, to Supervisor, Kai Kok Public School, Oct 1962; 
and Memo from Parliamentary Secretary, MOE, to Parliamentary Secretary, MOF, 11 Feb 1963. 
170 Memo from Parliamentary Secretary, MOE, to Parliamentary Secretary, MOF, 11 Feb 1963. 
  375Given the fait accompli in absorbing Kai Kok’s students and teaching staff in 
government-run schools, the Ministry informed the school management in 
December 1964 that it would not be given a piece of land to rebuild the school, 
because there were already ‘many primary schools and no secondary school in the 
Bukit Ho Swee area’.
171 The Ministry, in fact, felt that ‘it would be unwise to waste 
a capital grant to revive this Kai Kok School’, there being no further demand for 
primary school places in the locality given the primary schools already built.
172 This 
was, of course, a classic case of circular reasoning. In the meantime, the authorities 
vigorously pursued the building of the two secondary schools: Bukit Ho Swee 
Secondary School and Bukit Ho Swee Vocational School. Both schools were 
completed at the end of 1965 despite a poor start by the contracting firm, which had 
bid nearly 20% below cost and had completed only 13% of the work by the fourth 
month.
173 The construction finally progressed satisfactorily after the HDB, upon 
finding the building equipment inadequate and the workers inexperienced and guilty 
of numerous mistakes in their work, threatened to repossess the sites and building 
materials.
174  
 
  It was further public housing development in the locality which brought the 
protracted issue to a sorry end in 1967. Chuen Min School, located primarily within 
the Tiong Bahru fire site scheme, was ordered to vacate its premises by the end of 
1966 to enable the construction of 1,000 flats.
175 Under the HDB’s plan, ‘all the 
slums bounded by Tiong Bahru Road, Henderson Road, Malayan Railway, Silat 
Road, General Hospital and our Tiong Bahru Estate will be cleared’.
176 By the end 
                                                 
171 ME 2271/57, Letter from Director of Education, MOE, to former Chairman, Kai Kok Public 
School Management Committee, 2 Dec 1964. 
172 ME 2271/57, Memo from Acting Principal Assistant Secretary, MOE, to Director of Schools, 
MOE, 15 Jan 1965. 
173 HB 149/11/61, Memo from Secretary, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 21 Jan 1965; Memo from 
Contracts Officer, HDB, to Chief Architect, HDB, 18 Jun 1964. Interestingly, the contractor, which 
was the lowest bidder, had initially been rejected by Teh Cheang Wan who favoured the third lowest 
bidder. 
174 HB 149/11/61, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Secretary, HDB, 7 Jan 1965; Letter from 
Chief Architect, HDB, to Kim Thong Construction Co., 28 Dec 1964; Letter from Chief Architect, 
HDB, to Kim Thong Construction Co., 9 Oct 1964. 
175  ME 2271/57, Memo from Minister for Law & National Development to Acting Minister for 
Education, 30 Mar 1966; Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 22 Mar 1966. 
176 HB 25/59 Vol. III, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Deputy Secretary, Economic Planning 
Unit, 26 Jun 1967. 
  376of May that year, the balance of the scheme had been successfully cleared.
177 Hurled 
into a shared predicament, Chuen Min and Kai Kok pragmatically merged into a 
single school and were thereby allocated a 1-acre site on State land at nearby Jalan 
Membina Barat, the site of the former Tiong Bahru sewerage works.
178 The schools 
submitted plans to build a 3-storey building with 14 classrooms. In June, the 
construction began, with the government bearing $30,000 of the $170,000 total 
building and equipment costs, and a further $60,000 drawn from public donations to 
Kai Kok after the fire. The new school, named Kai Min Primary School, bearing one 
character from the original names of each school, was completed in November,
179 
and opened for classes in January the following year. As a measure of ministerial 
control, Kai Min now received grants-in-aid from the government. But for all 
practical purposes, Kai Kok had ceased to exist. 
 
A former kampong resident would have found Bukit Ho Swee 
unrecognisable in 1965. Beo Lane had been redirected into an arc as implied by its 
new name, Beo Crescent, while Bukit Ho Swee [road] had been removed entirely. 
There was now a new road running east-west through the estate named Jalan Bukit 
Ho Swee, completed in January 1964, with a minor road called Taman Ho Swee 
serving the former cemetery site. Another street, Jalan Delta (later renamed Lower 
Delta Road), flanked the estate’s western limit south of Delta Circus. The use of the 
Malay terms ‘Jalan’ (‘road’) and ‘Taman’ (‘garden’) signified the government’s 
attempt to Malayanise place and street names in the 1960s, although the public 
housing which dominated the roads was decidedly modern. The most obvious 
change to the landscape was to the skyline: the multi-storey flats clustered on land 
where unauthorised wooden housing had once stood: in the Beo Lane area, on both 
sides of Tiong Bahru and Havelock roads, at the Tiong Bahru sewage works, and on 
the once-vacant cemetery. Many of the shophouses which once lined the Tiong 
Bahru and Havelock roads were also cleared in this decade except, most prominently, 
the Malayan Chinese Association shophouse at Havelock Road. The flats of Bukit 
Ho Swee bridged a now unbroken stretch of SIT and HDB housing extending from 
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  377Delta Estate in the north to Tiong Bahru Estate in the south. The only wooden 
housing left was in Si Kah Teng and Hong Lim Pa Sat, both of which also faced 
imminent clearance. A further small pocket of wooden housing survived on the 
slopes of Ma Kau Thiong at Carey Road, behind Giok Hong Tian temple, in which 
direction the 1961 fire had not advanced. 
 
End of a Fatal Experiment: The Emergency Housing of Bukit Ho Swee 
 
Most of the Bukit Ho Swee fire victims wanted to return to the fire site. In 
June 1961, of the 1,162 families awaiting rehousing, the ‘[m]ajority want to be 
rehoused in [the Tiong Bahru] Cemetery Site and in localities’ and were ‘[p]repared 
to wait for them’.
180 By the end of 1963, of the 2,600 families registered with the 
HDB (from a total of 2,833 families registered with the Social Welfare Department), 
2,166 families had been successfully rehoused, although 333 families had cancelled 
their registration and there was still a balance of 101 families to be rehoused.
181 By 
1967, there were 12,562 flats in Bukit Ho Swee, nearly half of which were 1-room 
flats, capable of housing an estimated 75,000 people, five times the number who had 
previously lived in the kampong.
182 The 1970 census of Singapore counted 45,066 
persons in the estate, an increase of nearly 25,000 since the previous census in 
1957.
183 Demographically speaking, the Bukit Ho Swee rehousing project was a 
major success.  
 
Foremost in the minds of the returning fire victims was proximity to 
workplace, school, family, relatives and friends. These economic and social factors 
constituted the decisive influence on the opposing desires to return or leave. Tan 
Tiam Ho and his wife, Beh Swee Kim, had stayed temporarily in a wooden house in 
Hong Lim Pa Sat after the fire but later applied for a 3-room flat in Bukit Ho Swee 
for his family of seven, including his parents. They had calculated that the $66.50 
monthly rent was affordable, although his mother had been reluctant to leave behind 
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  378the traditional kampong lifestyle. Beh’s parents also lived nearby in an HDB flat in 
Si Kah Teng and subsequently moved into Bukit Ho Swee.
184 James Seah, whose 
family moved into a 1-room emergency flat in Block 9, Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, was 
studying nearby at Delta Primary School, while his elder sisters were also working 
at the Singapore Steam Laundry at Delta Circus.
185 Lee Ah Gar’s family of eight, 
including his parents, left their temporary HDB accommodation at Margaret Drive 
for a 2-room flat in Block 6, Jalan Bukit Ho Swee. They found the flat too small and 
rented a 1-room flat in Block 11 in the same area for Ah Gar and his father. The 
family was consequently split up but still resided in the same neighbourhood. For 
Ah Gar, a foreman with Robinsons Company in the Central Area, Bukit Ho Swee 
was conveniently close to his workplace. Similarly, his father, a hawker, did not 
want to lose his local clientele.
186  
 
Return to Bukit Ho Swee was, however, at other times involuntary or, at best, 
bo bian (‘no choice’). On his mother’s unwillingness to move into modern housing, 
Tan Tiam Ho asked, ‘What’s there to feel? Once you stayed there, you just carried 
on with it. She only reflected on the difference between the old days and present day 
and felt sad’.
187 Tay Yan Woon’s family of seven, who had moved temporarily to 
Kampong Henderson in order to continue rearing poultry, obtained a 3-room flat in 
Bukit Ho Swee in 1965. But the move was largely forced upon them by the 
redevelopment of the whole locality; Tay still felt that ‘if you were living in an attap 
house, you could rear some livestock and your livelihood could be better. But we 
had no choice. We had no choice even if there was no work for us. We could only 
pass by each day by being thrifty’.
188 In October 1961, another fire victim family of 
ten with a monthly household income of $150, who had lived in a 2-room flat at 
Kim Tian Road for five months, asked to be transferred to a 1-room flat in Bukit Ho 
Swee because they could not afford the $55 monthly rent, which had to be paid in 
full following the cessation of the 3-month rent subsidy.
189 For others, as was the 
case in the 1959 Tiong Bahru fire, the administrative process of applying for modern 
housing was bewildering, akin to stepping into a totally different world. Goh Yong 
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  379Soo’s family had applied to share a 2-bedroom flat with another family, but found to 
their horror upon entering the premises that what the HDB had advertised as a 2-
room flat had only a living room and a single bedroom. Finding the living space far 
too small for two families, Goh’s family moved into a 1-room flat at Block 54, Bukit 
Ho Swee. On the lack of official clarification of the size of the flat, Goh casually 
explained, ‘Things were like that in those days’.
190  
 
In Jacinta’s Chen’s small-scale survey of the Bukit Ho Swee fire victims in 
1965, half of the thirty families returned to the estate, while the other fifteen 
remained in Kallang Estate. According to Chen, most of the families had not wished 
to return to wooden housing, being ‘once bitten twice shy’. Whether the families 
returned to Bukit Ho Swee similarly depended on proximity to workplace, schools 
and relatives. Some families did not seek to return to Bukit Ho Swee because they 
found the flats were too small or the estate too noisy. Significantly, most of the 
returning families had lived in Bukit Ho Swee for at least five years before the 
fire.
191 
However, not all the families who moved into the new flats were fire victims. 
They included families given priority for rehousing because of demolition and 
eviction due to housing and industrial development and other kampong fires.
192 
These new official priorities signalled the changing role of the Bukit Ho Swee flats. 
In December 1961, for instance, two separate families formerly from the Central 
Area were allocated 2-room flats in Jalan Membina.
193 In September 1962, the 2- 
and 3-room flats of Bukit Ho Swee Phase II Contract I were reserved for families 
affected by the clearance of Bukit Merah for industrial and housing development.
194 
From July 1963 onwards, the flats of Phase III Contract II were allocated, in order of 
priority, to evicted families from the clearance areas (particularly Havelock 
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  380Road),
195 victims of the Bukit Ho Swee and Bukit Ban Kee fires and, finally, 
applicants on the housing register.
196  
A sample HDB survey in 1969 found that 44% of the households had moved 
into the estate by choice, while 30% had been resettled from other urban or rural 
areas; in addition, 44% had previously stayed in a shophouse, compared to 47% in 
wooden housing.
197 Some of the newcomers undoubtedly welcomed life in the 
modern flats. Yap Kuai Yong and her husband, Lai Chee Lung, were delighted to 
leave their wooden house at Kampong Bugis, where fire was a daily cause for 
concern, for a 1-room flat in Block 15, Bukit Ho Swee, together with her mother-in-
law and three sons.
198 A fifth of the households interviewed in the 1969 HDB survey 
had in fact moved to Bukit Ho Swee due to the fear of fire outbreaks in 
kampongs.
199 In 1964, Lim Yock Eng (born 1943) and her family were evicted from 
their shophouse residence in Chin Swee Road in the first phase of the HDB’s urban 
renewal programme (discussed below) and moved into a 3-room flat in Block 22, 
Havelock Road, among the first tenants in the block.
200 Similarly, in the mid-1960s, 
Quah Geok Hong (born 1946) and her husband left their shophouse dwelling in 
Jalan Kukoh close to the Central Area and bought an improved 1-room unit in Block 
33, Taman Ho Swee, for about $3,000. They had been unhappy with their former 
landlady who had been fussy with their use of water and electricity.
201  
 
In August 1961, an Allocations Committee made up of HDB officials and 
Chan Choy Siong and other Assemblymen convened to decide on the allocation of 
the 1-room emergency flats of Bukit Ho Swee Phase I Contract II. Priority was 
given first to Bukit Ho Swee fire victim families of 4-7 persons not already living in 
temporary HDB accommodation but who had registered for rehousing at the 
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  381cemetery site, or to families of not more than seven persons who were living in 
temporary Board housing elsewhere. They were followed, in order of priority, by 1) 
registered Kampong Tiong Bahru fire victim families of not more than seven 
persons who had not yet been rehoused by the Board or who had applied for transfer 
from Kallang Estate; 2) registered Bukit Ho Swee fire victim families of three 
persons, and combined families totalling 4-7 persons; and 3) families on the housing 
register of not more than seven persons and earning a monthly income of $200 and 
below.
202 
 
However, the HDB had not fully learnt the lesson of the Tiong Bahru fire 
rehousing scheme. In April 1961, the Board, recognising the unpopularity of the 
communal units in Tiong Bahru, had decided that all 1-room flats in future would be 
self-contained.
203 In the Tiong Bahru flats, although not fully occupied, the Board 
found the toilets, shared by five families each, in ‘an extremely filthy state’.
204 In 
mid-1962, the HDB admitted that the Tiong Bahru scheme demonstrated that ‘it 
would be fatal to build this type of [1-room] units with full communal facilities’.
205 
By August 1962, there were still vacant 1-room flats in Tiong Bahru, built a year 
and a half ago.
206  
 
Consequently, it was not surprising that the actual demand was poor for the 
Bukit Ho Swee 1-room emergency flats, partly because they also had communal 
toilets and partly because they were too small for many families. As Table 8.1 shows, 
more than half of the Bukit Ho Swee flats by 1965 were emergency housing, mostly 
1-room units. Numerous families made requests to transfer out of the flats to the 
Board. In December 1961, the Allocations Committee decided that it would not 
register transfer applications from these families, even with larger units in the estate 
ready for occupation by early 1962.
207 In February that year, to encourage the take-
up rate, the HDB fixed the monthly rentals of emergency housing in Bukit Ho Swee 
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  382and other estates at only $20 (for 1-room flats), $40 (2-room) and $60 (3-room).
208 
In June, the Board admitted that the high take-up rate for the 1-room flats at the 
Tiong Bahru cemetery site was misleading, because the tenants were considered the 
more ‘desperate cases’ of fire victims, but many of whom were already asking to 
transfer to larger flats.
209 As Table 8.2 shows, interest in the 588 1-room flats of 
Phase II Contract I offered to Bukit Ho Swee fire victims was so lukewarm that the 
Board conceded that ‘most fire victims who [are] in rent difficulties…are [still] 
prepared to pay more for slightly bigger flats’:
210  
 
 
Plate 8.7: The 6-storey 1-room emergency flats of Block 3 along Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, year 
unknown (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
Table 8.2: Demand for Bukit Ho Swee Phase II Contract I Flats, 1962 
Number & Type of Flat  Estimated Number of Families in Rent Arrears Interested 
588 1-room  90 
60 2-room  250 
120 3-room  100 
Source: Source: HB 16/59 Vol. II, Memorandum from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 14 June 
1962. 
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  383In general, the supply of 1-room communal housing exceeded its demand, as Table 
8.3 shows: 
Table 8.3: Demand for 1-Room Communal Flats, 1962 
HDB Estate  Number of Cases Registered  Number of Units to be Completed 
Bukit Ho Swee  88  588 
St. Michael’s  473  816 
Kallang 463  672 
Aljunied 169  444 
Alexandra Hill  53  900 
Total 2,046  3,420 
Source: HB 16/59 Vol. II, Memorandum from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 14 June 1962. 
 
The HDB soon realised the stark truth: that ‘the general opinion of the public 
is that there is no marked improvement from moving out of a one-room cubicle in 
the slum area to a one-room Housing Board unit other than cleanliness’.
211 In June 
1962, the Board decided that no further 1-room emergency units be built except 
where sufficient demand existed and that existing units should be converted into 2- 
and 3-room flats.
212 In the second half of the year, a rush of applications
213 led the 
Board to relax the application for 1-room flats and allow smaller families of three 
persons to apply.
214 Up to the end of the year, of the 15,800 applicants on the 
housing register, only 3,000 had applied for a 1-room flat, although the HDB had 
built 5,840 1-room flats out of a total of 15,669 units; in contrast, the SIT had only 
constructed 1,057 1-room units out of 20,917 units. The Board concluded that to 
avoid cramming families of five or more persons into 1-room flats, more 2- and 3-
room flats had to be built.
215 Further HDB surveys in 1963 and 1964 suggested that 
about 85% of the 1-room applicants preferred flats in Bukit Ho Swee and Tiong 
Bahru, being close to the Central Area,
216 but the actual take-up rate remained low. 
In July 1963, the HDB’s Estates Department admitted that ‘[t]he emergency units 
with central corridors are very unpopular, and many applicants prefer to wait for the 
standard type’.
217 In December, 350 applicants for the Bukit Ho Swee 1-room flats 
asked to be considered instead for self-contained 1-room flats just completed in 
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  384Tanjong Rhu, on the other side of the City.
218 In 1964, the HDB was forced to 
convert 140 emergency flats of Bukit Ho Swee Phase III into 70 shops.
219  
Financially, the 1-room flats were also a bleeding wound for the government: their 
economic rents were $33-40 but the rents charged were only $20.
220  
 
In February 1965, the HDB finally decided to close the register for the 
emergency 1-room flats in Bukit Ho Swee.
221 The following year, the government 
decided to restrict 1-room emergency flats to areas further away from the Central 
Area and to reduce their numbers from 25% to 15% of total housing, while more 
standard and improved 1-room units (totalling 25%) would be built in both the 
Central Area and suburban areas.
222 In the same year, 175 families were seeking a 
transfer out of the Bukit Ho Swee Phase I building scheme of 904 1-room 
emergency flats, as were 15 families from the Phase II scheme of 156 2-room 
emergency flats and 70 families from the Phase III scheme of 744 3-room 
emergency flats.
223 In December that year, Chan Choy Siong, citing the rape-cum-
murder of a girl in a communal toilet in Bukit Ho Swee the previous year, asked the 
government to convert the first batch of 904 1-room emergency units into self-
contained flats or, alternatively, to reduce their rentals, but the government rejected 
both suggestions as economically unsound. S. R. Dharmarajoo, the PAP Member of 
Parliament for Farrer Park, flatly stated that the authorities did not ‘consider human 
beings as human beings’.
224 In June 1968, when 452 improved 1-room flats in Bukit 
Ho Swee were first put up for public ballot, there were only 255 applicants.
225 In 
1970, the government finally decided to convert the 904 1-room flats in Bukit Ho 
Swee into self-contained 2-room units, with the affected families temporarily 
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  385rehoused in Kampong Tiong Bahru, Bukit Merah and Henderson estates.
226 As an 
indication of the unpopularity of the emergency housing, Bukit Ho Swee’s 
population of 45,066 people in 1970 was only three-fifths of the full capacity of 
75,000. 
 
By the mid-1960s, the HDB had unveiled its Second 5-Year Plan, which 
aimed to improve the design of the flats and the layout of the housing estates.
227 The 
new Plan marked the end of the HDB’s controversial experiment in emergency 
housing, an initiative of the SIT and a product of the great kampong fires of the 
1950s. The emergency flats, as an expedient rehousing measure, had pragmatically 
accomplished what they were meant to do: shatter the vicious cycle of proliferating 
unauthorised wooden housing, the unregulated migration of low-income Chinese 
families and the chronic outbreak of kampong infernos. However, for many tenants, 
living in emergency housing led to an undesired and unstable period of 
accommodation, often followed by relocation or even the involuntary fragmenting of 
families. Extended or semi-extended families who could not afford housing of 
suitable size were sometimes forced to split up and move into smaller flats. In June 
1962, the Allocations Committee permitted large, semi-extended families to move 
into separate 1-room flats, partly to obtain occupants for the flats.
228 A fire victim 
family of eleven, temporarily rehoused at Kim Tian Road (part of the Tiong Bahru 
fire site scheme) the previous June, obtained two 1-room flats along Tiong Bahru 
Road, one for the nuclear family, consisting of the husband and wife and five 
children, and the other for the mother, two brothers and a sister of the husband. The 
higher HDB rents, when compared to the rents for wooden housing, also made such 
flat-to-flat transfers unavoidable.
229  
 
‘A planned new city will be built’: The Making of Modern Singapore 
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  386Regardless of the unpopularity of the emergency flats, the development of 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate was a watershed in the history of public housing in Singapore. 
In a memorandum from Teh Cheang Wan to Howe Yoon Chong on 4 December 
1963, the Chief Architect, in underlining the need to continue to pursue a vigorous 
policy of land acquisition, noted, 
 
At the beginning of our first 5-Year Programme, the Board had clear 
or relatively unencumbered sites in Queenstown, St. Michael’s Road, 
MacPherson Road, Kallang, Tanjong Rhu, Selegie Road, and 
Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire Site. These sites have been gradually 
constructed in the course of the last few years and our building 
programme would have run into difficulties if not for the God-sent 
opportunity of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in 1961 where a site was made 
available for 10,000 units of flats.
230 
 
The Bukit Ho Swee flats gave the government a strategic foothold in both its 
kampong clearance and urban renewal schemes south of the Singapore River,
231 out 
of which, the HDB envisaged, ‘a planned new city will be built’.
232 The urban 
renewal project, advised by a United Nations team of experts in 1963 and started in 
earnest by the Board the following year, was a massive modernist undertaking to 
clear shophouse dwellings in the Central Area. The key to the success of the 
programme was to first resettle families residing in the area in flats located on the 
urban periphery. As Alan Choe remarked, ‘You don’t run before you can crawl’.
233 
In 1964, having built more than 40,000 flats since its inception, the Board declared 
confidently that the back of Singapore’s housing problem had been broken.
234 In 
October, the Board opened the vacant flats on the top floors of blocks in Bukit Ho 
Swee for application to families evicted from nearby South Precinct 1, south of the 
Singapore River, as part of the urban renewal programme.
235 When the HDB began 
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  387to clear towgay (beansprout)-growers along Palembang Road in North Precinct 1, 
the Board even wanted to convert shops in Bukit Ho Swee into agricultural lots for 
five agriculturists, who, not surprisingly, rejected the offer.
236 By late 1964, there 
were also a total of 177 Malay families, rehoused mainly from the northeastern part 
of the Central Area, now living in flats in Bukit Ho Swee.
237  
 
The clearance of Covent Garden, which had hit a social and political snag in 
1960, also revived in 1965 under the urban renewal programme. In early 1967, the 
kampong was clearly on the government’s clearance agenda, being described by 
Chan Choy Siong and other government officials as an insanitary area where ‘people, 
poultry and pigs share the same roof’.
238 By January 1970, it was triumphantly 
announced that, with only 12 families remaining on the site out of an original 
number of over 600, ‘Covent Garden is finished as a notorious slum area’.
239 Still, a 
fire swept through the remaining wooden houses the following month and rendered 
200 people homeless.
240 Joyce Soh’s family was evicted from 52 Covent Garden 
and moved to Bukit Merah Estate to the south.
241 The other residents were relocated 
to HDB flats in Bukit Merah, Alexandra, Queenstown, and Bukit Ho Swee.
242 
Around 1968, my mother and her family, comprising her mother and four brothers, 
had been similarly evicted and rehoused in a 2-room HDB flat in Bukit Merah.
243 
                                                
 
As modern flats enabled the PAP government to resettle families en masse, 
organised resistance to rehousing soon became untenable. After the Barisan Sosialis 
was formed in September 1961, the Singapore Country People’s Association and the 
Singapore Rural Residents’ Association supported the new party. Chan Chiaw Thor 
(the former Singapore Farmers’ Association leader), Poh Soon Seng (President of 
the SCPA), Sim Boh Kuan (President of the SRRA), and Chio Cheng Thun 
(Secretary of the SRRA) all condemned the government for its right-wing 
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  388reactionary politics.
244 American observers feared that the rural associations, along 
with the labour and student unions, would give the Barisan sufficient mass support 
to topple the Lee Kuan Yew government in an election.
245 In 1961-1962, the rural 
associations organised resistance against the PAP’s merger campaign and the HDB’s 
resettlement of wooden house dwellers in Toa Payoh.
246 The associations had an 
estimated combined membership of 12,000-15,000 in late 1961. The SCPA, which 
claimed to represent 25,000 villagers in Toa Payoh alone,
247 objected that the 
clearance would inflict economic hardship on the villagers and demanded higher 
rates of compensation.
248 By April 1962, the organised resistance had slowed the 
first phase of the Toa Payoh clearance.
249 In Changi and at East Coast Road, the 
SCPA demanded that the HDB reduce flat rentals for evicted wooden house 
dwellers to 30-40% of the original rates.
250 In Potong Pasir, the SRRA represented 
174 landowners protesting the Board’s decision to increase land rents in late 
1961.
251 The SCPA also organised stiff resistance in 1962-1963 against the Kallang 
Basin Reclamation Project, demanding appropriate compensation for the evicted 
dwellers and guarantees for their livelihood after resettlement.
252  
                                                
 
A coalescing international entente of conservative forces, however, overtook 
the urban and rural resistance to rehousing. The PAP was determined to smash its 
leftwing opposition and repeatedly warned the Malayan and British colonial 
governments of a deepening communist threat to their respective security interests in 
the region. In February 1963, a massive purge orchestrated by the PAP, Malayan 
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  389and British colonial governments called Operation Coldstore detained 113 leading 
leftists, including Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and Chan Chiaw Thor, on 
charges of a conspiracy to create a ‘Cuba in Singapore’ through violent 
revolution.
253 In June, Lee Kuan Yew warned of the dangers of Singapore falling to 
the communists if there was insufficient public housing for the people, for ‘there 
will be more squalor, more slums, and where will democracy be?’
254 Singapore 
joined Malaysia on 16 September, ending 144 years of British rule, but public 
housing remained, crucially, under the PAP’s control.
255  
 
In the snap general elections held on 21 September, the PAP won 37 out of 
51 seats, with the severely-weakened Barisan obtaining 13.
256 Some of the wards 
were fiercely-contested, with resettlement and rehousing being key issues. In Paya 
Lebar constituency, ‘a very dangerous district where the majority of the people were 
the labouring class and farmers’ and ‘where the Barisan had an advantage’, Tan Kia 
Gan, the Minister for National Development, was defeated.
257 In Delta, too, Chan 
Choy Siong held on to her seat by the barest of margins against strong support for 
the Barisan candidate, Wee Toon Lip. Although Wee, a trade unionist and the 
Secretary-General of the leftwing Singapore Association of Trade Unions,
258 had 
not been involved in grassroots work in the constituency, he still polled 40% of the 
vote, losing to Chan by a mere 63 votes. The close shave shocked the PAP. 
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  390Nevertheless, the polls signalled the first electoral shift to the right in Bukit Ho Swee 
and in Singapore generally.
259 After the elections, Wee was detained in a second 
crackdown on leftwing politicians and trade unionists. The SCPA and SRRA were 
also charged with ‘agitation on behalf of the Communists’ and operating ‘recruiting 
and training centres for Communist cadres in the rural areas’ and deregistered in 
November.
260 The Barisan took over some of the associations’ local branches and 
attempted to retain its grassroots influence but its political reach had been drastically 
curtailed.
261 The government’s rehousing plans, ‘each rivaling the other in size and 
scope’, were consequently able to proceed.
262  Following the political purges, 
wooden house dwellers in Toa Payoh increasingly accepted the HDB’s 
compensation and rehousing terms.
263 Over a hundred acres were cleared in Toa 
Payoh by the following year.
264  
 
In 1964, when worsening relations between the PAP and Malay-controlled 
Federal governments during the merger with Malaysia led to an increase in racial 
tensions, the HDB’s urban renewal programme encountered the resistance of Malay 
kampong dwellers. In April, an HDB demolition squad without a police escort was 
assaulted at MacPherson Road South by Malay kampong dwellers.
265 In May and 
June, the Singapore branch of the United Malays National Organisation, the ruling 
party of Malaysia, formed a Malay Action Committee to organise Malay kampong 
dwellers in the Central Area and the Kallang Basin against resettlement, a measure 
which contributed to the outbreak of race riots in July and temporarily halted the 
resettlement of Malay families.
266 But after Singapore was ejected from Malaysia 
and became a sovereign nation-state in August 1965, the influence of Malaysian 
politics disappeared. A total of 12,829 families in Singapore were evicted from their 
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  391homes between 1960 and 1965, of which three-quarters moved to planned 
resettlement areas or accepted HDB flats, with the remainder finding their own 
accommodation in the dwindling numbers of shophouse cubicles or wooden houses. 
A revised resettlement policy in 1964, providing higher compensation rates for 
kampong dwellers,
267 and a new Land Acquisition Act in 1966, which authorised 
the compulsory acquisition of land required for public development at pre-
development values, further accelerated the clearance campaign.
268  
                                                
 
In 1964, the HDB also launched a Home Ownership Scheme to encourage 
lower middle-income families to purchase flats in Queenstown at prices of $4,900 
and $6,200 for 2- and 3-room flats respectively, payable through monthly 
installments.
269 Four years later, a further step towards building a nation of home-
owners was taken when applicants were allowed to use their compulsory savings in 
the Central Provident Fund to pay for the flats.
270 This move, which enabled 
families to pay for their homes through monthly installments not much higher than 
the rentals, made the ownership scheme a resounding success. By tying down home-
owners to a regular income obtained from full-time, salaried employment, the Home 
Ownership Scheme contributed significantly to integrating low-income Chinese 
families into the social fabric of the state. From the standpoint of social history, the 
scheme also signified and reinforced an important change in the 1960s, when 
housing became a central asset desired by the population. No longer simply 
considered important solely in terms of its proximity to one’s workplace, family or 
relatives, or as a place to bring up one’s children, housing now began to be valued 
for its material quality, and for the permanence and security of residence it afforded. 
Increasingly, Chinese families began to view tenancy in unauthorised wooden 
housing as markedly inferior to the rental, and subsequently the purchase, of public 
housing. This new social attitude, which is examined more closely in the following 
chapter, was certainly evident in Bukit Ho Swee. By the end of 1971, more than a 
quarter of the flats in the estate – 452 improved 1-room, 453 2-room and 2,405 3-
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  392room flats – had been sold, with a further 1,108 applicants waiting to purchase flats 
in the estate.
271 
 
  Following the Bukit Ho Swee inferno of 1961, the HDB maintained its 
robust response to smaller kampong fires throughout the 1960s. On 8 March 1963, a 
major fire ravaged four acres of a congested kampong off Havelock Road at Bukit 
Ban Kee, near Bukit Ho Swee. The blaze destroyed 350 wooden houses and 
rendered 358 families (2,000 persons) homeless.
272 The next morning, the HDB 
registered 230 families for rehousing, with 206 families eventually accepting 
temporary housing, mostly 1-room flats, in Bukit Ho Swee Estate under rent subsidy. 
When the subsidised period ended and many families in 2- and 3-room flats had 
difficulty paying the rents, the HDB allowed them to share 3-room flats or transfer 
to cheaper 1-room flats.
273 The Bukit Ban Kee fire demonstrated the strategic 
importance of the Bukit Ho Swee flats in sheltering fire victims from nearby 
kampongs. The Bukit Ban Kee fire site was also acquired for public housing, in turn 
facilitating the clearance of other kampongs. By 1966, the first 534 1-room flats at 
Bukit Ban Kee had been completed, followed by larger 2- to 4-room flats. 
 
The successful HDB rehousing was once again followed by expressions of 
considerable anger among the fire victims directed against the government over the 
cause of the Bukit Ban Kee disaster. Clearly, what was perceived to have happened 
at Bukit Ho Swee less than two years earlier had become part of Singapore’s 
collective memory. Lim Kok Peng’s grandfather had been the defacto headman of 
Bukit Ban Kee, who had built the first attap houses on the hill. According to Lim, 
the cause of the 1963 fire was attributed either to gangsters or an unemployed opium 
smoker hired to set the fire, while the opposition parties also blamed the blaze on the 
government. Lim observed that ‘it was just like the Bukit Ho Swee fire. There were 
many rumours but there was no evidence’.
274 In December that year, the Barisan 
Assemblyman for Thomson, Koo Young, publicly criticised the HDB’s rehousing 
policy: 
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Whenever a fire breaks out in any part of Singapore, the Minister will 
go there and grab the land for building houses, ignoring other 
considerations. How can the fire victims afford to move into Housing 
Board flats after having had their belongings burnt down?....They are 
only building houses on the sufferings of the people.
275 
 
On 4 November 1964, another inferno swept through 200 wooden houses 
built on stilts over three acres of swampy land at Pulau Minyak, north of Geylang 
Lorong 1.
276 The fire destroyed 150 houses and rendered 325 families (1,657 people) 
homeless. Just a day after the fire, the HDB had allocated flats to 264 families 
(approximately 1,500 persons) at Tanjong Rhu, MacPherson and Queenstown 
estates.
277 Ong Lian Teng, the Barisan’s Assemblyman for Pasir Panjang, flatly 
attacked the government’s pragmatic emergency relief programme, 
 
Every year hundreds of attap houses go up in flames. These houses 
happened to be in areas under eviction orders. This is a coincidence. 
If this is arranged by God, we would rather say that it is arranged by 
the PAP.
278  
 
Chan Chee Seng, the PAP Assemblyman for Jalan Besar (to which Pulau Minyak 
belonged), replied that the fire victims themselves accepted that the blaze was due to 
the negligence of ‘careless people’.
279  
 
By 1965, the PAP government was politically secure enough to bluntly 
declare that it would clear all urban kampongs which constituted a fire hazard.
280 By 
then, the kampong fire-fighting squads which had been politically expedient in 
mobilising the wooden house population a decade earlier had become redundant. 
The squads gradually disappeared when their kampongs were either destroyed by 
fire, as in the case of Bukit Ho Swee in 1961, or cleared for development, such as 
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  394Bukit Bintang and Kallang Basin in 1964 and Tiong Bahru in 1965. By 1971, only 
13 squads remained of the original 38 formed in 1958 and were themselves being 
progressively phased out.
281  
 
The final fire of historical note struck the small kampong remaining in the 
Bukit Ho Swee locality at Carey Road on 23 November 1968.
282 The flames 
destroyed ninety wooden houses, rendering 436 families (2,119 people) homeless. 
240 families registered for HDB housing and were housed temporarily in Board flats 
in nearby estates within 48 hours of the fire, but 120-odd families who stayed with 
their relatives and friends initially did not register. In the 1968 general elections, 
Bukit Ho Swee was detached from Delta to become a separate constituency. Its 
Member of Parliament, Seah Mui Kok, was a veteran trade unionist who had been 
chosen to match the working class profile of the estate’s population.
283 Seah took 
the opportunity provided by the fire later that year to exhort kampong dwellers to 
apply for HDB flats, saying, ‘This fire should be a lesson to them. The government’s 
offer of flats to them is still open and they should seize this opportunity before a fire 
breaks out in their squatter colony and causes them more hardship’.
284 Seah also 
viewed the fire as a blessing in disguise which allowed a new housing estate to be 
built on the fire site.
285 A Straits Times editorial agreed that ‘squatter colonies are 
fire traps and are a threat both to those living in them and to the surrounding areas’ 
and urged that if the wooden house dwellers were reluctant to move into HDB 
housing, ‘appropriate incentives and pressures are essential to clear those areas in 
which fire hazards are specially concentrated’.
286 At the end of 1968, 318 out of the 
367 registered fire victim families had been rehoused in HDB flats. The 4-acre fire 
site was acquired for housing, pending clearance in 1972.
287 Because of the sheer 
pace of rehousing and rebuilding which followed them, a PAP critic called blazes 
like the 1968 Bukit Ho Swee conflagration ‘fires of convenience’.
288 
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Bukit Ho Swee Estate was a massive political victory for the PAP 
government, heralding the close association between public housing and political 
hegemony in the history of postcolonial Singapore. As Alan Choe said, Bukit Ho 
Swee ‘was one of the things that made the population understand that this 
government can deliver the goods’.
289 Conversely, the scale of the achievement gave 
the newly-established HDB a requisite psychological boost in its public housing 
project. The speed with which the Bukit Ho Swee flats were built became a defining 
benchmark by which the Board measured its efficacy. In 1962, when the HDB 
completed four building contracts and 2,828 flats in Bukit Ho Swee alone, it boasted 
of its ability to build a flat every 45 minutes,
290 an achievement which greatly 
impressed Australian observers.
291 The flats of Bukit Ho Swee themselves, the 
authorities proudly stated, were being constructed at a rate of 3.5 units a day.
292 
Success was also measured in terms of the ease of obtaining the public housing. The 
HDB declared that, while the waiting time for an SIT flat had been 2-3 years, for 
Board housing, it was one week if one was not too particular, or three weeks 
otherwise.
293 The HDB viewed its flats with great pride. Teh Cheang Wan, in 
writing to the Commissioner of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1964, boasted that the 
Board’s multi-storey housing was fire-proof, such that ‘[e]ven in the big fire in 1961 
in Bukit Ho Swee, the fire stopped at our flats at Delta Estate and none of the 
buildings were burnt’. Teh omitted to say that the flats had actually been built by the 
SIT and that the roofs of two blocks were partially scorched by the flames.
294  
 
Top HDB officials subsequently entered politics, reinforcing the important 
link between public housing and the making of the modern Singapore state. In 1962, 
the government awarded Lim Kim San the Order of Temasek for his housing 
accomplishments. Lim left the Board to contest Cairnhill constituency in the 1963 
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  396general elections, winning two-thirds of the vote. He was immediately appointed the 
Minister for National Development, with his former boss Tan Kia Gan switching 
places with him as the HDB’s Chairman. In 1965, Lim was given the Ramon 
Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership in ‘marshalling talents and resources 
to provide one-fifth of the Singapore population with decent, moderately priced 
housing amidst attractive surroundings’.
295 Lim became a trusted member of Lee 
Kuan Yew’s inner circle, with, according to Lee, ‘an intuitive sense for judging 
people, their character, their motivation and their capabilities’, which Lee used ‘to 
good purpose when I wanted candidates to be interviewed for jobs, especially for 
prospective MPs, to gauge their potential’.
296 In 1979, six senior ministers and 
Members of Parliament resigned as part of the PAP’s political renewal. Howe Yoon 
Chong, following a long civil service career, successfully contested Potong Pasir 
constituency and became the Minister of Defence.
297 Teh Cheang Wan, uncontested 
in Geylang West in the same elections, was appointed the Minister for National 
Development.
298 
 
Throughout the 1960s, modern HDB estates steadily replaced the kampongs 
in Singapore City.
299 By 1965, the Board had built 54,430 units of housing, well 
above the State Development Plan’s target of 51,031 units and exceeding the annual 
construction targets every year except in 1965.
300 In contrast, only about 500 
temporary wooden dwellings were then being built yearly.
301 Foreign observers 
marveled that the HDB and private enterprise combined had succeeded in building 
9.4 permanent dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants in 1960-1965, the highest rate in Asia 
and comparable to the construction rates in Western countries.
302 The Australian 
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  397Commissioner surmised that the HDB had ‘changed the face of Singapore from a 
city with half a million people living in slums to a city noted for its tall housing unit 
complexes’.
303  The HDB programme helped sustain Singapore’s economic 
development in the period 1959-1963.
304 By 1965, housing construction remained 
economically important. The government’s building programme that year provided 
direct employment for an estimated 180,000 workers, and indirect work for an equal 
number.
305 In the new urban periphery within a five-mile radius of the Central Area 
stood more than 50,000 units of public housing flats, accommodating 430,000 
people or 23% of the population, in estates such as Tiong Bahru, Queenstown, Toa 
Payoh, St. Michael’s, MacPherson Road South, Kallang Airport, Tanjong Rhu, and 
first and foremost, Bukit Ho Swee. The HDB’s next planning step was to build self-
contained satellite towns in the outlying areas, towards accomplishing the urgent call 
by the 1947 Housing Committee to disperse the population from the Central Area.
306  
 
In celebrating the achievements of the HDB’s first 5-year plan, Lee Kuan 
Yew proudly stated: 
 
All great civilisations have this hallmark in common – imposing 
public buildings and good private dwellings….Singapore is a proud 
city. It is acquiring the one hallmark of a great civilised community, 
magnificent buildings plus comparable workers housing.
307 
 
  The urban social and political margin which the British colonial regime had 
sought to erase had been removed by the People’s Action Party government. The 
emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate represented a vital catalyst for the government 
to eradicate the remaining urban kampongs of ‘Old Singapore’. About two-thirds of 
the estate’s population of 45,000 people in 1970 were not victims of the 1961 fire 
but rather, families affected by other kampong fires or by the urban renewal 
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  398programme. The intra-urban migration of families into Bukit Ho Swee was now 
closely-managed by the government and was radically different in form and intent 
from the previous uncontrolled movement into the kampong. In the new modern 
nation-state which was being forged, the former dwellers of semi-autonomous areas 
were being socially moulded into disciplined citizens living in systematically-
organised housing estates. The changes in housing arrangements constituted, Lim 
Kim San proclaimed in 1964, ‘a minor revolution in the social and living habits of a 
sizeable portion of the population’.
308 HDB residents, as model citizens, were 
reminded, among other things, not to keep livestock in the house, obstruct the 
common corridors and stairways, illegally sublet the flat, or make unauthorised 
alterations to the flat, things they had been accustomed to doing in the kampong.
309 
In addition to the rules imposed from above, former kampong dwellers themselves 
increasingly came to value the rental and subsequently the ownership of public 
housing. The emergency housing project, underpinned by a controlling official 
discourse which stressed the urgency of providing shelter for a low-income 
population, mobilised and relocated nuclear families en masse and integrated them 
into the social fabric of the new state.
310 The result was a marked reduction in the 
autonomy of former urban kampong dwellers who hitherto had the freedom to move 
houses and sublet, rent, build, and rebuild their housing on their own terms. Tay 
Kheng Soon, one of Singapore’s leading architects, argues that Teh Cheang Wan 
‘totally disempowered the Singapore population’ by rehousing them in planned 
public housing estates,
311 where ‘there is no spontaneity at all in any social life 
because everything is mobilised from certain power centres which are in themselves 
dominated by the PAP system’.
312  
 
In 1972, a state-controlled radio programme triumphantly declared that Bukit 
Ho Swee, like the proverbial phoenix, had ‘risen from the ashes’ as a self-contained 
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310 Gregory K. Clancey, ‘Towards A Spatial History of Emergency: Notes from Singapore’, in R. 
Bishop, J. Phillips & W. W. Yeo (eds), Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 53. 
311 School of Architecture, National University of Singapore, interview with Tay Kheng Soon for the 
Master’s of Architecture Elective titled ‘The Higher Ground: Architects and their Role in Society’, 
2000. http://www.akitektenggara.com/articles/2000/interview.htm, accessed 15 Feb 2008. 
312 Author’s interview with Tay Kheng Soon, 6 Oct 2006. 
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modern housing estate with schools, clinics, shops, markets, and playing fields. The 
programme hailed the social transformation as ‘a change that matters, not a change 
in statistics or concrete but in the quality of life of our people’. With the new homes 
built by the Housing and Development Board, the radio programme declared, 
‘Singapore looks different, Singapore feels different, Singapore is different’. The 
public housing, the programme concluded, satisfied ‘the needs of a modern 
metropolis and a new nation’.
313 This was a powerful image and metaphor of Bukit 
Ho Swee Estate as an icon of progress in the making of modern Singapore. In the 
next chapter, we shall compare the surface representation with the underlying reality. 
 
313 RCS, audio programme titled Then and Now (No. 1): ‘A Look At Housing, broadcast on 16 Sep 
1972. Chapter 9 
Change and Continuity: 1962-2008 
 
  Bukit Ho Swee Estate, in terms of its high modernist architecture and 
officially-sanctioned ways of life, was radically different from the kampong and the 
communal, semi-autonomous way of life it had replaced. Yet, from the very 
beginning, the estate maintained a tenacious social and cultural hold on its past. As 
Gerard Ee, a social worker in the estate since 1982, observed, ‘You can take the guy 
out of the kampong but you cannot take the kampong out of the guy’.
1 This 
statement provides the starting point for examining the extent of change and 
continuity in everyday life in Bukit Ho Swee from the kampong era to the present. 
This approach also enables us to assess the impact of the 1961 inferno and the 
subsequent rebuilding programme on the community. This chapter initially 
considers the policies of the People’s Action Party government aimed at maintaining 
and subsequently updating the state of modernity in the estate, including efforts to 
demolish and upgrade flats and to forge the desired social community. The chapter 
not only traces the ongoing lives of the former fire victims but also those of 
newcomers to Bukit Ho Swee, namely, the former kampong and shophouse dwellers 
affected by the Housing and Development Board’s rehousing programme in the 
1960s, as well as the generations of children and youths who grew up in the estate in 
the aftermath of the fire. The social history demonstrates that, despite the 
government’s determined efforts, the semi-autonomous ways of life which had 
existed in Kampong Bukit Ho Swee have persisted in the estate to the present, 
highlighting the tensions inherent in the residents’ social and economic relationship 
with the high modernist state. Social life in Bukit Ho Swee to a certain extent 
exemplified the larger changes occurring in Singapore but was in other ways 
remarkably different, with the estate still in the official mind perceived as much a 
‘black area’ in the present as the kampong had been in the past. This chapter argues 
that the PAP government’s central aim of establishing a socially disciplined ‘nation’ 
                                                 
1 Author’s interview with Gerard Ee, 13 Nov 2006. Ee is presently Executive Director of Beyond 
Social Services. 
  401was deeply contested by the long-term social and cultural dynamics and 
contradictions of everyday life in Bukit Ho Swee.
2 
 
The Flats: Revitalisation and Modernity 
 
In 1970, Bukit Ho Swee, measuring only 135 acres in size, was the third 
most densely populated estate in Singapore. With a population of 45,066 people, it 
had a density of 334 persons per acre, compared to the earlier kampong’s density of 
141 persons in 1957.
3 The estate’s population was a youthful one, a quarter of 
whom were under 10 years old and with just 6% aged 60 and above.
4 Subsequently, 
however, Bukit Ho Swee’s population matured much faster than in the rest of the 
nation. By 1980, there were only 20,773 persons in the estate, of whom only 12% 
were 10 and younger, well under the national average of 17%.
5 This was partly due 
to the government’s successful attempt to reduce the birth rate through family 
planning in the mid-1960s,
6 but also part of a deeper shift in Chinese attitudes 
towards family. Throughout Singapore, young married couples were leaving the 
families, homes and estates in which they had grown up for larger, newer flats in 
outlying HDB townships in the north, east and west of the island.
7 As early as 1977, 
the Singapore Parliament had heard from a Member that ‘the aged and weak parents 
have been forsaken by the children’.
8 By 1990, the proportion of children aged 10 
                                                 
2  Lily Kong & Brenda S. A. Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of 
‘Nation’ (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), pp. 2, 11. 
3 P. Arumainathan, Report on the Census of Population 1970, Singapore (Singapore: Government 
Printing Office, 1973), pp. 238-39. 
4 P. Arumainathan, Census of Population, 1970: Interim Release (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office, 1970), pp. 4, 5. 
5 Khoo  Chian  Kim,  Census of Population 1980, Singapore: Administrative Report (Singapore: 
Department of Statistics, 1983), p. 210; and Census of Population 1980, Singapore: Release No. 5 
Geographical Distribution (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983), p. 66. In 1984, Bukit Ho 
Swee was merged into Kim Seng constituency. In the 1990 census, the estate was surveyed as part of 
the Kim Seng census division, which comprised Delta-Havelock Estate, and returned a population 
figure of 23,683. The 1990 census figures given here are consequently of the Kim Seng census 
division. Lau Kak En, Singapore Census of Population 1990: Transport & Geographic Distribution 
(Singapore: SNP Publishers for Census of Population Office, Department of Statistics, 1992), p. 79.  
6 In 1966, the government had established a Family Planning and Population Board as part of its 5-
Year National Planning Programme to reduce Singapore’s population growth. At the end of the plan, 
the national birth rate had declined from 28.6 in 1966 to 22.1 in 1970. Family Planning & Population 
Board, Annual Report 1970, p. 1. 
7  Lau Kak En, Singapore Census of Population 1990: Households & Housing (Singapore: SNP 
Publishers for Census of Population Office, Department of Statistics, 1992), p. 3. 
8 SPD, 16 Feb 1977, p. 220. 
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and younger in Bukit Ho Swee had dropped further to 9%, while only 13% of single 
nuclear family households were comprised of three generations. The population of 
the Central Development Guide Plan Region, which encompassed demographically 
mature estates like Bukit Ho Swee, fell by nearly a fifth, while there were nearly 
twice as many elderly persons aged 60 and above still residing in the Central region 
as in other regions.
9 Already occurring in the postwar years, this pattern of the 
physical mobility of younger families without their parents was characteristic of 
postcolonial Singapore; in 2000, more than half of all households in the state had 
changed residence within the preceding decade. By then, a fifth of Bukit Ho Swee’s 
population of 19,737 persons were aged 60 and above.
10 
 
Png Pong Tee epitomises the family experience common among the elderly 
residents of Bukit Ho Swee. After the 1961 fire, she moved with her four children 
from a wooden house in Kampong Bahru into a 1-room emergency flat at Taman Ho 
Swee. Widowed, she struggled to support the family by herself, earning $2.80 an 
hour on weekdays and $1.80 on Saturdays as a long sai, and borrowing from ah long 
(unlicensed moneylenders) when the wages were inadequate to maintain the family. 
When her children were older, they persuaded Png to move into a 2-room flat in 
Queenstown. At the present, the four children had long moved out upon marriage, 
leaving her all alone in the flat and visiting only sporadically.  
 
Png’s lament that ‘if one is pai mia (‘has a hard life’), it will always be like 
that the whole life’ is not unique among the experiences of the first generation who 
had lived in public housing.
11 Their children’s migration to newer flats illustrated 
tensions within the Chinese family. As Tan Tiam Ho, who with his family lived in 
Block 6, recalled, ‘My son used to stay with me but has moved out to a 
condominium in the West. I cursed him to no end. I didn’t allow him to move. I 
asked him, “Why did you have to stay in such a big house?”’
12 Similarly, Jimmy Yi, 
who moved into a 3-room flat in Block 16 with his family in 1963, now lives alone.
 
9 Lau, Singapore Census of Population 1990: Transport & Geographic Distribution, pp. 12-13, 22. 
10 Leow Bee Geok, Census of Population 2000: Households & Housing (Singapore: Department of 
Statistics, 2001), pp. 12, 38. 
11 Author’s interview with Png Pong Tee, 10 Jan 2008. 
12 Author’s interview with Tan Tiam Ho, 12 Mar 2007.  
Plate 9.1: Png Pong Tee with author at her home, 2008 (Photograph by author). 
 
His brothers had left when they married, because, as he said, ‘they don’t want to stay 
here! They moved out and earned their own living, they don’t care about our father 
and mother’.
13 Tay Ming Choo (born 1935), who moved into a 3-room flat in Block 
22 in 1970 with seven other family members, also lives alone: 
 
Everyone who wanted to buy a flat would ask me, ‘Auntie, do you 
want to sell your flat?’ I said, ‘If I sell, where would I move to?’ My 
son is staying in Sengkang in a large 5-room flat. He asked me to sell 
this flat and move in with him but I said no. This flat was bought by 
his father and I am happy to stay here, so I don’t have to move out to 
stay with my son. [Laughs]
14 
 
The high-rise housing required a period of adaptation for family members 
who had previously lived on the ground in a kampong house. Residents responding 
to closed questions on national radio in the early 1960s unfailingly stated their 
satisfaction with the living conditions, cleanliness,
15 and even the beauty of the 
                                                 
13 Author’s interview with Jimmy Yi, 4 Feb 2007. 
14 Author’s interview with Tay Ming Choo, 29 Oct 2007. 
15 RCS, audio programme titled This, Our Singapore (No. 5): Housing, broadcast on 7 Jan 1963. 
  404modern housing.
16 A resident in a 3-room flat simply replied ‘Yes’ to ‘questions’ 
such as ‘With the lift, it [living on the 6
th floor] should be convenient’, and ‘If [the 
school is] nearer, you won’t have to take a bus, you can just walk. It’s also safer’.
17 
In reality, high-rise living drastically overturned former kampong dwellers’ 
conceptions of space and place. As a resident explained, ‘the kampong was big and 
spacious, with a lot of space to look out to, but here in an HDB flat, one person has 
only so much space’.
18 Vertical living also created social problems and tensions 
which did not exist to the same extent in the kampong. The greatest proportion of 
respondents (37%) to an HDB sample household survey in 1969, mostly living on 
the first three floors of the housing block, cited ‘rubbish thrown from upstairs’ as the 
main cause of dissatisfaction with the floor location of their flat.
19 Wet laundry hung 
on bamboo poles outside the windows were a constant source of irritation both for 
the owners of laundry hung out on lower floors and for passersby below.
20 This 
simple method of drying laundry consequently annoyed HDB estate management 
officials but was a Chinese custom long practiced in shophouse dwellings in the 
Central Area; the colourful wash also, British observers noted, helped to ‘soften the 
harsh exterior of the severely modern architecture’.
21 
 
For elderly residents, high-rise flats were initially foreign and even 
dangerous places. They literally became ‘traps’ for elderly persons confined to 
living on the higher floors, who, fearing that the lifts would break down, dared not 
                                                 
16 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. A survey was conducted in the mid-1960s on 
the prevalence of two common illnesses among the children of 159 families living in Bukit Ho Swee 
Estate (half of whom were former fire victims) and of 169 families still residing in unauthorised 
wooden housing at Carey Road. The main study was of soil-transmitted parasites called helminths 
which commonly spread via contact with contaminated bucket toilets or through the consumption of 
uncooked food. The study found that wooden house dwellers had a significantly higher rate of 
infection than flat dwellers who might have formerly lived in wooden dwellings, and concluded that 
modern housing with proper sanitary amenities had a ‘pronounced’ effect in reducing the incidence of 
helminths. However, the study also found the incidence of enteroviruses, which spread through direct 
physical contact, to be lower among wooden house dwellers than flat dwellers. This led the author to 
suggest that, contrary to the above argument, the overcrowded living conditions in the emergency 
flats, the residents’ inadequate use of water (which was payable by meter) and their poor hygiene 
habits were to blame. J. W. L. Kleevens, Housing and Health in a Tropical City: A Selective Study in 
Singapore, 1964-1967 (Assen: Van Gorcum & Company, 1972), pp. 98-104, 112-13. 
17 RCS, audio programme titled This, Our Singapore (No. 5): Housing, broadcast on 8 Jan 1963. 
18 Author’s interview with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. 
19   Stephen H. K. Yeh, Housing and Development Board Sample Household Survey, Vol. II 
(Singapore: Economic Research Centre, University of Singapore: Housing and Development Board 
of Singapore, 1969), p. 33. 
20 ST, 2 Mar 1973. 
21 CO 1030/1597, Memo titled ‘Public Housing in Singapore’ by the UK Commission, 16 Apr 1963. 
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22  The HDB’s 1969 household survey revealed that 57% of the 
respondents found the lifts unsatisfactory.
23 Of his grandfather, who had lived in a 
spacious wooden house but was relocated to a flat at Ganges Avenue after the fire, 
Ong Eng Boon said, ‘In the flat, he couldn’t get used to it. He didn’t have any 
feeling with the flat. There was nowhere to move, not like in the olden days’.
24 The 
flats came to be known as places of tiao lau (‘jumping off a building’), due to the 
incidence of elderly persons committing suicide this way.
25 When Tan Peng Kiat 
first moved from a shophouse in the Central Area into a flat on the thirteenth floor of 
Block 22 in 1966, although she was only 37 then, she felt that it was ‘very high. I 
was very afraid. But if I didn’t look out, it would be alright’.
26 The flats were also 
social traps for young children who had to remain home locked up while their 
parents were out working. Social workers knocking on the doors of 1-room flats in 
the estate during working hours frequently found that children ‘would open the door 
to strangers, and you see all young ones, the young ones taking care of the not so 
young ones’.
27 For instance, living in a 1-room emergency flat in Block 5, Angie 
Ng’s mother arranged for her and her sister to attend alternate morning and 
afternoon school sessions so that one of them would be home to do household 
chores and take care of the three younger children.
28 Similarly, as Tan Beng Huat 
(born 1958), who lived in a 2-room rental unit in Block 42 with his parents and nine 
siblings, recalled, ‘Only myself and my elder sister studied. If she studied in the 
afternoon, I would study in the morning, then one of us will do the cooking. She 
would do the lunch, I would do the dinner. Imagine just a Primary 3 or 4 boy, I had 
to cook dinner’.
29 
                                                
 
From having been a landmark public housing estate, Bukit Ho Swee was 
soon materially and architecturally overtaken by newer, larger HDB estates built 
further away from the Central Area. Where half of the 12,000-odd flats in Bukit Ho 
Swee were 1-room flats in 1965, only a quarter were 1- and 2-room units at the 
 
22 ST, 9 Aug 1989. 
23 Yeh, Housing and Development Board Sample Household Survey, Vol. IV, p. 34. 
24 Author’s interview with Ong Eng Boon, 4 Apr 2007. 
25 Author’s interview with Lee Soo Seong, 11 Oct 2006. 
26 Author’s interview with Tan Peng Kiat, 26 Jul 2007. 
27 Author’s interview with Leela Kwek, 2 May 2007. 
28 Author’s interview with Angie Ng, 8 Feb 2007. 
29 Author’s interview with Tan Beng Huat, 30 Apr 2007. 
  406century’s end, with more than half being 3-room units. Across Singapore, however, 
only 8% of all flats by 1990 were 1- and 2-room units, while 4-room flats comprised 
40% of the national total but only 2% in Bukit Ho Swee.
30 A decade later, 68% of 
all households in Singapore were living in 4-room or larger flats but in Bukit Ho 
Swee, the figure was only a fifth.
31 Similarly, the percentage of the estate’s flats in 
ownership increased from 55% in 1980 to 76% in 1990 while still trailing the 
national averages for Chinese families, which rose from 62% in 1980 to 88% in 
1990.
32 In 1983, 4,293 flats in Bukit Ho Swee, mostly 1- and 2-room units, were 
still being rented, compared to 3,456 flats, mostly 3-room units, which had been 
purchased.
33 Home ownership was desired by many residents in the estate as 
generally was the case in Singapore but this depended crucially on having a regular 
income. Working as a foreman in Robinsons Company, Lee Ah Gar was able to use 
his state-enforced savings in the Central Provident Fund to purchase a 3-room flat in 
Indus Road in 1972, since ‘the rent for the 3-room flat would be the same as the 
monthly rental payment, and then my children can live in better housing’.
34 Bukit 
Ho Swee consequently gradually acquired a dual character, with a home-owning 
population residing in 3-room flats and a low-income ‘underclass’ renting the 
smaller flats. 
                                                
 
The philosophy of high modernism demanded that the public housing be 
constantly renewed through a controlled process of demolition and rebuilding. In 
1979, the HDB scheduled 53 blocks of 10,976 1-room emergency flats in Bukit Ho 
Swee and elsewhere in Singapore for demolition to make way for new flats or social 
amenities, with their tenants offered larger Board housing nearby; 29 other blocks of 
emergency flats would also be upgraded into larger self-contained units.
35 The 
demolition project was justified through an official discourse of social rejuvenation, 
as part of an HDB plan to ‘restructure’ older housing estates and combine them into 
new towns, where social amenities could be built on the former emergency housing 
 
30 Lau, Singapore Census of Population 1990: Households & Housing, pp. 16, 35. 
31 Leow, Census of Population 2000, pp. 11, 40. 
32 Khoo, Census of Population 1980, Singapore: Release No. 5 Geographical Distribution, p. 173; 
Lau, Singapore Census of Population 1990: Households & Housing, p. 18; Lau, Singapore Census of 
Population 1990: Transport & Geographic Distribution, p. 154. 
33 HDB, Annual Report 1982/1983, pp. 62, 66. 
34 Author’s interview with Lee Ah Gar, 4 Nov 2006. 
35 HDB, Annual Report 1978/1979, p. 7. 
  407sites. Under the scheme of revitalisation, Bukit Ho Swee and Tiong Bahru estates, 
with a combined total of 26,000 units of housing, were integrated into a single new 
town.
36  The philosophy of high modernism did not allow for the negative 
experiences of living in emergency housing to be publicly articulated until such a 
time when the emergency housing was ready to be demolished and replaced by 
‘superior’ housing. This was, however, precisely the moment in time when some 
form of community among the residents had emerged. In 1981, Teh Cheang Wan, 
the Minister for National Development and the architect behind the emergency 
housing, explained that the demolition project was both necessary and desirable, 
since ‘they have served their useful purpose and their standard is considered too low 
today’.
37 The initial response in Bukit Ho Swee to the demolition scheme was mixed. 
The Member of Parliament for Kim Seng constituency, which included Bukit Ho 
Swee, found that while some residents were happy to move into larger HDB housing, 
others were financially unable to do so.
38  The government, however, was 
determined to ‘apply a little bit of pressure or…ask a local Member of Parliament to 
use a little bit of persuasion’ to relocate the residents.
39 In the official view, erasing 
a ‘failed experiment’ from the context of the estate was a fully justified damage 
limitation exercise.
40 In 1980, the first 22 blocks of emergency flats in Singapore 
were demolished, including units in Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, Tiong Bahru Road and 
Havelock Road. Within five years, the last emergency flats in Bukit Ho Swee 
associated with the rehousing of the 1961 fire victims had disappeared. At present, 
there remain only two blocks of self-contained 1-room flats in the estate: Block 33 
in Taman Ho Swee, already scheduled for en bloc redevelopment (see below), and 
Block 79 at Indus Road. 
pioneer batch of six precincts including Bukit Ho Swee was announced for the Main 
                                                
 
Another key component of the policy and post 1980s discourse of social 
revitalisation was the upgrading programme for larger flats. In 1990, the HDB 
declared that it would upgrade older housing estates in order to ‘create the physical 
conditions that will bring about a greater sense of community’.
41 In May 1992, a 
 
36 HDB, Annual Report 1979/1980, p. 6. 
37 SPD, 20 Mar 1981, p. 998. 
38 SPD, 22 Mar 1979, p. 1048. 
39 SPD, 22 Mar 1979, p. 1062. 
40 Author’s interview with Liu Thai Ker, 14 Dec 2006. 
41 HDB, Annual Report 1989/1990, p. 37. 
  408Upgrading Programme (MUP).
42  The MUP extended the long established 
association between public housing and bolstering the PAP’s political legitimacy; 
the six precincts were part of three constituencies where the party had won landside 
victories in the 1991 elections.
43 The upgrading programme, subsidised by the 
government up to 75-92% of the cost and requiring the consent of 75% of the 
residents, also became a major means of social mobilisation. The official grassroots 
organisations operating in HDB estates – the community centres’ management 
committees and the constituency’s Citizens’ Consultative Committee – worked 
actively to canvas popular support for the MUP through brochures, dialogue 
sessions, preliminary surveys, and promotional exhibitions.
44 An average of 91.4% 
of the residents in the six precincts voted for the Standard Package of the 
programme (which included improvements to both the flat and building façade), 
with a sizeable minority opting for the more expensive Standard Plus Package 
(which provided for new flat space and the addition of another toilet).
45 
 
Nine blocks of housing in Taman Ho Swee, containing the 276 2-room and 
488 3-room units built in 1962, were selected to be the first flats in Singapore for 
upgrading.
46 Yeo Ning Hong, the Member of Parliament for the Kampong Glam 
Group Representation Constituency, which included Bukit Ho Swee, delved into 
history to assert the symbolic significance of the HDB’s gesture: 
 
Bukit Ho Swee was fortunate to be among the first to benefit from 
the first chapter of our public housing programme in the early 1960s. 
Today, Bukit Ho Swee is fortunate again to be the first among the 
steady state precincts to be offered the upgrading programme….The 
success in this precinct will make us once again a symbol of success 
and a model for others to follow.
47 
 
                                                 
42 A pilot upgrading programme had been carried out earlier in six other precincts in 1991-1992. 
43 ST, 28 May 1992. 
44 ST, 19 Oct 1993. 
45 HDB,  Annual Report 1993/1994, p. 36; ST, 19 Oct 1993. The Basic Package provided for 
improvements to the flat, such as upgrading the toilets and installing new aluminum windows. The 
estimated amount a family had to pay to upgrade a 3-room flat was $2,200 for the Basic Package, 
$3,500 for the Standard Package and $9,900 for the Standard Plus Package. ST, 11 Mar 1993. 
46 ST, 28 May 1992. The blocks were Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18. 
47 ST, 15 Sep 1993. 
  409The upgrading programme was supported by 91.4% of Bukit Ho Swee’s residents. 
The residents of all the nine blocks save Block 4 opted for the less costly Standard 
Package because the additional living space was no longer needed by the smaller 
families now in residence.
48 The upgrading work began in 1994 and was completed 
the following year. A further 1,078 units of 2- and 3-room flats in seven housing 
blocks in Jalan Bukit Ho Swee were targeted for upgrading in 1995, and 86% of the 
residents voted for the Standard Plus Package, which provided for an additional 
utility room and new laundry racks.
49 Yeo Ning Hong lauded as ‘sensible’ and 
‘pragmatic’ the majority’s choice to treat housing as an investment to raise the flat’s 
resale value.
50 In the following year, nine more blocks in Beo Crescent were 
similarly selected for upgrading.
51  
 
Nevertheless, the discourses of social rejuvenation and of leveraging 
investment ignored the implications of the upgrading for many elderly residents. The 
upgrading was practically useful in providing, for example, lifts which either 
stopped at every floor or more frequently than before, an important improvement for 
elderly residents living on the upper floors who had difficulty with the stairs.
52 But 
the explicit connection between the housing upgrading and social revitalisation 
remained unclear, as many elderly residents would still have remained in the estate 
without such improvements.
53 Indeed, for them, the neighbourhood and sense of 
community was already socially-established. One resident, who had once thought of 
moving out, had decided to remain because of her old friends still living there; the 
upgrading would be more useful, she explained, to help persuade her children to 
continue to reside with her.
54  
 
In 1995, the upgrading programme came under the auspices of the HDB’s 
Estate Renewal Strategy, whereby another improvement plan, the Selective En Bloc 
Redevelopment Scheme (SERS), was launched. The stated aim, again, was to 
reinvigorate older housing estates and cater to the long-term needs of the residents. 
                                                 
48 ST, 19 Oct 1993. The residents of Block 4 voted for an additional toilet-cum-bathroom in the flat. 
49 The blocks were Nos. 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, and 32. 
50 ST, 13 Apr 1995. 
51 The blocks were Nos. 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, and 50. 
52 Author’s interviews with Lim Yock Eng, 25 Jul 2007; and Tan Peng Kiat, 26 Jul 2007. 
53 ST, 15 Sep 1993. 
54 ST, 7 Apr 1995. 
  410The method used, however, was different: where the MUP had sought to keep 
residents in upgraded housing, the SERS allowed the government to repossess the 
flat through the Land Acquisition Act and move the residents into replacement units. 
Under the SERS, selected blocks of housing which were not considered 
‘economically or functionally viable’ were to be demolished to make way for 
redevelopment, with the residents offered financial incentives to move into larger 
99-year lease units in the locality, where they could, it was argued, maintain their 
community ties.
55 The Minister for National Development, Lim Hng Kiang, in 
explaining the need to carry out this relentless pursuit of modernity in the name of 
progress, stated that ‘adjust we must. If we had not adjusted to the redevelopment 
programme for farmers and squatters, we would not have been able to build modern 
Singapore’.
56 The analogy was a historically apt one, for the SERS was an updated 
version of the government’s compulsory acquisition of land for development in the 
1960s. The residents, the HDB assured, were overwhelmingly in favour of the 
scheme.
57 Subsequently, the Board announced the acquisition of mostly 3-room flats 
in the locality: at Boon Tiong Road in 1995, Kim Tian Road and Nile Road in 1997, 
Jalan Membina Barat and Lower Delta Road in 1998,
58 and Taman Ho Swee, 
Havelock Road and Zion Road in 2003.
59  
 
In a preliminary poll of 70 residents living in SIT flats at Boon Tiong Road 
in 1995, however, 42 were lukewarm towards the en bloc scheme. One resident 
protested that ‘what we are being asked to give up is the quaint charm and 
exclusivity of our estate and that is intangible’, while another was ‘disillusioned’ 
that the government had simply acquired the site by law without giving her the 
chance to vote on it.
60 The SERS was altogether a programme envisioned by the 
young to benefit the young. Many elderly persons lacked the financial means to 
                                                 
55 HDB, Annual Report 1995/1996, pp. 42-43; and Annual Report 1997/1998, pp. 40. The incentives 
include replacement flats at subsidised prices and the waiver of various fees for the purchase. 
56 ST, 4 Sep 1995. 
57 Informal surveys by the HDB in 1995 showed that 93% of the respondents supported the scheme 
and 91% opted for replacement flats. HDB, Annual Report 1995/1996, p. 43. 
58 HDB, Selective En Bloc Redevelopment Scheme, Completed Sites, 
http://www101.hdb.gov.sg/hdbvsf/eampu200.nsf/0/Site_Completed.htm, accessed 15 Apr 2008. The 
blocks affected by SERS were Blocks 1-16 at Boon Tiong Road, Blocks 126-127 at Kim Tian Road, 
Blocks 51, 53 & 54 at Nile Road, Blocks 102 & 103 at Lower Delta Road, and Blocks 24, 31 & 32 at 
Jalan Membina Barat. 
59 The blocks were Blocks 29, 31 & 33 at Havelock Road and Taman Ho Swee. 
60 ST, 15 Sep 1993. 
  411afford the prices of the replacement flats in the locality.
61 A 78-year-old resident, 
when told that the replacement flats would be ready within three years, replied, ‘We 
are too old to uproot and move to a new area…we are living on borrowed time’.
62 
But compared to the contested history of rehousing in the 1950s and early 1960s 
marked by demonstrations and protests, there was no comparable resistance against 
eviction in present-day Singapore. The state’s determined mobilisation of residents 
in support of both the upgrading and en bloc schemes meant that dissenting voices 
would simply be drowned out by the pragmatic and socially-mobilised majority. A 
HDB survey of 890 households affected by SERS in 2000 and 2001 found that 85% 
supported the scheme when it was first announced and 90% were in favour by the 
time they moved into the replacement flats.
63 
 
To bring the historical development of Bukit Ho Swee full circle, the estate 
in the present-day has changed radically from the dense clusters of emergency flats 
which had first emerged from the ashes of the 1961 fire, and will undoubtedly 
continue to do so. Close to the ageing albeit upgraded multi-storey HDB flats built 
in the 1960s are new blocks of housing which architecturally dwarf them in height, 
size and design. In 1991, an area of nearly 25,000 square feet at Jalan Membina, on 
which the 1-room emergency flats had formerly stood, was released for the 
construction of private condominiums.
64 The resulting visually awkward mix of 
public and private housing, again couched in the language of ‘revitalisation’, has 
created towering HDB point-blocks at Boon Tiong Road and Jalan Membina as well 
as majestic condominium complexes like Emerald Park, situated next to Kim Seng 
Community Centre, Central Green along Jalan Membina, and, MeraPrime at Bukit 
Ho Swee Crescent. The stated reason for the combined mixed housing types was so 
that ‘even though the parents [living in smaller public housing] were poor, the 
children can learn from the richer families’ children and upgrade themselves’.
65 
Where once people desired to reside on the ground, ‘living in the sky’ had become 
the aspirational preference, with the upper-storey flats fetching higher prices. A 
massive, multi-storey shopping plaza and an underground train station have also 
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  412been built at the former site of the emergency flats between Tiong Bahru Road and 
Jalan Membina. As this study is being undertaken, construction work has also begun 
at the open space between Havelock Road and Ganges Avenue, again, where 1-room 
flats had once stood, and at Kim Tian Road for the replacement housing for residents 
affected by the en bloc scheme. Bukit Ho Swee’s proximity to the Central Area 
meant that its land would be ultimately coveted for future development in the same 
way as the old kampong, cemetery and fire sites had been in the late 1950s and 
1960s. Demolition and rebuilding in the name of the state would, as had occurred in 
the past, serve as the springboard for reconstituting Bukit Ho Swee as the new 
century dawned. 
 
 
Plate 9.2: The proximate spot where the 1961 inferno started, now the site of Zhangde 
Primary School and surrounded by newer high-rise HDB housing, 2006 (Photograph by 
author). 
 
  413 
Plate 9.3: A mix of unchanged private and redeveloped public architecture, 2006. The MCA 
shophouse and the upgraded façade of Block 40 behind it (Photograph by author). 
 
 
Plate 9.4: Block 34 along Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, 2006. The ‘attachment’ to the centre of the 
block, for lifts which stop at more floors, is a telltale sign of upgraded HDB flats 
(Photograph by author). 
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Plate 9.5: Flats in Taman Ho Swee selected for en bloc redevelopment, 2006. Most of the 
residents have already moved out (Photograph by author). 
 
 
Plate 9.6: Ongoing construction of new HDB flats for residents in the locality affected by 
the SERS, 2008. Comprising 25, 35, 36, 38 and 40-storey housing, these replacement flats 
are targeted for completion in the third quarter of 2011 and will tower over the 16-storey 
Block 22 in the background, which had been the highest HDB housing block in the estate in 
the 1960s (Courtesy of James Seah). 
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Plate 9.7: The unrelenting pursuit of architectural modernity in Singapore, 2007. The 
upgraded HDB flats of Jalan Klinik, built in the early 1960s, are dwarfed by MeraPrime 
Condominium across the road (Photograph by author). 
 
 
Plate 9.8: A place name error. The massive Tiong Bahru Plaza, a multi-purpose ‘one-stop’ 
shopping mall, located at the junction of Jalan Membina and Tiong Bahru Road, where the 
emergency flats of Bukit Ho Swee Estate had previously stood, 2007. The Mass Rapid 
Transit system’s Tiong Bahru station is located underground (Photograph by author). 
 
 
  416Becoming Good and Loyal Citizens 
  
However, the relentless pursuit of progress has had serious repercussions for 
the estate’s long-time residents. They have retained the social perceptions of space 
and distance traditionally associated with Chinese kampong and shophouse 
dwellings of the past, but have by now lived in the community for two generations. 
The government has focussed on providing strategic financial assistance to residents 
affected by the constant demolition and upgrading programmes. Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, maintaining in 1991 that it was more expensive to upgrade old housing 
than to demolish it and build new ones, assured residents that they would receive 
adequate financial compensation or government subsidies to obtain new flats.
66 To 
many residents, however, demolition and en bloc development meant involuntary 
relocation and disruption of well-established neighbourly and community ties.
67 Lim 
You Meng, who was born in Kampong Bukit Ho Swee and still lives in Nile Road, 
explained his attachment to the area: ‘I am quite contented. I will stay here forever, I 
will not move elsewhere. It’s convenient to go anywhere, the transport is convenient. 
They wanted to give me a flat in Jurong West but I rejected it, it’s too far’.
68 Tan Ah 
Poh, who previously lived in a 1-room flat in Nile Road and still visits Bukit Ho 
Swee regularly, asked, ‘Who is going to accept [rehousing] if you have been staying 
here for so long, the facilities all planned, so convenient?’
69 Tay Seng Kee (born 
1932) and his wife have lived in Block 22 since being evicted from a wooden house 
in Toa Payoh in 1965; although their friends had repeatedly asked them to buy a 
bigger flat, Tay had refused, because, as he explained, ‘it is very convenient here. 
The transportation system is very good, and you can easily get to town from here’.
70 
Similarly, Ong Chye Ho, who lived in 1-room units in Jalan Bukit Ho Swee and 
Havelock Road since the 1961 fire and currently resides at Indus Road, maintained, 
‘It is good to live here, or else how could I have lived here for more than 30 years? I 
won’t move anymore, I will continue to stay here’.
71 Wang Ah Tee, now living in 
Kim Tian Road, still frequents the coffeeshops at the bottom of Block 4, Jalan Bukit 
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  417Ho Swee, where former and present residents of the estate still gather. He explained, 
‘If I go to other places, I won’t be comfortable. Here, I sit down, and there are many 
old friends. You can order coffee, have a plate of rice, and your friends will look for 
you here’.
72  
 
 
Plate 9.9: Ong Chye Ho’s ‘pillar space’ at Block 79, Indus Road, in Hara Takafumi’s ‘Signs 
of Memory: HDB Spaces, 2006’ Public Art Installation, 2006. Note Ong’s reflection on his 
repeated moves of residence after the Bukit Ho Swee fire, which captures the shared 
experience of intra-urban migration, both voluntary and forced, of families in postwar 
modern Singapore (Photograph by author). 
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Plate 9.10: HDB flats along Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, built after the 1961 fire, 2007. At the 
bottom of the picture are a coffee shop and a recreational corner, where I spoke to Tan Tiam 
Ho and Wang Ah Tee, among others (photograph by author). 
 
These comments demonstrate the complex relationship between the modern 
public housing and basic community dynamics. In the late 1960s and 1970s, both 
local and foreign scholars criticised the HDB’s failure to forge a viable community 
in its housing estates but more recent research has shown that the social impact of 
rehousing varied according to gender, occupation and age.
73  From a larger 
perspective, the dissipation of area-based communities in the PAP era owed more to 
the transformation of what had once been a casual labour force engaged in the 
informal sector to one employed in routine industrial work than to the en masse 
relocation of kampong and shophouse dwellers in public housing per se.
74 One also 
needs to bear in mind that the Chinese urban kampong community was itself highly-
urbanised and pragmatically-oriented, and that the wooden house dwellers, including 
                                                 
73 Chua Beng Huat, ‘Resettling a Chinese Village’, Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding 
in Singapore (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 63-68. 
74 Author’s interview with Chua Beng Huat, 9 Oct 2006. 
  419the Bukit Ho Swee fire victims, had largely been relocated en bloc in modern 
housing and frequently resided together in the same high rise blocks.
75  
 
  The ethnographic evidence gathered in this study suggests that some 
semblance of the traditional way of life of the kampong community, when measured 
against specific criteria, has managed to survive in modern public housing. For 
instance, residents in 3-room flats in Block 22 exhibited considerable 
neighbourliness, although this was based on outward acts like greetings, social visits 
and borrowing of items of daily use, which have also been construed by the HDB as 
a gauge of community in its estates.
76 Lim Yock Eng, who has resided in the block 
since 1964, emphasised that her neighbours had always greeted and helped one 
another, despite the number of families moving in and out of the block over time.
77 
There were signs of neighbourliness too in other blocks of housing. As Lee Soo 
Seong, who lived in a 2-room flat in Bukit Ho Swee for several years, recounted, 
‘We got along very well with our neighbours. We seldom closed our doors. The 
neighbours were all very simple folk from the same area and spoke the same 
dialect’.
78 Tay Ah Chuan, who resided in a 3-room flat in Block 32, agreed that 
because his neighbours were previously from the same kampong, they never shut 
their doors.
79  
 
More crucially, however, the policies of the high-modernist PAP state made 
the existence of an autonomous, self-contained community in Bukit Ho Swee 
virtually impossible. In 1965, the HDB had declared that ‘[a] new housing estate is 
not made up of bricks and mortar’, but rather ‘must be given life, a heart and a will’. 
The Board organised social activities such as sports, games and dances in order to 
bring families into closer contact with one another.
80 In 1968 and 1969 respectively, 
the HDB launched the ‘Cleanest Estate’ and ‘Keep Singapore Mosquito Free’ 
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  420campaigns to socialise the occupants into becoming model residents.
81 In Bukit Ho 
Swee, as elsewhere in Singapore, the PAP government co-opted grassroots leaders 
and local businessmen into the community centres’ management committees, the 
constituency’s Citizens’ Consultative Committee and the Residents’ Committees. 
These key local committees functioned as the government’s ‘ears’ and ‘voice’ at the 
grassroots level in order to mobilise and obtain feedback from the residents.
82 As 
Seah Mui Kok, the Member of Parliament for Bukit Ho Swee, explained, the Bukit 
Ho Swee Community Centre’s main aim was to mould residents into ‘good and 
loyal citizens of Singapore’.
83  Much of this grassroots policy was to be 
accomplished through social campaigns such as family planning, encouraging the 
use of Mandarin and the moderate use of water, and reducing the incidence of ‘killer 
litter’.
84 But such officially-sanctioned activities were not always well-received. The 
community centres, for instance, offered courses in sewing and cooking but women 
were frequently more interested to learn a handicraft such as making plastic flowers 
or pasting paper bags and earn some money.
85 There was resistance, too, against the 
Speak Mandarin campaign directed against the use of Chinese dialects among the 
older residents, which evoked angry protests from even members of the local 
committees.
86 
 
The drastic need to implement such measures illustrates the difficulty the 
state faced of forging an ideal-typic community from above. In fact, it was far easier 
for the HDB to concentrate on simply enforcing its rules, given the unwillingness of 
the residents to regulate one another.
87 In 1966, the Board’s Housing Inspectors, 
who periodically visited the flats, identified the Bukit Ho Swee and Tanjong Rhu 
estates, where families from the clearance areas had been rehoused in specific 
housing blocks, as ‘the worst where infringements of tenancies were concerned’, 
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  421where the ‘[c]leanliness of common staircases, and open spaces were difficult to 
maintain, turfing, trees and other plants were periodically destroyed’. The Board was 
forced to separate such evicted families, relocating them on alternate floors in the 
future.
88 A study of residents in 1-room flats in Bukit Merah in the early 1970s 
found that Housing Inspectors typically took a ‘policing’ approach in their work, 
which merely enhanced the residents’ ‘fear and avoidance’ of authority.
89  
Consequently, the dwellers in 1-room flats, who arguably had the greatest need, had 
the least contact with the inspectors and were consequently resigned to accepting 
their housing problems as an intrinsic part of their lives.
90 
 
Independent efforts by non-government institutions or individuals to 
organise Bukit Ho Swee’s residents were firmly discouraged by the authorities. The 
most salient example of this was the attempt at community organisation by Sister 
Sabine Fernandez of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary and a pioneer in the Bukit 
Ho Swee Community Service Project in 1969-1970. Aided by church and university 
volunteers, Sister Fernandez sought to galvanise the residents in five blocks of 1-
room emergency flats into a socially-conscious community; one which could 
collectively bargain with the authorities over two housing problems: the damaged 
communal toilets and rat infestation. The residents, according to Fernandez, had 
hitherto ‘crawled’ individually to the local HDB Area Office for help but had been 
repeatedly ignored. When she first visited the 1-room homes, the children had rudely 
called her ‘Bang Kali’ (Hokkien corruption of ‘Bengali’), but Fernandez and her 
volunteers eventually convinced the adults that they were sincerely trying to help the 
residents solve their own sanitation and hygiene problems. She organised nightly 
meetings of residents, where men, and women, who were frequently flat-bound and 
most badly affected by the toilet and rat problems, actively participated in the 
discussions. Fernandez’s efforts were successful – the toilets were repaired and the 
rats removed – but this autonomous demonstration of ‘people’s power’ startled the 
authorities. The HDB Area Office accused her of trying to belittle their efforts in the 
eyes of the public and warned that her name was ‘on the Prime Minister’s desk’. 
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  422Harassment of the Community Service Project by government officials followed. 
Plainclothes police once interrupted a meeting to check the residents’ identification 
cards, before telling Fernandez, ‘See, Sister, they can use you. They are communists 
[members of the Barisan Sosialis]’. In 1970, Fernandez, weakened by a persistent 
injury, left the project, which died a natural death.
91 
 
  The absence of a vibrant community which extended beyond simple gestures 
of good neighbourliness was most clearly exemplified in acts of what the authorities 
termed vandalism and anti-social behaviour committed in the estate’s public spaces. 
The kampong’s public spaces had been intrinsic to everyday life, being either an 
extension of the wooden house or a publicly-sanctioned, natural point of social and 
economic activity. By contrast, the HDB estate’s public spaces were typically 
socially engineered and planned, according to a geometric order, and consequently 
much less deeply embedded in social life.
92 Urination in the lifts was, for example, 
particularly prevalent in Bukit Ho Swee, Kallang and MacPherson estates in the 
1960s and 1970s. In the former, Blocks 2 and 4 experienced numerous cases of 
urination in lifts daily. The reason was not, as the HDB initially believed, the 
absence of a public toilet, for when the Board built them, the toilets themselves 
became the targets of vandals, with their cisterns damaged, wash basins broken, taps 
stolen, and the water in the toilets used illegally by hawkers. To the unsavoury smell 
of urine in the lifts was then added the stench of unflushed feces in the latrines, since 
people continued to use the squat pans, particularly unbearable for families living 
near the toilets. The HDB, admitting the experiment as a ‘total failure’, demolished 
the toilets. The Board blamed the problem on children and ‘pranksters’, and 
‘squatters and fire victims’.
93 These were, as a national radio programme stated in 
1972, the people who needed more time to adjust to public housing.
94 In reality, the 
anti-social behaviour was a powerful sign of the social dislocation caused by having 
to move from a kampong into a high-rise modernist housing estate, a place where 
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  423nobody was prepared to accept communal responsibility in maintaining the estate’s 
public spaces. 
 
‘Tong Kor’: Work and Resignation to Poverty 
 
Despite its modern façade, Bukit Ho Swee Estate remained a low-income 
and economically-marginalised community as it had been during the kampong era 
prior to the 1961 inferno. The HDB’s 1969 household survey found that 44% of the 
estate’s households were earning an average monthly income of $200 or less, 
compared to the national average of 32%, with 952 out of 1,396 income-earners in 
the estate employed as labourers and transport, production and service workers. In 
the same survey, the percentage of households in Bukit Ho Swee who did not own 
the following luxury items was higher than the national average: radio, television 
and telephone (50% vs. the national average of 36%); refrigerator and air-
conditioner (64% vs. 49%); and cars and vans (95% vs. 89%).
95 In 1970, only 36% 
of Bukit Ho Swee’s population aged 10 and older were economically active, 
compared to the national average of 47%. The estate’s employment figure was high 
(86%) but lower than the national average of 90%.
96 The HDB-commissioned study 
of its tenants in seven estates in 1972, which generally found the residents satisfied 
with public housing, ranked Bukit Ho Swee with the second lowest average monthly 
household income of only $258 in Singapore, against an average of $318 for all 
areas. The amount, however, represented an 18% increase from the household 
income before the families had moved into Bukit Ho Swee, against an increase of 
29% for all areas. The study also found the estate’s residents dissatisfied with their 
employment status, household expenditure, prices of goods, and contact with 
relatives and friends.
97  
 
In this early phase of the development of public housing, former Bukit Ho 
Swee fire victims often lived at the margins of society. Having lost most of their 
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  424worldly possessions in the 1961 inferno and frequently lacking a regular source of 
income, they commonly incurred rent arrears. These families experienced repeated, 
frustrating encounters with HDB officials attempting to recover the arrears and in 
extreme cases, taking action to evict them for continued non-payment.
98 A family 
allocated a temporary 2-room flat at Kim Tian Road in June 1961 sank into arrears 
when the male breadwinner fell ill and lost his job. The family accumulated arrears 
over a six-month period before quitting the tenancy. By 1972, the widow of the 
deceased, then working as an odd-job labourer, was still unable to repay the 
arrears.
99 Another family, allocated a temporary flat in Queenstown in the same year, 
also failed to settle their arrears after the male breadwinner was arrested for crime 
and given three prison sentences. The family subsequently moved into a 1-room 
emergency flat at Tiong Bahru Road for two and a half years. When the wife passed 
away in 1968, the children were sent to a home, and by 1971, the arrears were 
deemed not recoverable.
100 Another fire victim, a part-time lorry-driver living in a 1-
room unit in Queenstown, terminated his tenancy after only six months and moved 
into an attap house in Kampong Henderson, where the HDB rent collectors pursued 
him, until this dwelling was demolished and he then became untraceable.
101 
 
Other families simply abandoned their emergency flats when the HDB 
instituted action to evict them for not paying long-standing arrears. This forced 
mobility to seek affordable housing, while seemingly similar to low-income Chinese 
families changing residence in the 1950s, was now taking place within the closely-
circumscribed public housing sector. In several dramatic cases, former fire victim 
families which lost their breadwinners suddenly vacated their homes without 
notifying the HDB. A resident, evicted from a 1-room flat at Jalan Bukit Ho Swee in 
1965 for continued non-payment of arrears, fled repeatedly from the Board’s rent 
collectors; his last known address was a wooden house in Jurong, before he vanished, 
permanently, from the reach of the housing officials.
102 A family living in a 2-room 
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  425flat at Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, already in arrears for four years, abruptly ‘abandoned’ 
the premises in 1966 after the HDB took action to evict them; the Board traced the 
family to a wooden house at Carey Road but they also disappeared from the official 
gaze.
103 Another family quit their 1-room flat in the same area and was also traced to 
a wooden dwelling at Carey Road, which now served as a refuge of sorts for 
families displaced from public housing. The 1968 fire, however, obliterated this 
family’s wooden house and any trace of their final whereabouts.
104  
 
By 1980, the percentage of Bukit Ho Swee’s economically active population 
had risen to 56%, with 96% in employment, figures similar to the national 
averages.
105 This was helped in large measure by the expansion of the nation’s 
industrialisation programme in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
106 There was, in 
particular, a rising level of female employment over time. In 1970, nearly three-
quarters of both the economically active and employed persons in Bukit Ho Swee 
were male.
107 By 1990, however, two-fifths of the estate’s economically active 
population were women.
108 The greater female participation in the workforce 
underlined the emergence of the nuclear family as an economic unit. Women’s 
chances of finding employment were constantly improving at this time. In 1970, 
only 77% of economically active women in Singapore were employed but the figure 
a decade later was 97%.
109 By 1990, in two-fifths of the married couples in 
Singapore, both the husband and wife were working, with an average household 
income of $3,557, much higher than incomes when only the husband or wife was 
working ($1,778 and $1,171 respectively).
110  Nevertheless, female economic 
participation was lower in Bukit Ho Swee, where women continued to comprise the 
bulk of economically inactive persons, accounting for two thirds in both 1970 and 
1990, mostly as homemakers.
111  
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Plate 9.11: Mothers and their children socialising in the day in the open space behind Block 
48, Beo Crescent, c. 1980 (Courtesy of Anne Lim). 
 
The occupations traditionally held by Bukit Ho Swee’s residents were 
generally low-paying and only began to change for the better in the 1980s. In 1970, 
nearly half of the working population were labourers or production and transport 
workers.
112 Two decades later, that figure had fallen to a quarter.
113 But the 
percentage of professionals and technicians living in the estate rose slowly from 5% 
in 1970 to only 13% in 1990.
114 By 1990, the real household income in Singapore 
had doubled within a decade. However, the average household income in Bukit Ho 
Swee was $2,479, lower than the national average of $3,076 and nearly a quarter 
lower than the average for all Chinese households at $3,213.
115 The Member of 
Parliament’s ‘Meet the People’ sessions were frequently inundated with requests 
pertaining to employment, hawking, and housing and rent.
116 The need to maintain a 
steady income for the regular payment of rent produced tremendous stress on flat-
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  427dwellers employed in casual work. Soh Boon Quee, a daily-rated worker living in a 
1-room flat in Tiong Bahru, stated, 
 
Living in the flat, the pressure was very great. We didn’t earn much 
so there was the pressure of paying the rent, because my pay was 
daily-rated. I worked initially as an electrician, then when I was in 
my 30s, I did casual work in a shipyard. I tell people that for five 
years when I was working, I never saw the sun! Because I was 
working from about 5 am to 11 pm.
117 
 
Recent research has highlighted the economic marginalisation of non-
English literate Chinese factory workers in Singapore in the 1980s.
118 In 1980, four-
fifths of the estate’s population aged 10 and above were literate in at least one 
language, slightly under the national average of 82%. Two fifths could read and 
write in English (higher than the national average of 35%), the language of 
administration and business, but a third were literate only in Chinese, while a fifth 
were illiterate.
119 In 1990, the literacy rate in Bukit Ho Swee was 84%, with the 
English-literate population increasing to 45% of the total. Still, 37% were only 
Chinese literate, while 16% were illiterate.
120 The proportion of literate men was 
consistently greater than that of women; within the illiterate group, more than two-
thirds were women in both the censuses of 1980 and 1990.
121 The level of education 
among residents of the estate also improved slowly. In 1980, 43% of Bukit Ho 
Swee’s population less school-going students had no formal education, compared to 
the national figure of 35%. Slightly more than half of the estate’s population had a 
primary or secondary education but only 1% had a tertiary education.
122 In 1990, a 
quarter of the population lacked a formal education, but nearly three quarters still 
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  428had only a primary or secondary education, with a mere 5% having obtained a 
tertiary education.
123 
 
This growing English economic and literacy divide was not lost on the 
poorer Bukit Ho Swee residents. Tan Tiam Ho, who did not receive a formal 
education, recalled an impassioned debate he had with his Member of Parliament in 
the 1960s on the government’s selective family planning policy: 
 
At the time, the newspapers were saying that to have three children, 
the parents must be university graduates. I couldn’t read the 
newspapers but my friends told me that the graduates were supposed 
to have better minds. I couldn’t stand it when I heard about it. This 
was unreasonable. How come our minds were bad? So I told Seah 
Mui Kok, ‘I am not very educated, but can I ask you something? Are 
you growing fruit trees, durian, rambutan, and picking the better 
fruits?’ He asked what I meant. I told him that it was unfair to favour 
those who were graduates, since my children were also ready to go to 
university. I said that the number of children should be based on 
whether you are able to raise them. I said, ‘Fruits are fruits but people 
are not fruits’.
124 
 
The economic lives and life paths of Bukit Ho Swee’s residents consequently 
followed two different trajectories. From the late 1960s, knowledge of English 
became crucial in a job market which was dominated by two major work providers: 
the multinationals, and the civil service and government-linked corporations.
125 
Because the development of the state-sponsored high-wage, capital-intensive 
economy in Singapore in the 1970s discriminated between those who were educated 
and skilled and those who were not, the income gap between these two groups 
widened in the 1970s and early 1980s.
126 James Seah, despite living with his family 
of five in a 1-room emergency flat in Bukit Ho Swee, obtained a job in the HDB and 
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  429retired as a finance supervisor.
127  Likewise, Jimmy Yi was employed as a 
draughtsman in the Ministry of National Development,
128 while Oh Boon Eng 
became a surveyor and later a draughtsman with the City and Planning 
Department.
129 They were all English-educated individuals whose education and 
skills were relevant to a nation-state which was physically transforming itself, 
expressly in the housing sector. On the other hand, in a sociological study of 48 low-
income residents in 1993, the informants expressed their condition of economic 
hardship as ‘tong kor’, literally, ‘painful bitterness’. The Hokkien term represents 
the strong belief that they, and even their children, would remain trapped in 
perpetual poverty. They were keenly aware of suffering deprivations which were 
inter-connected: a constant shortage of money, a lack of literacy in English, and an 
absence of a supportive social network of kin and friends.
130 As an informant told 
me, the living standards of the younger generation in the estate had improved but 
those of their parents had largely remained unchanged.
131 The modern housing, in 
short, had not to any meaningful extent improved the lives of those who had once 
lived in ‘slums of hope’. What had changed, evidently, was an increasing self-
awareness of and resignation to poverty in the midst of plenty in the 1980s, a belief 
in ‘终身注定’ (‘life is fated’).  
 
While generally Bukit Ho Swee Estate was a low-to-middle income area, its 
1-room flats continued to constitute a distinct social world where the difficulty of 
living with chronic economic marginalisation in modern Singapore was most acute. 
Although their children, if they obtained education and skills, could potentially 
transcend the parents’ economic plight, many occupants of 1-room flats found the 
Singapore dream of material achievement and family bliss unattainable. In general, 
families residing in 1-room flats in Singapore frequently suffered from the stress of 
irregular incomes, rent arrears and the difficulty of approaching housing officials for 
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  430help on these issues.
132 A study of such low-income residents in Bukit Merah Estate 
in the early 1970s discovered ‘serious social and psychological problems’ such as 
diminished contact with one’s social support network, and increased stress and 
health issues.
133 By the late 1990s, elderly, poorly-educated, economically-inactive, 
and low-skilled workers were still disproportionately represented among tenant 
households in HDB flats in Singapore.
134  
 
The government’s upgrading programme largely bypassed the 1-room flats 
of Bukit Ho Swee. The one ‘improvement’ accomplished for such housing was the 
conversion, in 1971, of the 904 1-room emergency flats at Jalan Bukit Ho Swee into 
384 self-contained 2-room units. The project, however, was poorly planned with 
little regard for the inconveniences inflicted on the residents. When the conversion 
work began suddenly without prior notice, more than half of the families were still 
residing in the flats because alternative housing was either too expensive or located 
too far away. The residents of Block 3 consequently had to endure many days of 
constant din and dust. As construction workers smashed down the dividing walls 
between the 1-room units to create a 2-room flat, they frightened sleeping babies and 
forced families to take their meals outside their homes.
135 When educated residents 
began to complain to the press about the inhospitable renovation conditions, the 
HDB hastily stopped the conversion and promised to first rehouse the families in 
flats at Ganges Avenue due for completion in early July.
136 The local authorities 
sought to placate the residents by organising a ‘noise pollution free’ campaign in the 
estate.
137 Most of the remaining 1-room flats in the estate were subsequently 
scheduled for demolition either in the early 1980s or the late 1990s. The government 
refused in 1981 to further upgrade self-contained 1-room units in Singapore, because, 
since these flats were pending demolition or conversion within the decade, 
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  431upgrading only meant that ‘more money is going down the drain’.
138 Basic facilities 
which were necessary for elderly residents to live decently such as lifts and social 
and recreational amenities were consequently denied to the poorest residents. The 1-
room flats in Block 33, Taman Ho Swee, were not upgraded and ‘stuck out like a 
sore thumb’ in the estate in the late 1990s, sorely lacking social and recreational 
facilities which would have enabled elderly residents to establish informal support 
networks.
139 
 
 
Plate 9.12: The 1-room flats of Block 33, facing each other across a common corridor, 2006 
(Photograph by author). 
 
According to Roy Chan, a grassroots leader in Bukit Ho Swee, the 1-room 
flats frequently housed the dysfunctional families of the estate, where people 
quarrelled loudly with their family or neighbours and where the children frequently 
dropped out of school either by choice or economic necessity.
140 Physically, the 
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  432units were frequently filled with furniture and bags of old items which spilled out 
into the common corridor, forcing large families to share the small living space by 
sleeping on double-deck beds, and in the kitchens. Yap Kuai Yong, a housewife, her 
husband, Lai Chee Lung, a daily-rated construction worker, and her mother-in-law 
and three sons lived in a 1-room flat in Block 15; in the small unit, Yap and her 
youngest son slept on a bed, Lai and the other two boys on the floor, while the 
elderly lady slept in the kitchen.
141 As Angie Ng recalled, because her 1-room 
emergency unit was always poorly lit and ‘gloomy’, she tried to spend as much time 
outside the flat as possible after finishing her housework. She often visited her 
classmate’s 3-room flat in Taman Ho Swee which was ‘always so nice’ by 
comparison. Ng later moved into an improved 1-room flat at Block 79, Indus Road, 
only slightly larger, but which was, to her, ‘天阴之别’ (‘vast difference’). But when 
she returned ‘home’ one day to the site of the emergency housing, the block had 
been torn down and she simply sat down on the ground and cried.
142 
 
The communal toilets symbolised the dynamics of social life and hygiene in 
the emergency flats.
143 Long queues materialised each morning in front of the two 
toilets serving each floor of the housing block.
144 The toilets were not surprisingly 
insanitary areas; Lim You Meng, whose family had moved into an emergency flat in 
Block 1, remembered that once ‘we had a water shortage for nearly a whole day. So 
the toilet became very full and smelly but you still had to use it. You can’t imagine 
it’. Despite this insanitary inconvenience, Lim, then 13, was ‘very happy’ to be 
living in public housing, where ‘we had water and electricity and everything’.
145 But 
the communal toilets were not safe places for the women from the standpoint of 
sexual harassment, since the men would frequently use the women’s toilet if theirs 
was not working or occupied.
146 The toilets were also difficult to manage because 
residents often illegally washed their laundry there to save expenditure on public 
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  433utilities;
147 the residents who with their pails queued up daily for water in the 
communal toilets were in fact repeating the kampong ritual of collecting free water 
at the public standpipes.
148 At Jalan Membina, where the emergency flats had both 
communal toilets and kitchens, thefts of unattended cooked food and cooking 
utensils were common.
149  
 
Quah Geok Hong’s experience typifies the difficult negotiation of time and 
energy between family and work for a 1-room flat dweller. Divorced and lacking a 
formal education in the late 1960s, she brought up four children by herself in Block 
33. Quah had to take on different jobs through the years, peeling bean sprouts at 
home or working in factories, hotels or restaurants for part of the day. When out 
working, she asked her eldest son or a neighbour to take care of the young children. 
The good ‘neighbourliness’ among some 1-room residents stemmed, consequently, 
from pragmatic need, for, she explained, ‘How could I not interact with them? If 
anything happened to the kids, how could I cope?’ Despite her heavy workload, 
Quah also took loans from ah long and participated in hweis to make ends meet, 
particularly when she incurred arrears in the monthly payment for the flat, which she 
had purchased. Quah did so many jobs in the process of raising her family as a 
single parent that she felt, ‘if I was educated, I would be a manager now’. Life was, 
for her, very kor.
150 
 
The Estate beyond the Law 
 
The tensions inherent in socialising low-income public housing residents, 
including an ‘underclass’ living in the 1-room flats, into model citizens of an 
emergent state produced a difficult relationship between former kampong dwellers 
and the high modernist state. Iain Buchanan maintained as early as 1972 that Bukit 
Ho Swee and Kallang-Tanjong Rhu estates, which housed resettled kampong 
dwellers, had developed a ‘split personality’, where aspects of the semi-autonomous 
character of the kampong community persisted despite the regulations of public 
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  434housing life.
151 The authorities continued to view Bukit Ho Swee as a ‘dangerous 
place’. As early as 1962, when the HDB was considering tenders for building 
contracts on the fire site, Teh Cheang Wan, the Chief Architect, had viewed the area 
as ‘a bad site and full of gangsters’, where ‘[c]ontractors might allow some money 
for loss and theft of building materials and protection money’.
152 In the late 1960s, 
the staff of the Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre viewed the estate’s listless youths 
as ‘a bad lot’ who should not be living in the same blocks of 1-room emergency flats. 
Similarly, the police, the principals and teachers of the schools in the locality, and 
the staff of the HDB Area Office perceived the estate as a ‘bad area’, notorious for 
gangsterism.
153  
 
Conversely, the estate’s poorer and less-educated residents maintained a 
cautious, even fearful attitude towards officialdom. The residents of the 1-room flats 
were the most difficult to integrate into the social ethos of the developmental state; 
there were, in the early 1980s, still no representatives from these flats in the 
Residents’ Committees, compared to 77% and 11% from 3- and 4-room flats 
respectively.
154 Angie Ng recalled of police visits to the 1-room emergency flats:  
 
If the police came, they were even more afraid of us than we were 
afraid of them. They would say, ‘Is this thing happening here?’ Then 
everybody would say, ‘I don’t know, I don’t know’. Then the police 
would just say, ‘OK, OK’.
155 
 
The state’s attempts to control unlicensed hawking in the 1960s and early 
1970s highlighted the persistence of the informal sector in the economy and a semi-
autonomous ‘kampong way of life’ in Bukit Ho Swee Estate. Unlicensed hawkers 
were, as before the 1961 fire, drawn to such places of social and economic activity 
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as roads, carparks, pavements, bus stops, markets and schools. In the mid-1960s, the 
entrance to Bukit Ho Swee East and West primary schools attracted numerous 
hawkers, and pupils, in the early hours, at noon and in the evening.
156 In 1962, the 
HDB, viewing hawker food as insanitary and the stalls as hindering construction 
work and traffic flow in the estate, had decided to demolish these stalls while 
seeking to confine hawkers to designated sites as the longer-term solution.
157 The 
Board’s demolition policy was ultra vires,
158 for the work was the responsibility of 
the Public Works Department, but which it had deliberately undertaken in the 
interest of ‘preserving the good appearance of housing estates’.
159 The HDB’s 
unequivocal stance against unlicensed hawking went beyond even the current policy 
of the Ministry of Health which, while concerned about insanitary hawker practices, 
nonetheless understood that hawking was not simply a vocation of the unemployed. 
Instead it was an occupation which both offered the prospect of success in business 
and rendered a valuable social service by keeping the costs of living down.
160 
 
In 1963, however, the HDB’s Estates Manager flatly declared Bukit Ho 
Swee a ‘slum’ due to the prevalence of illegally-erected hawker stalls in the estate 
and called for the hawkers to be relocated to fixed pitches at Numbers 491-561 Jalan 
Bukit Ho Swee.
161 At this time, Tay Ah Chuan, having just completed his Chinese-
medium secondary education, had to help his father, a lowly-paid lorry driver, 
support a large family of eleven. Secret society members, who were in actual fact his 
former primary school mates, helped him build a wooden stall along Jalan Bukit Ho 
Swee to sell Chinese foodstuff. Situated along the road with Tay were the stalls of 
more than ten former classmates, also unemployed, who sold fruits and provisions. 
The HDB summarily relocated them to temporary covered pitches behind Block 11 
 
156 ME 2785/62, Memo from Principal, Bukit Ho Swee East School, to Superintendent, Markets and 
Hawkers Department, 23 Aug 1966; and Memo from Principal, Bukit Ho Swee East School, to 
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161 HB 433/46 Vol. II, Memo from Estates Manager, HDB, to CEO, HDB, 22 Oct 1963; and Memo 
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Plate 9.13: Block 48, Beo Crescent, at the edge of Bukit Ho Swee Estate, year unknown. 
Note the hawker stalls in the open spaces below the flats, and also the laundry hung out on 
bamboo poles to dry (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
 
Plate 9.14: Jalan Bukit Ho Swee, year unknown. A hawker crosses the road with his cart, 
while at the bottom left of the picture is a girl with a basket and her younger sister in toll, 
showing the important role older children play in the family (Courtesy of National Archives 
of Singapore). 
 
  437later that year before permanently moving them to the Beo Crescent market.
162 In 
July-September 1964, when the outbreak of race riots in Singapore weakened the 
Board’s surveillance against unlicensed hawkers, what the HDB termed 
‘unscrupulous persons’ erected unauthorised stalls in Bukit Ho Swee, Jalan 
Membina and Delta Road, and in other estates.
163 Two years later, the Ministry of 
Health and the Hawkers Department still experienced ‘great difficulty’ in removing 
unlicensed hawkers from HDB estates.
164 In 1967, the Board finally accepted the 
need to build hawker centres in its estates to cater to the residents’ shopping needs, 
and instructed local hawkers to obtain licenses and move into these centres.
165 Bukit 
Ho Swee Estate was consequently served by a number of officially-approved hawker 
sites: the Beo Crescent market, which had a wet market and dry goods stalls,  open-
air pitches at the concourse next to the market, covered pitches off Jalan Bukit Ho 
Swee, and hawker centres at the foot of Block 50 and elsewhere. At the Block 50 
hawker centre, for instance, priority of rent for the stalls was given to 66 persons 
who had previously been arrested for illegal hawking.
166  In 1973, the HDB 
established a central register of all authorised hawkers in Singapore in order to 
identify the outstanding unlicensed hawkers.
167 
 
  The official attempts to regularise hawking were carried out without 
consulting the hawkers themselves.
168 Consequently, they naturally provoked strong 
resistance. By 1963, the demolition of unauthorised stalls, undertaken often by the 
Work Brigade and led by an HDB Enforcement Officer, had become an ‘everyday 
affair’.
169 The following year, acid bombs were thrown at the Board’s officers in 
Tanjong Rhu Estate, while others were threatened or physically assaulted, leading 
the HDB to seek police protection and training of its officers in unarmed combat!
170 
That year, in response to the appearance of a demolition squad in Bukit Ho Swee, 
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  438‘crackers were fired for about 10 minutes to obstruct and deter the demolition, and in 
spite of adequate police protection a glass bottle was thrown in the midst of the 
demolition squad but fortunately without causing any injury’.
171  Shoppers 
frequently sympathised with the hawkers by helping them push their stalls away to 
safety during raids.
172 In 1965, there were still 255 hawker stalls in Bukit Ho Swee 
awaiting demolition.
173 Wang Ah Tee, a resident of Block 2 who had joined the 
Work Brigade, took part in the demolition operations, which were, as he explained, 
no less than miniature ‘wars’: 
 
In the morning, a lorry would take me to Geylang and Kallang with a 
parang and a hammer. If someone had set up an unauthorised hawker 
stall or an unauthorised house, I had to hack it down. I was very 
frightened because you could get beaten up. There was only a 
policeman accompanying us, three lorries of workers. We demolished 
hawkers stalls with our hammers. We finished work at 2 plus in the 
afternoon. The Work Brigade was messy, full of pai kia [‘gangsters’]. 
No choice, if you had work, you just had to do it.
174 
 
In 1973, the Board revealed that its officers were experiencing ‘a declining 
number of assault cases’ due to the presence of a police escort.
175 But this did not 
mean that the raids were successful; in fact the Ministry of Health viewed the 
‘periodic raiding on hawkers’ as ‘one of the worst possible systems of control of 
hawkers’, since sentinels organised by gangsters would ‘usually look out for the 
raiding and disappear before the raiding party arrived at the scene’, with the result 
that it was usually the old hawkers, who elicited the greatest public sympathy, who 
were detained. The Ministry consequently decided in 1969 that the raids be carried 
out in the afternoon between 3-6 am to ‘avoid adverse comments’ from the 
public.
176 Not surprisingly, hawker inspectors came to be infamously known to the 
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  439Chinese population as tey gu (‘earth bulls’), which stemmed from the high-handed 
manner in which they arrested old hawkers and destroyed their stalls.
177 
                                                
 
Underpinning the government’s hardline hawker policy was a pragmatic aim 
to eradicate the unlicensed hawking which had characterised work in late-colonial 
Singapore. This was part of the PAP’s plan to channel casual labour into regular 
factory work in order to accelerate the development of the industrialisation 
programme.
178 The constant raids and demolitions were consequently part of a 
structural attack on the occupation designed to make it less attractive to the low-
income population, which also included raising the fees for licenses and for using 
public utilities in hawker centres and shopping centres.
179 In 1970, Chua Sian Chin, 
the Minister of Health, denied that the new license fees, which required hawkers to 
pay the fees in lump sums for three months, were causing them undue hardship. 
Instead, he complained that many hawkers had turned down skilled and semi-skilled 
factory jobs at the government-sponsored Jurong Industrial Estate because the 
location was considered too far away.
180  
 
Consequently, the authorities’ hawker policy disadvantaged both hawkers 
and their clients. The HDB’s preoccupation with zoning space-use in the estate, 
which was indicative of the  high modernist philosophy of the late colonial Master 
Plan, separated hawkers from residential premises. Such planning, however, clashed 
with the deeply-embedded cultural role of hawkers in the community. In the early 
1970s, hawkers relocated from Block 27 in Jalan Bukit Ho Swee to the Beo Crescent 
concourse were suffering a 50% reduction in their daily earnings (from $5 to $2-3) 
and were struggling to support their families. They had to compete with stallholders 
in the adjoining market
  and follow a two-shift system which reduced their working 
hours; in contrast, when they had hawked their food and wares below Block 27, the 
residents could simply ask their children to purchase the food downstairs.
181 The 
determined campaign against unlicensed hawkers also removed a convenient source 
of inexpensive food for the residents. When the first permanent hawker centres were 
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  440built in the estate in the mid-1960s, Lee Soo Seong was amazed that ‘we must go so 
far to a hawker centre to eat?’
182 
 
Another illegal economic activity which persisted during the 1960s in the 
HDB estates was the pirate taxis. These unauthorised ‘cabs’ continued to ply along 
Havelock Road and were regarded by the principal of Bukit Ho Swee East School as 
a traffic menace for travelling ‘at excessive speed with a complete disregard for all 
traffic rules’.
183 The authorities, as they did with the hawkers, sought to register 
pirate taxi drivers. By the mid-1960s, the number of licensed taxis in Singapore had 
doubled from 1,559 in 1956 to 3,206 in 1965.
184 But the illegal taxis remained in 
demand throughout the decade, simply because they were faster and cheaper than 
buses. In 1965, there were an estimated 61,000 school children using at least 4,000 
pirate taxis, comparable to the figure in the colonial period.
185 When he was 16, Goh 
Soon Leng, who lived in a 1-room emergency flat in Bukit Ho Swee, worked for 
twelve years as an agent for pirate taxis which ran trips between Singapore and 
Kuala Lumpur; the syndicate, he said, received the protection of the secret 
societies.
186 
 
The official regulation of the use of public space in the estate drove 
unauthorised, informal economic activity into HDB flats and shops. Some families 
continued to keep a few chickens in the flat or, if they were living on the ground 
floor, in the open grass around the block, bringing them back to the flat only at 
night.
187 Other families sold tidbits, fruits, cooked noodles, or soft drinks at home, 
or charged their neighbours five cents to watch television in the flat, continuing the 
Chinese custom of combining residential and commercial space use.
188 Women 
would also sew clothes or did other piece-rated handicraft work at home. If not 
actually serving as a business premise, the flat could also be used for preparing food 
such as kan chia mee (‘noodles on a cart’) and cheng tng which would be sold at the 
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  441foot of the housing block. Others simply sold char bee hoon outside their flats.
189 In 
1969, the police raided a 3-room flat in Beo Crescent and arrested a Chinese 
labourer’s wife for organising chap ji ki activities in the house. The family was 
subsequently served with a notice to quit.
190  Chap ji ki operations were also 
clandestinely carried out at the back of the stalls at the Block 50 shopping centre.
191 
The  hwei, the informal system of rotating credit popular in the pre-HDB days, 
remained in popular demand among low-income families and was based in flats and 
shops.
192 A family residing in Block 22, who had illegally sublet their vacant 1-
room flat in the vicinity to a hawker, had to constantly avoid detection by the HDB’s 
Housing Inspectors.
193 Another family living in a 2-room flat, having lost its male 
breadwinner, also illicitly sublet a room to a tenant or as a gambling den.
194 
 
Using the residential premises for work and income was a risky venture 
which could result in one’s eviction from public housing. This could transform 
families only recently resettled in HDB housing into the ‘ghosts’ of the modern state 
as people without a registered home address. Such an example was a female fire 
victim who moved into a large 4-room unit at Ganges Avenue in late 1961. She was 
found guilty of using the flat as a gambling den and evicted in 1966; by 1971, her 
family had still not updated their address with the National Registration Office.
195 
Subletting one’s residence, a common practice in wooden house and shophouse 
dwellings, also carried the threat of eviction. A family allocated a 1-room 
emergency flat at Tiong Bahru Road who sublet the accommodation were evicted by 
the HDB and summarily abandoned their flat. The Board, trying to collect rent 
arrears from the family, were unable to trace them through the National Registration 
Office.
196  
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  442The flats of Bukit Ho Swee were also economically linked to the pig farming 
industry. Families commonly placed leftover food in a bucket outside their flat, 
which was collected daily for use as pig feed. In return, before the Lunar New Year, 
the swill collectors would give the families eggs or chickens.
197 Beh Swee Kim, the 
wife of Tan Tiam Ho, whose family had been fairly well-to-do before the 1961 fire, 
had to work as a swill collector for three hours a day to help make ends meet, 
stopping only when their children were old enough to work.
198 When Tan Beng 
Huat, whose father had passed away, was in Primary Six, he had to help his mother 
collect pig swill from the flats. It was a difficult experience for him, as he felt ‘a bit 
shy lah, sometimes shameful. They called the job “toh poon”. It was very shameful, 
the lowest class of job, like pouring shit’.
199  
                                                
 
The Gangs and the Socially Detached Youth 
 
The social underside of Bukit Ho Swee were its secret societies and socially-
detached youth. The former’s continued presence and influence in the estate put into 
perspective a somewhat different official claim that the building of HDB housing on 
the fire site had brought to an end the days of crime and gangsterism in the area. 
Administratively, it was easier for the police to find secret society members in a 
regulated housing estate than in a kampong but this did not fully resolve a basic 
societal problem which was essentially social and economic in nature. In fact, 
because the new housing estate had broken down the kampong’s secret society turfs, 
there were initially frequent gang clashes between members of different groups 
residing in the same housing blocks as new territories were being demarcated and 
established.
200 As a resident in the estate recalled, ‘There were fights almost every 
week. There were fewer fights before the fire’.
201 The two most powerful gangs in 
Bukit Ho Swee were Sio Leng Hor (‘Small Dragon and Tiger’) and ‘369’, splinter 
groups of the secret societies of the late colonial period.
202 They continued to collect 
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  443kua tau lui from hawkers and businesses in the estate, including the swill collectors. 
One coffeeshop owner had to pay $20-30 each time the gangsters visited.
203 
However, it appears that in the 1960s as in the kampong period, secret societies 
usually carried out criminal activities in HDB estates other than the one they lived in, 
and that estates with the most powerful secret societies were actually least likely to 
be disturbed by other gangsters.
204 
 
The secret societies continued to recruit from the socially disaffected youths 
of the estate, who, like their fathers before them, lived at the edge of the law. As 
long-time social worker Gerard Ee observed, ‘You can take the guy out of the gang 
but you cannot take the gang out of the guy’, concluding that Bukit Ho Swee’s 
youths were much more difficult to handle than those in other housing estates.
205 A 
study of gang members in Singapore in the late 1970s found that most of them were 
poorly-educated, had been employed in low-paying jobs as labourers and production 
and transport workers, and came from large families of five or more persons, whose 
parents were also working in low-paying jobs. These youths were also more timid 
and shy than male youths in general, and consequently joined secret societies for 
social association and protection. The crimes they committed were, in order of 
incidence, drug abuse, rioting, homicide, and armed robbery.
206 In Bukit Ho Swee, 
such youths commonly played truant from school or dropped out prematurely, 
committed acts of vandalism in public spaces and engaged in petty thefts of bicycles 
and motor vehicles.
207 They desired to leave the confined spaces of their emergency 
flats,
208 hanging around at the staircases and void decks of the housing blocks.
 209 
They could be found catching rats from the drains and burning them for fun in the 
daytime and chatting and drinking in small groups throughout the night.
210 As a 
former detached youth explained, their socially aggressive behaviour was an explicit 
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  444challenge directed against authority: in the community centres, for instance, ‘when 
other people were playing basketball, we played soccer, and when they played 
soccer, we played basketball. We did this deliberately’.
211 
 
The youth problem was manifest in a series of incidents in Bukit Ho Swee 
which occurred sporadically from the 1960s to the 1980s. In November 1965, a 
planned fight occurred involving ‘outsiders’ and male students from Bukit Ho Swee 
East, Bukit Ho Swee West and Havelock Primary School at the front gate of the East 
school.
212 Five days before the fight, the East school had discovered a stick and 
aerated water bottles hidden beside dustbins in the school compound and had alerted 
the police. Detectives questioned five pupils of the school and found them armed 
with a dagger, a screwdriver and a bread knife.
213 To the management, the schools 
of Bukit Ho Swee were located in a place fraught with social danger.
214 The 
principal of Bukit Ho Swee East had, before the fight, informed the Ministry of 
Education that the school was ‘situated in a very bad area’, citing instances of 
burglary at night in the school bookshop and canteen. Outsiders, the principal 
claimed, could easily gain access to the school by climbing up the big drains under 
the school fence.
215 In 1970, Bukit Ho Swee West likewise experienced acts of 
vandalism in the early morning and at night on its property,
216 including vulgar 
language in Chinese scrawled on walls aimed at the school and at a PAP minister.
217 
In 1973, ten Primary Six pupils of Bukit Ho Swee West were assaulted by three 
Hokkien-speaking youths armed with long wooden poles at nearby Tiong Bahru 
Park, for apparently no reason.
218 According to a former teacher of Bukit Ho Swee 
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  445Vocational School, there were also frequent fights involving the school’s students 
outside
’ incidents. But for all their bravado, Seah and his gang were afraid of the 
ang chia (‘red car’, referring to the riot truck) which would regularly patrol the 
estate: 
 
eat us just for fun. I remember once when I was coming home from 
                                                
 the school gate.
219 
 
Seah Chee Heng, whose parents had moved into the estate after the 1961 fire, 
was born in 1962 in Bukit Ho Swee. His life centered around social and economic 
deprivations typical among the detached youth; he did not finish his primary 
education and became a construction painter when he was 15 years old. Because of 
the construction boom, the occupation of building painter was a niche for lowly-
educated and unskilled youths like him, paying $50-60 a day, which he considered 
good wages. As a youth, Seah was ‘curious’ and sought ‘thrills’, and consequently 
ran afoul of the law, committing robbery, taking drugs and stealing cars. Heroin, 
Seah recalled, was easy to obtain in the 1970s, for ‘your friends could help you buy 
and you could help them buy’, and there were several other young people in his 
housing block taking the drug. He joined the Sio Leng Hor because it was ‘cool’, 
and because the members could help one another when they were bullied; it was not, 
he insisted, to harass others. The gang collected protection money, controlled 
syndicates of ah long and frequently participated in petty fights over women and 
‘staring
 
This was a large vehicle like a fire engine. We were not afraid of 
police cars but we were afraid of the ang chia. They were very shady. 
If they saw that we had tattoos, they would catch us, put a bag over 
our head and beat us up in the truck. So whenever we saw a red truck, 
we would just flee. After that, they would just release us, they would
b
school, I saw a red truck, and I just ran. But they never caught me.
220 
 
The failure of socially detached youths in Bukit Ho Swee to acquire the 
education and skills which would enable them to break free of the vicious cycle of 
poverty was rooted in their ambivalent, conflicted roles in the family and in the 
 
219 Author’s interview with Granville Danker, 8 May 2007. 
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  446school. The pupils of Bukit Ho Swee were being pulled in different directions, on 
the one hand by school staff who wanted to mould them into model citizens and on 
the other by their parents and peers whose social, economic and cultural values 
belonged more to the kampong and to ‘Old Singapore’. As a social worker in the 
estate wrote in the early 1980s, the poorer and less educated parents, in raising their 
children, were torn between ‘intermingled hope and despair, joy and sorrow [and] 
love and indifference’.
221  Many low-income parents simply subscribed to the 
traditional view that ‘so long as my children are better educated than me, it’s okay 
already’.
222 Disagreements between these parents and the school management over 
their charges’ education reflected this severe tension. In 1973, a parent of a Primary 
Six student in Bukit Ho Swee West, submitted a complaint to the Ministry of 
Education, protesting that his son had been ‘forced’ to repeat ‘without any notice or 
reason given’. When he approached the principal for an explanation, the father 
claimed, he was given a ‘very rude reply of “take it or leave it”, due to the fact that 
he was ‘illiterate and retarded in speech’.
223 Conversely, the pressure of blue-collar 
work was frequently too exacting for parents to adequately supervise their children; 
as one father said in frustration about a son who was habitually in trouble with the 
law, ‘[E]very day and night, I work until die, drive lorry, feed all of you, still no 
use….That good for nothing, all he does is find trouble’. These parents considered 
the problem of their delinquent children as bo bian (‘hopeless’).
224 Education was 
consequently not high on many low-income parents’ minds. In fact, while the 
estate’s parents had been concerned with matters of employment and housing, they 
were less interested in the building of schools in the locality.
225 Even in the 1990s, 
there were still cases of parents in Bukit Ho Swee who, because of pressing financial 
concern
                                                
s, had not registered their children for primary education.
226 
 
For many children from low-income, Chinese-speaking families, school was 
a difficult initial experience which they did not always succeed in overcoming. Qian 
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  447Hua, born in 1957 and living in a 1-room emergency flat at Boon Tiong Road in the 
1960s, studied at Bukit Ho Swee West. Her father had refused to enroll her in an 
English school because, he felt, she would become ‘more Baba’ (‘Westernised’). 
When Qian Hua attended her first lessons, she did not even know Mandarin because 
her family only used Hokkien at home. She could not write her own name in 
Mandarin or respond when the teacher called her name, which was true for many of 
her classmates.
227 Yeo Seok Thai (born 1967) and his family of 14 lived briefly in a 
1-room flat in Bukit Ho Swee before shifting to a 3-room unit in the same estate. He 
dropped out of Bukit Ho Swee East prematurely at the age of 13 after performing 
poorly and arguing with his teachers. As Yeo explained, the common thinking of 
low-income, poorly-educated Chinese parents towards their children was, ‘As long 
as you 
roles as children and young adults, many youths, as an unemployed 
                                                
are alive, you are lucky already’.
228  
 
The economic structure of the low-income family also quickly drew children 
and youths into the household economy. Girls in particular were likely to be tied 
down at home to carry out chores or take care of their younger siblings.
229 When 
Lee Sor Huay intimated that she was afraid to go to school, her parents did not press 
her but allowed her to spend her teenage years at home preparing noodles for their 
hawker business.
230 Children like Soh Guat Soon, the son of the widow Quah Geok 
Hong,
231 also sold newspapers and snacks like curry puffs, chee cheong fun, soon 
kway, chai tow kway, and otah along the corridors of the flats, or stayed home to 
help their parents with handicraft work, such as pasting stickers for the tikam tikam 
game.
232 Whilst still in school, Yeo Seok Thai had began selling curry puffs in the 
housing blocks, making a profit of three cents a piece.
233 These street-wise kids 
engaged in forms of informal work consequently did not have a genuine childhood 
but were forced to grow up quickly.
234 Their lack of a cogent individual identity 
attracted them to secret societies, which readily provided one. Straddling at once 
different 
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  448adolescent related in 1970, consequently felt strong, helpless anger towards their 
parents
 
 mother has to work at the godown. My eldest 
rother is another bully like my father. My second eldest brother is in 
 a tour of the emergency housing 
block.
236 As the project’s supervisor surmised, ‘There’s a middle class person inside 
called ‘NC’, provides another telling insight into the social problems of detached 
: 
My father is unemployed. He cannot work as he is sick. He is 
hopeless. I ran away because I was fed up with him as he punished 
me unreasonably. Because of him, I left school to work to help the 
family out. Even my
b
National Service.
235 
 
A social work study in 1970 of detached youths living in the 1-room 
emergency flats of Jalan Bukit Ho Swee highlighted the factors which condemned 
them to the social and economic margins of modern Singapore society. The youths 
were Chinese-educated and worked in daily-rated, low-paying jobs as labourers, 
construction workers, painters, hawkers, trishaw-riders, and unskilled factory 
workers. They inherited their parents’ long-standing distrust of authority and 
disliked what they viewed as constant ‘harassment’ by police in the estate. They also 
possessed an acute lack of self-belief due to their limited education. However, when 
warmly engaged by the authorities, the youths showed ‘a radical change of their 
concept of self’ and successfully took on the role of ‘a donor in their community’. 
They had been banned previously from Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre for 
unruly behaviour, but when allowed to return in the course of the study, they 
organised a basketball team and showed commendable restraint in their games. They 
subsequently met the Member of Parliament, Seah Mui Kok, discussing with him 
the community’s problems and taking him on
everyone [of the youths], waiting to get out’.
237 
 
  Between the 1970s and 1990s, the work of the Bukit Ho Swee Community 
Service Project, based at Nazareth Centre at Block 44, which the locals simply 
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sented youths such as Seah Heng Chee 
when they got into trouble with the law.
243 
category were, according to Lim, ‘almost always inviting conflict’, not to inflict 
                                                
youth.
238 Although there was apprehension among some parents and youths that NC 
was  hong kau (‘Christian’),
239  former youths involved in its activities were 
unanimous in denying any attempts to convert them to Catholicism.
240 Following 
Sister Sabine Fernandez’s abortive attempt to organise the 1-room dwellers, the 
Community Service Project was revived in 1977 as a social service project for 
children and youths, involving them in sports and games, tuition and literacy classes 
and field-trips. Such a project was deemed acceptable by the authorities. NC became 
a place where both listless youths and secret society members gravitated towards 
one way or another. The pai kia viewed NC’s premises at Blocks 26 and 44 as 
sanctuaries from the police or hid their parangs nearby in preparation for secret 
society clashes.
241 NC’s appeal was that its activities targeted specifically what one 
former detached youth called the estate’s ‘di siao siao’ (‘mischievous’) kids.
242 One 
of the volunteers was a lawyer who repre
 
Former NC volunteer Anne Lim wrote in 1991 of the ‘street children’ of 
Bukit Ho Swee as belonging to the category of ‘failed’ and ‘misunderstood’ people 
who were part of the ‘old Chinese’ society before the 1961 fire and who lived ‘at the 
fringe of society’. At NC, there were, she found, two different groups of youngsters 
– one inclined towards learning in the tuition and literacy classes, and another 
seeking to disrupt them, by singing loudly outside the classroom, throwing ‘water 
bombs’ at the staff, or hurling car tyres against the walls. The youths in the second 
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Plate 9.15: The children of ‘NC’ at Block 44, Beo Crescent, c. 1980 (Courtesy of Anne Lim). 
 
 
Plate 9.16: In the foreground, walking away from ‘NC’, are the ‘street children’ of Bukit Ho 
Swee Estate, c. 1980 (Courtesy of Anne Lim). 
 
genuine harm but to obtain the attention of those in the other ‘world’. These youths, 
like their parents, were resigned to their peripheral social and economic status in 
society; of their studies, they said, ‘Some [students] sure must fail. Like us lah. We 
are the bodoh [‘stupid’] one’. As Lim surmised in a poem on the ‘street children’, 
‘you attack to defend, you shout your anger and cry your frustration’, actions which 
  451belied ‘the plea behind the cry, the frustration behind the anger’.
244 For Yeo Seok 
Thai, who learnt his English at NC and was one of the kids who infuriated Lim and 
other NC staff, such loud and superficially aggressive acts were a way of attempting 
to make contact with people who offered them respect and hope:  
 
The first thing was that we wanted to make fun of them. They 
couldn’t speak a word of Hokkien so we made fun of them until they 
were furious. In the end, we became friends. You needed to have 
conflict before you became friends. I felt very close to NC. You 
looked at them and you felt that you could get close to them. If you 
saw a policeman there, you would feel, kua liao du lan [‘If I see them, 
I get very angry’]. Because the people at NC were not looking for 
trouble with us, we felt very close with them. And you were only a 
child and yet an adult was listening to you, so you felt very proud.
245 
 
Tan Beng Huat was also an active volunteer at NC. He studied in the 
English-medium Tiong Bahru Secondary School, where his involvement in the 
Scout movement inspired him to help his own community and to cultivate a sense of 
identity among the local youth. Tan began volunteering with the Bukit Ho Swee 
Children Club in 1976 and later started a Detached Youth Club, where he organised 
trips and ‘joy-rides’ which were very popular for the youngsters. Taking up the job 
of a daily-rated construction worker, an occupation held by many of the youth, he 
soon got to know them well. They, Tan explained, worked and lived for the moment, 
with little thought of saving their earnings or settling down in a family. They were 
poorly educated, who ‘when they open their mouth, only vulgarity, and when they 
close their mouth, vulgarity’. The youths also frequently abused drugs such as 
heroin, upjohn, MX, and tranquilisers, or sniffed thinner, and were repeatedly 
undergoing drug rehabilitation. Tan’s volunteer work was fraught with great 
difficulty, as the youth continued to be pulled between rehabilitative and criminal 
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  452influences. He started boxing and carpentry classes and a liondance troupe for the 
youths but all of them were eventually penetrated by secret society elements.
246 
 
By the late 1990s, the character of the youth problem in Bukit Ho Swee had 
changed in form but remained deeply social and economic in nature. It was still 
firmly rooted in the structure of the low-income family and its uncertain place in the 
community and within the wider framework of a progressive, regulated nation-state. 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate’s population had consistently been overwhelmingly Chinese 
with a slight shift occurring only at the turn of the century. In 1970, the Chinese 
comprised 97% of the estate’s population,
247 and in 2000, the figure was still 
90%.
248 There were always fewer Malays than Indians living in the estate, even after 
ethnic quotas were introduced in flats in 1980 to achieve a proportionate balance of 
the ethnic groups in public housing. However, the entry of more ethnic minority 
families into the estate in the 1990s, many of whom were downsizing to smaller flats 
due to financial difficulty, particularly during the post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
economic downturn, brought about a new dimension to the social and economic 
problems still extant in Bukit Ho Swee.
249 There was, as Beyond Social Services 
observed, a self-perpetuating ‘culture of delinquency’, with not only the youths but 
their families also ‘deeply entrenched in delinquency (opiate delinquency in 
particular)’. Malay youths formed a disproportionately large percentage of Beyond’s 
clientele, of whom, significantly, three-quarters were living in the rental flats. The 
socially detached youths continued to lack parental supervision and to roam the 
streets, skip classes and abuse drugs. They still stole bicycles, broke into hawker 
stalls at night,
250  and were recruited from schools, entertainment centres and 
shopping malls into the secret societies.
251 Some of the liondance troupes in Bukit 
Ho Swee, comprised largely of Malay youths, were fronts for secret societies. The 
troupes provided both income and identity for the youth, who frequently skipped 
lessons to take part in performances.
252 
 
                                                 
246 Author’s interview with Tan Beng Huat, 30 Apr 2007. 
247 Arumainathan, Census of Population, 1970: Interim Release, p. 2. 
248 Leow, Census of Population 2000, p. 39. 
249 BHSSSC, Annual Report 1998, p. 52; and Annual Report 1999, p. 23. 
250 BHSSSC, Annual Report 1999, p. 33. 
251 BHSSSC, Annual Report 1997, pp. 15-54. 
252 Author’s interview with Leela Kwek, 2 May 2007. 
  453  The relative balance of the forces of change and continuity in Bukit Ho Swee 
Estate calls for a longer-term assessment of the actual impact of the 1961 inferno on 
the social development of Singapore. To some extent, the social and economic 
problems which persisted in the estate after the fire can rightfully be regarded as 
‘birth pangs’ of the nation-state and of an ambitious project in mass housing. The 
emergency flats, unlicensed hawkers, pirate taxis, and unauthorised uses of flats 
were short-term problems which were forcefully resolved as the official net drew 
tighter on the previously semi-autonomous ways of life in the estate. For example, 
since the late 1960s, formerly unlicensed hawkers such as Tay Ah Chuan, Tan Nam 
Sia and Tay Bok Chiu have become (and still remain) officially regularised vendors 
at the Beo Crescent market, indicating how a previously marginal occupational 
group has been successfully integrated into the economic and social fabric of the 
high modernist state. 
 
However, Bukit Ho Swee’s persistent ‘underside’, exemplified by the 
continued economic and educational marginalisation of families, particularly those 
in the 1-room flats, and the social detachment of youths from mainstream society 
and their frequent involvement in secret society activity, suggests that the central 
problem was not the lack of proper administration and social welfare but, rather, the 
social costs and repercussions of the relentless pursuit of progress itself. From this 
perspective, the Bukit Ho Swee fire was more successful in enabling the PAP 
government to rehouse former kampong dwellers in regulated public housing and 
socialising them to a disciplined way of life in tandem with the emergence of a high 
modernist state, than in redistributing the social and economic fruits of that 
economic development to the poorest group in society. A clear sign of the triumph 
of this political hegemony is that, even today, the economically marginalised 
continue to acknowledge the government’s role in providing clean, modern shelter 
for them while blaming their tong kor on predestination, or themselves. 
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Plate 9.17: Author on a swing at Taman Ho Swee, as bare-chested boys play in the field 
behind, c. 1970s. In the background is Block 29, Havelock Road (Photograph by Loh Tian 
Ho). 
 
 
Plate 9.18: Author at a playground just outside Block 28, Jalan Membina, the site of the 
emergency housing built after the 1959 Kampong Tiong Bahru Fire, c. 1970s. The block 
had the ‘pointed’ rooftop characteristic of HDB emergency housing (Photograph by Loh 
Tian Ho). 
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  As a footnote to this history of Bukit Ho Swee Estate, I shall briefly outline my 
family’s story here. My parents married in 1969 and lived with Ah Kong and Tua 
Pui Ma in their 3-room flat in Block 29, Havelock Road. I was born in 1972 and 
followed two years later by my sister. In 1975, our family of four moved out of chap 
lak lau (‘16 storeys’, the Hokkien name for Block 29) into a 1-room rental flat in 
Block 28, Jalan Membina, the site of the emergency housing built after the 1959 
Kampong Tiong Bahru fire. So began my experience of living in 1-room housing 
which preoccupied my youthful mind. Two years later, we shifted to an improved 1-
room flat, which the Chinese called ‘jit bang bua tia’ (‘one bedroom and half a 
living room’) in Block 14 in the same area, and then on National Day, 1980, into 
another, albeit lower-rent, improved 1-room flat in Block 79, Indus Road. For 
reasons then unclear to me, I was acutely embarrassed by the housing, which was, to 
me, a tangible sign of our ‘poverty’. I kept the fact from my classmates and 
repeatedly urged my parents to obtain a larger home. But my father was a daily-rated 
goo li (‘labourer’) and my mother a housewife, although we sometimes did 
handicraft work at home for additional income. But despite the humble 
accommodation, where my parents slept on blankets laid over the linoleum in the 
living room and my sister and I on a double-deck bed in a partitioned corner, I spent 
many happy days at Havelock Primary School. Although I still vividly recall the 
burning embarrassment on my face when a classmate visited my home and said, 
‘Your house so small ah?’ The school, as opposed to the flat, was the pivotal centre 
of my life. I knew blissfully nothing of how Block 79 was, as Yeo Seok Thai later 
told me, hock chap (‘complicated’), where low-income families struggled with debt 
and their children ran afoul of the law.
253 Instead, I graduated well from Havelock 
and enrolled in River Valley High School at Kim Seng Road, part of the relief centre 
for the victims of the 1961 inferno. It was in the midst of my secondary education, 
on 4 June 1989, the day of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, that my family finally 
left the locality, having purchased a 3-room flat in Yishun New Town in north 
Singapore. This, I thought happily, was the true meaning of progress. I never knew 
about the great kampong fire or thought about returning to Bukit Ho Swee. 
 
253 Author’s interview with Yeo Seok Thai, 3 May 2007. Chapter 10 
Memory, Myth and Identity 
 
There is a traditional Chinese cobbler in his 70s working in the Tanjong 
Katong area. On the sides of his shoe rack containing the tools of his trade are 
photographs of historical Singapore, including street scenes in the interwar years and 
the 1964 communal riots. There is also an image of the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire, 
showing men hauling cupboards away from the towering inferno, while a throng of 
onlookers moved forward in the opposite direction. One of the latter was Ng Hoot 
Seng, the cobbler, who had gone along to see the spectacle. The fire, he told me, was 
impossible to fight because the wooden houses were too closely built together, and 
there had been unsubstantiated rumours as to its cause. When I asked why he had the 
photograph displayed on the rack, Ng said it was to let his customers know about 
Singapore’s history.
1 
 
 
Plate 10.1: Ng Hoot Seng, 2006. The picture of the Bukit Ho Swee fire is on the lower part 
of the rack (Photograph by author). 
 
The intertwining of history and personal memory which surfaced in my 
chance encounter with Ng provides a useful starting point in this chapter for the 
                                                 
1 Author’s interview with Ng Hoot Seng, 18 Oct 2006. 
  457crucial discussion of the three myths of the Bukit Ho Swee fire and their relationship 
with memory and identity. The focus here is on the inferno’s social impact on the 
identity and collective memory of the fire victims and of Singaporeans more 
generally. Like the onlookers walking towards the conflagration in 1961, later-day 
Singaporeans have similarly been drawn towards the event. The chapter traces the 
People’s Action Party government’s creation of a powerful myth about the nature of 
the calamity, in which the hitherto ‘inert community’ of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee 
rose triumphantly, like the proverbial phoenix, from the ashes of the fire to be 
transformed in the modern era; a meta-social narrative generally accepted by the fire 
victims and the public at large. Nevertheless, co-existing in tension with the myth 
are memories of traditional kampong life which the fire victims recall with fond 
nostalgia, and which also mythologises the past as much as the official discourse.
2 
The nostalgia for the kampong, significantly, reflects both an attitude of deep 
ambivalence towards the rapid societal transformation of Singapore undertaken in 
the 1960s and a consequent sense of personal loss among elderly Singaporeans of 
their own role, identity and agency in the high modernist state. Another more covert 
form of the social memory of the fire shares with the nostalgia an implicit criticism 
of the present but differs in being discussed only in social contexts removed from 
official scrutiny. This perception of the past is what I call the unwritten ‘counter-
myth’ of the 1961 inferno – the rumours of government-inspired arson. The rumours 
that continue to persist are, really, ‘hidden transcripts’.
3 They are the last signs of an 
unauthorised, semi-autonomous way of life that was prevalent in the urban 
kampongs in the 1950s, still confronting and countering the officially-sanctioned 
PAP myth over the meaning of high modernity in Singapore. Both the nostalgia and 
the rumours signify the Singaporeans’ ongoing complex and ambivalent relationship 
with the PAP government and the uncertainty of their identity as citizens in the high 
modernist city-state. 
 
                                                 
2 K. K. Seet, ‘Last Days at Wak Selat: The Demise of a Kampong’, in Brenda S. A. Yeoh & Lily 
Kong (eds), Portraits of Places: History, Community and Identity in Singapore (Singapore: Times 
Editions, 1995), p. 219. 
3 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
  458The Making of a Myth 
 
  By speaking about the myth surrounding the Bukit Ho Swee fire, I do not 
mean that it is a historical fabrication. Rather, I refer to the fact that the inferno has 
not been officially treated as a historical event to date but, rather, has been utilised as 
a simplistic but powerful metaphor to signify the progress of Singapore under the 
PAP government.
4  The myth constitutes a celebratory account of success 
overcoming adversity, which forms the basic political template for the official 
narrative of the city-state’s history, the Singapore Story. It is, consequently, a highly 
selective account. Nothing is mentioned about the preceding process of kampong 
clearance and building of emergency housing on fire sites in the 1950s which 
assisted the PAP project; nothing is said, too, of the contestation over the nature and 
terms of the massive social transformation which took place after the fire, including 
the rumours of government-inspired arson and the many fire victims’ dissatisfaction 
with the Housing and Development Board’s rehousing programme. 
 
The Bukit Ho Swee myth first emerged in public consciousness in the 1960s 
when Singapore was depicted as a showcase state in the developing world for both 
international and local audiences. The PAP leadership, attempting to attract foreign 
investors to Singapore’s manufacturing sector, used the HDB’s work to market the 
island’s image as a modernist state to Western countries, particularly the United 
States.
5 By the end of its first 5-Year Plan, the HDB had also begun to view the 
scale and quality of its flats as a source of national pride. The Board was cautiously 
promoting its housing programme as providing relevant lessons for developing 
countries in the late 1960s.
6 On site tours, visual images of HDB construction sites 
and written and oral accounts of ‘insanitary’ and ‘dangerous’ autonomous housing 
being suitably replaced by modern flats were consequently offered as best practice 
                                                 
4 Roland  Barthes,  Mythologies (Palandin Books, 1973), p. 109; Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, 
Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. xx. 
5 Nancy Kwak, ‘International influences on the creation of a national landscape in Singapore 1945-
2000’, in Shane Ewen & Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds), The Other Global City: Transnational 
Connections and Urban Problems in the Modern Age (London: Palgrave, forthcoming in 2008). See 
also Nancy Kwak, A Citizen’s Right to Decent Shelter: Public Housing in New York, London and 
Singapore post-1945, unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of History, Columbia University, 
2006. 
6 Speech by E. W. Barker, Minister for National Development, in 2
nd Afro-Asian Housing Congress 
(Singapore, 1967), p. 4; and speech by Howe Yoon Chong, Chairman of HDB, in 2
nd Afro-Asian 
Housing Congress, pp. 2-6. 
  459to foreign dignitaries visiting Singapore in the 1960s. Significantly, a number of 
Asian officials, accompanied by the HDB’s Board members and departmental heads, 
viewed the ongoing construction at the Bukit Ho Swee fire site in 1961-1962.
7 
Conversely, it was also expedient to highlight the ‘before and after’ story of public 
housing to the local population and persuade those still living in shophouses and 
kampongs in the City to move into HDB flats. The PAP government, in short, 
pragmatically began to utilise the recent history of a social disaster to promote its 
social and political development programmes in the early 1960s. 
 
  The semiotic significance of the photograph in winning the hearts and minds 
of international and local target audiences should also be stressed here.
8 Because of 
its visual impact, as Susan Sontag observed, the photograph was an ideal instrument 
for transforming social reality.
9 In Singapore, in particular, the photographs taken by 
the Royal Air Force both before and after the 1961 fire played an important role in 
both supporting and promoting the HDB’s public housing programme. These aerial 
photographs were useful both for public exhibitions as well as providing vital 
topographical information on ‘the degree and state of occupation by squatters’, 
which enabled the HDB to effectively plan future clearance programmes.
10 In early 
1963, Teh Cheang Wan, the Chief Architect, ordered that various stages of the 
Board’s construction work be photographed: the site before and after clearance, 
when the earthworks and piling work had begun, when the flats were half-completed, 
and finally, when they were finished.
11 Such photographs became immediately 
useful later in the year when the government participated in an international 
conference in Berlin called ‘Partners in Progress’, with a view to promoting the 
                                                 
7 HB 617/55 Vol. II, Memo from Secretary, HDB, to Board Members and Heads of Departments, 
undated, 17 Dec 1962; Memo from Assistant Secretary, HDB, to PS, MND, 3 Oct 1962; Memo from 
Secretary, HDB, to Secretary of External Affairs, Prime Minister’s Office, 25 Jul, 1961; Memo from 
Secretary, HDB, to PS, Commerce & Industry, 11 Jul 1961. The visitors included Prince Sihanouk of 
Cambodia, the Governor of Jakarta, the Indonesian Minister for Trade, and the Minister of Finance of 
the Madras state government. 
8 On the usefulness of historical photographs for recovering the everyday life of the inarticulate in 
colonial Singapore, see James Francis Warren, ‘Social History and the Photograph: Glimpses of 
Chinese and Japanese Labour in Singapore in the Early Twentieth Century’, Pirates, Prostitutes and 
Pullers: Explorations in the Ethno- and Social History of Southeast Asia (Crawley: University of 
Western Australia Press, 2008). 
9 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Anchor Books, 1997). 
10 HB 37/50, Memo from CEO, HDB, to Assistant Secretary for Defence, MHA, 3 Nov 1960. 
11 HB 37/50, Memo from Chief Architect, HDB, to Assistant Public Relations Officer, HDB, 25 Mar 
1963. 
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island’s tourist industry and highlighting its recent industrial and housing 
development projects.
12 
 
Bukit Ho Swee Estate, notwithstanding its emergency housing, was a 
popular early target of the official photographers. The HDB’s 1962 Annual Report 
contained a photograph (see Plate 10.2) of the 6-storey blocks of 1-room emergency 
flats built on the 1961 fire site,
13 highlighting the building of flats on the ‘exact spot’ 
where the fire had started less than nine months earlier; this was both an explicit 
public reference to Lee Kuan Yew’s promise to the fire victims and a sign of the 
government’s genuine concern for the interests of the low-income urban 
population.
14 This and other photographs were also used to woo the support of 
British officials in Singapore and Britain. In June 1963, the British Trade 
Commissioner, based in London, upon receiving the Board’s Annual Report for 
1961 and its pictorial pamphlet, Homes for the People, ordered several photographs 
of its public housing programme, including two prints of the Bukit Ho Swee fire and 
one showing the ongoing construction on the fire site alongside an ‘adjoining attap 
slum’.
15 In 1970, aerial photographs of Bukit Ho Swee and Tiong Bahru estates 
provided the HDB vital aerial information on the existence of ‘extensive slums 
around the housing estates’.
16 These images proved useful for the Board’s clearance 
of the remaining unauthorised wooden housing at Covent Garden and Kim Seng 
Road and in the southern part of Si Kah Teng near the Malayan Railway Line.
17 
 
  A number of modernist-inclined publications in the 1960s also reinforced the 
role of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in the making of modern Singapore. In 1965, a book 
published by a group of progressive women hailed how the public housing 
programme had given Singaporeans ‘new life in new homes’ and described Bukit 
 
12 HB 37/50, Memo from PS, EDB, to Chairman, HDB, 2 Jul 1963. 
13 HDB, Annual Report 1962, p. 36. 
14 HB 48/50 Vol. II, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 22 Feb 1963. 
15 HB 37/50, Letter from Trade Commissioner for Singapore in the United Kingdom to Secretary, 
HDB, 7 Jun 1963. The Commissioner eventually did not receive the photographs of the fire as they 
had been taken by the Nanyang Siang Pau. HB 37/50, Letter from Secretary, HDB, to Trade 
Commissioner for Singapore in the United Kingdom, 19 Jun 1963. 
16 HB 37/50, Memo from CEO, HDB, to PS, MND, 13 Feb 1970. 
17 HDB, Annual Report 1969, p. 66.  
 
Plate 10.2: 1-room flats along Jalan Bukit Ho Swee. HDB, Annual Report 1962, p. 36. 
 
Ho Swee Estate as ‘a Phoenix rose out of the ashes of the old burnt out hutments’.
18 
In the following year, the Board produced 50,000 Up: Homes for the People to 
celebrate the accomplishments of its first 5-Year Plan. Here, the Bukit Ho Swee fire 
was depicted as a great unforeseen challenge which was successfully overcome and 
told in meticulous detail from the path of the fiery destruction on 25 May to the 
completion of the HDB flats within nine months and, consequently, the fulfillment 
of Lee Kuan Yew’s promise. This positivist empirical style, however, belied the use 
of strong discursive language and contrasting images to illustrate the transformation 
of ‘one of the city’s unloviest slum areas’ into a modern housing estate. 
Significantly, the inferno was categorised as a ‘natural disaster’, allowing the 
government to distance itself from rumours of arson and to attribute the cause of the 
conflagration to either an overturned cooking stove or a carelessly dropped cigarette, 
in effect placing the blame for the catastrophe squarely on the wooden house 
dwellers.
19 
 
                                                 
18 Seow Peck Leng, Report on New Life in New Homes (Singapore: Persatuan Wanita Singapura, 
1965), p. 23. 
19 HDB, 50,000 Up: Homes for the People (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1966), pp. 
56-60. 
  462In 1967, the HDB published the first official history of Bukit Ho Swee, 
simply titled Bukit Ho Swee Estate. This was the first in a line of publications on 
HDB housing estates which the Board had planned in 1965.
20 The slim 41-page 
booklet set out to tell the story of ‘a low-cost housing estate which was literally born 
out of fire’, contrasting descriptions and photographs of choked up drains, rotting 
timber and attap, and combustible building materials of the kampong, with those of 
the ‘happy families’ who were ‘looking forward’ after the 1961 fire to living in the 
well-furnished HDB homes with modern kitchens and social amenities in the estate. 
The inferno, then, was construed as a ‘blessing in disguise’ for the fire victims: 
 
The story of Bukit Ho Swee is a familiar one of an insanitary, 
congested and dangerous squatter area, which had an happy ending. 
The fire disaster was a blessing in disguise for all the occupants there. 
It is a far too familiar picture of an inert community who would not 
think of moving from their unpleasant and dangerous surroundings 
until a disaster makes the decision for them. Many are so used to the 
unpleasant surroundings that they do not know it possible to enjoy 
well-planned, congenial environment for happy and healthy 
upbringing of families. 
 
The fire, the booklet concluded, had pragmatically served ‘as a lesson for all those 
living in such dangerous and appalling conditions to cooperate with the Government 
in helping to wipe out such living conditions and prevent a recurrence of such 
disasters’.
21 Bukit Ho Swee Estate was soon followed in 1969 by a commemorative 
HDB book celebrating a decade of its work, which remembered the inferno for the 
way it ‘dramatically underscored’ the determination and success of the Board’s 
building programme in ‘five action-packed years’.
22  
 
  In addition to the photographs and public histories were the radio and 
television programmes on the 1961 fire made in the 1960s and early 1970s by the 
                                                 
20 HB 290/65, Memo from Assistant Secretary, HDB, to Secretary, HDB, 9 Feb 1966.  
21 HDB, Bukit Ho Swee Estate (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1967), pp. 3-5, 24-39. 
The book stated, erroneously, that there were only two fatalities in the fire. 
22 HDB,  First Decade in Public Housing, 1960-69 (Singapore: Housing & Development Board, 
1970), pp. 8-9. 
  463Ministry of Culture and the state-owned Radio Corporation of Singapore. Targeting 
local audiences, these productions typically contained selected interviews which 
inevitably elicited the fire victims’ satisfaction with their new flats and highlighted 
the historical significance of the conflagration. One advantage of the film images, 
which became increasingly important with the advent of popular television in 
Singapore in 1963, was the persuasive power of an aerial view of the newfound 
modernity, neat organisation and visual majesty of the HDB housing estates 
silhouetted under the tropical sun, with, occasionally, the traditional shophouses and 
wooden dwellings of ‘Old Singapore’ revealed to be standing resolutely in the 
shadows at the edge of the frame.
23 These moving pictures were framed in the 
customary official discourse of the absolute necessity of clearance and rehousing, 
where it was confidently stated that with Bukit Ho Swee Estate now having a ‘fire 
brigade near at hand’,
24  ‘the dangers of such devastating fires will be gone 
forever’.
25 
 
The early 1970s, however, temporarily ended official interest in the Bukit Ho 
Swee fire for a decade. As the HDB began to build satellite towns in the outlying 
areas of Singapore island, what it had recently accomplished at the margins of the 
City became less important to recall. More crucial at this point was the PAP’s 
decision to ignore history and the national past and to concentrate instead on the 
development of a modern nation-state. The active pursuit of history was viewed as 
stirring up the ‘jealous gods of the past’ which would prevent the citizenry from 
embracing the necessary ideology of progress.
26 In education, the central aim was 
‘to equip today’s child with those values and attitudes which will help him as 
tomorrow’s man’,
27 through the learning of science and technical skills. History 
became a partly non-examinable subject in primary schools in 1968, fully so in 1972 
                                                 
23 MC, audio-visual programme titled Berita Singapura: A New Look At Housing, broadcast in the 
1960s, exact date unknown. 
24 MC, audio-visual programme titled Berita Singapura: A New Look At Housing, broadcast in the 
1960s, exact date unknown. The Alexandra fire station, however, was already built in 1954. 
25 MC, audio-visual programme titled The People's Singapore: Fire Relief, broadcast in the 1960s, 
exact date unknown. Also RCS, audio programme titled This, Our Singapore (No. 5): Housing, 
broadcast on 7 Jan 1963; RCS, audio programme titled This, Our Singapore: Housing, broadcast on 
14 May 1963; RCS, audio programme titled This, Our Singapore: Social Welfare, broadcast on 3 Dec 
1962; and RCS, audio programme titled Then and Now (No. 1): A Look At Housing, broadcast on 16 
Sep 1972. 
26 Devan Nair, in Not by Wages Alone (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1982), pp. 313-
19. 
27  Nair, Not by Wages Alone, p. 277. 
  464and three years later was combined with Civics and Geography into a non-
examinable subject.
28 
 
This pragmatic dismissal of the place of history in society finally ended in 
the late 1970s. The authorities began to publicly worry about a generation of young 
Singaporeans born after independence, who had not, it was argued, experienced the 
trials and tribulations of nation-building and would consequently take the nation’s 
stability and prosperity for granted. When the Workers’ Party candidate, J. B. 
Jeyaretnam, won the Anson by-election in 1981, breaking the PAP’s complete hold 
over Parliament since 1968, the Old Guard’s worst fears about this generation’s 
‘complacency’ seemed to have been vindicated, by their apparent willingness to 
embrace the Western notion of a parliamentary opposition. The government’s 
response, in part, was to ‘return to history’, which would now provide the raw 
material for framing ‘lessons’ to discipline young Singaporeans’ ‘individualistic’ 
tendencies. One of the most important lessons, as Lee Kuan Yew argued after the 
Anson result, was that the PAP between 1965 and 1981 presided over ‘Singapore’s 
best years....our years of political stability, blessed by no fractious, querulous, 
carping opposition in Parliament’, and that a parliamentary opposition made no real 
difference to good government.
29 Singapore’s history, seen from the Old Guard’s 
vantage point, became the source for a new official ‘discourse of crisis’ and an 
important instrument of the PAP’s political legitimisation. Young Singaporeans 
seeking to depart from the PAP way were warned of unravelling the ‘vulnerable’ 
nation-state’s stability and prosperity.
30 
 
It was in this new political context in the early 1980s that the Bukit Ho Swee 
fire now reappeared as a foundational event in the making of the modern Singapore 
state. The inferno was hailed in 1979 and 1980 in the HDB bulletin Our Home as a 
turning point for an underprivileged, socially deviant population of ‘hawkers, 
labourers, secret societies and the unemployed’, hitherto living in ‘squalid 
conditions’. By contrast, the myriad new flats built after the fire both fulfilled Lee 
                                                 
28 Albert Lau, ‘The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore’, in Ban Kah Choon, 
Anne Pakir & Tong Chee Kiong (eds), Imagining Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 
1992), pp. 50-51. 
29  ST, 15 Dec 1981. 
30 Loh Kah Seng, ‘Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narrative of History in Singapore’, 
Crossroads, 12 (2), 1998, pp. 1-21. 
  465Kuan Yew’s promise to the fire victims and stood as ‘a concrete and living 
monument to the strength and viability of the Government and the Housing & 
Development Board to meet all eventualities in attending to the needs of all the 
people at all times and under all circumstances’.
31 These exhortations were of course 
not new but what was different was how Bukit Ho Swee Estate was now being 
depicted as a friendly, harmonious neighbourhood.
32 This community-based ethos, 
clearly, was targeted at the increasingly ‘individualistic’ young Singaporean. Other 
locally based commemorative publications at this time included the souvenir 
magazine of Bukit Ho Swee East School, which traced the institution’s origins to the 
1961 calamity,
33 and that of Kim Seng constituency, which in celebrating a quarter 
of a century of nation-building in 1984, highlighted Bukit Ho Swee’s transformation 
from a backward kampong to ‘a community with warm and friendly 
neighbourliness’.
34 In addition, the established assertion that the Bukit Ho Swee 
inferno ‘dramatically underscored’ the government’s determination to build 
affordable shelter for the low-income groups reappeared in an official publication 
reflecting on Singapore’s past, present and future in 1982,
35 and in John Drysdale’s 
1984 triumphal history of modern Singapore, aptly titled Struggle for Success and 
commissioned by the Straits Times.
36  
 
But the most important official publication on Bukit Ho Swee in this period 
was the 1983 public history book The Emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: From 
Desolation to Progress. Jointly produced by the HDB, the Archives and Oral 
History Department and the Kim Seng Citizens’ Consultative Committee, the 
publication told a familiar ‘before and after’ story of Bukit Ho Swee, where urban 
                                                 
31 HDB, ‘The Bukit Ho Swee Story’, Our Home, Oct 1979, p. 28. 
32 HDB, ‘The HDB Comes of Age – the Early Days of Bukit Ho Swee’, Our Home, Dec 1980, pp. 28, 
30. 
33 Bukit Ho Swee East School, BHSE: Bukit Ho Swee East School: Our First 20 Years (Singapore: 
Bukit Ho Swee East School, 1983), pp. 3, 8. 
34 Kim Seng Constituency, Kim Seng Kaleidoscope: A Souvenir Magazine to Celebrate our 25 Years 
of Nation-building 1959-1984 (Singapore: Kim Seng Constituency 19th National Day Celebration 
Committee, 1984), p. 1. Other official grassroots publications telling a progressivist story of Bukit Ho 
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rd Term Inauguration 
Souvenir Magazine, 1980-1982, 1982, pp. 10-24; and Bukit Ho Swee Community Centre, Bukit Ho 
Swee Community Centre Official Opening Souvenir Magazine, 31
st Jul 1982 (Singapore: Bukit Ho 
Swee Community Centre, 1982), pp. 7, 38-40. 
35 Liu Thai Ker, ‘A Review of Public Housing in Singapore’, in S. Jayakumar (ed.), Our Heritage 
and Beyond (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1982), p. 134. 
36 John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle for Success (Singapore: Times Books International, 1984), pp. 
257-58. 
  466dwellers living in dilapidated, combustible and insanitary wooden houses 
(powerfully exemplified by a photograph of pigs grazing among the dwellings) was 
brought to an end by great fires in 1961 and 1968, which enabled the building of 
modern public housing on the fire sites. What was new, once again, was a conscious 
effort to emphasise the social significance of age in the making of a national 
narrative. Yeo Ning Hong, the Member of Parliament for Kim Seng, observed: 
 
The residents of Kim Seng, especially those who have stayed here for 
the past two decades, are a hardy lot, representative of the true 
Singaporean. They have persevered through hard times and have now 
emerged a stronger and fitter community. 
 
With Yeo’s statement, the seemingly ‘inert community’ which had previously 
resided in the kampong before the fire were now duly elevated to the status of model 
citizens of the nation. Yeo continued by highlighting the need for Singaporeans to 
embrace the communitarian ethos and to be wary of ‘complacency’: 
 
But that does not mean we and our children can be complacent, sit 
back and relax and enjoy the fruits of our labour. New problems and 
new challenges await us….We need to keep up the good work, 
maintain close relationship and rapport with one another, our 
neighbours, and our friends. We must strive together as a team 
always – in our workplace, in our neighbourhood, in the SAF 
[Singapore Armed Forces] and in our nation.
37 
 
  In conjunction with the launch of the book was a week-long pictorial 
exhibition held at Kim Seng Community Centre,
38 featuring more than 175 metre-
high historical photographs, maps and documents mounted on viewing boards. The 
exhibition’s aim, it was stated, was to help ‘young Singaporeans to appreciate better 
the hard times experienced by our forefathers’. In promotional segments shown on 
                                                 
37 Archives & Oral History Department, Kim Seng Citizens’ Consultative Committee & Bukit Ho 
Swee Area Office, HDB, Emergence of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: From Desolation to Progress 
(Singapore: Singapore News & Publications Limited, 1983), Message from Dr Yeo Ning Hong. 
38 The exhibition was reportedly conceived in late 1979 by the executive estate officer of the HDB’s 
Bukit Ho Swee Area Office, a history honours graduate. ST, 7 Nov 1983. 
  467national television, the 1961 fire was re-presented through video footage and replete 
with recollections, now a generation removed, of former fire victims and fire-
fighters. The important link between the crisis, the government’s determined 
response and the social community which emerged thereafter was duly emphasised: 
 
Written on the faces of the people of Bukit Ho Swee are the 
experiences of a hard life, survival of 3 great fires, the tenacity of a 
migrant people, the courage of a PM who delivered the then 
seemingly impossible promise – providing homes for the 16,000, and 
the will and verve of a people who are not willing to be defeated.
39  
 
  The central event in the official reminiscence of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in 
1983 was Yeo Ning Hong’s half-hour speech at the opening of the exhibition. He 
began by recounting how as a boy he had visited Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, thus 
placing himself in the age set of elderly Singaporeans. The exhibition, he stated, was 
useful for young people who had not known hardship of any sort. At this point in the 
middle of his speech, Yeo broke away from the historical past to deliver a ten 
minute mini-lecture on the duties of the Singapore citizen, who, he warned, must not 
take the nation’s prosperity for granted: 
 
We would be making a very big mistake if we assume that progress is 
a natural state of affairs….There are thousands and thousands of 
villages all over the world where the living conditions today are no 
better than what they were 25 years ago, where the slums stood 25 
years ago. So we have been very fortunate that over the last 24 years, 
we have a combination of factors which brought about the success 
which we are presently enjoying in Singapore. These kinds of 
changes are rare. It does not happen everywhere. 
 
Continuing, Yeo explained that Singapore’s success was due to two primary factors: 
a government which was concerned for the people’s long-term interests and not 
afraid to implement unpopular policies, and a citizenry which was ‘sufficiently 
                                                 
39 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. 
  468realistic to know that in a country of 620 square km with no natural resources, we 
cannot get things for free’ and ‘sufficiently rational to understand the rationale of 
government policies….that they would be good for the people in the long run, for all 
the people, not just a small group of people’. Yeo then went on to wear a different 
parliamentary hat by explaining the government’s unpopular policy to limit the 
number of cars in Singapore.
40 His speech clearly demonstrated that the target of the 
government’s deliberations on the recent past was no longer ‘Old Singapore’, as was 
the case in the 1960s, but rather, ‘Young Singapore’. 
 
  The culmination of the framing of the official discourses on the Bukit Ho 
Swee fire in the 1980s was the event’s inclusion, as a defining moment in 
Singapore’s recent history, in the 1988 officially-commissioned documentary series, 
Diary of a Nation. Broadcast on national television on 25 May – the day of the blaze 
– the Bukit Ho Swee episode included oral history reminiscences and pictorial and 
video images of the inferno. The squalid, criminal and insanitary nature of kampong 
life was, invariably, triumphantly contrasted with the building of flats on the fire site 
on a hitherto unparalleled scale. ‘Bukit Ho Swee will long be remembered’, the 
programme emphasised, ‘as the place where the most devastating fire occurred, and 
which phoenix-like, a new estate emerged from the smoldering ashes’. The narrative, 
however, also extended the story of progress to the present, by noting that the 
emergency housing of Bukit Ho Swee had recently been demolished to ‘make way 
for newer and better ones’, a reference to the HDB’s programmes of controlled 
demolition and redevelopment during the decade.
41 
 
  The role of the 1961 inferno as part of this discourse of social ‘revitalisation’ 
and nation-building becomes even more evident with the publication of the 1996 
coffee table book by Sumiko Tan, a Straits Times journalist, titled Kim Seng: A 
Reflection of Singapore’s Success. Yeo Ning Hong, in introducing the book, urged 
that ‘[t]o survive the traumas and upheavals that are part and parcel of life, people 
need to remember their roots’, which would ‘provide them with the ballast and 
strength to meet the challenges of the future’. The book was relevant, Yeo explained, 
                                                 
40 NAS, audio-visual recording titled A Pictorial Exhibition: The Emergence Of Bukit Ho Swee Estate: 
From Desolation To Progress, broadcast in Nov 1983. 
41  SBC, audio-visual programme titled Diary of a Nation: Bukit Ho Swee Fire, 25 May 1961, 
broadcast on 25 May 1988. 
  469in recounting ‘how the slums and shacks of Bukit Ho Swee were destroyed by fires’ 
and in looking forward to ‘the continuing upgrading of the constituency’.
42 Filled 
with large glossy photographs of Bukit Ho Swee past and present and interviews 
with elderly residents, the publication begins with a scene of elderly men chatting in 
a shady corner of Beo Crescent, while noting, in the background, the preparations 
for the HDB’s upgrading work which, it was emphasised, was heavily subsidised by 
the government. The impending ‘revitalisation’ of Bukit Ho Swee Estate was now 
depicted to be an integral part of its ongoing history: 
 
The Kim Seng story is a reflection of Singapore’s success. It tells the 
tale of how, like the legendary phoenix, it rose from the ashes of 
burnt-out slums, and is today being upgraded and transformed to 
meet the needs of residents in the 21
st century.
43 
 
At present, the Bukit Ho Swee myth is solidly integrated into the national 
narrative of the Singapore Story. In celebrating Singapore’s 40
th year of 
independence in 2005, the Ministry of Education produced a book titled Today in 
History, in which school students wrote about an important event in Singapore’s 
history which fell on their own birthdays. A student from Nanyang Primary School, 
whose entry was selected for the book, wrote about the readiness of the Singapore 
Fire Brigade to deal with emergencies like the Bukit Ho Swee fire. Her classmate 
accurately drew an accompanying picture of seven wooden houses burning amid 
strong winds, only one of which was being reached by a jet of water from a fire 
engine standing on a track marked ‘one way’.
44 Two years later, a newly revised 
secondary textbook on the history of Singapore written by curriculum planners in 
the Ministry of Education was launched. Its aim was to cultivate creative and critical 
thinking skills among students by offering different perspectives on historical events. 
However, in the unit on the ‘Nation Building Years’, in which the 1961 fire was 
taught, the emphasis was on Singapore’s ‘constraints and vulnerabilities’ and the 
‘key values, attitudes and skills Singaporeans need in order to ensure the survival 
                                                 
42 Sumiko Tan, Kim Seng: A Reflection of Singapore’s Success (Singapore: Kim Seng Publication 
Committee, 1996), Foreword. 
43 Tan, Kim Seng, pp. 13, 17. 
44 MOE, Today in History (Singapore: Ministry of Education, 2005). 
  470and success of the nation’.
45 Not unexpectedly, the Bukit Ho Swee story as told in 
the textbook merely underlined the HDB’s work in clearing ‘slums and squatter 
settlements’ in the 1960s.
46  
 
Elsewhere, the significance of the Bukit Ho Swee fire has also been jealously 
safeguarded by government institutions or statutory boards whose history was 
closely bound up with the event. The Singapore Civil Defence Force Heritage 
Galley at the Central Fire Station contains two fire engines lined up in front of a sign, 
‘Bukit Ho Swee’. A short distance away is a model of 2-storey wooden houses, 
ablaze, and a television screen showing video footage of how the fire engines were 
‘slowed down by narrow, cluttered lanes and hindered by a crowd of onlookers’, 
while ‘well-meaning volunteers grabbed water hoses to spray water haphazardly 
instead of effectively’. This exhibit places the blame for the destruction caused by 
the fire squarely on the volunteers and onlookers, just as present-day Singaporeans 
are reminded, similarly, that ‘we have learnt the extent of damage and destruction a 
disaster can cause, we have come a long way since then, and must never take things 
for granted’.
47  
 
At the Heritage Gallery located at the HDB Hub, is a recreated living room 
of an HDB flat in the 1970s, with an old-style ‘tear out’ Chinese calendar on the 
wall showing the day ‘25 May’. A couple and their son are seated on a sofa, 
watching video footage of the 1961 fire. They see a mother and five children fleeing 
from the blaze (described in Chapter 6), fire hoses held by volunteers but wildly 
spraying, and finally, the completion of emergency housing on the fire site. In 
subsequent decades, as portrayed through other exhibits, public housing in 
Singapore continued on the developmental path of progress, from ‘Our Home, Our 
Community’ in the 1970s and ‘Total Living Environment’ in the 1980s to ‘Building 
Unique Identities’ in the 1990s, and now ‘World Class Public Housing’ in the new 
                                                 
45 CPDD, MOE, History Syllabus: Lower Secondary, 2005, pp. 3-4, 14. 
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  471millennium.
48 Finally, at the newly-renovated National Museum of Singapore, there 
is an attempt to incorporate a diversity of voices from the past. In the section named 
‘Singapore and the World, 1945-1970’, the experience of resettlement is 
acknowledged to be ‘both exciting and sometimes traumatic’, with an un-named 
Malay interviewee lamenting that one could not resist the PAP government’s 
acquisition of land for public development. Nearby, however, is large video exhibit 
of the Bukit Ho Swee fire, with the fire victims shown to be moving into ‘modern 
flats built on the previous slums’ within nine months.
49 
 
The official mythology which has emerged from the HDB’s eradication of 
the urban kampongs is so powerful that when Lim Kim San passed away on 20 July 
2006, he was duly remembered by the government as ‘Mr HDB’. Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong stated in his eulogy for Lim that ‘most Singaporeans [had] lived in 
overcrowded slums and squatter colonies, breeding grounds for crime and 
gangsterism’.
50 This was almost a verbatim account of the description given by Alan 
 
 
Plate 10.3: The Bukit Ho Swee fire exhibit at the Civil Defence Heritage Gallery, Central 
Fire Station, 2006 (Photograph by author). 
 
                                                 
48 HDB Gallery, HDB Hub, Toa Payoh, visited on 19 Sep 2006. 
49 NMS, Singapore History Gallery, Stamford Road, visited on 14 Dec 2007. 
50 ST, 24 Jul 2006. 
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Plate 10.4: The Bukit Ho Swee fire exhibit at the HDB Gallery, HDB Hub, 2006 
(Photograph by author). 
 
 
Plate 10.5: The intersection of historical event, education and social memory. MOE, Today 
in History (Singapore: Ministry of Education, 2005). 
 
  473Choe, the HDB architect-planner, in 1969 of the inner city slums as being the 
‘breeding grounds of crime and disease’.
51 In August the following year, Howe 
Yoon Chong, the former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National 
Development and Chief Executive Officer of the HDB, also passed away. Both 
Howe and Lim Kim San were applauded for ‘fast-tracking’ the public housing 
programme in the early 1960s,
52 and Singaporeans were once again reminded of 
Howe’s ‘reputation as a “bulldozer” who relentlessly pushed through obstacles to 
get things done’.
53 President S. R. Nathan acknowledged Howe’s key role in the 
established narrative of the PAP’s struggle against both ‘communists’ and 
‘squatters’ in the 1960s: 
 
It was he who undertook with determination and dedication the 
politically and technically arduous task of getting the township of 
Toa Payoh started. He stood up against organised opposition to the 
resettlement of Toa Payoh and the removal of squatters. The 
opposition was formidable, as it was led by Communist United Front 
agitators who vehemently obstructed him to the point of violence.
54 
 
When I spoke to former fire victims in the course of my fieldwork in 2006-
2007, two generations after the 1961 inferno, the influence of the official 
representations of the event was clearly evident. Spoken on behalf of by the 
authorities and depicted as the reified Other in the 1950s and 1960s before being 
embraced as the model citizen in the 1980s, former fire victims have generally 
assimilated at least part of the official discourse in their memories of the fire. Rare is 
the case of Cheong Soon Onn, who experienced a fire in his 1-room rental flat at 
Jalan Bukit Merah in August 2007. Cheong, whose family had lost their wooden 
house and medical hall in the 1961 blaze, asked, ‘Can you believe it, twice in my 
lifetime? I can only thank the gods that I’m still alive’.
55 For other fire victims like 
James Seah, the 1961 disaster contained an important set of lessons for themselves 
and for young Singaporeans. For Seah, the inferno inevitably enabled the 
                                                 
51  Alan Choe, ‘Urban Renewal’, in Ooi Jin-Bee & Chiang Hai Ding (eds), Modern Singapore, 
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  474government to suppress the secret societies and assist low-income families to break 
out of the cycle of poverty as their children acquired higher education. Seah 
consequently viewed ‘the fire at Bukit Ho Swee as a breakthrough for the PAP 
government to really change the whole socio-economic landscape of a big part of 
Singapore’, and he felt proud that ‘my days have to be tied up to Singapore’s 
starting time’.
56 
 
For many former fire victims, a sense of loyalty to the nation and support for 
the government have inextricably merged with the passage of time. Tay Bok Chiu 
remarked that ‘last time we scolded Lee Kuan Yew but now we understand what is 
good and what is bad’, particularly because the government had effectively 
eradicated the kampong’s secret societies after the fire.
57 Husband and wife, Lai 
Chee Lung and Yap Kuai Yong, who moved into a 1-room flat in Bukit Ho Swee 
Estate due to the fear of fire in their wooden house at Kallang, likewise recalled that 
life had previously been ‘jin cham’ (‘very difficult’): 
 
People say today that the government is no good. I think the 
government is superb! [Laughs] If not for the government, we 
wouldn’t have such a good life. Once the PAP came to power, they 
built flats, community centres, it was great. I was so happy to move 
into the flat. People who say the government is not good nowadays 
do not know how cham it was in the past.
58 
 
Even Tan Tiam Ho, who once argued against the government’s elitist educational 
policy, felt that the rebuilding of Bukit Ho Swee was necessary for the nation’s 
development. ‘If the government had not built these flats’ after the fire, Tan asked, 
‘how would the people have lived? There were more and more people in Singapore, 
how would they have lived?’ Tan, though, still retains sufficient self-awareness to 
say, with a laugh, ‘Now we Singaporeans are obedient like a dog to the 
government’.
59 
                                                 
56 Author’s interview with James Seah, 21 Oct 2006. 
57 Author’s interview with Tay Bok Chiu, 24 Jan 2007. 
58 Author’s interviews with Yap Kuai Yong and Lai Chee Lung, 16 Jun 2007. 
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Lim Yock Eng, who has been involved in grassroots activities in Bukit Ho 
Swee Estate, believed that the PAP government’s real achievement, facilitated by 
the 1961 fire, was the social mobilisation of former kampong dwellers into 
becoming active citizens of the state: 
 
Today, with all the progress we have made, our leadership deserves 
not a little credit. Last time, when we were young, we did not care 
about the country’s affairs. We were really like a pile of sand. I 
believe that the country is governed very well now. Because I have 
stayed in Bukit Ho Swee, and this fire burned a large area, so after 
this, many HDB flats were built here. From here, it developed into 
other places, until today. So how we have progressed today is also 
due to the impact of the Bukit Ho Swee fire.
60 
 
Tay Ah Chuan, another grassroots leader, similarly agreed that the inferno was a 
blessing in disguise; after the fire, he explained, ‘the mindset of the people of Bukit 
Ho Swee slowly began to change. The most important thing was to disperse the 
“black area”’.
61 Such firm support for the PAP government is, in fact, common 
among elderly residents who experienced the rapid social transformation of 
Singapore in the 1960s, including even its repercussions. Since 1963, Bukit Ho 
Swee constituency has been an unassailable PAP stronghold.
62 In particular, Lee 
Kuan Yew’s resolute response to the calamity left a deep, lasting impression on the 
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  476fire victims. Tay Yan Woon, for instance, vividly remembers the day he spoke to the 
fire victims:  
 
Lee Kuan Yew was very young then, lua hiong [‘very impressive’], 
only about 30 years old, and he wore a pair of long black trousers and 
a pair of canvas shoes. He went to interview people on a jeep. 
 
While Tay had grieved over the loss of the kampong lifestyle after the fire and her 
inability to rear poultry in an HDB flat, she was certain that ‘if Singapore did not 
have Lee Kuan Yew, our lives would have been very hard’.
63 
 
Romancing the Kampong, Rebooting the Estate 
 
The 1996 community history, Kim Seng: A Reflection of Singapore’s Success, 
illustrates that the PAP government, in remembering the recent past, does not seek to 
encourage nostalgia for the kampong but rather to mobilise popular support for its 
new redevelopment schemes. In 2007, a grassroots publication framed the 1961 and 
1968 Bukit Ho Swee blazes as belonging to an irretrievable past. Signs of their 
destruction, it stated, were no longer evident in present-day Bukit Ho Swee, with its 
‘mostly new and upgraded blocks of flats in pink and blue, and condominiums’, 
while one long-time resident was quoted as saying that although people missed the 
kampong lifestyle when they first moved into the emergency flats, ‘[n]ow, no one 
would want to move back’.
64  
 
Kim Seng: A Reflection of Singapore’s Success and an entire corpus of semi-
official public histories of spatial communities in Singapore since the 1990s are 
essentially documents about social mobilisation.
65 A good example of this genre of 
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  477literature is the National Archives of Singapore coffee table book, Kampong Days 
(1993), which took a seemingly nostalgic look at the children’s games, social 
festivities and communal life of the rural kampongs in postwar Singapore.
66  
Kampong Days focussed almost exclusively on Malay kampongs and fishing 
villages and Chinese rural kampongs, ignoring the ‘Black Belt’ which had stood at 
the City limits. Upon closer scrutiny, the book’s reminiscences of the kampongs of 
yesterday is highly selective, based on the hope that ‘those who had lived in the 
kampongs will try and pass on to our younger generation Singaporeans our 
memories, the joys, the inconveniences, hardships and most importantly the 
kampong values of neighbourliness, thrift and hard work’.
67 Subsequent community 
histories were even more explicit in mobilising mass support for the HDB’s social 
‘revitalisation’ programmes for its older estates in the 1990s: the Main Upgrading 
Programme and the Selective En Bloc Redevelopment Programme. The phrase 
‘kampong spirit’ began to appear in the mass media and public history books to refer, 
somewhat ironically, to newer public housing estates built over former kampongs in 
the outlying areas of the island; Bishan, Woodlands, Tampines, and Jalan Kayu 
estates were all lauded in 1992 for possessing the characteristic ‘kampong spirit’ of 
neighbourly relations and mutual self-help.
68 The unwritten association, which 
pragmatically inverted the official language of modern housing planning, was to 
persuade residents of aging estates like Bukit Ho Swee to support the HDB’s 
upgrading and redevelopment schemes in order to rekindle the ‘kampong spirit’ of 
the newer estates! In 1996, for instance, the launch of the SERS in Bukit Merah 
coincided with the publication of Bukit Merah: From a Hilly Kampong to a Modern 
Town, which by telling the story of the community’s progress towards modernity 
prepared present-day elderly residents in the estate for another requisite round of 
housing demolition and redevelopment.
69 
 
Nevertheless, despite selective official representations of the kampongs and 
public housing, among the former kampong-dwelling population of Bukit Ho Swee, 
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  478there still survives a sense of nostalgia which is independent of and in some ways 
diametrically opposed to the PAP government’s forward-looking modernist 
philosophy of governance. From the beginning, children who have moved from 
wooden to modern housing had grown increasingly nostalgic for the freedom of 
social life in the kampong era.
70 Moreover, by the 1980s, many former fire victims, 
now approaching middle age, were reflecting on the sheer pace of social change in 
the preceding two decades and yearned for a simpler time when, for example, they 
could buy a bowl of noodles for 20 cents. As Lee Soo Seong told me, ‘we have 
gained much but also lost much’.
71 The growing sense of social nostalgia also 
coincided with the PAP government’s ‘turn to history’ in the early 1980s. In 
particular, the official use of recent history to discipline a generation of young 
Singaporeans struck a personal chord among aging former kampong dwellers, many 
of whom had experienced the anguish of their children leaving flats upon marriage 
for larger housing further away. It came as no surprise, then, that much of the elderly 
people’s recollections are directed squarely at young Singaporeans. In addition, 
there is a tendency even among former kampong dwellers who had been relatively 
well-to-do to tell their life stories within a ‘hard times’, ‘rags to riches’ narrative, 
which parallels the Singapore Story. But despite the similarities between the popular 
and official reminiscences of kampong life, the ordinary people’s memories remain, 
to some extent, autonomous. Nostalgia for the kampong, as Chua Beng Huat 
observed, is ‘an intrinsic critique of the present by the ordinary people’ of the more 
regulated and stressful life; it belies a desire for ‘recovering control over daily life 
within the present zone of material comfort’, although the individual accepts that 
this cannot be accomplished.
72 It is this search for alternative meanings of the 
‘kampong days’ which makes oral history work in Singapore both viable and 
valuable. The PAP government’s selective promotion of the kampong past has 
consequently had the unintended effect of creating a mythological kampong which is 
implicitly critical of the high modernist development that has occurred in Singapore. 
 
This alternative kampong myth has only partially surfaced in published 
works. There have been, since the 1980s, a number of biographies by former 
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  479wooden house dwellers remembering, as children, the ‘good old kampong days’, 
particularly the rustic, carefree life and the neighbourliness of the community.
73 
These works do not overtly contest the official discourse on kampong clearance and 
rehousing. Peter Wee’s account of living in Kampong Amber in the 1950s accepted 
that the kampong’s clearance at the end of the decade to make way for 
redevelopment was inevitable and, given the insanitary living conditions and 
constant fire hazard, indeed necessary.
74 Resistance against resettlement is usually 
not mentioned in these biographies, as are the rumours of arson. Victor Seah, who 
broached the question of arson from a third person perspective, located such 
incidents in the context of racial conflict between Malays and Chinese in the 
1960s.
75 A historical novel, published in 1984, on the collective experiences of a 
group of former kampong children, acknowledged the possibility of arson but with 
the caveat that the truth behind the rumours remained unknown.
76 
 
Experiences of kampong life consequently emerge more fully by word of 
mouth. An important theme from the recollections is the child in the kampong. My 
elderly informant typically recalls a time when they were young and, as Lim You 
Meng surmised, ‘很自由, 很自在’ (‘very free’ and ‘very carefree’),
77 ‘free’, that is, 
from parental supervision and to engage in play in the kampong’s open areas. Marc 
Cheok (born in 1956), who resided at Havelock Road below Ma Kau Thiong in the 
1950s, fondly remembers his days as a ‘kampong kid’ playing with kites.
78  
Similarly, Oh Gek Heok recounts her joyous kampong days when she and her 
friends played with marbles in the day and listened to stories over the Rediffusion at 
night. ‘It was a happy time’, she reflected, ‘People today don’t do that anymore’. 
What has also been lost, according to Oh, was the remarkable physical toughness of 
the kampong children; if one, barefoot, stepped on a nail, they did not worry about 
tetanus but simply ‘took off our slipper and hit our foot with it, and when the blood 
stopped running, we continued running about’.
79  
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These selective memories of urban kampong life, seen through youthful eyes, 
are really, part of a narrative of both regeneration and loss.
80 They are acutely 
accentuated by the closely managed way of life which progressively emerged after 
the 1961 fire, especially in terms of the official regulations and financial demands of 
living in an HDB flat, and the psychological stress and social discipline of full-time 
work in the formal economy. Life in the kampong is always contrasted against that 
in public housing and consequently diverges markedly from the official discourse. 
Lim You Meng believed that Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, despite its secret societies, 
was not a dangerous place but ‘最有人情味’ (‘a warm place to live in’).
81 Lee Soo 
Seong agreed that ‘life was simple and backward but was full of charm back then’.
82 
When I asked Peter Lim about kampong life, he exclaimed, ‘It was a fantastic place; 
it was a place where you were so close to nature. And the neighbours, they didn’t 
put a wall to each other like nowadays in the flats’.
83 Sim Kim Boey related in 
amusement that ‘we could walk through people’s houses and they could walk 
through ours. [Laughs] It was strange but very good. No one would steal anything 
when going in and out of someone else’s home, and the residents also wouldn’t 
question you’.
84 According to Joyce Soh, who currently resides in an HDB flat, 
living in a kampong was happier, safer and warmer than residing in public housing:  
 
We helped one another much more in the past. Now, if you stay in an 
HDB flat, everyone closes their doors. In the kampong, we got along 
very well, we went to buy groceries together. People in the past were 
more genuine and honest. We left our doors open. There was no need 
to lock them. The door was wooden and we just placed a chair 
against it, that was all. There were no cases of theft because if some 
stranger came into the kampong, everyone would know about it.
85 
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  481Alongside this social critique of modernity in Singapore is the anger felt by 
many former fire victims towards young Singaporeans. Born in 1972 and after the 
inferno, I was, to many of them, ‘young’, and in many of my oral history interviews, 
the participants assumed dual roles as both informant and interrogator. Long-time 
friends in the kampong and neighbours today at Block 79, Indus Road, Tay Choo 
and Beh Poh Suan (who was widowed and caring for her infant child by herself 
before the fire) insisted that it was both comfortable and safe to live in an attap 
house. But they also went beyond reminiscing about the past to tell me, pointedly, 
‘For our generation, everyone’s life was tong kor. Only your generation has a better 
life. Our generation, if you asked ten people, nine of them had difficult lives. Your 
parents would know the difficult days’.
86 Tay Yan Woon similarly felt that ‘it would 
have been good if the fire had not broken out then, living in the attap house was so 
good’, although her life then was, as she admitted, difficult. Directing her comments 
at me, Tay lamented how young Singaporeans do not know the Hokkien names of 
the local places in Bukit Ho Swee or the immense hardship people suffered in the 
past: 
 
People nowadays are better off. Your mother would have experienced 
it before, she would know how hard life was last time. Our lives a 
few decades back were so pitiful, especially my generation. My 
generation was the most pitiful of all. Those who are 30 plus to 40, it 
was not so difficult.
87 
 
Almost insistent at times in highlighting the differences between the older 
and younger generations, Oh Boon Eng spoke passionately of the beauty, wonder 
and absolute freedom of his childhood days in Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, where the 
children ‘were very innocent and ignorant of everything’. He emphasised the 
physical and mental strength borne out of the hard times which had apparently 
dissipated; there was no way, he insisted, that I could undertake the manual work 
people had done in the past.
88 Roy Chan similarly remarked, ‘We were the chin chai 
[‘easygoing’] type. Everyday whatever food was cooked, we just ate it; whatever 
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  482porridge, whether there was fish, meat or vegetables. At that time, this was common. 
We couldn’t be choosy. Of course today the children are different; they want to go 
to the food court [Laughs]’.
89  
 
The young Singaporean is consequently the target for two very different 
discourses on kampong life. By reclaiming the past, elderly Singaporeans are 
reasserting their place in the present just as the PAP government is attempting to 
maintain its political hegemony through the use of history. In fact, the social 
malleability of the past within living memory could be used against any unpopular 
social development in the present. As Shirley Tan told me, ‘People last time 
wouldn’t get deceived unless they were unlucky. People last time wouldn’t do that’. 
Shifting comfortably from the past to the present, Tan commented on the large 
numbers of foreigners working in Singapore:  
 
People last time did not fall sick. If his area was not clean, he would 
sweep it himself. Now in Singapore, why are there people throwing 
litter? Now, there are many foreigners who have come here. We don’t 
know who threw the litter. The foreigners are staying in the houses 
too, and they would just throw the litter. We don’t know whether it is 
Singaporeans or foreigners who threw the litter.
90  
 
When I interviewed him, Tay Ah Chuan candidly revealed that Kampong 
Bukit Ho Swee, with its secret societies, was a renowned ‘black area’ in 1950s 
Singapore; many of the pai kia were in fact his primary school mates. Yet Tay 
possessed both an admiration for the development under the PAP government and 
an ambivalence towards the social consequences of the progress. For him, living in a 
modern nation-state had irreversibly changed young Singaporeans’ mindset, and not 
necessarily for the better: 
 
In the past, you could not survive on your own. Like a secret society 
could not be made up of one person. They depended on the group to 
survive. Your generation now is different. You take the individual as 
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  483the unit, right? You think, I am capable, I can be a director. You 
don’t depend on the group. 
 
Tay’s ‘black area’, consequently, is remembered with a tinge of pride.
91 
 
James Seah, telling me of a nasty slip he once suffered while climbing down 
the muddy slopes on his way home from Kai Kok School in the 1950s, emphasised 
the need for young people to know about the Bukit Ho Swee fire: 
 
If the young people met with us during those times, then they’ll have 
the fear. It’s just like bringing this little kid, who shouts like that, 
influenced by Western democracy, and putting him in our time to go 
through the racial riots, the labour strikes, the fire. Then maybe they 
will realise that we have gone through hardship. 
 
But, as Seah is also aware, it is frustratingly difficult to fully convey the sense of a 
terrifying event outside the experience of young Singaporeans: 
 
There is no media, however effective, whether it is video, visual, that 
can recreate the situation. How do I describe to you the day when it 
was on fire and we ran? Then the next day, when we came back and 
saw all was gone? That element of living through a certain period can 
never be replicated. There was a time when I liked to go to various 
parts of Malaysia, to the kampongs, and sit around the coffeeshops 
and see how slowly time passes by. Ah, that! I talked to my children, 
and they say, ‘Where got such things?’ Even the smell, how do I 
describe to you the smell of the feces pond in front of a house? This 
is something that I am very fearful of for the children. Because they 
can’t imagine the hardship that their parents went through.
92 
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  484My informants’ recollections of the kampong lifestyle are consequently critiques of 
both high modernity in present-day Singapore and of the perceived ignorance and 
complacency of young Singaporeans. In both aspects, nostalgia for the kampong 
reveals an ambivalence towards one’s inability to locate their identity and historical 
agency in a continuously changing high modernist society. 
 
Undying Rumours 
 
If, in the social myth of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee, life in the village is still 
warmly remembered by its former residents, its destruction by fire on 25 May 1961 
holds an even more uncertain place in their recollections. The nostalgia and the 
belief in government-inspired arson have reinforced each other in sustaining a 
partially independent set of social memories; recollections which in turn have made 
possible the re-creation, through oral history, of the semi-autonomous ways of life in 
the urban kampongs partially reconstructed in this study. 
 
Not surprisingly, the unresolved question of the cause of the 1961 inferno is 
rarely mentioned by government officials or in the mass media. But, interestingly, it 
was broached in a 29-part Chinese drama series titled Bukit Ho Swee, produced by 
the state-owned MediaCorp in 2002. The series traced the lives of a group of 
residents in Kampong Bukit Ho Swee in the 1950s up to the outbreak of the great 
fire.
93 Advertised as ‘an epic of true compassion’, ‘where kindness and warmth 
precede’ and ‘where strangers with different lives unite’, the series was essentially a 
love story which mixed the contrasting themes of good neighbourliness and social 
danger in the context of the kampong.
94 The gangsters in the series frequently 
harassed the locals living at the margins of society, such as a pirate taxi driver, an 
unlicensed hawker, and a nightsoil worker. The fire hazard in the kampong was 
simply attributed to the actions of the locals; in two separate episodes, the gangsters 
threatened to raze the settlement to the ground if the residents refused to pay them 
protection money. The threat of fire, consequently, became a mere plot device. On 
two other occasions, the villagers also accidentally started fires due to their 
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  485negligence, and eventually one of the residents, having lost his sanity, burned down 
the kampong. The TV drama series consequently made no attempt to revise the 
terms of the official narrative on the fire. 
 
Although no former fire victim has yet written about the cause of the inferno, 
the rumours of arson have left an indelible imprint on the relationship between the 
government and the citizenry. On the surface, the PAP’s political control is nothing 
short of hegemonic. The party has never lost more than four parliamentary seats in a 
general election since 1963 or seen its popular vote fall under 61%. The PAP’s 
ideological hegemony is demonstrated by the fact that the citizenry has generally 
accepted the official line that the near-universal provision of public housing has 
served their material interests.
95 This political dominance, however, has not created 
an ‘affective’ relationship between the PAP and the people.
96 On the contrary, the 
relationship has been based on a pragmatic exchange of goods – votes for the 
government and material rewards, including the ability to own a modern flat, for the 
people. In addition, the government’s management of spaces in contemporary 
Singapore has met with a mixture of ‘collusion, conflict, and collision’ from the 
citizenry, which has protested against policies considered to be inimical to 
individual or community interests.
97 In short, what Singaporeans want both for 
themselves and from the government are deeply conflicting. 
 
In this context, Lim Kim San’s death in 2006 precipitated critical and 
emotional responses on Internet discussion forums, particularly from elderly 
Singaporeans who remember the days when Lim presided over the kampong 
clearance campaign. Despite extensive government controls over the Internet in 
Singapore, the perceived anonymity provided by the medium has emboldened 
Singaporeans to candidly comment on sensitive topics, which would not have 
materialised in a public forum.
98 In the popular Sammyboy.com’s Alfresco Coffee 
Shop, a hotbed of anti-PAP discussions, the historical association between fires and 
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  486kampong clearance was vividly recalled following Lim’s death. A poster named 
e_visionary asked rhetorically, ‘How many kampong was burned due to a man?’,
99 
to which ÎÚÅ replied, ‘Yes, I heard stories about “government people” ‘purplely’ 
[purposely] burn down kampong to make way for new flats when all negotiations 
failed’.
100 In a separate thread on Kampong Bukit Ho Swee started before Lim Kim 
San’s death, mockingbir9 replied that ‘every old folks will be able to tell u BHS was 
burnt down by the arrogant PAPies. Burning the whole suburb was much easier 
option than time consuming eradicating the residents in stages, amid of threats from 
gangsters and huge compensations etc’, and concluded, ‘This is an untold story and 
we will know only one day someone will surface to tell the truth of the saga of BHS 
fire’.
101 Another poster, merlion, simply suggested, ‘Ask Lim Kim San...he knows 
what really happen to Bukit Ho Swee’.
102  
 
It is not merely the elderly people who are interested in Kampong Bukit Ho 
Swee and the great fire which destroyed it. A general revival of interest in the 
country’s history has led, for instance, to the appearance of Internet blogs offering 
independent, even critical, perspectives of the recent past, such as YawningBread, 
Singapore Angle, Citizen Historian, and s/pores.
103 Consequently, Singaporeans one 
or two generations younger, who allegedly are ‘complacent’ about the nation’s 
future, have begun to ask critical questions about the untold, unwritten past. In 2006, 
prior to Lim Kim San’s death, the pilot episode of a Malay-language documentary 
series boldly posed the question, ‘What caused the Bukit Ho Swee fire?’. The 
programme featured interviews with a former resident, a fire-fighter, a fire officer, a 
senior civil servant, a sociologist, and a history researcher (myself), none of whom 
acknowledged the possibility of arson. This refusal to publicly discuss the issue, 
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  487much less endorse the theory, highlights the sensitivity of the topic despite the 
intervening years. It is also indicative of the mindset of young Singaporeans, 
however, that questions such as these, which impinge directly on the birth of modern 
Singapore, are being asked. The episode concluded, in striking postmodernist 
fashion, ‘There are various versions to history. It is all up to you to make your own 
conclusions’.
104  
 
Regardless of how the mass media has approached the cause of the fire, 
away from public and official spheres, the rumours continued to be whispered, 
debated and denied among elderly people. Most of my interviewees attempted to 
sidetrack the question, and I often had to emphasise that I was not trying to establish 
the theory per se but only to understand why many people had believed in it. My 
informants were typically much more comfortable in suggesting other possible 
causes such as an untended cooking fire, malicious neighbours, secret societies, 
greedy landowners, and communists. My father, for instance, was certain that it did 
not make sense for the PAP to set the fire, since the disaster would have created a 
great burden on the government to provide relief for the fire victims. The rumours, 
he emphasised, were baseless and it was more likely that the fire was caused by the 
careless use of firecrackers.
105 They typically dismissed the rumours as luan kong 
(‘wild talk’). As Tay Ah Chuan explained,  
 
This problem is rather difficult to solve. You need evidence for such 
things. Even if there were eye-witnesses, it’s useless without 
evidence. Singapore is all about law. 
 
Tay is resigned to the fact that ‘after the fire, everything was razed to the ground. 
[Laughs] It was impossible to find any evidence’.
106  
 
My interviewees’ frequent warnings that I should not speculate about the 
cause of the 1961 fire and that the rumours of arson were completely unsubstantiated 
are a clear indication that the former residents of a ‘black area’ have accepted the 
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  488due processes of the law over the ‘words between neighbours’. Lim Yock Eng 
cautioned that if there is ‘no evidence, we cannot anyhow say’.
107 Similarly Ong 
Chye Ho stated, ‘这种话你不可以说’ (‘this sort of things you cannot say’). An un-
named friend of Ong added, ‘Even today, you cannot say that. If you interviewed 
him [Ong] and he said that, he would be in trouble’.
108 Someone even warned me 
that to ask such controversial questions would land me in prison; after telling me she 
had once personally seen a burning torch thrown onto an attap roof near the Great 
World Amusement Park, she stopped and said, ‘We can’t say, we will be arrested. 
Better not say. You also must not say’.
109 It seems that if there had been numerous 
people claiming arson at the time, it was always someone else, not themselves. Tan 
Tiam Ho, laughing, told me that it was the uneducated elderly people, particularly 
the women, who were spreading the rumours at the time.
110 These statements, really, 
reflect the ultimate success of the PAP government in socialising former wooden 
house dwellers into becoming obedient citizens of the state. 
 
Still, in my interviews, I could hear the echoes of the frenzied and emotional 
debates over the cause of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in the early 1960s. Some of my 
informants did acknowledge, with varying degrees of certainty, the possibility of 
arson. One of them said, with a smile, that the possibility was ‘50-50’, because the 
fire had occurred coincidentally on a public holiday so that the children were not in 
school and consequently few people were killed.
111 Another informant was sure that 
the blaze was clearly ‘Lee Kuan Yew’s idea’, that ‘we know this is Lee Kuan Yew’s 
system; he wanted to redevelop Singapore’.
112 Tay Bok Chiu remarked, ‘There was 
no evidence of arson but of course it’s hard to say. How can you just set the fire like 
that? People could get killed’.
113 Tay’s statement reflects a conviction that, if the 
government had really been responsible, its aim was to destroy the unauthorised 
wooden houses with a minimum loss of life. And in this belief in an ultimately 
benevolent if pragmatic government – one concerned with development for the 
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benefit of its people – the relationship between the past and present becomes clearly 
visible. Even if one acknowledges the possibility of arson, they nevertheless 
acknowledge the government’s philosophy and practice of development, and its 
outstanding track record, since the early 1960s. 
 
Modern Singapore, in a very real sense, was born out of fire like the phoenix 
rising from the ashes, and consequently the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee inferno holds a 
complex place in the minds of contemporary Singaporeans. In the 1960s, the PAP 
government found it expedient to selectively mythologise the fire in its pursuit of 
social and economic development. Two decades later, the fire became equally useful 
for promoting another policy of social mobilisation: to cultivate among young 
Singaporeans a sense of the fragility of the nation-state and to discourage their 
alleged desire for parliamentary opposition. At the same time, the scale of rehousing 
in the past became relevant, in a personal sense, for persuading elderly Singaporeans 
of the need for the ongoing redevelopment and ‘revitalisation’ of HDB estates in the 
1990s. Publicly, the Bukit Ho Swee myth remains unchallenged, and indeed many 
former fire victims I interviewed have embraced the progressivist aspects of the 
official narrative. Privately, however, independent views of both kampong life and 
the rumours of government-inspired arson have persisted into the present. Both the 
nostalgia with which the former is often remembered, and the manner in which the 
latter is typically denied or cautiously affirmed, signify the underlying ambivalence 
among elderly Singaporeans of their identity in this high modernist state. They are, 
by now, well socialised citizens who readily accept the terms of public housing in 
Singapore and the legitimacy and hegemony of the PAP government; at the same 
time, their experiences of rapid social and economic transformation since the 1960s 
and their advancing age have left them feeling increasingly sidelined in, and critical 
of, a society where unrelenting change is the basic frame of experience. Conclusion 
 
  The 1961 Kampong Bukit Ho Swee fire is an important case study for 
understanding both postwar Singapore history and broader issues relating to urban 
calamities and the establishment of high modernity in the twentieth century. For the 
former, the social history of the inferno has brought us beyond the classic struggles 
between elites, which have preoccupied traditional political historiography to the 
major shifts in state-society relations which underpinned the making of modern 
Singapore after World War Two. This study of a calamitous event, the devastating 
fire; of the community which it so powerfully affected; and of a state which 
embarked on the rapid, large-scale development of modernist public housing within 
a state of emergency occasioned by the disaster, revealed the true origins, 
development and consequences of high modernity in postwar Singapore.  
 
In brief, this study has examined how a semi-autonomous community of 
urban kampong dwellers became Singapore citizens in the 1960s. Politicians from 
the Progressive Party, the Labour Front, the People’s Action Party, and the Barisan 
Sosialis clashed over political platforms in the 1950s and 1960s but were 
nevertheless united, together with the British colonial regime, in an ambitious 
campaign to forge Singapore into a viable, well-organised and progressive city-state. 
Beyond the political and ideological rhetoric, decolonisation for the island-state was 
really about breaking down the traditional semi-autonomous communal ways of life 
which had re-emerged after the war. It was about socialising the population of what 
was then depicted as ‘Old Singapore’, particularly low-income, Chinese nuclear or 
semi-extended families, into becoming model citizens of the new nation-state. The 
basic instrument of change in this ambitious undertaking was public housing, and its 
targets were the kampong settlements of unauthorised wooden dwellings which had 
proliferated at the margins of the City, and which were perceived as insanitary, 
liminal, albeit dangerous, ‘black areas’. The Bukit Ho Swee fire on 25 May, then, 
was a historical turning point which decisively tipped the balance of this social-
cultural struggle in favour of the PAP state. Although there had been other serious 
kampong fires in the preceding decade, the 1961 calamity was unprecedented in the 
scale of the officially planned rehousing operation for the fire victims, and the 
  491resultant massive societal transformation which took place in the latter part of the 
1960s.  
 
The theme of change and continuity, consequently, lies at the very heart of 
this study. Some elements which would enable the PAP government to accomplish 
the making of modern Singapore after the Bukit Ho Swee fire were colonial legacies, 
including the powerful emergency discourse of kampong clearance and rehousing; 
the broad outlines of a plan for this vast project and the architecture of modernist 
emergency public housing well-suited for such schemes. There was also the 
important practical experience bequeathed by the British and Labour Front 
governments of the difficulties, but also the potential, of building emergency 
housing in the aftermath of kampong blazes, not only on behalf of the fire victims 
but also for the much larger numbers of wooden house dwellers living in the vicinity, 
who could then be cleared and relocated. Set against this background and context, 
the timing of the 1961 inferno was crucial. It occurred at the time of the birth of a 
self-governing nation-state, ruled over by a popularly-elected party which was much 
more determined than previous regimes to transform Singapore. As a result, the 
PAP’s relief and rehousing work on behalf of the fire victims received a powerful 
moral and social impetus and mandate. Admittedly, the new government prior to the 
1961 fire already possessed some of the qualities necessary to achieve its housing 
goals, most importantly, the formulation of a clear building plan and the recruitment 
of single-minded managers and architects into the Housing and Development Board 
to implement it. Nevertheless, the serious difficulties the PAP had faced in 
attempting to clear wooden house dwellers in 1960 stood in marked contrast to its 
largely unimpeded progress in clearing the Bukit Ho Swee fire site and rehousing 
the victims in emergency flats within the short space of a year. In turn, the newly 
built Bukit Ho Swee Estate served as a crucial precedent and staging platform for 
the HDB to rehouse kampong dwellers living in the vicinity, particularly Bukit Ban 
Kee and Bukit Merah, and to redevelop the southern precincts in the Central Area 
according to the Board’s urban renewal programme. Teh Cheang Wan’s view of the 
inferno as a ‘God-sent opportunity’ is testament to its singular historic importance. 
 
In weighing up the role of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in the progressive 
clearance of urban kampongs in the remainder of the 1960s, it is true that the 
  492 number of kampong and shophouse dwellers rehoused in Bukit Ho Swee Estate – 
45,000 in 1970 – was relatively small; that the operation affected mainly the areas 
adjoining Bukit Ho Swee (and consequently was outside the scope of kampong 
clearance in the eastern and northern parts of the City); and that political events in 
the early 1960s were also important for the HDB’s success, particularly the 
suppression of the leftwing rural associations in 1963 which made the clearance of 
Toa Payoh possible. However, the real extent of the Bukit Ho Swee fire’s impact 
was, most importantly, also symbolic and psychological as well as demographic. 
The government’s response to the inferno gave the HDB an important early boost to 
its confidence and resolve in implementing what were then deeply contested policies 
of kampong clearance and emergency public housing development. Conversely, the 
calamity played a crucial role in winning over the hearts and minds of many 
kampong and shophouse residents to the utility of HDB housing, and a willingness 
to accept these programmes as genuinely serving their interests. In other words, the 
1961 fire and the response in its aftermath became a strategic political victory which 
previous governments and the Singapore Improvement Trust had failed to achieve, 
and it was one which set the PAP on its way to achieving ideological hegemony 
over the citizenry of this newly emergent city-state.  
 
The PAP’s success in the Bukit Ho Swee project was not limited solely to 
the establishment of the first generation of emergency housing which was built over 
the fire site but also served as a powerful historical precedent for subsequent 
redevelopment schemes in the name of progress in Bukit Ho Swee Estate and in 
Singapore as a whole. There is a clear and direct link between the language of 
kampong clearance and resettlement in the late colonial era and the discourse of 
social revitalisation and redevelopment of HDB estates since the 1980s. Both 
discourses contained discursive language which empowered the state to demolish 
homes, and in many cases involuntarily relocate, and, mobilise or reintegrate 
families en masse into the social fabric of the enfolding modernist nation-state. Both 
policies, too, were based on emergency discourses in which the housing status quo 
was depicted as inimical to a safe, healthy and modern way of life and in which the 
consequences of rejecting change were deemed to be dire not only for the residents 
concerned but the nation as a whole. The key element in both sets of discourses and 
practices, of course, was a ‘natural’, ‘non-political’ historical emergency. In 
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emergency and gave the government a sufficient moral authority and certitude to 
mobilise a community, and then a country. Two decades later, the officially 
constructed myth about the significance of the fire, likewise, justified the PAP’s 
campaign to further restructure its own housing estates in the unceasing pursuit of 
progress. The 1961 inferno’s social and political contribution to the advent of the 
government’s public housing programme lies in its singular ability to signify and 
establish the validity of both official discourses and, consequently, to endorse the 
basis and rationale for future schemes of social change and societal transformation. 
The historical role of the fire as a catalyst, in short, is characteristic of the nature and 
relentless developmental dynamics of high modernity in our times. 
 
If it had been key to the PAP government’s campaign to reorganise 
Singapore, the Bukit Ho Swee fire’s social and economic impact on the residents of 
the public housing estate which was subsequently built over the fire site was 
significantly more complex. There was both profound change and continuity in the 
residents’ social and economic lives, out of which has emerged their ambivalent role 
and attitude as citizens of the high modernist state. Although strongly depicted as 
being resistant to progress by both the British and PAP regimes, low-income 
Chinese families in postwar Singapore inhabited a mental world in which modernity, 
quintessentially signified in the form of public housing, was often admired and 
sometimes desired, even if frequently beyond their financial means. This tension 
between the desire and ability to rent or own a modern flat had given rise in the 
1950s to semi-autonomous, frequently illicit or disapproved ways of life taking hold 
at the urban periphery, most notably, in how readily families could rent, build or 
rebuild their own unauthorised wooden houses. The tension also led to a series of 
brief but emotionally charged contestations by the victims of the 1961 fire over the 
terms of the PAP’s rehousing programme, particularly over the rents for the HDB 
emergency housing and at the ‘coincident’ nature of the fire. In the aftermath of the 
inferno, some of these semi-autonomous kampong ways of life and social markers 
have persisted in spirit if not completely in form, giving rise to a community which 
remains low-income and continues to persist, to some extent, at the social margins 
of contemporary Singapore society. What has changed, however, is the 
disappearance of the family’s traditional ability to dictate the terms of their own 
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one hand, the ‘model citizen’ of Bukit Ho Swee Estate has embraced the PAP 
government’s philosophy and practice of constant progressive development and 
overhaul. On the other hand, they also felt a deep sense of personal loss in the face 
of a disorientating, disempowering social transformation, and who were, then, often 
resigned to their peripheral position in society. The persistence of the ‘counter-myth’ 
of government-inspired arson in the present day illustrates the heavy social price of 
citizenship and the dilemma of living with the culture and reality of the march of 
unrelenting progress in Singapore, and in developmental states more generally. The 
ambivalence which many low-income Chinese felt and continue to feel towards the 
impact of the high modernist philosophy in Singapore both before and after the 1961 
fire upon their previous way of life up to the present is a recurring theme in this 
study. 
 
It remains to reflect on the significance of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in 
comparative terms. Unlike the 1953 Shek Kip Mei fire in Hong Kong, the 1961 
inferno was a far more significant event in Singapore’s history.
1 The Bukit Ho Swee 
rehousing programme did depend in part on the SIT’s emergency housing scheme at 
the site of the 1959 Kampong Tiong Bahru blaze. However, unlike Shek Kip Mei, 
the 1961 conflagration was more important than the fires which both preceded and 
followed it. In the Hong Kong case, the British colonial government’s response to 
the 1953 inferno was more uncertain. In Singapore, however, with a popularly-
elected government determined to remake, in its own image, a fledging state poised 
at the threshold of independence, the 1961 fire proved to be the decisive difference. 
The historical context of Singapore also explains why, unlike the 1911 Triangle fire 
in New York, the aftermath of the Bukit Ho Swee disaster witnessed an 
empowerment of the state rather than of society.
2 In this sense, the Singapore 
experience mirrors infernos in London in 1666, Edo in the 17
th century, and Chicago 
in 1871, where a great disaster represented a valuable moral opportunity for the state 
to transform society. What this work has further attempted to do, through the use of 
                                                 
1 Alan Smart’s argument that Hong Kong’s public housing programme developed as a continuing 
process in response to fires both before and after the Shek Kip Mei inferno is discussed in the 
Introduction. 
2 Referring to the discussion of the works of Dave von Drehle and John F. McClymer on the Triangle 
Fire in the Introduction. 
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oral history and a careful reading of the official sources, is to explore the 
consequences of the official emergency rehabilitation programme for a socially and 
economically marginalised community which had formerly resided at the disaster 
site. Compared to the social destruction of an entire community by the Buffalo 
Creek flood in 1972, the Bukit Ho Swee rebuilding project had an obviously more 
complex social impact on the fire victims.
3  
 
Like great urban fires in other places and times, the Bukit Ho Swee fire has 
also been mythologised by the government, becoming in effect a powerful metaphor 
for Singapore’s progress from ‘Third World to First’. But, unlike the other fires, the 
official Bukit Ho Swee myth does not discriminate against minorities, as had 
happened after the Chicago fire, or demonise unpopular kings, as was the case of the 
infernos in seventeenth century London. Instead, the official myth of the Bukit Ho 
Swee fire emphasises unity and consensus as an affirmation of a nation’s seemingly 
collective response, at the behest of a determined and decisive political leadership, 
to a monumental emergency. The imaginative power of the myth, though, belies the 
political leaders’ ambitious plans, which were immediately implemented in the 
aftermath of the fire and which played a crucial, leading role in the making of a 
modern nation-state.  
 
3 See Kai T. Eriksson’s evaluation of the social impact of the Buffalo Creek flood, discussed in the 
Introduction. Appendix: Localities and Residents of Kampong Bukit Ho Swee 
Map 1: The Beo Lane-Bukit Ho Swee [Road] Locality, 1949 
 
 
Key 
Shaded: Permanent Buildings 
Unshaded: Temporary Buildings 
 
Buildings & Places 
Former biscuit factory-warehouses, 40 Beo 
Lane 
Soya sauce & peanut oil factories (including 
Kwong Joo Seng soya sauce factory) 
Kai Kok Public School, 11-N Bukit Ho Swee 
 
People 
Chua Beng Huat, 60 Bukit Ho Swee 
Lee Ah Gar & Lee Soo Seong 
Peter Lim, 12-E Beo Lane 
Lim Soo Hiang, 10 Beo Lane 
Lim You Meng, 22 Beo Lane 
Oh Geok Heok & Oh Boon Eng, 597-E Bukit 
Ho Swee 
James Seah, 20 Beo Lane 
Tay Ah Chuan  
Wang Ah Tee, 37 Beo Lane 
Adapted from Map of Singapore Town, 1949 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 1: The Beo Lane-Bukit Ho Swee locality, 1958. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 
81/8816, 1958 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
  498Map 2: Si Kah Teng, 1949 
 
 
Key 
Shaded: Permanent Buildings 
Unshaded: Temporary Buildings 
 
Buildings & Places 
Chinese Industrial & Commercial School (to 
the east) 
Chuen Min Public School, 333 Tiong Bahru 
Road 
King’s Theatre 
 
 
People 
Angie Ng  
Pang Ming Toh 
Png Pong Tee 
Samuel Seetoh, 172 Kampong Tiong Bahru 
Soon Boon Quee 
Tan Ah Kok 
Tan Kok Kiem  
Tay Bok Chiu 
Adapted from Map of Singapore Town, 1949 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 2: Si Kah Teng, 1958. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 81/8816, 1958 (Courtesy of 
Ministry of Defence). 
  500Map 3: Or Kio Tau, 1949 
 
 
Key 
Shaded: Permanent Buildings 
Unshaded: Temporary Buildings 
 
Buildings & Places 
MCA shophouse, 751, 773 Havelock Road 
(also Or Kio Tau market) 
Singapore Steam Laundry 
Seiclene Electric Laundry 
People 
Goh Yong Soo 
Ong Ah Sai 
Ong Chye Ho  
Tan Tiam Ho, Beh Swee Kim 
Adapted from Map of Singapore Town, 1949 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
 
 
Plate 3: The Or Kio Tau locality  up to Ganges Avenue, 1958. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. 
No. 81/8816, 1958 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
 
  501Map 4: Havelock Road below Ma Kau Thiong, 1949 
 
 
Key 
Shaded: Permanent Buildings 
Unshaded: Temporary Buildings 
 
Buildings & Places 
Giok Hong Tian (Ti Kong Tua) temple 
Fuk Tak Tong (Kusu Tua Pek Kong) temple 
Pepsi-Cola Factory 
Petrol kiosk 
Sinsen soap factory 
Tan Boon Liat Building (to the east) 
Havelock Primary School 
Ganges-Delta Community Centre 
Havelock Road police station 
People 
Roy Chan, 585, 587 Havelock Road 
Marc Cheok  
Loh Tian Ho 
Lum Siang Onn 
James Seah, 608A Havelock Road 
Elizabeth Soh 
Zhou Lian Che 
 Adapted from Map of Singapore Town, 1949 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 4: Havelock Road below Ma Kau Thiong, 1958. Royal Air Force, RAF Ref. No. 
81/8816, 1958 (Courtesy of Ministry of Defence). 
 
  503Map 5: Hong Lim Pa Sat, 1949 
 
 
 
Buildings & Places 
Hong Lim market 
Chung Cheng Middle School Branch (to the 
north) 
Great World Amusement Park (to the north) 
 
People 
Joyce Soh, 52 Covent Garden 
Teo Khoon Wah 
Key 
Shaded: Permanent Buildings 
Unshaded: Temporary Buildings 
 
Adapted from Map of Singapore Town, 1949 (Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore). 
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Plate 5: Hong Lim Pa Sat, 1958. Royal Air Force, Sortie. No. V81:8930, 1958 (Courtesy of 
Ministry of Defence). 
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